

CHAPTER I

ŚĪKŚĀVALLĪ

[1]

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तमेकममलं ध्वस्तान्धकारं परं
निर्द्वैतं हृदि पद्ममध्यनिलयं निःशेषधीसाक्षिणम् !
वेदान्तोपनिविष्टबोधविषयं प्रत्यक्तया योगिनां
भक्त्या तं प्रणिपत्य वेदशिरसो वक्ष्यामि सद्भार्तिकम् ॥

Saluting with devotion the supreme Brahman which is existence, knowledge, infinite, and one, which is free from impurity, which destroys ignorance, which is free from difference, which, being seated at the centre of the lotus-heart, is the Witness of all cognitions, which is the purport of the *Vedānta*, and which is realized as the innermost Self by those who are steady in knowledge, I begin this verse commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* which strings together valid arguments.

Sureśvara's verse commentary on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* is known as *Vārtika*. A *Vārtika* is defined as a work which examines what is said (*ukta*), what is not said (*anukta*), and what is not well-said (*durukta*) in the original. It elucidates what is stated in the original text, supplements it, and offers wherever necessary alternative interpretations. Sureśvara seeks to bring out the nature of the existent Brahman by stringing together valid arguments in his *Vārtika*.

The Upaniṣads have their purport in the non-difference of Brahman and Ātman as stated in the principal text (*mahāvākya*), *tat tvam asi*. The word *tat* signifies through secondary sense (*lakṣyārtha*) Brahman. The secondary significance of the word *tvam* is Ātman. Brahman is of

the nature of existence (*satyam*). It is consciousness (*jñānam*) which is self-luminous. It is infinite (*anantam*) and eternal (*nityam*), for it is not limited by time and space. It is not limited by any object, for there is nothing like it or unlike it; and so it is one (*ekam*). It is also free from internal difference. It is free from impurity (*amalam*). It is the Supreme or the Highest (*param*) which transcends cause-effect-relation. By realizing Brahman, ignorance (*avidyā*) is destroyed. It is free from all distinctions superimposed on it (*nirdvaitam*). The Self (*Ātman*) located in the centre of the heart is the Witness to all the cognitions which take place through mental modes (*aśeṣabuddhivṛttinām sākṣibhūtam*). Since the two words *tat* and *tvam* are in grammatical apposition, they refer to one and the same entity. So the principal text *tattvamasi* teaches the non-difference of Brahman and *Ātman*.

[2]

यस्येदं सकलामलेन्दुकिरणप्रख्यैर्यशोरश्मिभि-
 र्व्याप्तं यश्च कृपालुतापरवशश्चक्रे हितं दुःखिनाम् ।
 यद्वाणीकुलिशावरुणमतयः पेतुर्दिशस्तार्किकाः
 भक्त्या पूज्यतमं प्रणम्य तमहं तद्भाष्यनीतौ यते ॥

Saluting with devotion the most revered teacher by whose rays of glory, similar to those of the impeccable full moon, this world is pervaded, who by his grace has done good to the afflicted caught up in bondage, by whose utterance, similar to the thunder-bolt, the Logicians (and others) being struck ran to different directions, I endeavour to write this explanation on his *bhāṣya* (on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*).

In this verse Sureśvara offers his salutation to his teacher, Śrī Saṅkara, who has written a commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*.

[3]

तैत्तिरीयकसारस्य मयाऽऽचार्यप्रसादतः ।
 विस्पष्टार्थरुचीनां हि व्याख्येयं सम्प्रणीयते ॥

By the grace of my teacher and for the benefit of those who wish to have a clear exposition, this verse commentary on the essence of the *Taittirīyaka* has been written by me.

Sureśvara's *Vārtika* is an explanation of both the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* and Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* thereon.

This verse occurs also in Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*.

[4]

दुरितक्षयहेतूनि नित्यानि ब्राह्मणे ययुः ।

काम्यानि चेह कर्माणि दृष्टादृष्टफलानि तु ॥

In the previous section called *Brāhmaṇa* the obligatory (and occasional) rites which cause the removal of sin, as well as the optional rites which give rise to fruits to be attained here and hereafter, have been told.

The *Upaniṣad* does not form part of the ritual section (*karmakāṇḍa*) of the *Veda*, and so there is the need to explain it separately. The ritual section of the *Veda* deals with obligatory, occasional, and optional rites. The different rites enjoined in the ritual section of the *Veda* are not intended to secure liberation. Since the theme of the *Upaniṣad* is different from that of the ritual section, there is the need to explain it separately.

[5]

विद्या प्रस्तूयतेऽथोर्ध्वं यथाभूतार्थबोधिनी ।

कर्मेपादानहेतूस्तान् सैवोच्छेत्तुमलं यतः ॥

In the subsequent part, viz., the *Vedānta*, the knowledge of the existent Brahman is commenced, for that alone can destroy action and its causes.

The *Upaniṣad* imparts the knowledge of the existent Brahman which one wants to attain after fulfilling the preliminary requisites prescribed therefor. The performance of good deeds here in this life or in the earlier life leads to the purity of mind (*antaḥkaraṇasuddhi*)

which in its turn helps one to have the discriminating knowledge, self-control, and the intense desire for liberation. The pursuit of various activities which bind a person is caused by desire; desire arises because of ignorance (*avidyā*). When knowledge (*vidyā*) arises, ignorance gets removed; with the removal of ignorance, its effects, viz., desire and action, disappear.

[6]

स यथाकाम इत्येवं योऽकामश्चेति सादरम् ।
कामाकाङ्क्षेहेतू नो बन्धमोक्षौ श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥

In the passages, "As his desire," and "He who does not desire," Scripture declares to us carefully that desire alone is the cause of bondage and that the absence of desire alone is the cause of liberation.

The two *śruti* passages cited in the verse are from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (IV, iv, 5-6). The passage, "As his desire, so is his resolve; as his resolve, so his work," clearly shows that desire leads to bondage. The other passage, "He who does not desire, who has no desires..." tells us that the absence of desires leads to the attainment of Brahman which is liberation.

[7]

अपविद्धद्वये तत्त्वे सर्वदैवात्मरूपके ।
विपर्ययोऽनभिज्ञानात्ततः कामः क्रियास्ततः ॥

Erroneous cognition arises on account of the ignorance of Brahman which is always of the nature of the Self and which is devoid of duality. From that (ignorance) arises desire, and from desire arises action.

The causal nexus from ignorance to bondage is set forth here.

[8]

यदज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तिर्या तज्ज्ञानात्सा कुतो भवेत् ।
तस्मात्सर्वप्रवृत्तीनामलं विद्योपशान्तये ॥

When the Self is known, how can there be the pursuit of activity which is due to the ignorance of the Self? So, knowledge (of the Self) is competent to put an end to all activities.

It may be argued that there is activity even for a person who has attained the liberating knowledge of the Self. A *jīvanmukta*, it may be said, is seen to be engaged in various activities. But this argument is based on a mistaken view of the so-called activities of a *jīvanmukta*. Since *avidyā* which is the cause of bondage has been put an end to, the embodied condition of a *jīvanmukta* and the so-called activities in which he is supposed to be engaged *from the standpoint of others* do not bind him any more. Since the root cause of the pursuit of activity has been annihilated, the *prārabdha-karma* which accounts for the continuance of the physical body in the case of a *jīvanmukta* has really been made ineffective. What we see in his case is not real action, but a semblance of action. This apart, there is no pursuit of any action for one who has realized the Self.

[9-10]

मोक्षार्थी न प्रवर्तेत तत्र काम्यनिषिद्धयोः ।

नित्यनैमित्तिके कुर्यात्प्रत्यवायजिहासया ॥

इति मीमांसकमन्यैः कर्मोक्तं मोक्षसाधनम् ।

प्रत्याख्यायाऽऽत्मविज्ञानं तत्र न्यायेन निर्णयः ॥

A person who is desirous of liberation shall not do acts which are forbidden as well as those which are prompted by desire; (but at the same time) with the desire of destroying sin, he shall perform the obligatory and occasional rites. Thus the *soi-disant* Mīmāṃsakas, rejecting Self-knowledge, speak of *karma* as the means to liberation. This view has to be examined.

The first *prima facie* view which is stated and criticised in verses (9) to (22) is that of the Mīmāṃsaka who holds that *karma* is the means to liberation. According to this view, a person who abstains from

forbidden acts and optional rites, and who performs obligatory and occasional rites will, without any further effort, attain liberation at the termination of the present life. The assumption behind this argument is that the entire past *karma* has given rise to the present life and that it comes to be exhausted completely without any residue through enjoyment in the present life itself. Since there is nothing to give rise to another life, a person can attain liberation at the termination of the present life, if only he performs the obligatory and occasional rites while abstaining from forbidden acts and optional rites.

[11]

नैतदेवं भवेन्न्याय्यं विरुद्धफलदायिनाम् ।

सम्भवात्कर्मणां पुंसो भूयसां शास्त्रदर्शनात् ॥

This argument is not valid, since many deeds productive of opposite results are possible for a person, as shown by Scripture.

Let us suppose for the sake of argument that a person who is desirous of liberation abstains from prohibited deeds, and also does not perform optional rites. The difficulty which the Mīmāṃsā view has to face centres round the accumulated deeds which are in store (*sañcita*). These accumulated deeds may be of different kinds, good as well as bad. Again, there may be many kinds of good deeds and also many kinds of bad deeds. If it is admitted that there is a storehouse of deeds of various kinds which are productive of opposite results, rebirth cannot be avoided.

It may be argued that all the deeds which have not yet given fruit so far in this life of a person will bear fruit *together* in the next life. If so, *sañcita-karma* will cease to exist at the termination of this life. But this argument is untenable. It is not true to say that all the accumulated deeds bear fruit together at the same time. The fruit of *jyotiṣoma* is different from that of a cold-blooded murder. These fruits have to be reaped in two different bodies. How is it possible for a person who has performed these deeds to reap their fruits in one and

the same life? Scripture does not justify the view that the fruits of different deeds can be enjoyed in one and the same life. Among the deeds which are in store, that which is powerful bears fruit at the termination of life, putting aside other deeds which are not so powerful.

[12]

अनारब्धफलानीह सन्ति कर्माणि कोटिशः ।
तद्य इहेतिवचसो गम्यतां कर्मणां स्थितिः ॥

Crores of deeds which have not yet borne fruit are there for the individual. The status of deeds is known from the text "Those of good conduct."

The text from the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (V, x, 7) which is quoted here says: "Among them, those of good conduct here soon attain to a good womb." Even for a person who goes to heaven there is again rebirth in accordance with the nature of the residual *karma*.

[13]

न चैकदेहे भोगोऽस्ति ब्रह्महत्याश्वमेधयोः ।
विरुद्धफलहेतुत्वान्मूढसात्त्विकदेहयोः ॥

Since killing a Brahmin and horse-sacrifice give rise to opposite results to be enjoyed in impure and pure bodies, it is not possible to enjoy them in one body.

[14]

सप्तजन्मानुगं कार्यमेकस्यापीह कर्मणः ।
श्रूयते धर्मशास्त्रेषु किमुतानेककर्मणाम् ॥

It is said in the ethical treatises that the result of even one deed done here follows seven births. If so, what more to be said about many deeds?

Verses (13) and (14) emphasize the fact that the fruits of the accumulated deeds which are in store cannot be enjoyed in one birth.

[15]

अनारब्धेष्टकार्याणां नित्यं चेद्ध्वस्तये मतम् ।

नैवं स्वात्माक्रियाहेतुं यतोऽनर्थं निहन्ति तत् ॥

If it be said that the performance of obligatory rites destroys the good (as well as bad) deeds which have not yet borne fruit, it is not so; for it (the performance of obligatory rites) prevents sin arising from non-performance (of obligatory rites).

The Mīmāṃsaka argues that the performance of obligatory rites causes the destruction of the entire *sañcita-karma*, of all good and bad deeds which are in store. A person who performs his obligatory rites, so he argues, will, without the knowledge of the non-dual Self, attain liberation when his present life comes to an end. But this argument is untenable. The Mīmāṃsaka himself admits that the fruit which accrues to one who performs the obligatory rites is the removal of sin which one will incur as a result of the non-performance of obligatory rites. So the Mīmāṃsaka contradicts himself when he says that the performance of obligatory rites causes the destruction of *sañcita-karma*.

[16]

पापस्य कर्मणः कार्यं प्रत्यवायिरोच्यते ।

नित्यैर्विरोधात्तद्वानिर्न त्विष्टफलदायिनः ॥

The result of an evil deed is referred to by the expression "sin". It is destroyed by obligatory rites, for it is opposed to them, but not the deed which gives rise to a good result.

Even granting that obligatory rites, when performed, will cause the destruction of *sañcita-karma*, they can destroy only the evil deeds and not the good ones, for the latter are not opposed to them. If so, there is bound to be rebirth for the enjoyment of the fruits of the good deeds which are in store.

[17]

कामश्च कर्मणो हेतुस्तस्योच्छित्तेर्न सम्भवः ।
प्रत्यबोधमृते यस्मादसम्यगिदमुच्यते ॥

Further, desire is the cause of action. In the absence of the knowledge of the inward Self; its destruction cannot take place. So the view (of the Mīmāṃsaka stated earlier) is not sound.

One of the requirements contained in the Mīmāṃsā view stated in verses (9) and (10) is that a person who is desirous of liberation should abstain from optional rites. A person gets involved in *kāmya-karma* because of desire (*kāma*) which in its turn is due to *avidyā*. It is only by knowledge that *avidyā* can be removed. And so long as *avidyā* exists, desire is bound to be there. It only means that without getting the knowledge of the Self one cannot be free from *kāmya-karma*.

[18]

यद्व्ययनात्मफलं तस्मै कर्म सर्वं विधीयते ।
आप्तत्वादात्मनः कर्म नैव स्यादाप्तये ततः ॥

All action is enjoined as means for attaining fruits other than the Self. Since the Self is already attained, action is of no use for attaining it.

Whenever we do any action (*karma*), it is with a view to achieve one of the four results, viz., production, purification, transformation, or attainment; and a fifth use of action cannot be thought of. In the matter of attaining liberation, *karma* is of no use. Since *mokṣa* is eternal, it is not something to be produced. Since it is bereft of all qualities and impurities, it is not something to be purified. Since it is immutable, it is not something to be transformed. Since it is always attained as the Self of every one, it is not something to be attained.

[19]

नित्यानां चाक्रियाऽभावः प्रत्यवायस्ततः कुतः ।
न ह्यभावाद्भवेद्भावो मानं यस्मान्न विद्यते ॥

Non-performance of obligatory rites is negative. From that how can sin arise? What is positive cannot, indeed, come out of what is negative, as there is no evidence for that.

The Mīmāṃsā view that the non-performance of obligatory rites results in sin is now criticized. Non-performance of obligatory rites is *abhāva*; but sin is a positive something (*bhāva*). What is negative cannot be the cause of anything positive.

[20]

पूर्वोपचितकर्मभ्यस्तस्मात्कर्तारमेति या ।

प्रत्यवायक्रिया तस्या लक्षणार्थः शता भवेत् ॥

(Since a positive something cannot come out of what is negative), the suffix *śatṛ* is, therefore, used in the sense of indication of sin which accrues to the agent as a result of the deeds done in the past.

The Mīmāṃsaka may argue that there is *pramāṇa* to show that a positive something may come out of what is negative. He may cite the *smṛti* text (*Manu*, XI, 44) which says, "Omitting the prescribed rites... man will have a fall." This text, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, supports the view that the non-performance of obligatory rites is the cause of sin which is positive. But this argument is not acceptable. The suffix *śatṛ* (*śatṛpratyaya*) in the word *akurvan* is used not only in the sense of *cause*, but also in the sense of indication (*lakṣaṇārtha*). The text which says that the non-performance of what is enjoined (*akurvan vihitam karma*) is the cause of a man's fall has to be properly interpreted. Here non-performance of obligatory duties is not the cause, but only an indication, of the sin accumulated in the past.

[21]

नित्यानामक्रिया यस्माद्भक्षयित्वैति सत्त्वा ।

प्रत्यवायक्रियां तस्माद्भक्षणार्थे शता भवेत् ॥

Since non-performance of obligatory rites, having indicated sin, immediately ceases to function, the suffix *śatṛ* is used in the sense of indication.

[22]

सर्वप्रमाणकोपः स्यादभावाद्भावंसम्भवे ।

तस्मादयन्नतः स्थानमात्मनीत्यतिपेलवम् ॥

The view that a positive something comes out of what is negative is contrary to all evidences. So the contention that liberation which is remaining in one's own state can be attained without any special effort is not acceptable.

It is true that the suffix *śulpe* is used both in the sense of cause (*heivārtha*) and in the sense of indication (*lakṣaṇārtha*). Of the two usages, we have to reject the former usage here; for, perception and other evidences show that only a positive something can be the cause of what is positive.

The Mīmāṃsā view that liberation can be attained without any special effort by just abstaining from forbidden acts and optional rites, and by performing obligatory and occasional rites is, therefore, not acceptable.

[23]

निर्धूताऽतिशया प्रीतिः कर्महेतुरिति त्वया ।

यदभाणि तदन्याय्यं यथा तदभिधीयते ॥

The view that action is the means to the unsurpassed pleasure (which is said to be liberation) as maintained by you is unsound. And this is explained (in the sequel).

Another *prima facie* view is stated here. According to this view, the attainment of heaven (*svarga*) which is of the nature of the highest pleasure is liberation. Scripture tells us that heaven can be attained through *karma*. It will be shown that even this view is wrong.

[24]

मुक्तेः कौटस्थ्यरूपत्वान्न तस्याः कर्म साधनम् ।

स्वर्गादिवदनित्या स्याद्यदि स्यात्कर्मणः फलम् ॥

Since liberation is eternal, action is not the means thereto. If it were the result of action, it would not be eternal like heaven, etc.

[25-26]

अनित्यफलदायित्वं ज्ञानहीनस्य कर्मणः ।

कूटस्थफलदायित्वं विद्येतस्येति चेन्मतम् ॥

नैवमारभ्यमाणस्य ह्यनित्यत्वसमन्वयात् ।

न च प्राप्तमनित्यत्वं विद्या वारयितुं क्षमा ॥

If it be said that action without meditation yields an ephemeral fruit, but with meditation, it yields an eternal fruit, it is not so. Indeed, whatever is produced is impermanent; and meditation is not competent to overcome the impermanence of what is produced.

The combination theory is also not acceptable. According to this theory, action has to be combined with meditation (*upāsana*); for, action by itself gives rise to a fruit which is not eternal; but, when it is combined with meditation it gives rise to an eternal fruit. But this argument is wrong. We know from experience that what is produced is impermanent. If *mokṣa* is produced, then it must also be impermanent. But the truth is that *mokṣa* is eternal, and it is a contradiction in terms to say that what is eternal is produced. Further, meditation is not able to alter the impermanent nature of its own result. If so, how could it make the impermanent fruits of *karma* permanent?

[27]

प्रध्वंसाभाववच्चेत्स्यात् कर्मकार्यमपि ध्रुवम् ।

भावात्मकत्वान्मोक्षस्य नैवमप्युपपद्यते ॥

The view that release, even though produced by action, is eternal like posterior non-existence is not tenable, because release is positive.

It may be argued that release may be brought into being by *karma*; nevertheless, it may be eternal. This argument is sought to be justified by citing the case of *pradhvaṁsābhāva*. When a pot is destroyed, it is non-existent; and this non-existence of a pot as a result of destruction is known as *pradhvaṁsābhāva*. The latter has a beginning, but no end: that is to say, though it is produced by *karma*, it is eternal. In the same way, *mokṣa* also may be brought into being by *karma*, and it may still be eternal.

This argument is wrong. The comparison between *mokṣa* and *pradhvaṁsābhāva* is not apt. While the former is positive, the latter is negative.

[28]

कार्यं प्रध्वंसतोऽन्यच्चत्तदनित्यं क्रियोत्थितेः ।
घटादिवत् प्रतिज्ञायां विशिष्टत्वाददोषता ॥

Any effect, other than posterior non-existence, which is produced by action, like pot, etc., is impermanent; since (the effect whose impermanence is sought to be established) is qualified (as being positive), there is no defect.

The Advaitin argues that, if a *positive* something is produced, then it is impermanent. The effect whose impermanence is sought to be established by inference is thus qualified as positive. The case of *pradhvaṁsābhāva* cannot be cited as an exception to the principle, for it is *abhāva* and not *bhāva*. The inference may be stated as follows: Heaven which is said to be release is impermanent; because it is an effect which is positive; all effects which are positive are impermanent like a pot.

[29]

प्रध्वंसाच्छकलादि स्यात्तच्चानित्यं घटादिवत् ।
कल्पनामात्रतोऽभावो नैवाऽऽरभ्यः स कर्मभिः ॥

By the act of destruction, the effect in the form of potsherds is produced. Like pot, etc., it is also impermanent. *Abhāva* which is only in imagination is not produced by action.

The Advaitin does not accept negative entities like *pradhvaṁsābhāva*. When a pot is destroyed, what originates is potsherds. Strictly speaking, there is no destruction or non-existence of pot. If pot does not exist in the form of pot, it exists in some other form, say, potsherds. So the Advaitin accepts neither *pradhvaṁsābhāva* nor its being an effect of an act. According to Advaita, what is called *pradhvaṁsābhāva* is, like a hare's horn, a figment of imagination, and the question of its being permanent or otherwise does not arise.

[30]

आविर्भावतिरोभावैर्धर्मिण्यां मृदि सर्वदा ।

धर्मा घटादयः सर्वे वर्तन्ते न त्वभावगाः ॥

All objects such as the pot ever inhere in clay (etc.) which is their cause, either manifested or latent; they are never non-existent.

[31]

नास्त्यभावस्य सम्बन्धः क्रियया वा गुणेन वा ।

निरात्मकत्वाच्चैवालं सम्बद्धं केनचित्कचित् ॥

Non-existence has no relation either with action or quality. Since it has no existence, it cannot be related to anything in any place.

The Naiyāyika admits not only positive entities, but also negative ones. The category of *abhāva* stands for all negative or non-existent facts. *Abhāva* or non-existence is of four kinds, viz., *prāgabhāva*, *pradhvaṁsābhāva*, *atyantābhāva*, and *anyonyābhāva*. Let us consider the first two varieties. *Prāgabhāva*, according to the Naiyāyika, is without a beginning, but has an end. It is subject to termination or cessation (*vināśya*); and so it is *anitya*. *Pradhvaṁsābhāva* has a beginning, but no end. It is subject to origin in time (*janya*); but when once it comes into being, it is said to be without an end, and so it is eternal (*nitya*). The Nyāya view thus associates these two kinds of *abhāva* with a certain act (*kriyā*), the act of destruction or origination as the case may be, and with a quality (*guṇa*), non-eternality (*anityatva*) or eternality (*nityatva*) as the case may be.

But the Nyāya view cannot be accepted. Only a positive entity can be said to have a beginning and an end, and also some quality or other. A pot, it can be said, is produced or destroyed; it can be said to be characterized by a certain colour. But it is absurd to think of origination or destruction of non-existence (*abhāva*); nor can any quality be associated with it.

[32]

तस्मात् स्यात् कल्पनामात्रो व्यवहारप्रसिद्धये ।
प्रध्वंसादिरभावोऽयं शिलापुत्रादिवन्मृषा ॥

Therefore, non-existence such as *pradhvaṃsābhāva* which is admitted for the sake of the business of life is only illusory. It is unreal like a stone-son.

Abhāva does not exist in reality. It is a product of *avidyā*. It is conjured up in different forms such as *prāgabhāva*, *pradhvaṃsābhāva*, etc., for carrying on our business of life.

[33]

तस्मादविद्याव्युच्छित्तौ स्यादवस्थानमात्मनि ।
न चाविद्याप्रहाणं स्याद्ब्रह्मविद्यामृते कचित् ॥

So, remaining in one's own condition (which is release) can be attained when ignorance is destroyed. Destruction of ignorance can never be brought about except by Brahman-knowledge.

[34]

तस्माद्विद्याप्तये ज्ञेया प्रारब्धोपनिषत्परा ।
सैवाविद्यापनुत्त्यर्था विद्या चैवाऽऽत्मगामिनी ॥

Therefore, we should understand that for the attainment of this knowledge the subsequent part comprising the (*Taittirīya*) *Upaniṣad* is commenced. This knowledge alone concerning the Self can remove ignorance.

[35]

विद्यासंशीलिनां यस्माद्भजन्माद्यशेषतः ।

उपमृदनाति विद्येयं तस्मादुपनिषद्भवेत् ॥

Since this knowledge (of the Self) destroys birth, etc., completely for those who have attained it, it is called *Upaniṣad*.

Following Śaṅkara, Sureśvara explains the meaning of the word *Upaniṣad* in this verse as well as in the next one.

[36]

उपेत्य वा निषण्णं तच्छ्रेय आत्यन्तिकं यतः ।

तस्मादुपनिषज्ज्ञेया ग्रन्थस्तु स्यात्तदर्थतः ॥

Since the highest good (viz., Brahman) reaches or is seated in the Self (as a result of this knowledge), this knowledge is, therefore, called *Upaniṣad*. The text is also called *Upaniṣad* as it is intended to produce this knowledge.

[37]

प्राणवृत्तेस्तथा चाहो देवता याऽभिमानिनी ।

मित्रः शं नः सुखं भूयादिति ब्रह्मेह याच्यते ॥

May *Mitra*, the deity who identifies himself with *prāṇa* and the day, be propitious to us — thus the *Sūtrātman* is invoked.

The *Śikṣāvallī* contains twelve sections (anuvākas). Verses (37) to (49) deal with the first *anuvāka*.

It is first of all necessary to invoke the blessings of the various deities for the removal of the obstacles on the path of Brahman-knowledge. The *Śikṣāvallī*, which deals with *saguṇa-vidyā*, gives instruction on the practice of various meditations (*upāsana*). Concentration or one-pointedness of mind which is necessary for Brahman-realization can be attained only through *upāsana*, and not through *karma* which,

when performed in a spirit of dedication to the Lord, purifies the mind and creates a taste for knowledge, a desire to know (*vividiṣā*). Many are the obstacles to the practice of meditation like disease, dullness of mind, etc. Hence the prayer for the removal of the obstacles.

It is the *Sūtrātman* that is invoked here as *Mitra*, and subsequently as *Varuṇa*, and others.

[38]

रात्रेरपानवृत्तेश्च वरुणश्चाभिमानभाक् ।
शं नो भवतु सर्वत्र चक्षुस्थश्चार्यमा रविः ॥

May *Varuṇa*, the deity who identifies himself with *apāna* and the night, be propitious to us. May *Aryaman*, the Sun, who identifies himself with the eye, be propitious to us. In all places (it is the *Sūtrātman* that is invoked).

[39]

बले तु भगवानिन्द्रो वाचि बुद्धौ बृहस्पतिः ।
विष्णुश्चोरुक्रमः शं नो विस्तीर्णक्रमणो ह्यसौ ॥

May *Indra* who identifies himself with strength, *Brhaspati* with speech and intellect, *Viṣṇu*, who is of vast extent, with the feet, as he is, indeed, possessed of great strides, be propitious to us.

[40]

अध्यात्मदेवताः सर्वा मित्राद्याः शं भवन्तु नः ।
सुखकृत्सु हि तासु स्याद्विघ्नोपशमनं ध्रुवम् ॥

May *Mitra* and others who are the deities controlling the individual organism be propitious to us. Indeed, only when they are propitious, the removal of obstacle will certainly take place.

[41]

श्रवणं धारणं चैवमुपयोगश्च सिद्ध्यति ।

ज्ञानस्याप्रतिबन्धेन प्रार्थनीयमतो भवेत् ॥

When there is no obstacle, there takes place the comprehension, retention, and communication of knowledge. Hence (the deities) have to be invoked.

Śravaṇa, *dhāraṇa*, and *upayoga* of Brahman-knowledge will be possible only when the obstacles are removed through the benign influence of the deities. *Śravaṇa* consists in determining the import of the *Vedānta* texts by sitting at the feet of a teacher. Retention of what has been studied is *dhāraṇa*. Imparting to others what one has learnt is *upayoga*.

[42]

ब्रह्मविद्योपसर्गाणां शान्त्यर्थं वायुरूपिणे ।

ब्रह्मजिज्ञासुना कार्ये नमस्कारोक्तिकर्मणी ॥

For the purpose of removing the obstacles in the way of acquiring Brahman-knowledge, salutation and eulogy are offered to Brahman in the form of *Vāyu* by one who craves for the knowledge of Brahman.

[43]

सर्वक्रियाफलानां हि ब्रह्माधीनत्वहेतुतः ।

वायवे ब्रह्मणे तस्मै प्रह्वीभावोऽस्तु सर्वदा ॥

Since the fruits of all actions are under the control of the *Sūtrabrahman*, let salutation be offered always to *Vāyu*, that is, to Brahman.

[44]

परोक्षेण नमस्कृत्य प्रत्यक्षेण नमस्क्रिया ।

परोक्षसाक्षाद्रूपाभ्यां वायुरेवाभिधीयते ॥

After saluting it mediately, it is saluted directly. *Vāyu* alone is referred to both mediately and immediately.

In the *śruti* text, “*namo brahman*,” salutation is first of all offered to Brahman in the form of *Vāyu* mediately. It is then directly saluted as *Vāyu* as shown in the text, “*namaste vāyo*,” since it is immediate to us (*pratyakṣatvāt*).

[45]

प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्म हे वायो त्वमेवासीति संस्तुतिः ।
त्वमेवातो वदिष्यामि साक्षात्त्वमुपलभ्यसे ॥

“O *Vāyu*, verily thou art Brahman perceptible”—thus it has to be praised. Since you are directly perceived, I shall, therefore, declare you to be Brahman.

The word *stuti* can be used in two senses. First, it can be understood in the sense of the description of the nature of an object as it is (*guṇiniṣṭha guṇābhidhānam*). The first line of the verse may be understood in this sense. In the subtle form *Vāyu*, no doubt, is remote. But it is directly present to everybody's consciousness as individualized *prāṇa* or vital air. While the existence of the visual sense is to be inferred from the perception of colour, etc., that of the vital air is directly known. *Prāṇa* is spoken of as perceptible Brahman, since it causes the body to expand (the root *brh* means to expand).

The word *stuti* can also be used in another sense. The description of an object in terms of certain qualities which it does not really have is also *stuti* (*guṇiniṣṭhatayā guṇābhidhānam*). The second line of the verse may be understood in this sense. Though not the very Brahman, *Vāyu* is addressed as such just as the gate-keeper of a king's palace is praised as king to get an easy admission. *Prāṇa* is the gate-keeper as it were of Brahman seated in the heart. The seeker of liberation who wishes to see Brahman addresses *Prāṇa* as Brahman with a view to praise it.

[46]

यथाशास्त्रं यथाकार्यं बुद्धौ सुपरिनिश्चितम् ।
ऋतं तत्त्वदधीनत्वाद्ब्रदिष्यामीति सङ्गतिः ॥

That which is fully ascertained by the intellect as taught in Scripture and as constituting our duty is called *ṛtam*. Since it is under your control, I will declare you to be *ṛtam*.

[47]

प्रयोगस्थं तदेव सत्यमित्यभिधीयते ।

तदपि त्वदधीनत्वाद्ब्रह्मैव साम्प्रतम् ॥

The same (*ṛtam*), when executed in action, is called *satyam*. Since that, too, is under your control, I shall declare you to be that (*satyam*).

[48]

विद्यार्थिना स्तुतं सन्मां ब्रह्मावतु गुरुं च मे ।

विद्याग्रहणवक्तृत्वशक्तिभ्यां नौ सदाऽवतु ॥

May the existent Brahman which is praised by me, the seeker of knowledge, protect me and also my teacher. May it always protect us by endowing the power of comprehension of knowledge and the power of exposition.

The disciple prays for two things. He should be endowed with the power of grasping what is taught to him. And his teacher should be endowed with the power of imparting instruction to his disciples.

[49]

विद्याप्राप्त्युपसर्गाणां त्रिःशान्तिरभिधीयते ।

आचार्यशिष्ययोस्तस्यां ब्रह्म ज्ञातुं हि शक्यते ॥

The uttering of the word "peace" three times is for the purpose of removing the obstacles to the acquisition of knowledge. Only then, the teacher and the disciple can, indeed, know Brahman.

The teacher will be able to impart knowledge to the disciple, and the disciple will be able to grasp what is taught, only when the

obstacles are removed. The obstacles may be (1) physical (*ādhyātmika*) arising from fever, etc., (2) natural (*ādhibhautika*) arising from animals, thieves, etc., and (3) supernatural (*ādhidāivika*) arising from rain, etc.

[50]

अर्थज्ञानप्रधानत्वाद्धेदान्तानां विपश्चिताम् ।

पाठे त्वयलो मा प्रापदिति शिक्षाऽभिधीयते ॥

Since the comprehension of meaning is important to the *Vedānta*, the science of phonetics is begun so that the learned may not become indifferent to the recital of the text.

Verses (50) to (53) cover the second *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad*.

[51]

शिक्ष्यते ज्ञायते साक्षाद्वर्णाद्युच्चारणं यया ।

स्याद्वा कर्मणि शिक्षेति व्याख्यास्यामोऽधुना तु ताम् ॥

Śikṣā is that science by which we learn directly the pronunciation of letters, etc. Or we may here explain it as the letters, etc., (which are treated of in that science).

The word *Śikṣā* may be interpreted in two ways. It means the science of phonetics dealing with the pronunciation of letters, etc. According to the second interpretation, it means the letters, etc., which are treated of in that science.

[52-53]

अकारादिर्भवेद्वर्ण उदात्तादिः स्वरस्तथा ।

ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुता मात्रा प्रयत्नश्च बलं स्मृतम् ॥

समता साम वर्णानां वैषम्यस्य विवर्जनम् ।

सन्तानः संहिता तु स्यादिति शिक्षोपदिश्यते ॥

Varṇa is the alphabet such as *a*, etc. *Svara* is high-pitched tone, etc. *Mātrā* is measure such as short, long, or prolated. *Balam* is the effort or force required for articulation. *Sāma* is a medium mode of pronunciation of letters without difference. *Santāna* is the conjunction of letters — these are the things to be learnt.

A person who studies the *Veda* should pay attention to *varṇa*, *svara*, etc. Comprehension of meaning plays a prominent part in the *Upaniṣad*. Further, there should not be any indifference in the recital of the text. Carelessness in the recital of the text will lead to evil. It is said that the *mantra*, when wanting in rhythm or sound, or when wrongly used, does not convey the intended meaning. The *Upaniṣad* proceeds with a lesson on phonetics with a view to enjoin great care in the study of the text.

[54]

सूक्ष्मार्थानुप्रवेशाय बहिष्प्रवणचेतसाम् ।
संहिताविषयं तावत् स्थूलोपासनमुच्यते ॥

With a view to divert the mind, which is engrossed in external things, towards the subtle meaning (conveyed by the *Upaniṣad*), meditation on the combination of letters which are gross is taught.

Inquiry into the *Upaniṣad* will be fruitful only if the mind is made pure by meditations. First of all meditation on the *Samhitā* (combination of letters) is taught. It is called *sthūlopaśanā* because meditation is to be made on the letters which are gross.

Verses (54) to (67) deal with the third *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad*.

[55]

संहितादनिमित्तं यद्यशस्तन्नौ सहास्त्विति ।
आचार्यशिष्ययोस्तद्वद्ब्रह्मवर्चसमावयोः ॥

Whatever fame accrues as a result of meditation on the *Samhitā*, etc., may it accrue to both of us together, the

teacher and the disciple. In the same way (whatever spiritual resplendence accrues therefrom), may it accrue to both of us.

Earlier, removal of obstacles was prayed for in the invocation to the various deities like *Mitra*, etc. Here, the disciple prays for perfection in the meditation and its fruits.

[56]

यशः ख्यातिः प्रकाशः स्याद्वृत्तास्दाध्यागहेतुजम् ।

ब्रह्मवर्चसमित्याहुस्तेजो यत्तन्निबन्धनम् ॥

Fame is renown or lustre which results from the performance of deeds (as enjoined in Scripture) and the study of the *Veda*. The refulgence which results from them is called spiritual resplendence.

The meanings of the words *yaśaḥ* and *brahmavarcasa* are stated here. A person who observes the duties enjoined in Scripture and who studies the *Veda* through a teacher under prescribed conditions attains fame (*yaśaḥ*) and spiritual resplendence (*brahmavarcasa*) which pervades the body.

[57]

शिष्यस्याशीरियं ज्ञेया नाचार्यस्य कृतार्थतः ।

अनाप्तपुरुषार्थानामाशीर्वादो हि युज्यते ॥

It must be understood that this is the invocation of the disciple and not that of the teacher who has realized his aspirations. Invocation is, indeed, proper in the case of a person who has not attained his objects of desire.

[58]

वेदाध्ययनविज्ञानादनन्तरमिदं यतः ।

नेदीयः संहिताज्ञानमतस्तदभिधीयते ॥

Since meditation on the *Saṁhitā* is quite close to the text, it is explained immediately after the study of the *Veda*.

[59]

संहिताविषयं ज्ञानमिहोपनिषदुच्यते ।

पञ्चाधिकरणां तां तु व्याख्यास्यामोऽधुना स्फुटम् ॥

Meditation on the factors of *Samhitā* is what is meant by *Upaniṣad* here. We shall now explain clearly the five objects of knowledge (to be meditated upon).

The word *Upaniṣad* which occurs in the *śruti* text is used in the sense of *upāsanā*.

Just as one looks upon an image as *Viṣṇu* for the purpose of meditation, so also one has to look upon the different factors of the *Samhitā* as the deities that preside over them. It is the presiding deities (*devatās*) that are to be meditated upon and not the things which are mentioned as the five objects of knowledge.

[60]

अधिलोकमधिज्योतिरधिविद्यमधिप्रजम् ।

अध्यात्मं चेति लोकदेर्महत्त्वात्तद्विदो जगुः ॥

ता महासंहिताः सर्वा इति ता य उपासते ॥

The universe, light, learning, progeny, and the self are the five objects (of meditations). Since the universe, etc., are great, those who know (the *Veda*) speak of them (namely, the five objects) as great combinations. Those who meditate (on the *Samhitā*) will attain all the fruits (such as progeny stated in the sequel).

The universe (*loka*) consists of earth, etc. Light (*jyoti*) here stands for fire (*agni*), etc. By learning (*vidyā*) is meant the teacher, etc., responsible for it. Progeny (*prajā*) here implies parents who are the cause of the progeny. The self (*ātman*) stands for the body. It should be understood that in all these cases the objects of meditation are the presiding deities and not the objects such as the earth. The material forms are not worthy of meditation.

[61]

दृष्टिक्रमविधानार्थास्त्वथशब्दा अमी स्मृताः ।
लोकादीनधिकृत्योक्तेरधिलोकाद्यतो भवेत् ॥

The word *atha* (which means then) in these passages is intended to show the sequence of meditation. Since meditation is with reference to the worlds, etc., it is said to be *adhilokam*, etc.

Since one and the same person has to do all the meditations mentioned here, he must do them in the same order or sequence in which they are stated.

[62]

पृथिव्यग्निरथाचार्यो माता या चाधरा हनुः ।
पूर्वं स्यात् संहितारूपं दिवादित्याद्यथोत्तरम् ॥

The prior form (that is, letter) of the *Saṁhitā* should be meditated upon as earth, fire, teacher, mother, and the lower jaw. And, the posterior form (that is, letter) should be meditated upon as heaven, sun, etc.

In the *Saṁhitā* or combination, terminal letter of the first word is called *pūrvārūpa*, while the initial letter of the second word is called *uttarārūpa*. For instance, in a combination of words like *iṣettvā* (*iṣe* (t) *tvā*), the 'e' in *iṣe* is the terminal letter of the first word, and this is called *pūrvārūpa*. The initial letter 't' of the second word *tvā* is called *uttarārūpa*. While the *pūrvārūpa* must be meditated upon as earth, fire, teacher, mother, and the lower jaw, the *uttarārūpa* should be meditated upon as heaven, sun, pupil, father, and the upper jaw.

[63-64]

पूर्वो वर्णः पूर्वरूपमुत्तरश्चोत्तरं स्मृतम् ॥

संहिताया इति ज्ञेयं ततोऽन्या कात्र संहिता ।

सन्धिः स्यान्मध्यमं छिद्रमाकाशदिस्तथैव च ॥

It must be understood that the prior letter of the *Samhitā* is the prior form, and that the posterior letter is the posterior form. Here, what is the *Samhitā* other than these (adjacent letters which are combined)? The mid-space (between the letters) is the junction. Likewise, space, etc., (are the objects of meditation).

Earlier, meditation on the prior and posterior forms was indicated. The mid-space, it is now said, must be meditated upon as space (*ākāśa*), water (*jalā*), learning (*vidyā*), progeny (*prajā*) and speech (*vāk*).

[65]

सन्धत्ते येन सन्धानं वाय्वादिर्हि कीर्त्यते ।

इतीमा इति वाक्येन प्रदर्श्यन्ते यथोदिताः ॥

That by which (the earlier and the subsequent letters) are joined together is the link. This (must be meditated upon) as air, etc. By the sentence "Thus there are the great combinations," (meditations on the *Samhitā*) as mentioned above are explained.

Sandhāna must be meditated upon as air (*vāyu*), lightning (*vidyut*), instruction (*pravacana*), procreation (*prajanana*) and the tongue (*jihvā*).

The text that is referred to in the verse occurs in the *Upaniṣad* almost at the end of the *anuvāka* before the statement of the fruits.

[66]

वेदोपास्ते तु यस्त्वेताः फलं तस्येदमुच्यते ।

शास्त्रार्पितधियोपेत्य ह्यातादात्म्याभिमानतः ॥

चिरासनम्भवेदर्थे तदुपासनमुच्यते ॥

This fruit is said to accrue to one who meditates on these (great combinations as explained before). Viewing an object as taught in Scripture and prolonged dwelling on that till one gets identified with that, is, indeed, said to be meditation.

[67]

सन्धीयतेऽसौ स्वर्गान्तैः प्रजादिभिरसंशयम् ।

महतीः संहिता वेदो यो यथोक्ताः समाहितः ॥

He who meditates with concentration on the great combinations as mentioned above attains undoubtedly progeny, etc., including heaven.

The fruits which will accrue to a person who meditates on the *Samhitā* are progeny, cattle, spiritual resplendence, food, and the like, and heaven. If a person meditates on the *Samhitā* with a desire to attain the fruits stated above, he will attain them. But if he does the same thing without any desire for these fruits, he will attain purification of the mind (*citta-suddhi*) which is conducive to the attainment of Brahman-knowledge.

[68]

यश्छन्दसामितिज्ञानं मेधाकामस्य भण्यते ।

आवहन्तीति तद्वत् स्याच्छ्रीकामस्येह लिङ्गतः ॥

The recitation of the hymn beginning with "He who is the most excellent in the hymns of the *Veda*" is intended for one who is desirous of intelligence. In the same way the hymn (to be used for offering oblation beginning with) "fetching" is intended for one who is desirous of wealth.

The entire fourth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad* may be divided into two parts. The first part beginning with *yaśchandasām* till *śrutam me gopāya* contains the *mantra* to be recited by one who desires intellectual vigour (*medhā*). The second part beginning from *āvahantī vitanvānā*

till *pra mā padyasva* contains the *mantra* to be used for offering oblations by one who wants fortune (*śrī*). The *Upaniṣad* here purports to teach *japa* and *homa* as means for obtaining intelligence and wealth. Both *japa* and *homa* are conducive to the attainment of Brahman-knowledge. A person who lacks intellectual vigour — intelligence and tenacious memory — cannot comprehend Brahman. Hence the need for the recitation of *mantra* (*japa*) which is the means to the acquisition of intellectual vigour. One who has no wealth cannot perform *yāga*, etc., for the purpose of attaining purification of the mind. So the offering of oblations (*homa*) is indirectly useful to the attainment of Brahman-knowledge.

[69]

छन्दःशब्दास्त्रयो वेदास्तत्प्रधानत्वकारणात् ।

ऋषभो विश्वरूपश्च सर्ववाग्व्याप्तिकारणात् ॥

The word *chandas* refers to the three Vedas. The syllable *Om* is the most exalted (in the Vedas), because it is the most important therein. And also, it is all-pervasive, since it pervades all speech.

The word *ṛṣabha* refers to the syllable *Om*. Like the bull in a herd of cattle, the syllable *Om* is the most pre-eminent or exalted (*ṛṣabhaḥ*, *śreṣṭhaḥ*) in the Vedas. The following text from the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (II, xxiii, 3) speaks about *Om* as the underlying principle or the self of all (*sarvātmakatva*): “Just as all leaves are permeated by the stalk, so is all speech permeated by *Om*. Verily, this syllable *Om* is all this.” The purport of this text is to show that the reality of the world of objects is speech, and that the reality of speech is the sound *Om*. The text, therefore, concludes that *Om* is all this, that it is all-pervasive.

[70]

अमृतेभ्योऽसौ वेदेभ्यः प्रतिभातः प्रजापतेः ।

ओंकारस्य हि नित्यत्वान्नाञ्जसोत्पत्तिरुच्यते ॥

From the immortal Vedas this syllable *Om* flashed (as the most exalted one) to *Prajāpati*. Indeed, since the syllable *Om* is eternal, it cannot be literally said to have origination.

It is said in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (II, xxiii, 2-3) that *Prajāpati* reflected on the worlds in order to get at their essence. The threefold knowledge (i.e., the three Vedas) issued forth or revealed itself as their essence. When again he reflected on it, the three utterances *bhūḥ*, *bhuvaḥ* and *svaḥ* manifested themselves; and from these, when reflected upon manifested the syllable *Om*.

[71]

ओंकारः सर्वकामेशः स इन्द्रः परमेश्वरः ।
मेधया प्रज्ञया मां स स्पृणोतु प्रीणयत्विति ॥

The syllable *Om* is the Lord of all desires. He (it) is the supreme Lord. Let him (it) gratify me with intelligence.

[72]

अमृतत्वैकहेतोः स्यामात्मज्ञानस्य धारणः ॥

May I be the possessor of the knowledge of the Self which alone is the cause of immortality.

[73]

विचक्षणं च मे भूयाच्छरीरं देव सर्वदा ।
मनः प्रह्लादिनी मे स्याज्जिह्वा मधुरभाषिणी ॥

And also, O Lord, may my body be fit always. May my tongue utter what is sweet and what makes the mind happy.

In this verse and in the next one, the prayer is for physical fitness which is necessary for the practice of the hearing of the text (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*), etc.

[74]

कर्णभ्याञ्चैव वेदार्थम्भूरि विशृणुयामहम् ।

ब्रह्मणश्चासि कोशस्त्वमसेरिव परात्मनः ॥

May I, through my ears, listen abundantly to the meaning of the Vedas. You are the sheath of Brahman, the supreme Self, like the scabbard of a sword.

Since the syllable *Om*, being a sound, is insentient (*śabdamātratvena acetanatvāt*), how could it be, it may be argued, the giver of intelligence and the supreme Lord (*indrah, paramēśvaraḥ*)? The answer to this objection is stated in the second line of the verse. Just as the scabbard is the support or the seat (*ālambana*) for a sword, so also the syllable *Om* is the seat of Brahman-realization (*brahma-upalubdhisthāna*). It is the symbol of Brahman; through it Brahman is realized. Hence, it can be looked upon as the giver of intelligence, etc., and the supreme Lord.

[75]

अपविद्धैषणा यस्मात्त्वयि पश्यन्ति तत्परम् ।

अभिधानप्रतीकत्वद्वारेणास्योपलब्धये ॥

त्वमेव हेतुतां यासि तस्मात् कोशस्त्वमुच्यसे ॥

Since those who have given up attachment see the supreme Brahman in (through) you, and since you are the cause of knowing it by being the designation and symbol of it, you are, therefore, said to be the sheath of (Brahman).

[76]

लौकिकप्रज्ञया यस्मान्मेधया पिहितस्ततः ।

नोपासते पराक्वित्तास्त्वां देवममृतप्रदम् ॥

Since you are concealed by worldly knowledge, those whose minds are engrossed in external things do not meditate on you, the divine being, the giver of immortality.

[77-78]

रगद्वेषादिहेतुभ्यः श्रुतं गोपाय मे प्रभो ॥

येन श्रुतेन सम्पन्नस्त्वामेव प्रविशाम्यहम् ।

प्रापयन्त्यावहन्तीति विस्तारार्थोत्तरा क्रिया ॥

O Lord, protect my knowledge acquired through hearing from forces like attachment, aversion, etc., so that by being endowed with that knowledge I shall enter you alone. The word *āvahanti* means fetching, and the subsequent word (viz., *vitānvānā*) means increasing.

The knowledge which has been acquired must be retained by overcoming obstacles like desire, aversion, etc. Hence the prayer for retentiveness.

[79]

कुर्वाणामुभयं देव चिरमावह मे श्रियम् ।

ततो वेदार्थविज्ञानादन्नपानान्तदायिनीम् ॥

O Lord, after (endowing me with) the knowledge of what is taught in the Vedas, bring me always prosperity which will both bring me, and increase, fruits including food and drink.

[80]

लोमशां पशुभिर्युक्तां प्रत्येकं सर्वदेति च ।

मन्त्रान्तज्ञापनार्थाय स्वाहाकारोऽयमुच्यते ॥

Bring me the prosperity that is endowed with woolly animals and cattle. Bring every one (of them) all the time. The word *svāhā* is used for indicating the end of a *mantra*.

The word *sarvadā* must be added to every one of the fruits desired. The fortune that I must be endowed with must be such that it brings me and also increases clothes, cattle, food, and drink always (*sarvadā*).

[81]

तथैव चोत्तरत्रापि स्वाहा तत्सम्भवाद्भवेत् !
 दैवेन मानुषेणैव वित्तोनामुत्रिकैहिकम् ॥
 कर्म कर्तुमलं यस्मात् प्रार्थ्यते तेन तद्द्वयम् ॥

Here and also subsequently, the word *svāhā* is used in the same way, for there is the indication of that. Since the rite which gives fruit here in this world and hereafter can be performed only through the wealth, divine and human, both of them are prayed for.

Knowledge is the divine wealth; human wealth is material wealth such as gold (*daiva-vittaṃ jñānam, mānuṣavittaṃ suvarṇādī*). Both of them, knowledge and material wealth, are necessary for performing a rite.

[82-83]

आयन्तूद्दिश्य मां सर्व अधीतिश्रवणार्थिनः ॥
 प्रकृष्ट्यार्थं प्रमायन्तु यत्नतो ब्रह्मचारिणः ।
 सम्भूय कोटिशश्चैव मामेवायन्तु सत्वराः ॥

May all the celebrate students who want to hear for the sake of knowledge come to me from all sides. May all of them come to me taking pains in large numbers in order to learn the highest (teaching). May all of them come to me alone at once in crores together.

The verses refer to the mantras with which oblations should be offered for getting disciples.

[84]

जनेऽसानि यशश्चेति पूर्वस्यैतत्प्रयोजनम् ।

वस्यसोऽहं सकाशाच्च श्रेयान्स्यां गुणतोऽधिकः ॥

वसीयसो वस्यस इतीलोपश्छान्दसो भवेत् ॥

May I become renowned among men — this is the fruit of the earlier (invocation). May I become superior among the wealthy on account of abundant merits. The word *vasīyas* has become *vasyas* by the dropping of the letter *i* in the Vedic usage.

[85]

ईयसुन्वसितुर्वा स्यात्स्याद्वा वसुमतः परः ।

अभीष्टोऽतिशयो यस्मात् सजातीयाद्गुणोन्नतेः ॥

The suffix *īyasun* is used after the word *vasitr* or *vasumat*. Since it is natural to desire superiority in virtues among those like him (there is the invocation to that effect.)

Vasitr means one who lives. *Vasumat* means one who has wealth. As a result of addition of the suffix *īyasun* to these words we get the sense of superiority among those who live or those who are wealthy.

The addition of the suffix *u* to the root *vas* gives *vasu* which means (1) one who lives by nature an excellent life and also (2) one who wears by nature excellent clothes. (3) The word *vasu* means wealth. It may also mean by implication a wealthy man. As a result of the addition of the suffix *īyasun* to *vasu* we get the meaning of superiority in all the three senses mentioned above, *viz.*, superiority among those who lead an excellent life or who wear excellent clothes and who are wealthiest.

[86-87]

ब्रह्मणः कोशभूतं त्वां भगवन्प्रविशाम्यहम् ।

मां च सर्वात्मभावेन प्रविशेश प्रसीद मे ॥

ऐकात्म्यमावयोरस्तु भेदहेतुं विनाशाय ।

अनन्तभेदे त्वय्येव निमृजे दुष्कृतं ततः ॥

O venerable One, may I enter you who are the sheath of Brahman. As the Self of all, may you enter me also. Bless me. Let there be oneness between us. Destroy the cause of difference. Hence, I cleanse myself of sin in you alone who are greatly diversified.

The spiritual aspirant prays for union with Brahman which is designated by the syllable *Om*.

[88-89]

द्रुतमापो यथा यन्ति निम्नेन मकरालयम् ।

तथैवाऽऽयन्तु मां सर्वे समन्ताद्ब्रह्मचारिणः ॥

यस्मिन्नहानि जीर्यन्ते सोऽब्दोऽहर्जर उच्यते ।

अहर्जरे यथा मासा यन्ति संवत्सरात्मनि ॥

Just as water flows quickly downwards into the ocean, just as months run into the year, so also may all celebrate students come to me from all directions. The year is called *aharjara*, because the days are consumed in it.

[90]

आसन्नगृहपर्यायः प्रतिवेश इहोच्यते ।

प्रतिवेश इवासि त्वं सर्वदुःखापनोदकृत् ॥

Here the word *prativeśa* is a synonym for an adjacent house. You are like an adjacent house, since you are capable of removing all sorrow.

Just as a rest-house close at hand helps one to overcome weariness, etc., so also you help me to overcome sorrow resulting from sin.

[91]

प्रतिप्राणिप्रवेशाद्वा प्रतिवेशोऽसि कीर्त्यसे ।

मां प्रत्यतः प्रभाहि त्वं प्रमापद्यस्व चाञ्जसा ॥

Or, since you enter into every creature, you are called *prativeśa*. Hence you become revealed to me. And also get hold of me soon.

You are all-pervasive, and so reveal to me your nature and make me full of you.

Verses (68) to (91) cover the fourth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad*.

[92]

उपासनमथेदानीं व्याहृत्यात्मन उच्यते ।

स्वाराज्यफलसिद्धयर्थं महिमाऽतोऽस्य कीर्त्यते ॥

Then, meditation on Brahman as identified with the Vyāhṛtis is now expounded for attaining the fruit of self-sovereignty. Hence its glory is praised.

From this verse on, meditation on the Vyāhṛtis as taught in the fifth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad* is taken up for explanation. The Vyāhṛtis form a theme for internal meditation (*antarupāsana*). *Bhūh*, *Bhuvah*, *Svah*, etc., which stand for the respective worlds are called the Vyāhṛtis. It will not be possible for the spiritual aspirant to comprehend Brahman if it is taught straightaway by ignoring the Vyāhṛtis. The *Upaniṣad*, therefore, proceeds to teach internal meditation on Brahman embodied in the Vyāhṛtis as *Hiraṇyagarbha*.

[93]

भूर्भुवः स्वरिति ज्ञेयाः प्रसिद्धा व्याहृतीनरैः ।

तिस्रस्तासां चतुर्थी तु मह इत्यृषिरभ्यधात् ॥

Bhūḥ, *Bhuvāḥ*, and *Svāḥ* are the three well-known *Vyāhṛtis* known to men. The sage (*Māhācamasya*) uttered the fourth of them called *Mahāḥ*.

[94]

महाचमसगोत्रत्वाद्वोत्रार्थस्तद्धितो भवेत् ॥

माहाचमस्योतः साक्षान्महो वेदयते पशम् ॥

The *taddhita* suffix “*ya*” (after *mahācamasa*) indicates the family, because the sage belonged to the family of *Mahācamasa*. So the sage is called *Māhācamasya*.

[95]

उपासनाङ्गतार्थोऽयमृषिनामग्रहो भवेत् ।

आर्षेयस्मृतिसंमिश्रमुपासनमिहोच्यते ॥

The mentioning of the name of the sage is to indicate that it forms part of the meditation. The meditation along with the remembrance of the sage is here explained.

[96]

चतुर्थी व्याहृतिर्येयं ब्रह्मेत्येवमुपास्यताम् ।

महत्त्वाद्ब्रह्म सा ज्ञेया आत्मा चाप्नोति येन सा ॥

Let this fourth *Vyāhṛti* be thus meditated upon as Brahman. It should be regarded as Brahman because of its greatness, and also as *Ātman* since it pervades all.

The words *brahma* and *maha* mean “the great.” The word *ātman* is derived from the root *āp* which means to reach, to pervade, to encompass. Hence the fourth *Vyāhṛti* should be meditated upon as Brahman, as *Ātman*.

[97-98]

आदित्यचन्द्रब्रह्मान्नभूतेन व्यापिना यतः ॥
लोकदेवादयो व्याप्ता आत्मा तेन महो भवेत् ।
देवताग्रहणं चात्र परिशिष्टोपलक्षणम् ॥

Since the worlds, gods, etc., are pervaded by the all-pervasive *Maha* in the form of the sun, the moon, Brahman, and food, it is the Self. Here, the mention of gods is an indication of the remaining ones.

The fourth *Vyāhṛti*, viz., *Maha*, is to be looked upon as the body of Brahman in its aspect of *Hiraṇyagarbha*. The other *Vyāhṛtis* must be regarded as its limbs. The idea is that Brahman must be meditated upon as embodied in the *Vyāhṛtis*.

In the *śruti* text *aṅgānyanyā devatāḥ* meaning "The other gods are the limbs," the mention of "gods" is only an illustration suggestive of the remaining ones, viz., worlds, the Vedas, and the vital forces.

[99]

लोका देवास्तथा वेदाः प्राणाश्चाङ्गानि सर्वशः ।
मह इत्यस्य ज्ञेयानि व्याहृत्यात्मन एव हि ॥

The worlds, gods, the Vedas, and the vital forces must always be understood as the limbs of the Self in the form of the *Vyāhṛti* called *Maha*.

[100]

महीयन्ते यतः सर्व आदित्याद्यात्मना परे ।
मह इत्येवमुक्तेन तस्मादात्मा भवेन्महः ॥

Since all of them grow by the *Vyāhṛti* called *Maha* in the form of the sun, etc., *Maha* is, therefore, the Self.

Previously the fourth *Vyāhṛti*, viz., *Maha*, was referred to as the Self on account of its pervasiveness (*vyāpakatvāt*). Now it is said to be the Self on account of its being the cause of growth (*varddhi-hetutvāt*) of the worlds, etc.

[101]

आत्मना हि महीयन्ते हस्ताद्यङ्गानि सर्वशः ।

यथा लोकादयस्तद्वदादित्याद्यात्मनैधिताः ॥

Just as limbs like hands, etc., grow, indeed, entirely through the self (or the trunk of the body), so also the worlds, etc., thrive by the sun, etc.

The analogy may be explained as follows. The central part (*madhyabhāga*) or the trunk of the human body is characterized as the self of the body. It is that which makes the limbs grow. It is the whole (*aṅgī*) on which the limbs (*aṅgāni*) like hands, etc., are dependent for their growth. The *Vyāhṛti* called *Maha* is the trunk or the self of the body of Brahman in its aspect of *Hiraṇyagarbha*, while the other *Vyāhṛtis* are its limbs. The first *Vyāhṛti*, viz., *Bhūh*, forms the legs; *Bhuvaḥ*, the second one, constitutes the hands, and the third *Vyāhṛti*, viz., *Suvaḥ*, is the head. Like the trunk of the human body, *Maha* in the form of the sun (*ādityātmanā*), etc., contributes to the growth of the worlds, etc. The *Upaniṣad* refers to the four forms of *Maha* in the following way: *Maha* is the sun (*maha ityādityaḥ*), *Maha* is the moon (*maha iti candramāḥ*), *Maha* is Brahman (*maha iti brahma*), *Maha* is food (*maha iti annam*). The worlds are pervaded by the sun. The luminaries (i.e., the presiding deities of these) are pervaded by the moon. The Vedas which are in the form of speech are pervaded by the syllable *Om*. The vital forces are nourished by food. So the other *Vyāhṛtis* comprising the worlds, gods, the Vedas, and the vital forces are dependent on *Maha*.

[102]

अयं लोकोऽमिर्ऋग्वेदः प्राणश्चेति चतुर्विधा ।

भूरिति व्याहृतिर्ज्ञेया तथैवान्या यथाक्रमम् ॥

The *Vyāhṛti* called *Bhūh* must be understood as having the four forms, viz., this world, fire, the *Rg-veda*, and the

air that is breathed in. In the same way, the other Vyāhṛtis (must be understood, each having four forms) in the prescribed order

[103-104]

अन्तरिक्षञ्च वायुश्च साम चापान एव च ।
चतुर्धा भुव इत्येषा द्वितीया व्याहृतिर्मता ॥
द्यौरादित्यो यजुश्चेति व्यानश्चेति चतुर्थ्यपि ।
महश्चेति पुरा प्रोक्ता चतस्रः स्युश्चतुर्विधाः ॥

The second *Vyāhṛti* called *Bhuvah* must be known as having four forms, viz., the intermediate space between heaven and earth, the air, the *Sāma-veda*, and the air that is breathed out. The heaven, the sun, the *Yajur-veda*, and the vital air that sustains life when breath is arrested (are the forms of the third *Vyāhṛti* called *Suvah*). And the forms of the fourth *Vyāhṛti* called *Maha* have already been told. Each of the four Vyāhṛtis becomes fourfold.

The sun, the moon, Brahman, and food are the forms of the *Vyāhṛti* called *Maha*. (see verse 97).

Brahman which is mentioned here as one of the forms of *Maha* means the syllable *Om*. Since this occurs in the context of words (*śabdādhikāra*), any other meaning for this is inadmissible.

[105]

उक्तानाम्पुनरुक्तिः स्यादुपासानिययंसया ।
यथोक्ता व्याहृतीरेता वेदोपास्ते तु यो नरः ॥
स वेद सकलं ब्रह्म वक्ष्यमाणविशेषणम् ॥

The repetition of what was said (regarding the four Vyāhṛtis which become each four) is for emphasising the sequence of meditation (on them). A person who meditates on these Vyāhṛtis as stated above knows Brahman fully as qualified by the attributes to be mentioned.

The repetition is not for praising the Vyāhrtis, but to emphasise that each *Vyāhrti* must be meditated upon in its four aspects in the proper sequence so that the entire meditation may comprehend the supreme Spirit (*Puruṣa*) in its sixteen phases. The sixteen divisions of the Vyāhrtis correspond to the *Ṣoḍaśakala Puruṣa* mentioned, for instance, in the *Praśna Upaniṣad* (VI, 5).

[106]

ब्रह्म वेद स इत्येवम्पुनरुक्तं किमुच्यते ।

वक्ष्यमाणानुवाकार्थविवक्षुत्वाददोषता ॥

Since it has already been stated (that the fourth *Vyāhrti* is Brahman, why is it again said: "He knows Brahman"? It is not a fault as it is intended to convey what is to be said in the next section.

The objection is that Brahman has already been known, for it was stated earlier that *Maha* is Brahman. If so, there is no need to declare again that he knows Brahman (*sa veda brahma*) as if Brahman were unknown earlier.

[107]

स य एषोऽन्तरित्यादि वक्ष्यमाणानुवाकगम् ।

वस्तूपास्यमिहैवेति स वेदेति पुनर्वचः ॥

The repetition "He knows" is to show that the object to be described in the following section as "He who is within the heart," etc., must be meditated upon here itself.

Though Brahman was known as identified with the *Vyāhrti* called *Maha*, its distinctive feature of its being knowable within the heart, etc., which will be stated in the sequel is yet unknown. It is with a view to mention this and other features to be stated in the next *anuvāka* that the *Upaniṣad* assumes as though Brahman is unknown and says that he knows Brahman who knows it as stated in the sequel.

[108]

एकवाक्यत्वमेतस्माद् द्वयोरप्यनुवाकयोः ॥

For this reason, both the sections constitute one subject matter.

This section and the one that follows deal with one and the same meditation.

[109]

लोका देवादयश्चास्मा उपासित्रे यथाबलम् ।
बलिम्भोगम्प्रयच्छन्ति फलमेतदुपासितुः ॥

To this person who meditates, the worlds, the gods, etc., bring enjoyment according to their respective powers. This is the fruit which accrues to one who meditates.

The fifth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad* is covered by verses (92) to (109).

[110]

तिस्रो व्याहतयो यस्य ब्रह्मणोऽङ्गान्यवादिषम् ।
स्थानादिसिद्धये तस्य परः सन्दर्भ उच्यते ॥

It has been said that the three Vyāhṛtis are the limb of Brahman. With a view to establish its location, etc., what follows in the context is said.

The sixth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad* covered by verses (110) to (126) deals with the location of Brahman, the attributes with which it is directly realized when it is meditated upon as located in the cavity of the heart (*hṛdayākāśa*), and the way to its realization as the Self of all.

[111]

स यः परोक्षनिर्दिष्टः प्रत्यक्षेण स दश्यते ।
अन्तर्हृदय आकाशे पश्यात्मानं त्वमात्मना ॥

Brahman who has been described (earlier) as what is remote is (now) shown to be the immediate one. See the Self through the Self in the space within the heart.

[112]

पद्माकारो हि मांसस्य खण्डो हृदयमुच्यते ।

आकाशस्तस्य मध्ये यो बुद्धेरायतनं सदा ॥

तस्मिन्स पुरुषो ज्ञेयो मनोमय इहाञ्जसा ॥

The heart, indeed, is said to be a piece of flesh in the shape of a lotus. In the space at the centre of the heart which is always the abode of the intellect, there dwells the person who is *manomaya* to be cognized directly.

[113-114]

शशिस्थिराहुवत्साक्षान्मनस्येवोपलभ्यते ॥

मनुते मनसा यस्मात्तनायं स्यान्मनोमयः ।

स्याद्वा तदभिमानित्वात्तल्लिङ्गात्तन्मयः स्मृतः ॥

The Self is cognized directly only in the mind like *Rāhu* in the moon. Or, since it knows (the objects) through the mind, it is, therefore, *manomaya*. Or, since it identifies itself with the mind, or since it is indicated by the mind, it is said to be *manomaya*.

Different reasons are given to show why the Self is said to be *manomaya*. *Manomayaḥ* means *manahpradhānaḥ*.

[115]

अमृतोऽमरणधर्मा स्याद्धिरण्यं ज्योतिरुच्यते ।

तन्मयोऽयम्पुमान्ध्येयस्तत्प्राप्तौ द्वारथोच्यते ॥

The Self is immortal. It is said to be effulgent. This Person who is effulgent must be meditated upon. The path for attaining it afterwards is stated.

The word *atha* (afterwards) here means after death, i.e., after the cessation of *prārabdha-karma*.

[116-117]

ऊर्ध्वम्प्रवृत्ता नाड्येका सुषुम्ना हृदयादधि ।
गत्वा तालुकयोर्विद्वान्मध्ये नोदानगर्भया ॥
स्तनवल्लम्बते कण्ठे मांसखण्डस्त्वधोमुखः ।
इन्द्रस्यासौ सृतिर्ज्ञेया रेचकेन तथा व्रजेत् ॥

It should be known that a nerve called *susumnā* which goes upwards from above the heart is the path to the attainment of (the lower) Brahman. By means of the *revaka* allowing the *udāna* to go upward through the nerve which runs piercing the piece of flesh which hangs down in the throat like a teat with its face turned downward, and passing through the middle part of the two palates, the meditator has to reach Brahman.

According to Ānandagiri, the word *indra* here means the lower Brahman (*aṣṭabrahma*). The word *vidvān* is used in the sense of mediator (*upāsaka*).

[118-120]

तथा गत्वाथ यायात्स यत्केशान्तो विवर्तते ।
भित्त्वा शिरःकपाले द्वे भूरित्यग्निम्प्रपद्यते ॥
द्वितीययाथ व्याहृत्या वायौ सम्प्रतितिष्ठति ।
आदित्ये सुवरित्येवं लोकेशे प्रतितिष्ठति ॥
स्थित्वैवमङ्गभूतेषु प्रतितिष्ठत्यथाङ्गिनि ।
मह इत्यात्मनि स्थित्वा स्वाराज्यम्प्रतिपद्यते ॥

The passing by that path and breaking open the two portions of the skull, he reaches the top of the head where

the roots of the hair divide. He attains Fire which is a form of the *Vyāhṛti* called *Bhūh*. Then through the second *Vyāhṛti* he abides in Air. In the same way he remains in the Sun, the lord of the world, which is a form of the *Vyāhṛti* called *Suvaḥ*. Thus having remained in the limbs, he then remains in the Self which is the whole in the form of (the fourth *Vyāhṛti* called) *Maha*. Remaining thus, he attains sovereignty.

Agni, *Vāyu*, etc., stand for the presiding deities. The meditator pervades the world through his identity with *Agni*, *Vāyu*, and others, which are the forms of the *Vyāhṛtis*.

[121]

नान्यो राजास्ति यस्येह राजा यः स्वयमेव तु ।
स स्वराट् तस्य भावश्च स्वाराज्यमिह कीर्त्यते ॥

Here (in the world), he who has none else as his king and who is himself the king is the sovereign. And his status here is described as sovereignty.

[122]

मनो गीश्चक्षुषाञ्चैव श्रोत्रविज्ञानयोरपि ।
आप्नोति पर्युपासीनः स्वाराज्यं नात्र संशयः ।
तत एतत्फलं दिव्यं यथोक्तोपासनाद्भवेत् ॥

The meditator attains sovereignty over the mind, speech, and sight, and also over ear and intellect. There is no doubt about this. This divine fruit will accrue from the aforesaid meditation.

Before he resorted to this meditation, he was the lord of the mind, speech, and other senses of an individual organism. When as a result of the meditation enjoined here he attains to the state of the *Virāj* and becomes all-pervasive, the self of all, he becomes the lord of the mind, speech, etc., of all beings.

[123]

व्याहृत्यात्मन एतस्य रूपसंकलस्येऽधुना ।
उपासनविधित्सायै परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥

In order to state the nature of Brahman in the form of the *Vyāhṛti* with a view to enjoin meditation thereof, the subsequent portion is now begun.

[124]

वियद्देहमिदम्ब्रह्म वियत्सदृशमेव वा ।
मूर्तामूर्तस्वभावञ्च त्रैलोक्याद्यात्मतो भवेत् ॥

This Brahman has space as its body or has a body similar to space. Since it is in the form of the three worlds, it has the gross and the subtle as its forms.

Brahman that is being discussed here in the context of meditation has a body which is similar to *ākāśa*. Like *ākāśa* which is subtle and all-pervasive, the body of Brahman is subtle and all-pervasive.

The universe consists of five elements of which fire, water, and earth are gross (*mūrtam* or *sat*) and the remaining two, viz., space and air, are subtle (*amūrtam* or *tyat*). The word *satyam* refers to both the forms, the gross and the subtle, *sat* and *tyat* (*sacca tyacceti satyam*). Though forms are attributed to Brahman, it is really formless. The two forms of the universe, *mūrta* and *amūrta*, or *sat* and *tyat*, are superimposed on Brahman which is the essence (*svarūpa*) of all.

See the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II, iii, 2, for an account of the two forms of Brahman. In the course of his commentary on this text Śaṅkara says: "Brahman or the supreme Self has but two forms, through the superimposition of which by ignorance the formless supreme Brahman is defined or made conceivable."

[125]

इन्द्रियारमणञ्चैव मन आनन्दमेव च ।

शान्त्या समृद्धमत्यर्थं ब्रह्मैतदमृतम्परम् ॥

And also this Brahman has its disport in the senses and has a mind which produces happiness alone. It is fully enriched with peace. It is the immortal, the supreme.

The expression *indriya-āraṇam* may be explained in two ways: Brahman has his pleasure-ground or pastime in the senses, or the senses have their delight in Brahman.

[126]

प्राचीनयोग्योपास्वेतद्यथाव्याख्यातलक्षणम् ।

माहाचमस्य आचार्य अन्तेवासिनमुक्तवान् ॥

The preceptor Māhācamasya told the disciple: "O Prācīnayogya, meditate on this Brahman in the manner explained above."

The word *prācīnayoga* means a person who has made himself eligible for meditation after removing his sins by the observance of *nitya* and *naimittika karma* (*prācīnaiḥ nityanaimittika-karmabhiḥ durita-kṣaye satyupāsanaḥ yogyah*).

[127]

पाङ्क्तस्वरूपेणैतस्य भूयोऽप्यन्यदुपासनम् ।

उदारफलसिद्धयर्थं पृथिवीत्युच्यतेऽधुना ॥

Again, another meditation of that Brahman (i.e., *Hiranyagarbha*) in the form of *Pāñkta* for obtaining unlimited fruit is now explained in the text beginning with "The earth," etc.

Verses (127) to (134) cover the seventh *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad*.

In the previous *anuvāka* meditation on Brahman in the form of *Hiraṇyagarbha* who is said to be *manomāya*, etc., was taught. Such a meditation on Brahman who is endowed with qualities not perceivable by the eye is fit for those aspirants who are second-rate or middling (*madhyama*). The *Upaniṣad* now proceeds to teach in the seventh *anuvāka* meditation on the same *Hiraṇyagarbha* as endowed with qualities perceptible to the eye with a view to help aspirants who are inferior (*mandamatīnām upakārāya*).

[128]

पञ्चभिर्यत् आरब्धं जगत्पाङ्क्तमतो भवेत् ।

यज्ञः क्लृप्तो भवेदेवं पाङ्क्तो यज्ञ इति श्रुतिः ॥

Since the world has been originated by five factors, *Hiraṇyagarbha* is, therefore, *Pāṅkta*. Since *śruti* says that a sacrifice is a *Pāṅkta*, it (i.e., *Hiraṇyagarbha*) is thus a sacrifice.

The world is created out of the five elements of matter such as *ākāśa*, and so it is a *Pāṅkta* or a five-membered group. *Hiraṇyagarbha* or the World-soul (*jagadātmā*) who is the essence of the world, who is the cause of the world, may be regarded as a *Pāṅkta*, because the effect is non-different from the cause (*kārya-hāraṇayorabhedā*). A sacrifice is performed with five factors, viz., the sacrificer, his wife, his son, divine wealth, and human wealth, and so it is a *Pāṅkta*. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (I, iv, 17) says that sacrifice has five factors. Hence, *Hiraṇyagarbha* may also be regarded as a sacrifice (*yajña*).

[129]

यज्ञेन परिकल्पेन त्रैलोक्यात्मानमश्नुते ।

पाङ्क्तत्वसिद्धये तस्मादारब्धेषा परा श्रुतिः ॥

Through the sacrifice thus effected in meditation, the meditator attains to the state of *Prajāpati* who is the self

of the three worlds. So in order to show that the universe consists of the five-membered groups of objects, the subsequent *śruti* text is commenced.

[130]

दिगन्तं लोकपाङ्क्तं स्यान्नक्षत्रान्तञ्च दैवतम् ।
अत्मान्तं भूतपाङ्क्तञ्च विराडात्माधिकारतः ॥

The five-membered group of worlds has direction at the end, and that of the deities has the stars at the end. The five-membered group of elements has the Self at the end. Because of the context, the word *ātmā* means *Virāj*.

Three groups, each of which consists of five objects, are mentioned here. The first is *lokapāṅkta* which consists of the earth, sky, heaven, the primary quarters, and the intermediate quarters. In this five-membered group of worlds, "direction" (i.e., the intermediate quarters) comes as the last member. *Devapāṅkta* is a group of five deities, viz., fire, air, the sun, the moon, and the stars. In this group we have "stars" at the end. The third group is *bhūtapāṅkta* consisting of water, herbs, trees, space, and the Self. In this group of five, "self" comes at the end. Since the context is about the elements, the word *ātmā* must be understood as the cosmic gross body of *Virāj*.

[131]

उपलक्षणमेतत्स्याद्देवतालोकपाङ्क्तयोः ।
अधिभूतमिति वक्ष्यामोऽथाध्यात्ममतः परम् ॥

The expression *adhibhūtam* is used to imply the group of five deities and the group of five worlds as well. Then in the subsequent portion we shall explain (the three groups of five each) with regard to the self.

The three groups of five each mentioned earlier relate to *external* things comprehended by the notion "this" (*idam*). The three groups

of five objects beginning with *prāṇa* mentioned in the next verse are *internal*; and they are comprehended by the notion "I" (*aham*). They relate to the aggregate of the physical body and the senses *popularly* known as the self, and hence the expression *adhyātman*.

[132]

वायुपाङ्क्तं समानान्तं त्वगन्तञ्चैन्द्रियं तथा ।
चर्मादि धातुपाङ्क्तञ्च विश्वमेतावदुच्यते ॥

The group of five vital airs has *samāna* at the end. Likewise, the group of five sense-organs has the sense of touch at the end. And the group of five material constituents of the body has skin at the beginning. This much (as stated) is said to be the universe.

The three groups of five objects each, which are internal, are (1) *vāyupāṅkta* consisting of *prāṇa*, *vyāna*, *apāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*; (2) *indriyapāṅkta* consisting of the eye, the ear, the mind, speech and touch, and (3) *dhātupāṅkta* consisting of skin, flesh, muscles, bones and marrow.

The three fivefold groups of external things and the three fivefold groups of internal things constitute the entire universe.

[133]

पाङ्क्तमेव जगत्सर्वमिति दृष्ट्वाभ्यधादृषिः ।
पाङ्क्तं वा इदमाब्रह्मस्तम्बं नान्यदिति स्म ह ॥

Intuiting that the whole universe consists of five-membered groups of objects, the sage said that this (universe) from *Brahmā* down to the plant is *Pāṅkta* and nothing else.

[134]

आध्यात्मिकेन पाङ्क्तेन सङ्ख्यासामान्यकारणात् ।
बलयत्यात्मभावेन पाङ्क्तम्बाह्यमशेषतः ॥

Because of the similarity in number, by the groups of five objects in respect of the self, the meditator strengthens the entire external groups of five objects as identical.

The general rule of meditation is that the lower or the inferior object must be meditated upon as the higher or the superior. In the *Vyāhṛtyupāsana*, what is lower, viz., the *Vyāhṛti* called *Maha* must be meditated upon as the higher, viz., Brahman. Likewise, the three groups of five objects coming under *adhyātmā* must be meditated upon as the three groups of five coming under *adhibhūta*; that is, the lower individual factors must be looked upon as identical with the higher cosmic factors.

[135]

सर्वोपासनशेषस्य प्रणवस्याधुनोच्यते ।

उपासनमलं यस्माद्ब्रह्मणोः प्राप्तये द्वयोः ॥

Meditation on *Praṇava* which forms part of all meditations is now explained, since it is the means for the attainment of the two forms of Brahman.

Verses (135) to (142) cover the eighth *anuvāku* of the *Upaniṣad* which teaches meditation on *Praṇava* or *Om*. The latter must be meditated upon as *para* as well as *apara* Brahman. A person who meditates on *Om* attains Brahman, *para* or *apara*, in accordance with the kind of meditation he does.

Praṇava forms part of all rites and meditations enjoined by Scripture. Scripture-ordained actions are commenced by uttering the syllable *Om*. The *Gītā* (XVII, 24) says: "So with the utterance of *Om* are the acts of sacrifice, gift, and austerity, as enjoined in Scripture, always begun by the students of Brahman (i.e., the *Veda*)." Since *Om* has been accepted with faith, any instruction on Brahman which is not associated with it is not readily accepted by the intellect. Hence meditation on *Praṇava* as Brahman, the higher as well as the lower; and this meditation is for the benefit of the highest class of spiritual aspirants (*uttamādhikārin*).

[136]

परस्य ब्रह्मणो यस्मादपरस्य च चोद्यते ।

आलम्बनतया तस्मात्स एवात्राभिधीयते ॥

Since it is enjoined as the support (symbol) of the higher and the lower Brahman (in other places), it alone is enjoined here.

The *Pratna Upaniṣad* (V, 2) says: "That which is the sound *Om*, O Satyakāma, is verily the higher and the lower Brahman. Therefore, with this support alone does the wise man reach the one or the other."

[137]

ओमित्येतच्छब्दरूपम्ब्रह्मेति मनसा सदा ।

धारयेत्स्तुतये तस्य परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥

The sound *Om* has always to be held in mind as Brahman. The subsequent passage is commenced for praising it.

The *Upaniṣad* speaks of *Om* as what is to be meditated upon when it says *omiti brahma*. It praises it in the sequel when it says that *Om* is, verily, a word of concurrence (*omiti etat anukṛtiḥ*), etc.

[138]

तद्यथा शङ्कुनेत्येवं सर्वमोमिति युज्यते ।

अभिधानादृते यस्मादभिधेयं न विद्यते ॥

It is proper to say that all is *Om*, since *śruti* says "As all leaves are held together by a stalk," and also because without the name the nameable does not exist.

The text quoted in the verse is from the *Chāndogya*, II, xxiii, 3. Scripture declares that the syllable *Om* pervades all speech; and all that is nameable (*abhidheya*) is dependent on the name (*abhidhāna*) or the sound (*śabda*) which is the underlying principle. Hence *Om* is all this.

[139]

अनुज्ञानुकृतिस्तद्वत्सर्वत्रोमिति कीर्त्यते ।

ओश्रावयेत्यनुज्ञाता यत आश्रावयन्ति च ॥

The word *anukṛtiḥ* means compliance. In this sense *Om* is used everywhere. Since by giving the direction, "O Agnīdhra, make (the gods) hear," they make them recite, (*Om* is compliance).

The expression *O śrāvaya* contains the direction. The priests who perform the acts enjoined in the *Yajur-veda* give the direction to the Agnīdhra: "O Agnīdhra, make it known to the gods that an oblation is ready to be offered." By giving this direction, they make them recite the *mantra*.

[140]

प्रसौति ह्यनुजानाति ब्रह्मोमित्येव चत्विजम् ।

प्रवक्ष्यन्ब्राह्मणो वेदमोमित्येवम्प्रयुज्यते ॥

By uttering *Om*, the *Brahmā* gives his assent to the *Ṛtvik* (to begin action). A *Brāhmaṇa*, when about to recite the *Veda*, begins by uttering *Om*.

The priest who is well-versed in the Vedas and who supervises the rite is called *Brahmā*. The *Ṛtvik* is a performing-priest.

[141-142]

उपाप्रवानि ब्रह्मेति स च वेदमवाप्नुयात् ॥

परात्मा वा भवेद्ब्रह्म स तदोङ्कारपूर्वकम् ।

प्राप्नोत्येव न सन्देह उपासीतात ओमिति ॥

(Thus uttering *Om*) with the resolve "May I acquire Brahman (i.e., the *Veda*)," he attains the *Veda*. Or, the word *brahma* means the supreme Self. Thus uttering *Om* (with the resolve "May I attain the supreme Self") he

does attain it without any doubt. Hence, meditation on *Om* as Brahman.

The word *brahma* is first of all used in the sense of the *Veda* and then in the sense of the supreme Self.

The main idea which is sought to be conveyed here is that all activities which are undertaken with the utterance of *Om* become fruitful; and so one should meditate on *Om* as Brahman.

[143]

यथोक्तोपासनादेव स्वराज्यफलसंश्रयात् ।

नैष्कल्ये कर्मणाम्प्राप्ते तत्साफल्यार्थ उत्तरः ॥

Since the fruit of sovereignty can be attained by the meditation alone as stated above, one may think that rites are futile. In order to show their usefulness, the next section is commenced.

The ninth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad* is covered by verses (143) to (150). It gives an account of the duties of the meditator (*upāsaka*). The latter who acts on the notion of duality (*dvaita-bhāva*) thinks that he is the agent, that there is an end to be attained by him, and that there is a means thereto. Such a person has to perform the rites enjoined by Scripture. He should not neglect them thinking that the fruit of sovereignty could be attained through the *upāsana* itself. Obstructed by the sin whose existence is indicated by the neglect of the Scripture-ordained duties, the *upāsana* cannot produce the desired result. Hence the utility of rites enjoined by Scripture. While *upāsana* may be combined with *karma*, it is not so in the case of knowledge (*jñāna*).

[144]

स्वाध्यायोऽध्ययनं ज्ञेयं तथा चाध्यापनम्परम् ।

आधातव्या यथाशास्त्रमग्नयः श्रेयसे तथा ।

होतव्यममिहोत्रञ्च कुर्याच्चातिथिपूजनम् ॥

Svādhyāya means the study of the *Veda*. And the other word (viz., *pravacana*) means the teaching of it. And also the fires have to be consecrated and lighted up as taught in Scripture for attaining the good. The *agnihotra* sacrifice is also to be performed. The worship of the guests has to be done.

The meanings of the words *rta* and *satya* have already been explained in verses (46) and (47).

Adhyayana is not the blind recitation of the *Veda*; but it is the study of the *Veda* knowing its meaning.

The offering of oblation in the consecrated fires is conducive to the attainment of the good, viz., Brahman-knowledge through purification of the mind (*cittaśuddhi*).

[145]

तथा संव्यवहारश्च मानुषं स्यादसंशयम् ॥

Likewise, *mānuṣam* which means social duty (such as conducting marriage) has undoubtedly to be discharged.

[146]

उत्पाद्या च प्रजा योग्या प्रजनञ्चर्तुसेदनम् ।
निवेशनं सुतस्येह प्रजातिरिति गम्यताम् ॥

And good progeny should be begotten. Procreation has to be done by sexual enjoyment in proper season. *Prajātiḥ* here must be understood as the entering of the son (into the householder's order).

[147]

उक्तेषु व्यापृतेनापि कार्ये एव प्रयत्नतः ।
स्वाध्यायप्रवचने तेन प्रत्येकञ्च ग्रहस्तयोः ॥

The study and the teaching of the *Veda* should be done with effort even by one who is engaged in all these duties.

The mentioning of these two in each case is to convey this idea.

[148]

वेदार्थबोधनं नास्ति स्वाध्यायेन विना यतः ।
तथा प्रवचनेनातो धर्मार्थश्च ग्रहस्तयोः ॥

Since the comprehension of the meaning of the *Veda* is not possible without the study of it, and since (the increase of) *dharma* is not possible without the teaching of the *Veda*, the two are mentioned in every case.

[149-150]

सत्यमेव तु वक्तव्यमिति सत्यवचा जगौ ।
राथीतरो मुनिस्तद्वत्तप एवेत्युवाच ह ॥
पुरुशिष्टस्य तनयः कर्तव्यं तु महातपाः ।
मुद्गलस्यात्मजश्चाह कर्तव्ये यत्नमास्थितैः ॥
स्वाध्यायप्रवचने एव ते एव तु तपो यतः ॥

The sage Rāthītara whose speech consists of truth has said that truth alone must be uttered. Puruṣiṣṭa's son who practised great austerity said that austerity alone must be practised. The son of Mudgala declared that the study and the teaching of the *Veda* alone must be done taking proper effort by all eligible persons, for they alone constitute austerity.

The purpose of stating the views of the different sages is to emphasize the importance of *adhyayana* and *pravacana* and to inspire special regard for them.

[151]

स्वाध्यायार्थश्च विज्ञेयः अहं वृक्षस्य रेखिवा ।
इत्यादिरुत्तरो ग्रन्थो विशुद्धिर्हि ततो धियः ॥

The subsequent section beginning with "I am the mover of the tree" is meant for recitation. From that (recitation) arises, indeed, purification of the mind.

The tenth *anuvāka* of the *Upaṇiṣad* covered by verses (151) to (160) gives us the *mantra* for recitation (*japa*). Recitation of the *mantra* leads to purification of the mind which is necessary for the attainment of knowledge.

[152]

विशुद्धमनसो यस्मात्मग्नानोदयो भवेत् ।
मन्त्राभ्यायोऽयमारब्ध एतस्मात्कारणात्परः ॥

Because of the reason that there arises the right knowledge in one whose mind is pure, the *mantra* portion of the *Veda* that comes next is begun.

[153]

उच्छित्तिलक्षणस्याहं विश्वस्य जगतः सदा ।
अस्य संसारवृक्षस्य रेखा जनकोऽस्म्यहम् ॥

I am always the creator of this tree of *samsāra*, of this entire world which is subject to uprooting.

The word "I" (*aham*) here refers to the sage Triśaṅku, who realized Brahman, who became Brahman.

[154-155]

कीर्तिः ख्यातिर्मम ज्ञेया गिरेः पृष्ठमिवोच्छ्रिता ।
ऊर्ध्वं तत्कारणं ब्रह्म पवित्रम्भवहानतः ॥
यस्य सोऽहं भवेदूर्ध्वं पवित्रम्पावनम्परम् ॥

My fame is high like the top of a mountain. The word *ūrdhvam* means the cause, viz., Brahman; and it is *pavitram* (i.e., purifying) since it destroys the transmigratory

existence. I who am of this nature of Brahman become the pure supreme Brahman, the primal cause.

The word *urdhva* literally means high or above. Here it refers to Brahman which is the cause of the world, which transcends the world of plurality, which is not touched by transmigration (*samsārāsprṣtam*). Brahman is the purifier, because it destroys the transmigratory existence through *akhaṇḍākāravṛtti-jñāna* generated by the *śruti* text. When the *jīva* is purified through the knowledge conveyed by the *mahāvākya*, it becomes Brahman, the pure one, the primal source of substratum.

[156]

वाजमन्नमिति ज्ञेयं तद्वतीव दिवाकरे ।

स्वमृतम्परमं ब्रह्म बुद्धावस्यामहं सदा ॥

The word *vājam* means food. Like the immortal Self in the sun which is possessed of that (nectar-food), I always remain *svamṛtam*, that is, the supreme Brahman in the intellect.

Many *śruti* texts point out that the pure, immortal principle called the Self (*ātmatattvam*) which is in the *jīva* is the same as that which is in the sun. See, for instance, the *Taittirīya* text (II, viii, 5) which says: "He that is here in the human person, and He that is there in the sun, are one." In the third chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* it has been said that the solar sphere is sweet-honey, and that in its several compartments, eastern, western, etc., there are stored up immortal essences of red, white, and other colours, constituting the fruits of works, and that Vasus and other gods live upon these immortal food (*karmaphalarūpam vasvādi-devabhogyam-amṛtamannam*).

[157]

द्रविणं धनमित्याहुरिह त्वात्मावबोधनम् ।

सर्वर्चसं सुदीप्तं स्यान्मोक्षामृतफलप्रदम् ॥

Draviṇam, it is said, means wealth. But it means here the knowledge of the Self. It is *savarcasam* which means effulgent; it gives the immortal fruit of liberation.

Wealth is of two kinds, human and divine. While gold, jewel, etc., constitute human wealth, Brahman-knowledge is divine wealth. Brahman-knowledge is effulgent inasmuch as it reveals the reality of the Self (*āmatattva-prakāśakatvāt*).

[158]

अक्षितोऽक्षीणरूपत्वाद्वेदानुवचनं त्विदम् ।
त्रिशङ्कोर्ब्रह्मभूतस्य ह्यार्षं सन्दर्शनम्परम् ॥

I am immortal, because I am free from decay. This statement, after the attainment of Brahman-realization, by Trisāṅku who became Brahman is, indeed, the expression of the supreme saintly vision.

The entire *mantra* here is the statement of the sage Trisāṅku after his attainment of Brahman-realization. It is an expression of the fact that Trisāṅku, like Vāmadeva, has attained the *summum bonum*. It shows what constitutes Self-realization.

[159]

पावनोऽस्य जपः श्रेयान्ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य जन्मने ।
मुमुक्षुः प्रयतस्तस्माज्जपेदेतत्समाहितः ॥
कर्मप्रसङ्ग उक्तत्वादयमर्थोऽवसीयते ॥

The recitation of this sacred *mantra* is the most excellent means to the rise of Brahman-knowledge. Hence, a person who seeks liberation should recite it by remaining pure and with a concentrated mind. This idea (viz., that this *mantra* is for recitation) is arrived at, since it is stated in the context of *karma*.

The earlier and the subsequent sections deal with *karma*. The present section, too, deals with *karma* in the form of recitation (*jaṭa*), for it contains the *mantra* which is intended for recitation.

[160]

मुमुक्षोस्तत्परस्यैवं श्रौतस्मार्तेषु कर्मसु ।
आर्षञ्च प्रातिभं ज्ञानमाविर्भवति मोक्षदम् ॥

The intuitive knowledge of the real which leads to liberation dawns upon the spiritual aspirant who performs the rites as enjoined in *śruti* and *smṛti* texts for the sake of the Lord.

It should not be thought that the recitation of the *mantra* alone leads to Brahman-knowledge. All Scripture-ordained duties which are performed for the sake of *Īśvara* as an offering to Him and not for the sake of any immediate fruit are conducive to the attainment of Brahman-knowledge through *citta-suddhi*.

[161]

आरम्भो नियमार्थः स्यादात्मज्ञानोदयात्पुरा ।
श्रुतेर्वेदमनूच्येति श्रुतिश्चैवानुशास्ति हि ॥

The commencement of the *śruti* text "Having taught the Vedas" is to show that Scripture-enjoined rites have to be performed before the rise of Self-knowledge. Indeed, *śruti* itself, as well as (*smṛti*), instructs it.

The purport of the eleventh *anuvāka* is to show that obligatory and occasional rites must be performed before the origination of Brahman-knowledge inasmuch as they are conducive to it. There is, for instance, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (IV, iv, 22) which says: "The Brāhmaṇas seek to know it through the study of the Vedas, sacrifices, charity..." In the ninth *anuvāka* it was pointed out that Scripture-enjoined rites are

useful for the attainment of Brahman-knowledge. The exhortation contained in this section is intended to show that the performance of Scripture-enjoined rites is obligatory.

There are two aspects in respect of the injunction which enjoins the performance of rites. One is that obligatory and occasional rites have to be performed (*avaśyamabhāvena kartavyāni*). The other aspect emphasizes that they have to be performed only *prior* to the origination of Brahman-knowledge (*pūrvameva kartavyāni*).

Verses (161) to (183) deal with the eleventh *anuvāka*.

[162]

विद्योत्पत्त्यर्थमेतानि कर्तव्यानि मुमुक्षुणा ।
वक्ष्यमाणानि कर्माणि यावदात्मावबोधनम् ॥

The rites which will be stated here have to be done by the spiritual aspirant for the sake of the origination of knowledge till Self-knowledge is attained.

[163]

आत्मज्ञानोदयादूर्ध्वं पुरुषार्थविसानतः ।
स्वतः सिद्धेश्च मोक्षस्य कर्मकाण्डमनर्थकम् ॥

Since after the rise of Self-knowledge the end sought after (*viz.*, liberation) is achieved, and since liberation is eternal, the ritual-section is futile.

Karma is a remote means to the attainment of Brahman-knowledge. The performance of *karma* leads to purification of the mind; and the latter is necessary for the rise of Brahman-knowledge. The attainment of Brahman-knowledge itself is liberation which is the supreme end sought after by the spiritual aspirant. There is, therefore, no need for *karma* after the rise of Brahman-knowledge.

[164]

तस्मात्सत्त्वविशुद्ध्यर्थं कार्यं कर्म मुमुक्षुभिः ।
 प्रागेव ब्रह्मविज्ञानान्नियमेनेति ह श्रुतिः ॥

Hence, *śruti*, indeed, says that, only prior to Brahman-knowledge, *karma* must be performed by spiritual aspirants for the sake of purification of the mind.

[165]

आनर्थक्यापनुत्त्यर्थमृतादीनाम्पुरा श्रुतिः ।
 नियमार्थमिहोक्तिः स्यादात्मज्ञानोदयार्थिनः ॥

Earlier *śruti* spoke about *rta*, etc., in order to remove the notion of futility (about them). Here they are stated with a view to show that they have to be done by one who seeks the rise of Self-knowledge.

[166]

अध्याप्य निखिलं वेदमन्तेवासिनमादरात् ।
 सत्यं वदेत्येवमादि गरीयाननुशास्ति हि ॥

After teaching the entire *Veda* to the disciple with solicitude, the most eminent teacher instructs him, indeed, thus: "Speak the truth."

[167]

यथोपलब्धं यद्वाक्यं हिंसाकल्कविवर्जितम् ।
 सर्वधर्मविदः प्राज्ञास्तत्सत्यम्प्रतिजानते ॥

The wise who know the entire *dharma* lay down that truth-speaking consists in uttering a sentence as it is known, without a motive to do injury and without hypocrisy.

[168]

अमिहोवाचनुष्ठानं धर्ममाहुर्विपश्चितः ।

प्रमादं मा कृथास्तद्वत्स्वाध्यायम्प्रति सर्वदा ॥

The wise say that *dharma* consists in the practice of *agnihotra*, etc. In the same way, do not be indifferent towards the study of the *Veda* at any time.

The instruction contained in the two sentences "Speak the truth," and "Practise *dharma*," is so comprehensive as to include all duties enjoined in *śruti* and *smṛti*.

[169]

तथाभिलषितां न्याय्यामाचार्याथ दक्षिणाम् ।

दत्त्वा दारांस्त्वमाहृत्य मा च्छेत्सीः सुतसन्ततिम् ॥

Then, having given the teacher the offering, which he desires reasonably, and having secured a wife, do not break the line of progeny.

[170]

विस्मृत्याप्यनृतं नित्यं न च वक्तव्यमण्वपि ।

इत्यस्य प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं सत्यादीति पुनर्वचः ॥

Once again *śruti* speaks of truth-speaking with a view to teach that one should never tell a lie, however small, even in forgetfulness.

[171]

एवं शिष्टेष्वपि ज्ञेयं प्रसिद्धार्थत्वकारणात् ।

स्पष्टार्थ उत्तरो ग्रन्थः स्वयमेवावगम्यताम् ॥

The remaining ones, too, have to be understood in the same way. The subsequent portion whose meaning is clear can be understood by itself, for it states what is well-known.

Explanation for what is stated subsequently beginning from "There should be no deviation from *dharmā*" till "Let your guest be a god unto you" is not given as it is well-known.

[172]

उक्तेभ्योऽन्यानि कर्माणि शिष्टाचारोपगानि तु ।
अनाशङ्कितदोषाणि त्वया कार्याणि यत्नतः ॥

Other actions besides those mentioned above which are practised by the wise and which do not involve any suspicion of evil have to be performed by you with effort.

[173]

समाशङ्कितदोषाणि शिष्टैराचरितान्यपि ।
सत्रयानि न कार्याणि कर्माणीह कदाचन ॥

Those actions which are blameworthy and which are open to the suspicion of evil, though practised by the wise, should never be done.

[174]

श्रुतिस्मृत्यविरुद्धानि शिष्टाचारोपगानि च ।
अस्मत्कर्माणि कार्याणि न विरोधीनि कर्हिचित् ॥

Our actions which are not opposed to *śruti* and *smṛti* and which do not conflict with the practice of the wise at any time should always be followed.

[175]

अस्मत्तो ब्राह्मणा ये स्युः श्रेयांसः शास्त्रवेदिनः ।
तेषामासनदानेन श्रमापनयनं कुरु ॥

By the offering of a seat you must remove the fatigue of those Brāhmaṇas who are well-versed in Scripture and who are superior to us.

[176]

तेषामाख्यायिकायां वा न वाच्यं सम्भ्रमात्त्वया ।
तदुक्तसारन्त्वादाय नापकार्यं यथाबलम् ॥

Or, in their discourses, you should not speak anything in haste. Grasping the essence of what they say, you should never thwart them, if ever you have the ability to do so.

[177-178]

श्रद्धयैव हि दातव्यमश्रद्धाभाजनेष्वपि ॥
श्रीर्विभूतिस्तया देयं देयं चापि सदा ह्रिया ।
भिया भयेन दातव्यं संविन्मैत्री तयापि च ॥

With reverence alone, indeed, should be given (whatever is to be given) even to undeserving persons. It should be given according to one's prosperity. And also, it should be given always with modesty. It should be given with fear, and also with friendliness.

It is said in the *Gītā* (XVII, 28): "Whatever is sacrificed, given, or done, and whatever austerity is practised, without reverence (*aśraddhayā*), it is called *asat*, O Pārtha; it is naught here or hereafter." Gifts should be given with faith, according to one's means, with modesty, with fear of the ruler or the public, and with friendliness in occasions like marriage.

[179-180]

एवं चेद्वर्तमानस्य श्रौतस्मार्तेषु कर्मसु ।
 वृत्ते वा विचिकित्सा स्यात्संशयो मतिविभ्रमात् ॥
 तस्मिन्कर्मणि वृत्ते वा विप्रः ये सूक्ष्मदर्शिनः ॥

स्वतन्त्रा अभियुक्ताश्च ऋजवः कामवर्जिताः ।
 यथा ते तत्र वर्तन्ते वर्तेथास्त्वं तथैव च ॥

If, while acting thus, there should be doubt, owing to confusion of mind, with regard to the rites enjoined in *śruti* and *smṛti* texts and also with regard to customary duties, you should behave in the same way alone in respect of these rites and duties as those Brāhmaṇas, who are able to discern the subtle points, who are independent and also well-versed, who are not cruel, who are free from passion, would act in such matters.

Doubts are likely to arise with regard to the instruction of both *śruti* and *smṛti*. For example, one may entertain a doubt whether the offering of oblation should be made when the sun has risen or when it has not yet risen, for *śruti* says one thing in one place (i.e., *udite juhoti*), and another thing in a different place (i.e., *anudite juhoti*). In cases of doubt such as this, one must act following the wise who happen to live there at that time, and who are really competent to decide as to the real meaning of the scriptural texts.

[181]

तथा शङ्कितदोषेषु यथोक्तमुपपादयेत् ।
 आदेशोऽत्र विधिर्ज्ञेय उपदेशः सुताय च ॥

In the same way, as to those who are suspected to be guilty of a blameworthy act, what has been stated above

must be done. Here *ādeśaḥ* must be understood as injunction. The advice is to the son and others.

The post-instruction given to the students by the preceptor beginning from *satyaṁ vada*, *dharmam cara*, etc., is, indeed, an injunction, and so all the duties enjoined here have to be done. The advice or the instruction (*upadeśaḥ*) with which we are familiar in *Itihāsa*, etc., (such as the one given by Vyāsa to Śuka) conveys the same idea which has been stated here.

[182]

रहस्यं सर्ववेदानां वेदोपनिषदुच्यते ।

अनुशासनमीशस्य ज्ञेयमेतत्परात्मनः ॥

The secret of all the Vedas is said to be *Vedopaniṣad*. This must be understood as the command of *Īśvara*, the supreme Self.

Satyaṁ vada, etc., taught in *śruti* and *smṛti* are enjoined by God and must be done. There is, for example, the *smṛti* text: "*Śruti* and *smṛti* are my own command."

[183]

यस्मादेवमतः सद्भिर्यथोक्तं यत्नमास्थितैः ।

उपासितव्यं कर्तव्यमेवञ्चैतत्समाचरेत् ॥

Since this is so, this as stated above has to be meditated upon (as what is to be done) and (then) should be performed by the righteous with effort.

[184-186]

प्रमादोत्थादपन्यायाद्गुरुशिष्याभिसङ्गतेः ।

प्रसक्तो यस्तयोर्द्वेषस्तच्छान्त्यै शान्तिरुच्यते ॥

स्याज्ज्ञानं फलवद्यस्माच्छान्तान्तःकरणे गुरौ ।

तस्येश्वरेणानन्यत्वाद्भूयः शान्तिरियं ततः ॥

भाव्यन्तु परिहाराय तन्मामात्रेदितीरणम् ।

आत्मनो ब्रह्मतां यस्मात्स्वतः सिद्धाम्प्रवक्ष्यति ॥

The peace-chant is uttered with a view to remove the ill-feeling which, in the mutual relation between the teacher and the pupil, may have arisen from unworthy act done unawares. (There should not be any ill-feeling between them, because) the knowledge imparted by the teacher is fruitful when the mind of the teacher is tranquil, for he is not different from *Īśvara*. Since *śruti* says, "That has protected me," the peace-chant which occurs again is intended for removing the future obstacles (in the way of Brahman-knowledge which is going to be taught); for *śruti* (in the sequel) will teach the eternal identity of the Self with Brahman.

In the first *anuvāka* of the *Śikṣāvallī* there is an invocation with a view to remove the obstacles in the way of the attainment of the lower knowledge (*aparavidyā*). In the beginning of the *Brahmavallī* (Chapter II) there is, again, invocation, viz., "May *Mitra* be propitious to us," etc., "May he protect us both together," etc., with a view to remove the obstacles in the way of Brahman-knowledge (*brahma-vidyā*) which is going to be taught in the next chapter called the *Brahmavallī*.

The disciple prays for, among other things, the absence of ill-feeling between him and the teacher. There may be occasion for displeasure due to unwitting lapses both on the part of the teacher and the disciple in their mutual relation. It is the ardent prayer of the disciple that there should not be any occasion for displeasure or ill-feeling between them.

There is no need for an invocation at this stage with regard to the *saguṇa-vidyā* which has been taught, for the latter has already produced its effects. This is obvious from the thanks-giving of the disciple as stated in the twelfth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad*. The disciple says: "That has protected me. That has protected the teacher," by way of expressing his gratitude to *Mitra*, *Varuṇa*, and other gods for removing the obstacles in the way of *saguṇa-vidyā*. So the invocation at the commencement of the second chapter called the *Brahmavallī* is intended for removing the obstacles in the way of attaining *nirguṇa-vidyā* to be taught in the following two chapters.

CHAPTER II

BRAHMAVALĪ

[1]

कामादयो यदज्ञानात्तज्ज्ञानात्स्यादकान्ता ।
अतःपरं तदैकात्म्यं वक्ष्यतेऽज्ञानवस्सरम् ॥

Desire, etc., arise due to the ignorance of that (Brahman). By knowing that (Brahman) freedom from desire takes place. Hence the knowledge of the unity of Brahman-Ātman which destroys ignorance will be explained in the sequel.

Saguṇa-vidyā was the theme of the previous chapter. In this chapter as well as in the next one, *nirguṇa-vidyā*, i.e., the knowledge of Brahman which is free from attributes and distinctions created by limiting adjuncts will be explained.

[2]

नानागतमनैतिह्यं प्रत्यगेकमविक्रियम् ।
अनादेयमहेयं यन्नमस्तस्मै सदादृशे ॥

Salutation to Brahman, the eternal consciousness, which is present in the manifold things, which is not known, which is the innermost Being, which is one and immutable, and which is neither to be secured nor avoided.

Sureśvara offers salutation to the non-dual Brahman-Ātman with devotion and faith.

Brahman, the ultimate reality, is all-pervasive. It is not known through the ordinary means of knowledge like perception, inference, etc. There is the *Taittiriya* text (II, ix, 1) which says: "That from which all speech along with the mind turns away, not having reached it." The *Chāndogya* (VI, ii, 1) says that Being is "one only, without a second." The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (VI, 19) speaks of it as that which

is "without parts, without activity, tranquil." Since it is all-pervasive, it is not what is to be secured. Being one's own Self, it cannot be given up. It is the eternal Witness-self of all.

[3]

यावन्त्युपासनान्यादावविरुद्धानि कर्मभिः ।

संहिताविषयादीनि स्युस्तान्यभ्युदयाय तु ॥

Meditations on the *samhitā*, etc., explained in the beginning are not opposed to rites. They are, indeed, for attaining prosperity.

In the previous chapter, meditations on the *samhitā*, etc., were dealt with. These meditations are conducive to the attainment of prosperity (*abhyudaya*) alone; they cannot lead to liberation (*mokṣa*). Hence the commencement of this chapter which instructs on the knowledge of Brahman that leads to liberation.

[4]

न चैतावद्वष्टम्भात्कामकर्मोद्भवत्वतः ।

सर्वानर्थैकबीजस्य मोहस्यास्ति निराक्रिया ॥

By the support of the combination of *karma* and *upāsana*, the removal of ignorance which is the seed of all evil cannot take place, since it (i e., ignorance) is the cause of desire and action.

It may be argued that, though meditations by themselves cannot lead to liberation, they can be the means to liberation in combination with rites. But this argument is not tenable. *Avidyā* is the cause of desire (*kāma*) and action (*karma*), and so there is no conflict between *avidyā* and *karma*. In other words, *avidyā* cannot be removed by combining *karma* and *upāsana*. Knowledge alone which is opposed to it can remove it.

[5]

तस्मात्संसारमूलस्य भृशमुच्छित्तयेऽधुना ।

यथाभूतार्थबोद्ध्यात्मज्ञानं सम्यक्प्रवक्ष्यते ॥

Hence for the sake of completely destroying the root cause of bondage, the knowledge which brings out the true nature of the existent Self is now well explained.

[6]

नित्यकर्माद्यनुष्ठानाच्छुद्धान्तःकरणः पुमान् ।
विरक्तश्चाग्रजाल्हाभात्स्वप्नपुत्रादिलाभवत् ॥

A person who has become pure in mind by the performance of obligatory rites, etc., and who is free from attachment to the fruits which have accrued in the waking experience, in the same way as one is free from attachment to the son, etc., seen in dream, (is eligible for knowledge).

A *sannyāsin* who has a pure mind, who is free from attachment, and who has renounced all rites is eligible for the pursuit of Brahman-knowledge.

[7]

प्रत्यक्षागमलिङ्गैर्हि यद्यत्कर्मोद्भवम्फलम् ।
तत्क्षयिष्विति विज्ञाय विरक्तो नरकाद्यथा ॥

Knowing through perception, Scripture, and inference that whatever fruit is obtained through *karma* is, indeed, perishable, a person becomes free from attachment to it, as (he is free from attachment) to hell.

The knowledge that whatever is produced by *karma* is perishable helps a person who has a pure mind to be non-attached. This knowledge may be obtained through perception (*pratyakṣa*), for we see very often in our experience that objects which are produced perish. It may be obtained through inference (*anumāna*) such as: "This object is perishable, for it is produced and whatever is produced is perishable." It may also be obtained through Scripture (*āgama*); consider, for instance, the *Muṇḍaka* text (I, ii, 12) which says: "Having scrutinised the worlds won by works, let a *Brāhmaṇa* arrive at non-attachment."

[8]

अपास्ताशेषदोषं यत्सर्वकामनिरासकृत् ।

तदनाप्तं तमोमात्रात्प्रसिद्धयैव हि तद्यतः ॥

That (state of liberation) which is devoid of all blemishes and which removes all desires appears to be unattained only due to ignorance, for it (i.e., ignorance) is, indeed, only in our experience.

Liberation (*mokṣa*) is eternal, ever-existent. If one thinks that it is what is to be *attained*, it is on account of *avidyā* which conceals its true nature. *Avidyā* which appears to be well-established in our experience is not really established by any *pramāṇa*. Though it is *prasiddha*, it is not *pramāṇa-siddha*. And so it is removable by knowledge.

[9]

तदनाप्तिकृदज्ञानध्वस्तयेऽलं न कारकम् ।

प्रत्यग्ज्ञानेऽधिकार्यस्मात्त्यक्तपूर्वोक्तसाधनः ॥

Since knowledge, but not action, is competent to destroy ignorance which makes it (i.e., *mokṣa*) unattained, a person who has abandoned the means (viz., *karma*) mentioned above is eligible for Self-knowledge.

Knowledge and ignorance are mutually repellent, but not action and ignorance. Hence ignorance can be removed by knowledge, and not by action. A *sannyāsin* who has renounced all works and who has the fourfold means of eligibility (*sādhana-catuṣṭaya*) is the right person to pursue Brahman-knowledge.

[10-11]

त्याग एव हि सर्वेषां मोक्षसाधनमुत्तमम् ।

त्यजतैव हि तज्ज्ञेयं त्यक्तुः प्रत्यक्परम्पदम् ॥

त्यज धर्ममधर्मञ्च तथा सत्यानृते अपि ।

न्यासो ब्रह्मेति च प्राह तैत्तिरीयश्रुतिस्तथा ॥

Renunciation alone is, verily, the best of all the means to liberation. Only by a person who has renounced all, that (Brahman) can be known. A person who renounces attains the Self, the supreme abode. (*Smṛiti* says): "Renounce *dharma* as well as *adharma*, and likewise the true and the false." In the same way, the *Taittirīyā-śruti* also says: "Renunciation is Brahman."

The *śruti* text which is quoted here is from the *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, XXI, 2.

[12]

क्षयिष्णुसाध्यं विज्ञाय निःशेषं कर्म साधनम् ।
तत्त्यागसाधनस्तस्मात्प्रयगज्ञाने प्रवर्तते ॥

Hence, knowing that all works which are means lead to perishable results, a person, equipped with the renunciation of works, seeks to attain Self-knowledge.

[13]

उत्पत्त्यादि स्वतश्चेत्स्यात्कर्मणा किम्प्रयोजनम् ।
स्वत एव न चेत्तत्स्याद्द्वन्द्वं स्यात्कर्मणात्र किम् ॥

If origination, etc., are ever-existent (in liberation), of what use is action there? If they are never existent there, pray tell, what is the use of action in this regard?

This verse brings out the futility of action in respect of liberation. The result of *karma* must be one of these four, viz., (1) origination, (2) attainment, (3) transformation, and (4) purification. If any one of these is ever-existent in liberation, *karma* is not required therefor. If, on the contrary, none of them is possible at any time in liberation, *karma* has to be ruled out as there is no scope for it in respect of liberation.

[14]

उत्पत्त्यादौ तु यच्छक्तं हेतुमात्रमपेक्षते ।
कर्मव्यपेक्षा तस्यैव घटोत्पत्तौ मृदो यथा ॥

But a thing which is capable of being produced, etc., needs only a cause (for its origination, etc.). For that alone, there is the need of action, in the same way as clay (needs action) for the production of a pot.

[15]

नित्यं न भवनं यस्य यस्य वा नित्यभूतता ।
न तस्य क्रियमाणत्वं खपुष्पाकाशयोर्विव ॥

That which never comes into existence like the sky-flower or that which is ever-existent like ether can never be produced by an act.

[16]

कर्तव्यता न साध्यस्य विदितत्वाद्विधीयते ।
दुःखत्वाच्च न यागस्य ह्युपायस्त्वबोध्यते ॥

Since the end is known, it is not enjoined as what is to be achieved. The performance of a sacrifice, too, (is not enjoined), since it is painful. The means, indeed, is made known by (Scripture).

The Mīmāṃsaka argues that the ritual section (*karma-kāṇḍa*) of the *Veda* has validity inasmuch as it enjoins the performance of *karma*. In the same way, the knowledge section (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*) has validity since it enjoins the practice of meditation. There is, for instance, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (II, iv, 5): "The Self should be realized — should be heard of, reflected on, and meditated upon." If so, it is wrong to say, the Mīmāṃsaka contends, that only a person who has renounced all works is eligible for Brahman-knowledge.

This argument is wrong. There is no scope for injunction even in the *karma-kāṇḍa*. *Yāga* and *svarga* are related as means and end. What is it that is enjoined here? Is it the end or the means? It cannot be the end, for heaven which a person desires as an end is already known to him without any injunction. Nor can it be the means, for the performance of *yāga* is painful; it cannot be the case that Scripture which has man's happiness in view compels him to do what is painful.

Scripture purports to reveal what is not known (*ajñātajñāpakam sūtram*). That *yāga* is the means to *svarga* is not known by us. The ritual section makes known to us that the one is the means to the other. In the same way, the *Upaniṣad* makes known to us the non-difference of Brahman and Ātman; here also there is no scope for injunction.

[17]

विजिज्ञासस्व तदिति ब्रह्मज्ञाने प्रवर्तकम् ।

जिज्ञास्यलक्षणोक्तिः स्याद्यतो वा इति च श्रुतिः ॥

The declaration "Crave to know that (Brahman) well" prompts (a person) towards Brahman-knowledge. And, the *śruti* text "That from which..." states the definition of Brahman which we desire to know.

If there is no scope for injunction both in the ritual and knowledge sections of the *Veda*, what is it that prompts a person to perform a certain action or to pursue knowledge? It is desire that provides the motivatory force in both the cases. A person who has the desire to know Brahman pursues Brahman-knowledge in the same way as one who has a desire for heaven performs the appropriate sacrifice. That is why the text which occurs in the sequel says: "Crave to know that (Brahman) well." (*Bhṛguvallī*, first *anuvāka*)

Brahman which is sought to be known may be defined by means of its accidental attributes (*taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*) and its essential nature (*svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*). The *śruti* text (*Bhṛguvallī*, first *anuvāka*) "That

from which all beings are born....." (*yato vā imāṇi bhūtāni jāyante*) contains the twofold definition of Brahman. Creation, maintenance, and dissolution of world are the accidental attributes of Brahman, while existence, consciousness, and bliss constitute its essential nature. The word *yataḥ* in the text mentioned above is interpreted as containing the *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* of Brahman.

[18]

कोशप्रत्यक्प्रवेशेन पूर्वपूर्वप्रहाणतः ।

कारकादिनिषेधेन ह्युपायो ब्रह्मवेदने ॥

The means of knowing Brahman consists, indeed, in abandoning one after another (the different sheaths such as the *annamayakośa*), in rejecting the instruments of action, etc., and in passing through the sheaths inside.

One must give up action, the instruments of action, etc., which involve duality, and proceed inward to the Self by rejecting *annamaya-kośa*, *prāṇamaya-kośa*, etc., as not-Self.

[19]

अविद्योद्धूततृष्णेन पुंसां यत्कल्पितम्फलम् ।

अनन्तफलसिद्ध्यर्थं तदनूक्तिः प्रवृत्तये ॥

The fruit is conceived by the person, who longs for it due to the desire caused by ignorance, (as something limited and as what is yet to be attained). Its restatement (by the *śruti* text) is to make him pursue (knowledge) for attaining the unlimited fruit.

This verse explains why the *śruti* text *brahmavid āpnoti param* even at the outset refers to the fruit which accrues to the knower of Brahman.

There are nine *anuvākas* in the *Brahmavallī*. A detailed explanation of the first *anuvāka* starts from this verse onwards till verse (256).

[20]

कर्तुः कर्माणि कार्यार्थमनात्मफलदानि हि ।
पुरोक्तानि यतो नासावन्यथातः प्रवर्तते ॥

Since the rites mentioned earlier (in the ritual section) yield, indeed, to the doer a fruit which is not-Self, a person (who desires liberation) does not, therefore, proceed in a different way.

The performance of *karma* as taught in the ritual section leads to a fruit such as heaven which is different from the Self and which is perishable. Liberation is not what is to be accomplished through *karma*. A seeker after liberation will not proceed in the direction of *karma*, but will pursue Brahman-knowledge.

[21]

क्षयिष्णु साधनाधीनं फलम्बुद्ध्वा वितृष्णतः ।
कामहेतोरनुच्छित्तोरपरात्परमीप्सति ॥

Realizing that a fruit which is accomplished through a means is perishable, a person who has no desire for it longs for the highest fruit (viz., liberation) which is different from the inferior fruit (of *karma*), because *avidyā*, the cause of desire, is not destroyed.

[22]

साध्यसाधनवद्वाक्यं तद्विरुद्धार्थसिद्धये ।
प्राह ब्रह्मविदाम्प्रोति श्रुतिः प्रत्यक्प्रवेशिनी ॥

By way of leading (the aspirant) towards the inward Self, Scripture utters the means-end-statement, "The knower of Brahman attains the highest," with a view to the attainment of what is quite the contrary.

The *śruti* text *brahmavid āpnoti param* states aphoristically both the means and the end. It says that knowledge is the means to liberation

which is the end. Though means-end relation is not applicable to *mokṣa* which is eternal, Scripture adopts this procedure as a methodological device with a view to initiate the spiritual aspirant into Brahman-knowledge.

[23]

शिखा ते वर्धते वत्स गुडूचीं श्रद्धया पिब ।
मातेव प्रेयेद्दालं सदसम्भाव्यसिद्धये ॥

Just as a mother prompts a child by saying, "Dear child, drink the medicine with faith: your hair will grow," so also Scripture prompts a person with a view to the attainment of liberation, not attainable through any means (other than knowledge).

[24]

साध्यसाधनसम्बन्धात्प्रसक्ता येह दोषधीः ।
सा चैकरूपविज्ञानशिखिप्लुष्टा विनङ्क्ष्यति ॥

The thought of defect in this (liberation) which may arise on account of means-end relation is destroyed being burnt by the fire of knowledge that Brahman is one.

It may be argued that, since whatever is accomplished is perishable, liberation, too, inasmuch as it is accomplished through knowledge is transitory. But this argument is wrong. The category of means-end relation is applicable only in the state of ignorance. Liberation consists in realizing the true nature of Brahman-Ātman. Brahman, the ultimate reality, is one and non-dual; it transcends the means-end relation. It is neither a means to an end, nor an end to be accomplished through a means, for there is no second to Brahman. If it is thought that Brahman is what is accomplished through knowledge, it is because of ignorance. Though Brahman is eternal and is ever-attained, it appears as what is to be attained due to ignorance. When there arises Brahman-knowledge, ignorance gets removed; when ignorance which suppresses the true and projects the false is removed,

release is said to be attained by the knower of the truth. For *brahma-prāpti* or release what is needed is the knowledge of the truth, viz., that the *jīva* is essentially of the nature of the eternal, free, self-luminous, non-dual Brahman. Release, therefore, signifies the realization of what is ever-existent, and not the accomplishment of anything new. The *Chāndogya* text (VIII, iii, 4) characterizes liberation as remaining in one's own form. If the knower of the truth accomplishes anything new, if the *jīva* attains a new form which it did not have already, it is absurd to say that liberation consists in remaining in one's own form. One's *own form* is not to be attained; and what is attained or reached will not be one's *own form*.

[25]

मा भूदण्वपि मे दुःखं सुख्येव स्यामहं सदा ।
इति स्वतोऽभिलाषोऽयं सत्येव विषये भवेत् ॥

This inborn desire (of every one), "Let me not have even an atom of misery, and let me always be only happy," can take place only if there is this object (of desire, viz., liberation).

It may be argued that there is no such thing as liberation, and that the desire for liberation must, therefore, be ruled out. This argument is untenable. The pleasure derived from the sensuous objects is evanescent. But everyone desires happiness and nothing but happiness all the time. Such a spontaneous desire for eternal happiness can be accounted for only if it is admitted that there is the state of liberation which is eternal bliss.

[26]

अज्ञातमोक्षरूपोऽपि कैवल्याय प्रवर्तते ।
अलं यथोक्तकामेद्धिषणो भवभीषितः ॥

Even though the nature of liberation is not known, a person with his mind burning with the desire mentioned above, and filled with the fear of bondage, endeavours for liberation.

[27]

प्रवृत्तिजनकं यस्मात्सर्वत्रैव प्रयोजनम् ।

श्रुतिर्ब्रह्मविदानोतीत्याह पुंसः प्रलुब्धये ॥

Since the end to be attained is everywhere the cause of activity, Scripture declares that "the knower of Brahman attains (the highest)" with a view to kindle desire (for Brahman-knowledge) in the person.

[28]

फलश्रुत्यङ्कुशाकृष्टः श्रवणादौ प्रवर्तते ।

तत्पूर्वकं यतो ज्ञानं श्रुतिश्चैवमभाषत ॥

Moved by the hook of the fruit declared in the *śruti* text, a person resorts to the hearing of the text, etc., because knowledge can be acquired through them. Scripture also has declared thus.

A spiritual aspirant who fulfils the fourfold requirement of eligibility shall resort to the hearing of the texts (*śravaṇa*) followed by reflection (*manana*) and meditation (*nididhyāsana*) which are considered to be the principal proximate means (*mukhya-antaraṅga-sādhana*) to Brahman-knowledge. Commenting on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (II, iv, 5), "The Self should be realized — should be heard of, reflected on, and meditated upon," Śaṅkara says that the Self should first be heard of from a teacher and from Scripture, then reflected on through reasoning and then steadfastly meditated upon. He adds: "Thus only is the Self realized when these means viz., hearing, reflection, and meditation, have been gone through. When these three are combined, then only true realization of the unity of Brahman is accomplished, not otherwise — by hearing alone."

[29]

लौकिकी वैदिकी चाथ प्रवृत्तियैह काचन ।

नर्ते प्रयोजनं यस्मात्तदेवातः प्रवृत्तिकृत् ॥

Since there is no activity here whatsoever, whether secular or scriptural, without (the thought of) the result, the latter alone induces activity.

There is no distinction between secular and scriptural activities in respect of the motivatory factor. It should not be thought that, while in secular matters a person is moved by the thought of the result (*prayojanam*), in scriptural matters he proceeds to do certain actions because he is enjoined to do so. If a person begins to do a *karma* as taught in Scripture, it is because of the result which he wants to attain thereby, and not because of the scriptural injunction.

[30]

ब्रह्मविद्ब्रह्म वेत्तीति यः स आप्नोति तत्परम् ।
सत्यादिलक्षणं ब्रह्म वक्ष्यते तदृचा स्फुटम् ॥

Brahmavid, that is, a person who knows Brahman attains the Supreme. That Brahman which is of the nature of existence, etc., will be clearly explained by *śruti* (in the sequel).

[31]

फलोक्तिः परमाप्नोतीत्याप्ता ब्रह्मविदुच्यते ।
सामर्थ्याद्ब्रह्मविद्या तु परस्यावाप्तिसाधनम् ॥

The fruit is stated in the words "attains the Supreme"; the attainer of the fruit is spoken of as "the knower of Brahman." From what is conveyed by this sentence it follows that Brahman-knowledge is the means to the attainment of the Supreme.

[32]

स्वर्गं यथामिहोत्रेण यजमानः प्रसाधयेत् ।
परावाप्तिं तथा कुर्याद्ब्रह्मविद्ब्रह्मविद्यया ॥

Just as a sacrificer has to attain heaven by means of *agnihotra*, so also the knower of Brahman has to attain the Supreme by means of Brahman-knowledge.

[33]

ब्रह्मैवात्र परं ग्राह्यं तज्ज्ञानं नान्यसिद्धये ।

अन्यज्ज्ञानं हि नान्यस्य क्वचिदप्याप्तये यतः ॥

Here (in the text *Brahmavid āpnoti param*) Brahman alone is meant by the word "supreme" (*param*). Brahman-knowledge cannot be a means to the attainment of something else; for the knowledge of one thing cannot, indeed, anywhere be the means to the attainment of something else.

[34]

देशकालादिसम्भेदपूर्विकावाप्तिरिष्यते ।

देशकालाद्यभिन्नस्य कथं सेत्युच्यते यथा ॥

सर्वात्मनोऽप्यनासिः स्यादशमस्येव मोहजा ॥

Attainment is possible in the case of that which is limited by space, time, etc., involving duality. How is that possible in the case of Brahman which is not limited by space, time, etc.? The answer is that though (Brahman is) all-pervasive, it is non-attained due to ignorance, like the tenth man.

Brahman, it may be argued, is not an object of attainment. One can attain an object which is limited by space, time, and other objects. But Brahman is all-pervasive, eternal, and the Self of all; and so it is not limited by space, time, and other objects. It may, therefore, be objected that Brahman cannot be an object of attainment.

It is true that attainment in the literal sense of the term is not possible in the case of Brahman. The attainment here is not real, but figurative (*aupacārika*). Consider the case of a person who wrongly thinks, due to ignorance, that the tenth man is missing, though he

happens to be that tenth man. When his ignorance is removed, there is the "attainment" of the tenth man. In the same way, on account of ignorance Brahman is not attained; and when ignorance is removed it appears as if Brahman is attained though the truth is that it is always ever-attained. So the attainment of Brahman is not real, but only figurative.

[35]

पञ्चवन्नमयाद्येषु ह्यहमस्मीति विभ्रमात् ॥

Indeed, owing to the erroneous cognition of the five sheaths such as the *annamaya-kośa* as "I am (that)," (there is non-attainment of Brahman).

[36]

दशमोऽस्मीत्यतो ज्ञानादज्ञानध्वस्तिवर्त्मना ।
दशमास्तिवदासिः स्याद्ब्रह्मणोऽज्ञानहानतः ॥

Just as from the knowledge that "I am the tenth," the tenth man is attained through the destruction of ignorance, so also there is the attainment of Brahman through the destruction of ignorance.

The non-attainment of Brahman is due to ignorance, and its attainment is by means of knowledge.

[37]

विभिन्नवेत्तृवेद्यादौ गौणं ब्रह्म यतस्ततः ।
अभिन्नवेत्तृवेद्यादि ग्राह्यं मुख्यार्थसिद्धये ॥

Since the word *brahma* will be understood in the secondary sense so long as the knower, the known, etc., are admitted to be different from Brahman, the knower, the known, etc., must be viewed as non-different from Brahman with a view to get the primary sense (of the word *brahma*).

If the attainment of Brahman is real, Brahman cannot be infinite, great which is, indeed, the primary meaning of the word *brahma*. In that case we may have to adopt the secondary sense by giving up the primary meaning. If we are to retain the primary sense, then Brahman must be understood as one and non-dual, as free from distinctions such as the knower, the known, etc. It follows, therefore, that Brahman appears to be different from the knower due to ignorance, and that it is attained through knowledge when ignorance is removed. In short, the attainment of Brahman is only figurative.

[38]

अन्यदृष्टाविवातोऽत्र न नियोगो मनागपि ।
मोहप्रध्वंसमात्रेण निवृत्ते रोगहानिवत् ॥

There is, therefore, no need for an injunction at all, as there is (the need) in the state of duality (based on ignorance) inasmuch as here (when Brahman-knowledge is attained) the evil (viz., bondage) gets removed by the mere destruction of ignorance, (in the same way as a sick man becomes his normal self) on the destruction of the disease.

That the attainment of Brahman is real and not figurative may be argued in a different way. Even the knower of Brahman, according to this argument, is enjoined to practise meditation on Brahman (*brahma-dhyāna*) with a view to attain Brahman. Just as the attainment of heaven (*svarga*) through the performance of sacrifice is real, so also the attainment of Brahman through the practice of meditation, it may be contended, is real.

This argument is wrong as it is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of Brahman-knowledge. There is scope for injunction so long as *avidyā* persists giving rise to distinctions such as the knower and the known. But when Brahman-knowledge arises, ignorance is destroyed; and along with ignorance, its effect, viz., bondage, also gets removed. There is, therefore, no need for the practice of meditation on the part of the knower of Brahman (*brahmavid*), one in whom Brahman-knowledge has dawned. It means that there is no scope for

injunction once Brahman-knowledge has taken place. *Mokṣa*, according to Advaita, is remaining in one's own state (*svatūpāvasthā-lakṣaṇo-mokṣaḥ*). Just as a person remains in his normal condition when the ailment he is suffering from is removed, so also the *jīva* remains in its own state as the ever-free, self-luminous Brahman when *avidyā*, as well as its effect, is removed.

[39]

कर्तृताम्प्रत्यगालिङ्ग्य योऽकर्त्रात्मानमीप्सति ।

उत्कपिशाचं सोऽभ्येति शीतार्तः पावकेच्छया ॥

A person who invests the inward Self with agency and then wishes to attain the Self which is not an agent is like one who, suffering from cold and seeking for fire, approaches a fire-demon.

The Self by its very nature is free from agency, etc. Treating it as an agent in the real sense, one cannot realize it as a non-agent. The attempt to realize the Self which is free from agency, etc., by means of meditation which involves distinctions such as agency will not only be futile, but will also strengthen the clutches of bondage.

[40]

करोमीति धिया चैतद्ब्रह्मास्मीति हि लभ्यते ।

ब्रूतालमेऽस्य को हेतुर्न ह्यतोऽन्योऽस्यदर्शनात् ॥

If it were the case that a person who has the notion "I am the agent" should attain the realization to the effect "I am this Brahman," pray tell, what is the cause of its non-attainment? There is, indeed, no other cause than ignorance.

It is impossible to realize the Self which is neither an agent nor an enjoyer by knowing it as an agent and an enjoyer in the real sense. Consider the case of a person who looks upon the Self all the time, excepting when he is in the state of deep sleep, as an agent and an enjoyer. In spite of the fact that he has such a knowledge all the

time except in the state of deep sleep, he has not realized Brahman. There is no other cause for his non-realization than his ignorance of the true nature of the Self as devoid of agency, etc.

[41]

तस्मादविद्यासम्भूतकर्तृ प्रत्यगविक्रियम् ।

अविद्यानर्थतत्कार्यप्रत्याख्यानेन बोध्यते ॥

Therefore the immutable inward Self, which is an agent due to the association of ignorance, is taught (by Scripture) by sublating ignorance and its evil effects.

[42]

कर्तुर्ज्ञातुर्हि या दृष्टिः सामान्याद्यर्थसंश्रया ।

तत्प्रत्यगात्मदृष्ट्या तां प्रत्याख्यायाश्नुते परम् ॥

A person, indeed, attains the Supreme by sublating the cognition of the universal, etc., based on the agency of the knower, through the knowledge of the inward Self.

Every cognition, whether it is of a universal (*sāmānya*) or a particular (*vīśeṣa*), is obtained through the modification of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). Agency (*karṣṭvam*) and cognizership (*jñātṛtvam*) are the attributes of the internal organ and not of the Self or the 'I' which is immutable and which is free from attributes. As a result of the superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of the nature of the internal organ on that of the Self, a person says: "I am the agent," "I am the cognizer." The attainment of the Supreme, the highest good, which is liberation, consists in the removal of the cognition of the various objects such as the universal, etc., which are not-Self by the immutable knowledge (*kūṭastha-dṛṣṭi*) which is Brahman-Ātman.

[43]

अशेषानन्दवल्लभ्यर्थसूत्रमाद्यमिदं वचः ।

यस्मात्तस्मात्तदर्थस्य ह्याविष्कृद्गुदीर्यते ॥

Since this statement at the beginning expresses aphoristically the purport of the entire *Ānandavallī*, (the subsequent) *R̥g mantra* which brings out its meaning clearly is uttered.

So far the meaning of the *śruti* text *brahmanid āpnoti param*, which is very brief, has been explained. Since the text speaks about "the knower of Brahman", it is necessary to know what Brahman is. What follows in the sequel sets forth the nature of Brahman.

[44]

विशेषणविशेष्यत्वात्सत्यादीन्यत एव च ।

चत्वार्येकविभक्तीनि नीलरक्तोत्पलादिवत् ॥

As in the expressions, "blue lily", "red lily," and so on, the four words, viz., real, etc., are in the same case, because they are related as attribute and substantive.

The *Upaniṣad* defines Brahman as real (*satyam*), knowledge (*jñānam*), and infinite (*anantam*). Here all the four words are in the same case, referring to one and the same thing. While the words *satyam* *jñānam* and *anantam* are attributes, the word *brahma* is the substantive.

[45]

वेद्यत्वेन यतो ब्रह्म प्राधान्येन विवक्षितम् ।

तस्माद्विशेष्यं विज्ञेयं ततोऽन्यत्स्याद्विशेषणम् ॥

Inasmuch as Brahman, being the thing to be known, is intended as the principal, it is, therefore, to be understood as the substantive. The words other than that are attributes.

[46]

नीलं महत्सुगन्धीति विशिष्यन्त्युत्पलं यथा ।

एकाधिकरणान्येवं सत्यादीनि परं महत् ॥

Just as the words "blue," "big," and "fragrant" by qualifying lily are in co-ordinate relation, so also the words "real", etc., by qualifying the supreme Brahman are in co-ordinate relation.

[47]

एवं विभज्यमानं सत्सत्यमित्येवमादिभिः ।

स्वविशेषविरुद्धेभ्यो धर्मिभ्यः स्यान्निराकृतम् ॥

Being thus qualified by words such as "real", Brahman stands distinguished from all other substances qualified by attributes opposed to its own.

The three attributes, viz., real, knowledge, and infinite, serve to distinguish Brahman from all other things which are unreal (*anṛta*), insentient (*acetana*), and finite (*paricchinna*).

[48]

एवं च सति तज्ज्ञातं यदन्येभ्योऽवधार्यते ।

नीलोत्पलादिवद्ब्रह्म नान्यथानवधारणात् ॥

As in the case of "blue lily", etc., Brahman is ascertained by distinguishing it from others. When it is thus distinguished, it can be said to be known, and not otherwise since it is not ascertained (through differentiation).

When we say, for example, that a particular lily is blue, it serves to differentiate that flower from other lilies which are red, etc. A blue lily is said to be known only when it is known as distinguished from the red lily, etc. This is the case with regard to everything. It may be said in a general way that a thing is said to be known only when it is known as distinguished from all else.

[49]

ननु व्यभिचरद्वस्तु स्याद्विशेष्यं विशेषणैः ।

ब्रह्मान्तरादते त्वत्र कुतो ब्रूहि विशेष्यता ॥

If an object is different (from others of the same class) it can be a substance qualified by attributes. But, here, since there is no other Brahman, pray, tell, how can it be the qualified?

An objection against the explanation of Brahman as the qualified and *satyam*, etc., as attributes is stated in this verse.

One object can be distinguished from others of the same class by means of attributes which qualify it. A particular lily can be distinguished from other lilies by using attributes such as blue, red, etc. But that is not possible, it is argued, in the case of Brahman which is said to be one and non-dual. Unlike the blue lily which can be distinguished from the red lily, etc., there is no other Brahman from which it has to be distinguished by means of attributes. If so, how can it be the qualified?

[50]

विशेषणविशेष्यत्वे सति दोषः प्रसज्यते ।
लक्ष्यलक्षणतां यातु न दोषोऽत्र मनागपि ॥

If there is attribute-substantive relation, the defect (mentioned above) will arise. Let there be the defined-definition relation. In this (explanation) there is not even a trace of defect.

The objection stated in the previous verse is answered here. The words *satyam*, *jñānam* and *anantam* have been used in the defining sense and not in the qualifying sense; and so Brahman is the defined (*lakṣya*) and "real", etc., state the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of Brahman.

[51]

अनेकात्मविशेष्यस्थमागृहीतविशेष्यकम् ।
सजातीयान्निराकर्तुं विशेषणमिहोच्यते ॥

Here, that is said to be an attribute which, abiding in a heterogeneous object (which belongs to a class of many similar objects) and coinhering in the object it qualifies, distinguishes it from others of the same class.

The relation that obtains between the definition and the thing defined is different from that which obtains between the attribute and the thing qualified. This calls for an explanation of (1) an attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*), (2) a substantive (*viśeṣya*), (3) definition (*lakṣaṇa*), and (4) the thing defined (*lakṣya*).

An attribute is that which distinguishes an object which it qualifies from others of its own class (*samānājātiyāt-vyāvartakam viśeṣaṇam*).

[52]

सामान्येतरसंयुक्तमनेकगुणसंयुतम् ।

सम्भव्यसम्भविगुणं विशेष्यं तत्प्रचक्षते ॥

A substantive is said to be that which is in association with the universal and other features, and which possesses many qualities which are present in some and absent in others.

Every object has many specific qualities (*viśeṣa-dharmāḥ*) in addition to the universal or the class characteristic (*sāmānya-dharma*). Take the case of a lily which is blue. It is characterized by liliness (*utpalatvam*) which it has in common with other lilies. It has also certain specific or particular qualities such as the blue colour, which distinguishes it from other lilies which are red, white, and so on. So a specific quality, e.g., the blue colour of a lily, is present in some, but absent in others. If every lily were characterized by the blue colour, the latter would cease to be a specific quality, and the object also would cease to be a substantive in the absence of a specific quality to qualify it. So a substantive (*viśeṣya*) is that which is distinguished only from other objects of its own class (*sajātiyamātrāt-vyāvartitaṁ viśeṣyam*).

[53]

विशेष्यान्तरशेषं यत्स्वविशेष्यान्यबुद्धिकृत् !
परिकल्पितसम्बन्धलक्षणम्भावलक्षणम् ॥

A definition of an object is that which isolates all other things from the thing defined, i.e., which causes the differentiating knowledge in respect of the defined, and which is related to the defined (through identity).

A definition (*lakṣaṇa*) distinguishes the thing defined from everything else, from the objects of its own and other classes (*sajātīyādvijā-
tīyācca sarvasmādyāvartakāṃ lakṣaṇam*).

[54]

निरस्यति यथैवैकं तथैवान्यद्विरोधि यत् ।
स्वात्मनैवैकरूपेण लक्ष्यमत्र निगद्यते ॥

Here, the defined is said to be that which, through its definition which is one, is distinguished from other objects of its own class, as also of other classes which are opposed to it.

A thing is said to be the defined (*lakṣya*) when it is marked off from all else by its definition (*svalakṣaṇena sarvasmādyāvartitāṃ yattal-
lakṣyam*).

[55]

सत्यादयः परार्थत्वादितरेतरनिस्पृहाः ।
एकैकस्त्वत एवैषां विशेष्यार्थेन बध्यते ॥

The words, *satyam*, etc., are unrelated with one another because they subserve something else. Hence, each of them is related with the substantive.

It was stated in verse (50) that the words *satyam*, etc., have been used in the defining and not in the qualifying sense. It is now argued

that the explanation of the text in terms of attribute-substantive relation is equally tenable.

The words *satyam*, *jñānam*, and *anantam* have their purport in Brahman which is the chief object of knowledge. And also there is no mutual expectancy among these words. Each of them is independent of others, and is directly related to Brahman. Thus we get: *satyam brahma* (Brahman is the real), *jñānam brahma* (Brahman is knowledge), and *anantam brahma* (Brahman is infinite). Being thus related to the word "Brahman" which is the substantive, they serve to distinguish it from what is not real, what is insentient, and what is finite.

[56]

सकृत्प्रमितरूपाद्यद्रूपमन्यत्कदाचन ।

नैव प्रगद्यते सत्यं तस्मात्कार्यविलक्षणम् ॥

That is real which never attains another form different from that in which it has been once known. Hence it is different from effect.

A thing is said to be real when it does not change the nature which is ascertained to be its own. Consider the case of clay. The nature which is ascertained to be its own does not undergo any change. But it is quite different in the case of the objects made of clay. What is known as a pot at one time may be seen later on in the form of potsherds. A pot which is an effect is a mutable thing. The form in which it is known does not remain the same, and so pot and other objects which are produced, which are modifications, are unreal. That is why the *Chāndogya* text (VI, i, 4) says, by way of illustration, that the clay alone is real, and that the modifications such as pot, and so on are unreal. Since Brahman is real, it is different from things which are produced (*kārya-vilakṣaṇam*).

[57]

यावान् कश्चिद्विकारोऽत्र ब्रह्म तस्मान्निवर्तितम् ।

भजते कारणत्वं तत्ताथाचैतन्यधर्मकम् ॥

Here (in that case) Brahman which is free from all kinds of modifications assumes the nature of cause, and thereby becomes insentient.

This verse states an objection. It may be argued that, if Brahman is other than effect, it has to be treated as cause (*kāraṇa*) and also as insentient (*jaḍa*) like clay.

[58]

तदोषद्वयनुत्तर्य ज्ञानं ब्रह्मेत्युदीर्यते ।
अनेकार्थाभिसम्बन्धात्मिकमर्थं ज्ञानमुच्यते ॥

With a view to remove the two defects, it is said that Brahman is knowledge. Since the word "knowledge" is used in different meanings, what is the meaning in which it is used here?

The word *jñāna*, which qualifies Brahman, is intended to show that Brahman is neither the cause nor insentient.

The word *jñāna* may be derived in four ways conveying the sense of (1) the knower, the agent of the act of knowing, i.e., *jānāti iti jñānam*, (2) the object known, i.e., *jñāyate iti jñānam*, (3) the instrument of knowledge, i.e., *jñāyate anena iti jñānam*, and (4) knowledge, i.e., *jñaptiriti jñānam*. If so, it may be asked, which of these is meant when it is said *jñānam brahma*?

[59]

ब्रह्मणो भेदकं यस्मादानन्त्येन च सङ्गतेः ।
ज्ञप्तिर्ज्ञानमिति न्याय्यमन्यथा दोषदर्शनात् ॥

Since it is used as an attribute of Brahman and since it goes along with the word "infinite", it is proper to say that the word *jñāna* means knowledge; otherwise, it is open to objection.

If the word *jñāna* which qualifies Brahman is derived in any other sense than that of knowledge itself (*jñaptiḥ*, *avabodhaḥ*), Brahman

will cease to be infinite. If, for example, we derive it in the sense of the knower and apply it to Brahman, the latter, as the knower, becomes delimited by the known as well as by knowledge. So it must be explained in such a way that it accords with the meaning of the word "infinite" (*anantam*) with which it is used to qualify Brahman. The only derivation which will be tenable in the context is that which conveys the sense of knowledge itself.

[60]

तस्मात्सत्यमनन्तं यज्ज्ञानं तदिह गृह्यते ।
भावसाधनमेवातः स्यादेतद्युक्तिदर्शनात् ॥

Therefore, knowledge which is real as well as infinite is here understood. Because of this reasoning, the abstract notion of the verb (i.e., knowledge itself) will hold good.

[61]

ज्ञानं ब्रह्मेति वचनादन्तवत्त्वमवाप तत् ।
ज्ञानस्य लौकिकस्येह ह्यन्तवत्त्वसमन्वयात् ॥

From the expression, "Brahman is knowledge," it (i.e., Brahman) may be thought of as finite, because empirical knowledge is, indeed, associated with finitude.

Empirical knowledge is momentary (*kṣaṇika*) and therefore limited. If Brahman is said to be of the nature of knowledge, it will follow, it may be argued, that it is finite.

[62]

अतस्तत्प्रतिषेधार्थमनन्तमिति शब्ध्यते ।
अन्तः सीमा तथेयत्ता तन्निषेधस्त्वनन्तता ॥

So in order to deny that (objection), the word "infinite" is used. The word *antaḥ* means limit, and also a fixed measure; and its opposite is infinitude.

The objection stated in the previous verse is now answered.

The cognition of an empirical object obtained through the modification of the mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) is finite. But Brahman which is of the nature of knowledge is immutable (*kūṭastha*). It is not *vṛtti-jñāna*, but *svarūpa-jñāna*. It is infinite (*ananta*) inasmuch as it transcends the limitations of space, time, and object.

[63]

अनृतादिनिषेधेन सत्यादीनामुपक्षयात् ।

ब्रह्मणश्चाप्रसिद्धत्वान्मिथ्यार्थञ्चेद्वचो न तत् ॥

If it be said that the sentence conveys the sense of a non-entity, since, the scope of the words "real", etc., comes to an end after negating the unreal, etc., and since Brahman is not known, it is not so.

It may be argued that the sentence, "Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite," does not set forth the nature of Brahman. Each one of the words in the sentence is meant only for negating something. The word *satyam* negates what is unreal; the word *jñānam* negates what is insentient; and the word *anantam* negates what is finite. So these words are not intended to reveal the nature of Brahman. Nor is Brahman known through any other source of knowledge such as perception. If so, the sentence has to be explained, according to this argument, as having its purport in a non-entity, a void (*śūnya*) and not in Brahman.

The untenability of this argument is shown in verses (64) to (69).

[64]

परमार्थमनालिङ्ग्य न दृष्टं वितथं क्वचित् ।

तस्माद्वा वितथं सर्वम्परमार्थैकनिष्ठितम् ॥

An illusion which does not rest on a real substratum is nowhere seen. Hence, all illusions are based only on the real.

An illusion cannot take place in the absence of a substratum. In the case of the rope-snake illusion, the rope which is in front is the substratum for the illusion to arise. It is the rope that is mistaken for a snake. Brahman is the substratum on which the pluralistic universe which is unreal, insentient, and finite is superimposed. Through the negation of the unreal, etc., the text intends to teach that Brahman is the reality (*paramārtha-vastu*) lying at the basis of the illusory manifestation of the whole universe. So the text has its purport in Brahman and not in a void. Brahman which is the substratum for the appearance of the world is not a void (*niradhiṣṭhāna-bhramasya aprasiddhivat na brahmaṇaḥ śūnyatvam*).

[65]

पदात्पदार्थबुद्धिर्न उत्पत्तादौ प्रजायते ।

तदभावधियै नालं पदवाक्यार्थरूपतः ॥

From a word such as "lily," the cognition of the word-sense takes place to us. It is not competent to convey the cognition of the absence of a thing, which is the meaning of a sentence.

It was stated earlier that the words "real," etc., serve to negate the unreal, etc. Though this explanation has been offered to start with, it is not strictly speaking tenable. A word can convey only a word-sense and not a sentence-sense. From the word "lily" we get the cognition of the object denoted by the word, and not the cognition that it is not lily (*nedam utpalam*). The latter can be conveyed only by a sentence, i.e., by a group of words, and not by one word. Similarly the cognition that Brahman is not unreal, which is the import of a sentence, cannot be conveyed by the word "real." It should, therefore, be said that the words *satyam*, etc., convey respectively the sense of the reality (*paramārthatva*), of the self-luminosity (*svayamprabhatva*), and of the fullness (*pūrṇatva*) of Brahman.

[66]

प्रतिपद्य पदार्थं हि विरोधात्तद्विरोधिनः ।

पश्चादभावं जानाति वध्यघातकवत्पदात् ॥

After knowing the word-sense from the word, a person, indeed, later on knows the absence of the opposite, because of their mutual opposition, as in the case of the destroyed and the destroyer.

From the presence of rats in a particular place a person infers the absence of their enemy, viz., the cat, because they are related as the destroyed and the destroyer. In the same way, after grasping the meaning of the words "real", etc., a person presumes the absence of unrcality, etc., in Brahman. Since reality and unreality are related as contradictories, Brahman cannot be both real and unreal at the same time. Since it is known through the given word that Brahman is real, one can postulate the absence of unreality in Brahman. Just as the stoutness of a person who is known to fast by day cannot be accounted for unless we suppose that he eats at night, so also the reality of Brahman cannot be accounted for unless we suppose the absence of unreality in it. That Brahman is not unreal, etc., is not known through *śabda*, but only through postulation (*arthāpatti*).

[67]

शब्दात्प्रतीयते तावत्सङ्गतिर्धर्मधर्मिणोः ।

मानान्तरादपोहस्तु न शब्दस्तेन स स्मृतः ॥

The relation (of identity) between the attribute and the substantive is first of all known from the sentence. But the absence (of the unreal, etc.,) is known from some other source of knowledge, and not from the sentence.

The two words *satyam brahma* which are placed in co-ordinate relation are related as attribute and substantive. The relation that

obtains between them is one of identity (*tādātmya-sambandha*), and so it is known, in the first instance, from *śabda* that Brahman is real. That Brahman is not unreal, which is known subsequently through postulation, cannot itself be the meaning of the verbal testimony (*śabdā*), for that is the meaning of a sentence, which is not otherwise obtained (*ananyalahyaḥ śabdārthaḥ*).

Since the sentence conveys the sense that Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite, it is wrong to say that it has its purport in a void or a non-entity.

[68]

न नीलवदनादाय नीलधीरुपजायते ।
विशेष्यज्ञानमप्येवं नान्तरेण विशेषणम् ॥

The cognition of the blue colour does not arise leaving out the thing which has the blue colour. In the same way, the cognition of the substantive, too, does not arise leaving out the attribute.

To know a substantive is to know it as possessing a certain attribute, and to know a certain attribute is to know it along with the substantive of which it is the attribute. To know the one is to know the other, because the two are correlatives. Therefore, the words *satyam*, etc., which cannot obviously be the attribute of a non-entity, point to Brahman which is the substantive.

[69]

वाक्यार्थानुभवोऽस्माकं नीलादेरुपजायते ।
किं नीलमिति चाकाङ्क्षा सत्येवमुपपद्यते ॥

From words such as "blue", the cognition of the sentence-sense takes place to us. Thus (because of the relation to the other word), the expectancy, viz., "What is that which is blue?" is intelligible.

A sentence is a group of words. The construed meaning (*anvito'rtha*) of a sentence takes place when words combine with each other fulfilling certain conditions like expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), fitness (*yogyatā*), etc. Thus, when the word "blue" is uttered, a certain expectation is aroused for the completion of thought as can be seen from questions such as "Which is blue?", "Where is it?", etc. And the expectancy is fulfilled when it is said "a blue lily." In the same way words like "real", etc., point to Brahman with which they are combined in a significant way, and not to a void or a non-entity which cannot bear any relation.

[70]

प्रत्यक्षतोऽवसेयत्वादेवं सर्वस्य वस्तुनः ।
नैव साधयितुं शक्यं क्षणिकत्वं कथञ्चन ॥

Similarly, since all objects are known through perception (and other *pramāṇas*), the momentariness (of anything) can never be established.

A fresh objection is now raised. Knowledge is momentary; and since Brahman is knowledge, it is momentary. So the expression *jñānam brahma*, it is argued, points to the momentariness of Brahman. This objection will not do.

It is through *pramāṇas* such as perception that we come to know of anything. But no *pramāṇa* can be cited as proof of the momentariness of an object. Perception, for example, reveals what has so far remained unknown. The object which, though existed, was not known earlier comes to be known now. The earlier state when it was not known and the later one when it comes to be known are different. This difference has to be admitted since a thing cannot be both known and unknown at the same moment. So the existence of a thing prior to its becoming an object of knowledge at a particular moment is obvious. If so, it is not momentary. What holds good in the case of perception is equally true of inference and other *pramāṇas*.

So far as Brahman-Ātman is concerned, Scripture emphatically declares that it is eternal consciousness; e.g., there is the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (IV, iii, 23) which says: "The vision of the witness can never be lost."

[71]

सति कुम्भे न नाशोऽस्ति नाशोऽपि न तदाश्रयः ।

अस्ति चेत्पूर्ववद्धर्मी न नष्टः पूर्ववद्घटः ॥

When a pot exists, its destruction cannot take place; when it does not exist, destruction cannot be in it. If it be said that (even after destruction) the object exists (as the locus of destruction) as before, there is no destruction of pot as before.

Since it is impossible to prove the destruction of any object, the momentariness of objects is not tenable. Either the object, say a pot, exists or not. If it exists, its non-existence or destruction is not true. The object which is existent cannot also be non-existent at the same time, existence and non-existence being related as contradictories. If it does not exist, there is no destruction of it. In the absence of the object, it is meaningless to talk about its destruction (*nāśa*). Destruction requires a locus (*āśraya*), and if the object is not there to serve as the locus, where is it located? It is no argument to say that the object continues as before to exist even after its destruction as the locus of destruction. It will only mean that there is no non-existence or destruction of object as in the earlier state.

[72]

इष्टो नाशस्य नाशश्चेदस्तु जीव शतं समाः ।-

घटोऽनाशीति मत्पक्षः स च नैवं विहन्यते ॥

If the destruction of destruction is acceptable, may you live a hundred years. That the pot is indestructible is our view, and so far it has not been struck down.

If it is said that, though destruction has taken place when the pot exists, the destruction itself is destroyed because of the existence of the pot to which it is opposed, it amounts to saying that the pot exists.

[73]

न नाशो हन्ति नष्टारं गन्तारमिव तद्रतिः ।

यस्मिन्सत्येव यः सिद्धयेन्निरुणद्धि स तं कथम् ॥

The act of destruction does not kill its locus, the object which undergoes destruction, any more than the act of going can kill the goer. How can anything, which depends for its existence upon something else existing, remove that other thing?

[74]

लक्षणार्थमिदं वाक्यं यस्मात्पूर्वमुदाहृतम् ।

विशेषणाश्रयान्नातः शून्यतात्र प्रसज्यते ॥

Since it has already been said that this sentence states the definition (of Brahman), the objection that a void is what is meant here due to the adoption of the qualifying sense cannot apply.

It has been shown that the sentence *satyam jñānam anantam brahma* does not refer to a void or a momentary existence even when it is interpreted in terms of attributive-substantive relation. But strictly speaking it is meant, as stated in verse (50), as a definition of Brahman, and so its purport is not in a void or a momentary existence.

[75]

विशेषणत्वेऽप्येतेषां लक्षणार्थत्वमात्मनि ।
लक्ष्येऽसति न तादर्थ्यं सत्यादीनाम्प्रसज्यते ॥

Though these are attributive words, they are used in the sense of a definition (of the essential nature) of Ātman. In the absence of the defined, the words, "real," etc., cannot have their purport in that.

No definition is possible in the absence of the defined. Just as an attribute points to the substantive, so also a definition points to the defined. There is no need for a definition of a non-entity. So when the sentence is interpreted even in the defining sense, it does not point to a void.

[76]

अतो लक्षणवाचित्वान्न शून्यार्थमिदं वचः ।
विशेष्यत्वेऽपि नैवं स्यात्स्वार्थासन्त्यागकारणात् ॥

So, this sentence does not relate to a void since it states the essential nature (of Brahman). Even if (Brahman) is the substantive, it is not the case (that the sentence points to a void), since the words do not abandon their meanings.

[77]

स्वार्थेऽसति न सत्यादेर्विशेष्यार्थे नियन्तृता ।
नियम्यार्थनियन्तृत्वं स्वार्थे सत्युपपद्यते ॥

If words like "real," etc., do not convey their meanings, they cannot differentiate the substantive. The differentiation of the substantive is intelligible only if words convey their meanings.

[78-79]

स्वेनार्थेनार्थवांश्चात्र ब्रह्मशब्दः सहेतुरैः ।
 तत्रानन्तोऽन्तवद्वस्तुव्यावृत्त्यैव विशेषणम् ॥
 स्वार्थार्पणप्रनाड्यैव परिशिष्टौ विशेषणम् ।
 तद्विरोध्यर्थसन्त्यागः सामर्थ्यात्स्यान्न शब्दतः ॥

Further, here the word *brahma*, along with other words, is significant by conveying its own meaning. Among these words, the word *ananta* becomes an attribute only by negating finite objects. The remaining (two) words become attributes only by way of conveying their own meanings. The exclusion of the opposite is obtained through implication and not (directly) from the sentence.

Since the word *brahma* is derived from the root *brh* to grow, it means a-being which is great, vast. This is another reason to show why the sentence which we are discussing here cannot refer to a non-entity.

Though all the three words, *satyam*, *jñānam* and *anantam*, become attributes only by way of conveying their own meanings, there is this difference: while the word *ananta* becomes an attribute by way of *negating* finitude, the other two words become attributes by conveying their *positive* meanings.

[80]

गुहायां निहितं यस्मादेतस्मादात्मनस्तथा ।
 ब्रह्मात्मशब्दयोस्तस्मादैकार्थ्यमवसीयते ॥

Inasmuch as Brahman is spoken of as what is laid in the cave, and since from (Brahman), this Self, (ether, etc., are said to have come), the identity of meaning of the two words "Brahman" and "Ātman" is, therefore, ascertained.

It may be argued that Brahman is not infinite since it is limited by the Self which is different from it. But this argument is wrong since the Self is non-different from Brahman. It is significant that the *Upaniṣad* uses the term "Brahman" in the place where the term "Ātman" is normally used, and *vice versa*. Whereas we would usually say that the Self is seated in the intellect (*buddhi*) which is here referred to as the "cave", and that it is the witness of all mental modes (*sarvabuddhivṛtti-sākṣi*), the *Upaniṣad* in the sequel refers to Brahman as existing in the intellect and as its witness. It only means that Brahman is no other than the Self of the individual. Again, while Brahman is usually referred to as the source of ether, etc., the *Upaniṣad* in the sequel points out that from that Brahman (*tasmāt*), i.e., from this Self (*etasmāt ātmanaḥ*), ether came into existence. This again confirms the non-difference between Brahman and Ātman. If so, the contention that the Self, being different from Brahman, limits it is untenable.

The two passages referred to in the verse are: (1) *yo veda nihitaṁ guhāyām parame vyoman* and (2) *tasmādvā etasmādātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*.

[81]

विज्ञानात्मातिरेकेण ज्ञाप्यते ब्रह्म चेत्परम् ।

नियोगगम्यः सन्भेदो वद केन निवार्यते ॥

If it be said that the supreme Brahman is spoken of as different from the conscious Self, pray tell, how could the difference known through Scripture be set aside?

If it be the case that the difference between Brahman and the Self is taught by Scripture itself, it must be real; and if it is real, it can never be removed. Such a conclusion is undesirable. Further, it goes against the teaching of the principal texts like *tat tvam asi* which stress the non-difference between Brahman and the *jīva*. It should, therefore, be said that, wherever *śruti* seems to speak about the difference between Brahman and the *jīva*, it does not intend to show that

difference is real; it only makes a re-statement (*anuvāda*) of our common belief in difference which is due to *avidyā* with a view to teach non-difference.

[82]

न चेदात्मा परं ब्रह्म स्वतः स्यादस्य दुःखिनः ।
नियोगो वाभियोगो वा कं विशेषं करिष्यति ॥

If the Self by its very nature is not the supreme Brahman, what difference could either scriptural injunction or meditation make to this afflicted *jīva*?

It is no argument to say that, though the difference between Brahman and the *jīva* is real based as it is on the support of Scripture, it can be overcome by following the scriptural command "Let the mind dwell in the thought that Thou art That" (*tat tvam asi iti ceto dhārayediti niyogāt*), or by means of meditation. If the *jīva* by its very nature is not Brahman, neither scriptural injunction nor meditation can help it to attain the nature of Brahman. Nor can they overcome the difference between Brahman and the *jīva*, if it is really the teaching of Scripture.

[83]

पश्यतः प्रत्यगात्मानमपविष्टान्यवस्तुनः ।
अहं ब्रह्मेति चेज्ज्ञानं शास्त्रादन्यत्परं कथम् ॥

If, for one who sees the inward Self devoid of other objects, the realization "I am Brahman" takes place from Scripture, how can the supreme Brahman be different from the Self?

The objection of the opponent was refuted in the previous verse by conceding his assumption that Scripture teaches the difference between the *jīva* and Brahman. Strictly speaking, Scripture purports to teach their non-difference. When a person discriminates the Self from the not-Self and realizes that he is no other than Brahman by understanding

the purport of the texts like *tai tvam asi*, how can the supreme Brahman be different from him?

[84]

आत्मनोऽन्यस्य चेद्धर्मा अस्थूलत्वादयो मताः ।

अनात्मत्वेऽस्य किं तैः स्यादात्मत्वे त्वन्यधी हुतिः ॥

If it be held that not-gross, etc., are the attributes of Brahman which is other than the Self, what is their use to this Self when they are not its attributes? If they are the attributes of the Self, the idea of difference (between Brahman and the Self) is removed by them.

A different argument is now advanced to show that the *jīva* must be different from Brahman. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (III, viii, 8) describes Brahman as not-gross, but the *jīva* is gross; and since Brahman and the *jīva* are characterized by a set of different attributes which are mutually exclusive, they must be different.

This argument will not do. The description of Brahman as not-gross, etc., is of no avail so far as the Self is concerned. What does the *jīva* personally gain by denying grossness, etc., of Brahman? If, on the contrary, the Self is said to be not-gross, etc., it will help to differentiate the Self from the body, the senses, and the mind and thereby to overcome the thought of difference between the Self and Brahman, for the person will be led to understand that the Self which is not-gross, not-subtle, etc., cannot be different from Brahman, the ultimate reality. Since the essential nature of Brahman and Ātman is the same, it is not possible to argue that they are different.

[85]

यत्साक्षादित्युपक्रम्य य आत्मेत्युपसंहृतेः ।

अन्योन्यार्थसमाप्तेश्च व्यतिरेके त्वसम्भवात् ॥

Since *śruti*, beginning with *ya* *sākṣāt*, ends with *ya ātmā*, (Brahman and the Self are one). If they are different the completion of the meaning of the one by the other is not possible.

Here reference is made to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (III, iv, 1) which speaks about "the Brahman that is immediate and direct—the Self that is within all" (*yatsākṣādāparokṣādābrahma ya ātmā sarvāntaraḥ*) with a view to show that Brahman and the Self are non-different. In this text Brahman is spoken of as that which is immediate and direct, and the Self as the inner being of all. Here the usage of these two words "Brahman" and the "Self" is not along conventional lines. Whereas it is commonly held that the Self is direct and immediate, *śruti* here says that Brahman is direct and immediate. In the same way, instead of saying that Brahman is the inner being of all, it says that the Self is the inner being of all. If the word "Brahman" is used in the place of the "Self" and *vice versa*, it is because of the fact that the two words refer to the same entity. Each word includes the connotation of the other, and this will not be possible if Brahman and Ātman are different.

[86]

आत्मैव चेत्परं ब्रह्म भवताभ्युपगम्यते ।

आत्मनो ज्ञानकर्तृत्वाज्ज्ञानं स्यात्कर्तृसाधनम् ॥

If it is accepted by you that the supreme Brahman is the Self alone, then (Brahman is a knower) because the Self is the agent of cognition. The word *jñāna* is used in the sense of the agent of cognition.

This verse, as well as the next one, states the opponent's view.

If Brahman is non-different from the Self, it becomes a knower (*jñātā*), for it is a well-known fact that the Self is a knower, the agent of cognition.

[87]

पारतन्त्र्यमनित्यत्वं धात्वर्थत्वे प्रसज्यते ।

तर्कशास्त्रप्रसिद्धेश्च कर्तृतैवात्मनो भवेत् ॥

If the root-sense is taken, the defects of other-dependence and impermanence will arise. And, because of the

well-known authority of the *Tarka-śāstra*, the Self must be taken as an agent alone.

Knowledge is object-dependent and impermanent. If Brahman is knowledge, it will be open to the charge of other-dependence and impermanence. But there will be no room for these defects if Brahman-Ātman is said to be the knower (*jñātā*) by deriving the word *jñāna* in the sense of knower, i.e., the agent of cognition (*jñāti iti jñānam*), and not in the cognate sense of the verb. This view that the Self is the knower meets with the approval of the Naiyāyika.

[38]

उच्चैर्बाहुं समुद्धृत्य इत्याहुश्चोद्यचुञ्चवः ।
यथोदितमिदं सर्वं नैतदेवम्भवेत्कुतः ॥

Raising the arms above, those who are experts in criticism say all this as said (above). But this will not hold good. Why?

[39]

स्वरूपाव्यतिरेकेऽपि कार्यत्वमुपचारतः ।
बुद्ध्युपाश्रयकार्याणि कल्प्यन्तेऽत्राविवेकतः ॥

Though knowledge is not distinct from the nature of the Self, it is spoken of as an effect by courtesy. The changes which take place in the mind are superimposed here (i.e., on knowledge) due to non-discrimination.

Knowledge is the essential nature of the Self, and so it is not different from it. It is immutable; it is not subject to changes (*vikārāḥ*) such as beginning and end. But the mental modes, the changes which take place in the mind which is the adjunct of the Self, have beginning and end. Being illumined by the knowledge which is the Self, they are spoken of as cognitions. On account of ignorance, the changes of the mind are wrongly superimposed on the immutable knowledge which is Ātman. It is only in a figurative sense that knowledge which is the Self can be said to be an effect or what is originated.

[90]

स्वरूपमात्मनो ज्ञानं न तस्माद्व्यतिरिच्यते ।

बुद्धेः प्रत्ययकारित्वं तत्साक्षिण्युपचर्यते ॥

Knowledge which is the nature of the Self is not different from it. The cognitive functioning of the mind is ascribed by courtesy to the Witness thereof.

The internal organ which carries the reflection of consciousness (*sābhāsa-antahkaraṇa*) is the knower, the agent in the act of knowing. The Self which is only a witness thereto is only knowledge and not a knower.

[91]

आत्मचैतन्यसंव्याप्ता वृत्तीर्धोः कुरुते यतः ।

चैतन्यालिङ्गिताः सर्वास्तप्तायोविस्फुलिङ्गवत् ॥

For, the mind pervaded by the knowledge-Self gives rise to modes which are all embraced by consciousness, even as the sparks of the red-hot iron (are pervaded by fire).

The mental modes can be compared to the sparks of a red-hot iron piece. Every spark that comes out of the glowing iron piece is seen in the form of fire. Likewise, since the mind is pervaded by the conscious Self, every mental mode, being thus illumined, is in the form of cognition.

[92]

चैतन्यखचितान्दृष्ट्वा प्रत्ययान्बुद्धिकर्तृकान् ।

ज्ञानं क्रियत इत्यज्ञाः कूटस्थमपि मन्वते ॥

Seeing that the cognitions given rise to by the mind are blended with knowledge, the ignorant think of the knowledge which is immutable as originated.

[93]

आविर्भावतिरोभावौ बुद्धेर्यत्साक्षिकौ नृणाम् ।
ततोऽन्यं कं समाश्रित्य साक्षिकर्तृत्वमुच्यते ॥

If the appearance and disappearance (of the modes) of the mind of men are said to be of the Witness-self, on what other evidence is the agency of the Witness-self said?

[94]

बुद्धिभावानवच्छिन्नं तादृग्रूपं यथा पुरा ।
बुद्ध्युत्पत्तावपि तथाऽविक्रियं ह्यनुभूयताम् ॥

Just as earlier (i.e., prior to the rise of the mind) consciousness remains unaffected by the mental state, so also even after the rise of the mind it is in the same condition. Indeed, the immutability (of consciousness) is known through experience.

It is the Witness-consciousness which reveals to us the presence as well as the absence of the mind. Mind is insentient (*jaḍa*). Carrying the reflection of consciousness, it knows itself as "I" (*aḥam*); in the same way it knows other objects as "this" (*idam*). It is through the mind which is subject to modifications that we are able to have the cognition of anything as such-and-such. The mind is present in waking and dream states, but is absent in the state of deep sleep. Waking up from deep sleep, a person recollects his experience by saying : "I did not see anything." Since the mind *as such* is absent in the state of deep sleep, one is not conscious of anything at that time. There is no duality of subject and object in that state. While the mind is sometimes present and sometimes absent, consciousness is uniformly present in all the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep. It remains unaffected by the mental modes which appear and disappear, while merely witnessing their presence or absence.

[95]

कर्तृकार्यवभासित्वात्कर्तृकार्याभिधायिनः ।

लक्षयन्ति परं ब्रह्म नाञ्जसा तत्प्रचक्षते ॥

Since Brahman illumines the agent and the act, words which designate the agent and the act indirectly indicate the supreme Brahman; they cannot directly denote it.

It is not possible to argue that Brahman is subject to change (*sakriyam*) on the ground that it can be denoted by a word (*pada-vācyaiva*), and that whatever is denoted by a word is subject to change, e.g., a pot. This argument proceeds on the wrong assumption that Brahman can be denoted by a word. Words can denote a class characteristic (*jāti*), or a quality (*guṇa*), or an action (*kriyā*), or a relation (*sambandha*). But Brahman is none of these, and so it cannot be denoted by words. It can only be indicated through secondary implication.

[96]

यत्तु तद्ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानं सर्वानन्यदविक्रियम् ।

ब्रह्मणोऽव्यतिरिक्तं तत्सर्वप्रत्यक्समाहितः ॥

But as to Brahman's consciousness which is not different from Brahman, which is non-different from all, and which is immutable, it is the inward Self of all.

Brahman cannot be denoted even by the word *jñāna*.

We use the expression "consciousness of Brahman" (*brahmaṇo jñānam*) quite frequently. It does not mean that Brahman is different from consciousness. It must be understood as in the case of "the light of the sun" or "the heat of the fire."

[97]

प्रत्याख्याताखिलानात्मभेदसत्यार्थवाचिना ।

तथैव सत्यशब्देन लक्ष्यते तन्न तूच्यते ॥

Likewise, Brahman is indicated by implication and not denoted by the word *satya* which means the supreme reality in which all diversity which is not-Self is negated.

[98]

एवं सत्यादयः शब्दाः स्वार्थासन्त्यागिनः परम् ।
लक्षयन्ति विरुद्धार्थनिवृत्त्याज्ञानहानतः ॥

Thus, words like “real”, etc., without abandoning their own meanings indicate by implication the supreme Brahman by eliminating what is opposed to it through the destruction of ignorance.

[99]

निवर्त्यभेदाद्भिन्नोऽर्थोऽसत्याद्यर्थनिवर्तिनाम् ।
सत्यादीनामतः सिद्धमवाक्यार्थत्वमात्मनः ॥

Words like “real”, etc., which eliminate ideas such as unreality, have different meanings, since the ideas to be eliminated are different. Therefore, it follows that the Self is not to be construed as the import of a sentence.

It was stated earlier that the three words *satyam*, *jñānam*, and *anantaṁ* convey their own meanings and thereby serve to eliminate the unreal, the insentient, and the finite respectively. Since the things to be eliminated are different, there is the need for the use of three different words. Consequently the meaning conveyed by the three words are said to be different. But it should not be thought on this account that the sentence here conveys a relational content (*saṁsr̥ṣṭa-viśaya*). Brahman is pure and simple, one and impartite (*ekarasa*), and the words here have their purport in Brahman. So the sentence conveys a non-relational (*asaṁsr̥ṣṭa*), non-verbal content (*avākyaṛtha*).

[100]

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते नेति नेतीति चापरम् ।
एवं सत्यर्थवत्सर्वमन्यथा तदनर्थकम् ॥

Only thus, all passages like "That from which words return," and also, "Not this, not this," are significant; otherwise they will become meaningless.

That Brahman-Ātman cannot be made known through words is brought out by the *Taittirīya* text (II, iv, 1), "That from which words return along with the mind, being unable to reach." If it cannot be designated by words, it must necessarily be *nirviśeṣa*, what is free from all characteristics of every kind, gross as well as subtle. That is why the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (III, ix, 26) says; "Not this, not this."

[101]

कौटस्थं सत्यमित्युक्तं तद्गुणं ज्ञानमुच्यते ।
स्वतो बोधस्य कौटस्थ्ये ज्ञातुरानन्त्यमेकता ॥

The word "real" signifies immutability. It is said to constitute the nature of knowledge. Knowledge being in itself immutable, the infinitude and the oneness of the knower, i.e., the Witness-self, (is thereby established).

[102]

ज्ञात्रभेदात् तद्ब्रह्म ह्यनीप्सिततमम्परम् ।
ज्ञातुरन्यस्य चाभावाद्यो वेदेत्युच्यते कथम् ॥

The supreme Brahman is, indeed, not an object which is most desired to be known, because it is non-different from the knower. And since there is no other knower than Brahman, how can it be said "He who knows"?

This verse states an objection.

The critic argues that the Advaitin cannot give a satisfactory explanation of the text, "He who knows" Brahman (as existing in the intellect), inasmuch as it lends support to the difference between the knower and Brahman. Since Brahman, according to Advaita, is non-different from the knower, it cannot be what is known, an object of knowledge. Nor is there, according to Advaita, a knower different

from Brahman, for the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (III. vii, 23) says that there is no other witness (*draṣṭā*), no other thinker (*mantā*), no other knower (*viññātā*), but Brahman. Nor is it possible to say that one and the same entity is both the knower and the known, for what is known must be different from the person who knows. If so, the text *yo veda*, the critic argues, cannot be interpreted on the basis of Advaita.

[103]

सत्यादिलक्ष्याज्ञानोत्थाऽसत्याद्यर्थनिषेधोः ।

या तयैवाप्तमाप्नोति केवलाज्ञानहानतः ॥

What is already attained is attained by the mere destruction of ignorance through that knowledge which negates the unreal, etc., arising from the ignorance of Brahman which is indicated through secondary implication by words like “real”, etc.

The objection stated above is answered in this verse.

The text should not be construed on the basis of the knower-known relation. Though Brahman is already attained or known, it appears as if it were not attained or known due to ignorance. The removal of ignorance which veils the nature of Brahman is figuratively referred to as attainment of Brahman or knowing Brahman.

[104]

एवं ज्ञातं विजानाति विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते ।

निवर्तते निवृत्ताञ्च त्रिवः शपथयाम्यहम् ॥

Thus, one knows what is already known; and “being already free, one is liberated;” and also what is already removed is removed. I promise you thrice.

Though the *jīva* in its essential nature is Brahman itself, it does not know itself to be so only due to ignorance. As in the case of attaining what is already attained, to know Brahman is to know what is already known. Since Brahman is ever-free and since it is non-different from the inward Self of the individual, the bondage of the

jīva which is to be removed is like removing the serpent in the rope. The serpent is not in the rope; it is only imagined to be there. Likewise, the condition of bondage can never be a characteristic of the ever-free Self; but it is imagined to be so, the real nature of the Self being concealed by *avidyā*. So what is ever-free gets liberated; and bondage which is not really there gets removed. That is why Śaṅkara says in the course of his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, IV, iv, 5: "Really there is no such distinction as liberation and bondage in the Self, for it is eternally the same; but the ignorance regarding it is removed by the knowledge arising from the teachings of Scripture."

The idea of the attainment of the attained finds support in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (IV, iv, 6) which says: "Being Brahman, he goes to Brahman" (*Brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti*). The *Aitareya* text (III, i, 3), "Consciousness is Brahman" (*prajñānam brahma*) conveys the idea that Brahman which is of the nature of consciousness is already known. Brahman-consciousness is the basis of every act of cognition. What is presupposed in every act of cognition is already known. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (II, ii, 1) speaks of the liberation of what is already liberated (*vimuktaśca vimucyate*). The idea of removing what is already removed is supported by the *Chāndogya* text (VI, ii, 1) which says that Brahman, the ultimate reality, is "one only, without a second" (*ekameva advitīyam*). Only if there is a second to Brahman, the question of removing what is other than Brahman will arise. But Brahman is free from difference of every kind — *sa-jātiya*, *vijātiya* and *svagata-bheda*. There is nothing like Brahman; there is nothing unlike it; and also Brahman is free from internal differentiation. So the *jīva* which in its essential nature is no other than Brahman is not really subject to bondage. What is really free from bondage appears to be bound due to *avidyā*. And so removing bondage is a case of removing what is already removed.

[105]

तस्मादासन्नकर्तृत्वतिमिरोऽयमविद्यया ।

सत्यादिलक्षणं ब्रह्म प्रत्यक्स्थमपि नेक्षते ॥

Hence, with the vision obscured by agency (and other attributes) ascribed (to the Self) due to ignorance, one does

not know Brahman in its true nature as real, etc., even though it is seated inwardly.

[106]

अतोऽविद्यानिषेधेन सदा विस्फुरितेक्षणः ।

पिबञ्जानादिनानात्वम्प्रत्यगात्मानमीक्षते ॥

So, a person who attains the ever-revealing knowledge sees the inward Self by negating ignorance and devouring plurality such as the knower, (known, etc.).

[107]

भूतमात्रोपसंश्लेषसमुत्थं यत आत्मनः ।

कर्तृभोक्तृत्वविज्ञानम्बुद्धौ तन्निहितं ततः ॥

Since the notion of agency and enjoyership takes place to the Self due to the association of the intellect, Brahman is located in the intellect.

Why Brahman is said to be located in the intellect is explained in this verse and in the next one.

The Self, which is pure consciousness, is reflected in the intellect (*buddhi*) which serves as its primary adjunct (*mukhyopādhi*). There is superimposition of the nature of the Self on the intellect and that of the intellect on the Self. Though insentient, the intellect appears to be sentient and assumes the status of a knower due to the reflection of consciousness in it. In the same way, agency and enjoyership which are the characteristics of the intellect are superimposed on the immutable Self.

[108]

तमोरजोविनिर्मुक्ततद्वृत्त्या चोपलभ्यते ।

ब्रह्मातो निहितम्बुद्धौ मनसैवेति च श्रुतिः ॥

Brahman is known through the mental mode which is free from *tamas* and *rajas*. Hence, it is located in the

intellect. *Śruti* also says: "Through the mind alone (it is to be realized)."

The intellect arises out of the *sattva* phase of the pure elements. Brahman is comprehended through the *akhaṇḍākāra-buddhi-ṛtti*. While the content of the ordinary mental mode through which we cognize an object, e.g., a pot, is finite and related, the content of the *akhaṇḍākāra-buddhi-ṛtti* is a unitary and unrelated one, viz., Brahman which is pure and simple, homogeneous and partless. It is in this sense that we have to understand the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (IV, iv, 19) which says: "Through the mind alone it is to be realized (*manasaiva anudraṣṭavyam*). The same idea is conveyed by the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (II, i, 11) when it says: "This (Brahman) is to be attained through the mind" (*manasaivedam āptavyam*).

Brahman is said to be located in the intellect for two reasons: (1) Brahman-consciousness is reflected in the intellect. (2) It is known through the intellect.

[109]

निगूढमस्यां तद्ब्रह्म कामाविद्याद्युपप्लवात् ।
प्रत्यग्धियोऽनुपश्यन्ति तस्माद्बुद्धिर्गुह्योच्यते ॥

That Brahman is concealed in this (intellect), because the latter is in distress due to its association with desire, ignorance, etc. Those whose mind is turned inward perceive it. Therefore, the intellect is said to be a cave.

[110]

परमं व्योम हार्दं स्याद्वाह्यत्तत्परमं यतः ।
श्रुतेर्योऽयम्बहिर्धेति तच्च बुद्धेः समाश्रयम् ॥

The space within the heart is the highest, since it is superior to the outer (space). *Śruti* refers to "this (space) outside (the person)". And it (i.e., the space within the heart) is the locus of the intellect.

Reference is made to the *Chāndogya* (III, xii, 7-9) which, after mentioning the space outside the person (*bahirdhā puruṣāt*), speaks about the space within the person (*antaḥ puruṣa ākāśaḥ*) and then the space within the heart (*antarhṛdaya ākāśaḥ*).

The material *ākāśa* is inferior to the space within the heart called the *Avyākṛta*, the Unmanifested. The latter is, therefore, spoken of as the highest (*paramaṁ vyoma*). When Brahman is not known in its nature (*ajñātam brahma*), it is called the *Avyākṛta* which is the cause of everything. The whole universe consisting of name and form, means and ends, has come out of the Undifferentiated, as pointed out in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (I, iv, 7). Because of its similarity to *ākāśa* in so far as both of them are incorporeal (*amūrta*), it is spoken of as *ākāśa*.

[111]

गुहायाम्परमे व्योमन्वस्तुवृत्तमपेक्ष्य वा ।

सत्यादिलक्षणान्नान्यद्वियः प्रत्यक्प्रतीयते ॥

Or, considering the real position, *śruti* says that the Unmanifested called the supreme Space is in the intellect. No other inward being is, indeed, seen (within the intellect) than Brahman which is defined as real, etc.

In the previous verse, the intellect has been referred to as that which is located in the highest Space (*parama vyomni sthitā yā guhā buddhiḥ*). Now the *Avyākṛta*, the Unmanifested, which is referred to as the supreme Space, is said to be seated in the intellect (*guhāyām vyoman*). Here the word *vyoma* does not mean the element *ākāśa*. The latter is the effect of the Unmanifested, and so it cannot be characterized as supreme.

The pure Brahman which transcends the cause-effect relation is placed in the Unmanifested called *vyoma* which, again, being the cause of the intellect, is inherent in it, just as clay which is the cause is inherent in pot, pan, and other objects which are its effects.

[112]

सत्याचर्यविरुद्धेभ्यः सम्यगन्यावृत्ताधीर्यतिः ।

धियः प्रत्यक्प्रविश्याथ सत्यात्मानमप्रपश्यति ॥

The ascetic whose mind is completely turned away from what is opposed to the real, etc., by (first) going inward to the mind, realizes, then, the Self which is real.

The ascetic who fulfils the conditions of eligibility for Brahman-knowledge turns away from things which are unreal, insentient, and finite. At first he conceives Brahman as the cause of everything. Then he understands that the entire world of diversity which is illusory has no real existence apart from Brahman which is the cause. Cause-effect relation holds good only from the relative, empirical standpoint. Seeing that Brahman which is said to be the cause is non-different from Brahman which transcends the cause-effect relation, he concludes that the Witness-consciousness which is inward to the intellect and which illumines the presence as well as the absence of the intellect, is no other than Brahman which is real, consciousness, and infinite.

[113]

तस्मादुपायसिद्ध्यर्थम्बुद्धेः प्रत्यक्प्रवेशनम् ।

गुहायाम्परमे व्योमञ्श्रुतिरस्मानतोऽन्वशात् ॥

Hence, for the purpose of stating the means (of realizing Brahman), the *śruti* text *guhāyām parama vyoman* has taught us the entrance (of Brahman) into the Witness-self of the intellect.

[114]

ज्ञातुर्ज्ञेयम्परं ब्रह्म भेदबुद्धयपनुत्तये ।

गुहायाम्परमे व्योमञ्ज्ञेयं ज्ञातरि शिष्यते ॥

With a view to remove the thought of duality involved in the idea that the supreme Brahman is known by the knower, *śruti* says *guhāyām parama vyoman*. Thus, Brahman which is to be known is in the knower.

If the Witness-self is the knower and if Brahman is what is known, it may be thought that they are different. The *Upaniṣad* speaks about the existence of Brahman in the intellect which is located in the supreme

space in the heart with a view to show that they are not different. The purport of this passage is to show that Brahman which is to be known is the Witness-self, and that the Witness-self is no other than Brahman.

[115]

साध्यसाधनसम्बन्धवर्त्मनैवानुधावतः ।

साध्यसाधननिर्मुक्तं स्वात्मन्याविशते परम् ॥

He who has been all along pursuing the path of means-end relation attains in his own Self the Supreme which is free from both means and end.

If the *jīva* and Brahman are non-different, what is true of the *jīva*, it may be urged, is equally true of Brahman. Since the *jīva* is in bondage, it would follow that Brahman, too, is in bondage. But this contention is wrong. The *jīva* has all along been acting on the basis of means-end relation. Following the scriptural teaching, it realizes at last that in its essential nature it is no other than Brahman which is neither a means nor an end. As a result of this realization, the *jīva* who has so far been acting as a *saṃsārin* ceases to be a *saṃsārin*. If so, how could it be said that the Advaita view of the non-difference of Brahman and the *jīva* would make Brahman a *saṃsārin*?

[116]

सोऽश्नुते निखिलान्कामान्कर्तृत्वे तदसम्भवम् ।

आशङ्क्य ब्रह्मणेत्याह युगपत्स्यात्सहेति च ॥

He (who realizes Brahman) enjoys all desires. Since that (enjoyment of all desires) will not be possible so long as the sense of agency remains, *śruti* has said "as Brahman". And, the word *saha* means simultaneously.

The *śruti* text *so'śnute sarvān kāmān saha* is taken up for explanation in this verse. The knower of Brahman does not fulfil the desires one after another in sequence. The enjoyment of desires in sequence is tenable only so long as the *jīva*, entertaining the notion of agency and depending on the body and the sense-organs, acts in a particular

way to attain a particular fruit. When a person attains Brahman-realization, the notions of agency, etc., set by *avidyā* disappear along with *avidyā*. The knower of Brahman, having become Brahman, enjoys as Brahman, by being identified with Brahman (*brahmaṇā*) all desires simultaneously.

[117]

प्रतीचि न स्यात्तद्ब्रह्म भेदार्था चेत्सहार्थता ।
सम्भाव्यते पराभूतं नापि सत्यादिमत्परम् ॥

If the meaning of the word *saha* is taken as conveying the sense of duality, then Brahman cannot be the Self. Nor is it possible for what is external (to the Self) to be the Supreme which is real, etc.

Here, the word *saha* should not be understood in the sense of "with". That is to say, the *śruti* text should not be construed to mean: "He enjoys all desires *with* Brahman (*brahmaṇā saha*)," since it leads to several difficulties. First, Brahman would come to be treated as different from the Self. Second, it conflicts with the *śruti* texts such as *tat tvam asi* which teach the non-difference between the Self and Brahman. Third, if Brahman is different from the Self, it cannot be non-dual, infinite, sentient, real. So, taking the word *saha* in the sense of "simultaneously" the text should be construed to mean that the knower of Brahman enjoys all desires simultaneously, at one and the same moment.

When the *Upaniṣad* says that the knower of Brahman enjoys all desires, using the word "desire" in the plural, it should not be thought that there is plurality of objects of desire enjoyed by him. The *Upaniṣad* here speaks in the language of plurality to which we are accustomed all along.

[118]

नापि नोत्सहते वक्तुं निपातत्वात्सहार्थताम् ।
तस्माद्युगपदर्थस्य वाचकं स्यात्सहेति यत् ॥

Nor can it be said that the word *saha* does not convey the meaning "simultaneously", because it is a particle (which conveys many meanings). So the word *saha* must be taken as conveying the meaning "simultaneously".

[119]

ज्ञानादसत्याद्युच्छित्तेरात्मनोऽन्यन्न विद्यते ।

तस्माद्विपश्चिद्ब्रह्मभ्यां कामान्सर्वान्सहादनुते ॥

When the unreal, etc., have been removed through knowledge, there exists nothing other than the Self. So, the knower of Brahman enjoys all desires simultaneously as the wise, as Brahman.

It should not be thought that there is difference between the knower of Brahman and Brahman. When *avidyā* which is the cause of difference and which sets up the unreal, etc., is removed through the right knowledge, the knower of Brahman remains as the Self, as Brahman.

[120]

ज्ञातुर्हार्दिगुहान्तस्थं प्रतीचोऽन्यन्न लभ्यते ।

सत्यादिमदतो ब्रह्म प्रत्यगात्मैव तद्विदः ॥

The knower does not attain anything other than the Self which is in the intellect, lodged in the heart. So, to one who knows it, Brahman which is real, etc., is only the inward Self.

The Self, it is well-known, is within the intellect. *Śruti* says that Brahman is located in the intellect. It follows, therefore, that Brahman which is defined as real, knowledge, and infinite is no other than the Self of the knower.

[121]

विपश्चिद्व्यतिरेकेण ज्ञेयत्वाद्यपनुत्ताये ।

सामानाधिकरण्येन ब्रह्मणाह विपश्चिता ॥

With a view to deny that what is known (and attained) is other than the wise man, *śruti* says "as the wise, as Brahman" by placing the two words in co ordinate relation.

[122]

एकयाक्रमवर्तिन्या व्यप्नोति क्रमवर्तिनः ।

अवगत्याखिलान्कामान्योऽकाम इति च श्रुतिः ॥

By the one consciousness which admits of no sequence, he comprehends all desires which occur in sequence. There is also the *śruti* text: "He who is without desire."

When a person realizes through knowledge that his inward Self is Brahman which is infinite, he fulfils at once, without the help of the body and the senses, all desires which are enjoyed in sequence by others. This idea is conveyed by the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (IV, v, 6) which says: "Of him who is without desire, who is free from desire, the objects of whose desire have been attained, and to whom all objects of desire are but the Self — the organs do not depart. Being but Brahman, he is merged in Brahman." In the course of his commentary on this passage Śaṅkara observes that the knower of Brahman has attained all objects of desire, "because he is one to whom all objects of desire are but the Self, who has only the Self and nothing else separate from it that can be desired." He has fulfilled all his desires, because he has realized his identity with Brahman-Ātman which is all.

[123]

आदावन्ते तथा मध्ये धियोऽनेकशरीरगाः ।

निर्विशेषैकचिद्व्याप्ता ह्यनन्यानुभवात्मना ॥

The mental modes which assume different forms are, indeed, pervaded at the beginning and end, and also in the middle, by the one undifferentiated consciousness which experiences none separate from it.

First of all, a person knows a thing (*jānāti*), then desires it (*icchati*), and finally endeavours to attain it (*yataṭe*). Though the mental modes thus appear in many forms, the Witness-consciousness which illumines them remains the same.

[124]

सर्वप्रवृत्तिहेतूँश्च यस्माद्ब्रह्मविदश्नुते ।

कामान्ब्रह्मविदस्तस्मान्न प्रवृत्तिरहेतुतः ॥

Since the knower of Brahman has fulfilled all desires which are the cause of all activities, there is no pursuit of activity to the knower of Brahman, as there is no cause (for activity).

[125-126]

अविद्याहेतवः कामाः काममूलाः प्रवृत्तायः ।

धर्माधर्मौ च तन्मूलौ देहोऽनर्थाश्रयस्ततः ॥

अतोऽविद्यानिरोधे स्यान्निरोधो विदुषः सदा ।

निःशेषकर्महेतूनां विकाराणां तदैव तु ॥

Desires are caused by ignorance; activities are rooted in desires. And activity gives rise to *dharma* and *adharma*; and from these comes the body which is the seat of evil. Therefore, to the wise man, when ignorance is destroyed for ever, desires which are the cause of all activities are also destroyed at the same time.

When *avidyā*, the root cause, disappears on the onset of knowledge, desires, too, cease to exist. No special effort is need to root them out.

[127]

कृत्स्नोपनिषदर्थस्य सूत्रमित्यभ्यधात्पुरा ।

सङ्क्षेपतस्तदर्थश्च सम्यङ्मन्त्रेण वर्णितः ॥

It was stated earlier that the text ("The knower of Brahman attains the Supreme") is a statement in brief of the purport of the entire *Upaniṣad*. And its meaning has been well-explained in a concise manner by the *mantra* portion (which follows it).

The text, "The knower of Brahman attains the Supreme," which occurs in the *Brāhmaṇa* portion, states aphoristically the central teaching of the *Brahmavallī* and the *Bhṛguvallī*. It speaks about (1) Brahman, (2) the knowledge of Brahman, and (3) the fruit which accrues to one who knows Brahman. Since it is necessary to know the nature of each one of them, the *Mantra* portion, which follows this text, beginning from *satyam jñānam anantam brahma* and ending with *brahmaṇā vipaścitā* serves as a brief commentary thereon. It first of all sets forth the nature of Brahman as real, knowledge, and infinite. Secondly, it says that one must know Brahman as identical with the inward Self. Finally, it declares that the knower of Brahman, remaining identical with the Self of all, enjoys bliss which is illimitable and unsurpassable.

[128]

अनेन त्वाद्यसूत्रेण यावानर्थोऽत्र सूत्रितः ।

आसमाप्तेरियं वृत्तिस्तस्मादित्युच्यतेऽधुना ॥

For the meaning that was briefly conveyed by the aphoristic statement at the beginning, there is this elaborate explanation beginning from *tasmāt* till the end.

This verse states the connection between what was stated in the *Brāhmaṇa* text and the *Mantra* explanation thereof and what follows in the sequel from the text *tasmādvā etasmāt ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ*. It is with a view to discuss at length the central teaching that the *Upaniṣad* proceeds with the sequel.

[129]

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तञ्च रसदेः पञ्चकात्परम् ।

स्यामदृश्यादिशास्त्रोक्तमहं ब्रह्मेति निर्भयम् ॥

May I become Brahman which is real, knowledge, and infinite, which is beyond the five sheaths such as *annamaya*, which is free from fear, and which is spoken of by *śruti* as "That which is not seen," etc

The human body is constituted by five sheaths (*pañcakōśa*), viz., the sheath made of food (*annamaya*), the vital sheath (*prāṇamaya*), the sheath of consciousness (*manomaya*), the sheath of self-consciousness (*viśvānamaya*), and the sheath of bliss (*ānandamaya*). The sheaths are so called because they veil the Self, hiding it from our view. They are one within the other. As we proceed from the outermost to the inner sheaths, we get nearer the Self. Brahman-Ātman which is real, knowledge, and infinite is inward to the five sheaths. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (I, iv, 2) says that "it is from a second entity that fear comes." Since Brahman is one and non-dual, it is free from fear (*nirbhayam*). Brahman is not only not designated by words, but as the *Muṇḍaka* text (I, i, 6) says, it is also "that which is not seen and grasped, that which is without source, features, eyes, and ears, that which has neither hands nor feet..." The wise, however, realize it through higher knowledge.

[130]

ननु सत्यमनन्तञ्च कथं सम्यक्प्रतीयते ।
देशकालादिहेतुत्वात्तदिदानीं विभाव्यते ॥

If it be asked how Brahman is clearly known to be real as well as infinite, (the reply is:) because it is the cause of space, time, etc. It will be explained now (in the sequel).

It may be argued that Brahman, in so far as it is differentiated as an object from other objects, must be considered to be limited or finite. Whatever is finite is not real; and since Brahman is finite, it is not real. If it is not real, so it may be argued, it is insentient (*jaḍa*). If so, how could it be said that Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite?

This argument will not do. Since Brahman is the cause of the world, it is not limited by space (*deśa*) or time (*kāla*) or object (*vastu*).

That is to say, it is infinite; and from this it follows that it is real and also consciousness. While the critic argues that Brahman is not real and consciousness proceeding on the wrong assumption that it is limited, the Advaitin maintains that Brahman is real and consciousness, since it is infinite.

[131]

वस्तुतो देशतश्चैव कालतश्च त्रिधोच्यते ।

आनन्त्यम्ब्रह्मणश्चातः सत्याद्यपि च सिद्ध्यति ॥

The infinitude of Brahman is said to be threefold in respect of object, space, and time. And from this it is established that Brahman is real, etc.

The objects of the world are subject to the threefold limitation — limitation by space, time, and object. Every one of them exists at a particular time and place, and is also limited by other objects. But Brahman has no such limitation. It is, therefore, infinite.

[132]

अनन्तं देशतो व्योम देशवत्प्रकृतित्वतः ।

कारणेनैकदेशं हि कार्यं नान्यत्र वर्तते ॥

Ether is unlimited in respect of space, because it is the material cause of all that exists in space. An effect which is, indeed, a part of the cause does not exist elsewhere (outside the cause).

With a view to show that Brahman should not be placed on a par with ether (*ākāśa*), it is first of all stated that ether, being the material cause of all objects such as earth which exist in space, is not limited by space. An effect, e.g., a pot, is pervaded by its material cause, viz., clay (*kāraṇavyāptaiḥ kāryaṃ*). It does not exist outside its material cause. Inasmuch as all objects which are effects are inherent in *ākāśa* which provides space for them, the latter is not limited by space. But it is limited in other respects as shown in the next verse.

[133]

कार्यत्वात्कालतो नास्य वस्तुतश्च विहायसः ।

वस्त्वन्तरस्य सद्भावादानन्त्यं वस्तुतोऽपि न ॥

Since it is an effect, (ether) is not unlimited by time. Nor is it unlimited by object. Since there is another object, it is not unlimited by object also.

Though ether (*ākāśa*) is not limited by space, it is limited in respect of both time and object. Ether is an effect. It comes into being at a particular time. The category of cause-effect relation presupposes time. Cause and effect are related as earlier and later. Cause is what is prior to its effect; and effect is what follows its cause. As an effect, ether is, therefore, limited by time. It is limited in respect of object as well, because there is Brahman which is its cause and which is different from it. While an effect is non-different from its cause, cause is not non-different from its effect, as it can be seen in the case of pot and clay.

[134]

कालाकाशादियोनित्वात् सर्वात्मत्वात्तथात्मनः ।

वस्त्वन्तरस्य चासत्त्वान्मुख्यानन्त्यम्परात्मनः ॥

The supreme Self is infinite in the real sense, because it is the cause of time, ether, etc., because it is the Self of all, and also because there is no other object besides the Self.

(1) Brahman is not an effect or a created thing, and so it is not limited by time. (2) *Ākāśa* is unlimited in space. Being the cause of *ākāśa*, Brahman is infinite in space. (3) Since it is the cause of time, ether, etc., it is the Self of all. And if it is the Self of all, there cannot be any object different from it. It is not, therefore, limited by object. Since Brahman is not limited in all the three respects, it alone is infinite in the real sense of the term.

The two words *ātman* and *paramātman* have been used in the verse with reference to one and the same thing for the purpose of emphasizing their non-difference.

[135]

कल्पितेन परिच्छेदो न ह्यकल्पितवस्तुनः ।

कल्पितश्चेह कालादिर्वाचारम्भणशास्त्रतः ॥

What is real cannot, indeed, be limited by what is illusory. Here, time, etc., are illusory as shown by Scripture (which speaks about modifications) "as arising from speech."

It is no argument to say that Brahman is limited by its own effects such as time, ether, etc., and that it is not, therefore, infinite in the real sense. Time, etc., which are effects are illusory. Apart from the cause there is really no such thing as effect. A pot which is a modification (*vikāra*) does not exist apart from the clay which is its cause. The modification which exists only in name is nothing but clay. It is the clay which constitutes the essence (*svarūpa*) of the pot. That is why the *Chāndogya* text (VI, i, 4) says: "The modification exists in name only arising from speech; clay alone is real."

Being a cause is what makes a thing real, and being an effect is what makes a thing illusory (*kāraṇatvaṁ satyatva-prāyojakam, kāryatvaṁ tu mithyātva-prāyojakam*). If clay is said to be real, it is because of the fact that it happens to be a cause. Similarly, pot and other objects made of clay are said to be illusory, because they happen to be effects. The example of clay is cited by Scripture only with a view to enunciate the general principle that cause alone is real. It is not intended to show that clay has absolute reality. The reality of clay is only relative. It is real enough when compared with its modifications such as pot. But in so far as it is an effect of some other entity which is its cause, it is illusory. The only thing which is absolutely real is Brahman.

What holds good in the case of transformation (*pariṇāma*) is also true of transfiguration (*vivarta*). The illusory snake is a transfiguration of the rope. The latter appears as a snake without undergoing any transformation. It remains a rope all the time though it appears as a snake. The illusory snake does not exist apart from the rope which is its substratum. It has no nature of its own apart from

its substratum (*kalpitāsya adhiṣṭhānameva svarūpam*). The entire universe comprising time, ether, etc., is superimposed on Brahman due to *avidyā*. Time, ether, etc., which are illusory cannot, therefore, limit Brahman which is real.

[136]

तस्मात्सत्यादि याथात्म्यं तस्मादित्येवमादिना ।

वक्ष्यते ब्रह्मणः सम्यक्सृष्टिव्याजेन यत्नतः ॥

Hence, the true nature of Brahman as real, etc. will be clearly stated with diligence by the text *tasmāt*, etc., by way of narrating creation.

The *Upaṇiṣad* proceeds to give, beginning from the text *tasmādoḥ etasmāt*, an account of creation. The purpose of narrating creation is not to show that the world which is created is real, but to set forth the true nature of Brahman as real, knowledge, and infinite. Scripture makes use of the account of creation as a pretext (*vyāja*), as a convenient means, as a methodological device, for stating the absolute reality of Brahman and the illusory nature of the world.

[137]

तस्मादित्यादिवाक्योक्तं वैशब्दः स्मरणाय तु ।

एतस्मादिति मन्त्रोक्तं सत्यादिगुणलक्षितम् ॥

The word *tasmāt* refers to Brahman which has been stated in the text at the beginning. The word *etasmāt* refers to (the same) Brahman which is indirectly indicated by real, etc. as stated in the *Mantra* portion. The letter *vai* is used for the purpose of recollection.

The meanings of the three words *tasmāt* (from that), *etasmāt* (from this), and *vai* (verily) are stated in this verse. The text recalls to our mind Brahman which has been first of all stated in the aphoristic text and which has been subsequently defined in the *Mantra* portion as real, knowledge, and infinite.

[138]

तद्विद्विपश्चित्सामर्थ्यात्तदेतद्व्याम्प्रतीयते ।

आत्मश्रुतेर्न मुख्योऽर्थः प्रतीचोऽन्यत्र लभ्यते ॥

Through the force of the expressions "the knower of that (Brahman)" and "the wise", and also through the words "that" and "this", (the non-difference between Brahman and Ātman) is known. Further, the word "Ātman" is used by *śruti* (in the place of Brahman). The primary sense (of the word "Self") does not hold good with regard to anything other than the inward Being.

The aphoristic text which contains the expression *brahmavid*, the knower of Brahman, tells us that by the mere knowledge of Brahman one attains Brahman.

In the expression *brahmaṇā vipascitā*, the word "wise" is put in apposition to "Brahman", thus showing that Brahman and the wise man are identical.

Again, since the two words *tat* (that) and *etat* (this) are put in apposition in the expression *tasmādvā etasmāt*, *śruti* wants to convey the idea that *that* Brahman which has been referred to earlier is identical with *this* Self. From the word *tasmāt* which means *from that* (Brahman), one may get the impression that Brahman is something remote and mediate. With a view to remove this misconception *śruti* uses the word *etasmāt* which means *from this* (Self), putting the two words in apposition, and thereby conveys the idea that Brahman is the same as the Self which is immediate.

It is usual to say that Brahman is the cause of everything. But here, using the word "Self" in the place of "Brahman", *śruti* says that from this Self (*etasmād-ātmanah*) ether came into existence. The idea is that *ākāśa* and other elements came into being from Brahman which is identical with the Self. Brahman is the Self of all, as stated in the *Chāndogya* (VI, viii, 7): "That is real, that is the Self."

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मत्तः सर्वमिदञ्जातं मय्येवान्ते प्रलीयते ।

अहमेको बिभर्मीदमित्येवञ्च प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥

“From me all this came into existence; in me alone it will be dissolved in the end; I alone support this world”—thus (from this statement) also (the identity of Brahman and Ātman) is established.

The Upaniṣads refer to Brahman as the cause of the world. There is, for example, the *Taittirīya* text (III, i, 1) which says: “Crave to know that from which all these beings are born, that by which they live after being born, that towards which they move and into which they merge. That is Brahman.” The Self, too, is said to be the cause of the world. There is, for instance, the *Aitareya* text (I, i, 1): “The Self, verily, was all this, one only, in the beginning.” From this one may think that the world has two causes, viz., Brahman and the Self. But inasmuch as there cannot be two causes for one and the same effect, it must be understood that one and the same cause is spoken of as Brahman in some places and also as Ātman in some other places with a view to emphasize the non-difference of Brahman and Ātman.

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सर्वानन्याविकार्येकमकार्यकारणम्परम् ।

ब्रह्मस्वभावमालम्ब्य सृष्टिर्वक्तुं न शक्यते ॥

It is not possible to explain creation by depending on the nature of the supreme Brahman which is non-different from all, immutable, one, and which is neither an effect nor a cause.

Since the *Upaniṣad* says that from the Self which is Brahman ether came into existence, it may be argued that creation is real. But this is wrong. The nature of Brahman is such that it cannot be the cause of anything.

[141]

ब्रह्मणोऽन्यदतः सर्वं कार्यत्वेन विवक्ष्यते ।

ब्रह्मणोऽकारणत्वाच्च सृष्टौ हेतोरसम्भवः ॥

All things other than Brahman should, for that very reason, be regarded as effects. And, since Brahman is immutable, there can be no cause for creation.

It may be, the critic may urge, that the nature of Brahman is such that it cannot be the cause of the world. But this is no reason for denying the existence of a cause for the world. The world, being an effect, must have a cause. And so the creation of the world, it may be argued, cannot be set aside as unreal.

This argument does not hold good. The difficulty which arises here is that there is no object which could be considered to be the cause of the world. Two possibilities may be thought of here, but neither of them is tenable. Either something other than Brahman is the cause of the world or Brahman itself is the cause of the world. It cannot be said that something other than Brahman is the cause of the world. We are in search of the root cause (*mūla-kāraṇa*) of the world. Since all objects other than Brahman are effects, none of them could be thought of as the root cause. Nor does the other alternative hold good. Being immutable (*kūṭastha*) Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. There is no effect in the absence of a cause (*kāraṇābhāve kāryābhāvāt*). Since there is no cause for the world, it cannot be said that the world really exists or that the creation of the world is real.

Ānandagiri explains the word *akāraṇa* which occurs in the second line of the verse as *kūṭastha*.

[142]

ब्रह्मस्वभावो हेतुश्चेत्सृष्टेस्तत्सन्निधेः सदा ।

सर्वदा ब्रह्मवत्सर्गो न च देशाद्यसम्भवात् ॥

If it be said that the nature of Brahman is the cause of creation, its proximity being always there, the universe

must always exist like Brahman. But this cannot be, since space, etc., cannot take place.

It may be, the critic argues, that Brahman by its very nature is immutable (*kūṭastha*). Nevertheless, it could be the cause of the world in the same way as a magnet, remaining where it is and without undergoing any change, is the cause of the movement of the iron filings just by its proximity to them.

This argument cannot be accepted. The basic difficulty here is that since the infinite Brahman is ever-existent its proximity to the world is also ever-existent, and this would mean the creation of the world, the existence of the world, all the time. This is not acceptable. Creation and dissolution alternate like day and night. Creation (*śṛṣṭi*) is followed by dissolution (*pralaya*), and dissolution is followed by creation. The idea of eternal creation is unacceptable.

There is also another difficulty. Every object which is created comes into being at a particular time and space. Then, what about time and space themselves? While the occurrence of a thing is explained in a particular space-time context, the same thing cannot be said of both space and time. The occurrence of space is not explained by presupposing another space. Similarly, the occurrence of time is not explained by presupposing another time. There is strictly speaking neither plurality of space nor plurality of time. Therefore, the occurrence of space and time cannot be thought of in the context of another space and time, for there is no "other space", nor "another time" (*deśasya deśāntarābhāvāt, kālasya ca kālāntarābhāvāt*). The explanation of the occurrence of an object in terms of space and time breaks down when we attempt to explain the occurrence of both space and time.

Further, to think of another space and another time with a view to account for space and time of the first level will lead to the fallacy of infinite regress (*anavasthā*), for both space and time which are posited at the second level would in their turn require another space and time at the third level, and these in their turn would require another space and time at the fourth level, and so on. It is, therefore, impossible to subscribe to the idea of eternal creation or the eternal existence of the world.

[143]

नाभूत्सृष्टिरभूतत्वादभूतं कालहेतुतः ।

न भविष्यत्यभाव्यत्वादभाव्यञ्चाक्रियोत्थिते ॥

It cannot be said that there was creation (by Brahman) because Brahman is not of the past; and Brahman is not of the past, because it is the cause of time. Nor can it be said that there will be creation (by Brahman), because Brahman is not of the future; and Brahman is not of the future, because it is not an effect.

If it be said that Brahman is the cause of the creation of the world, it is necessary to explain the occurrence of creation in respect of time: that is to say, it must be stated whether the creation of the world by Brahman took place in the past, or whether it will take place in the future, or whether it takes place now. But none of these alternatives is acceptable. The untenability of the first two alternatives is shown in this verse.

It cannot be said that Brahman created the world in the past. Two reasons are given here in support of this contention. (1) Without assuming Brahman's relation with time, it cannot be said that Brahman created the world in the past. But Brahman is unrelated (*asaṅga*) to anything whatsoever. So Brahman is not of the past. (2) To say that something is of the past is to say that it is limited by the temporal dimension called the past. Inasmuch as Brahman is the cause of time, it cannot be said to be limited by time. And so, Brahman is not of the past.

Though Brahman is said to be the cause of time, it has no real relation with time. Its relation with time by virtue of its being the cause is due to *māyā* (*kāraṇatvena kālānvayasya māyātmakatvāt*). By itself, Brahman is neither a cause nor an effect. It is what transcends the cause-effect-relation. If it comes to be looked upon as a cause, it is due to its apparent association with *māyā*.

Similarly, it cannot be said that Brahman will create the world in the future, because (1) it is not limited by the temporal dimension called the future, and also because (2) it is not an effect, that is to say, no change can ever arise in Brahman.

[144]

नेदानीमद्वितीयत्वात्कौटस्थ्यादात्मनः सदा ।
भविष्यत्यस्यभून्नातो वस्तुवृत्तमपेक्ष्य तु ॥

Creation is not now, because the Self is always non-dual and immutable. So considering the real state of things, there never was, nor is, nor is yet to be, (the creation of the world by Brahman).

It cannot be said that the creation of the world takes place now. Creation involves duality. If the world is created now by Brahman, it means that the created is different from Brahman, the creator. Since *śruti* says that Brahman is non-dual, it is absurd to think of creation in the real sense of the term. There is also another reason to show that Brahman cannot be the cause of creation. Brahman is immutable; it is not a factor involved in any action. So, Brahman cannot be said to create the world in the present.

To sum up: creation was not in the past; nor is it in the present; nor will it be in the future.

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भविष्यत्यस्यभूच्चेति यतो बन्ध्यं विशेषणम् ।
उष्ट्रादिवदणोस्तस्मादविद्यैवात्र कारणम् ॥

Since the use of qualification (in respect of creation with a view to specify) that it will be, or that it is, or that it was, is meaningless like (the use of qualification such as) camel, etc., to an atom. Hence here *avidyā* alone is the cause (of creation).

It is meaningless to apply any qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) to an atom, the minutest particle. No one would try to specify what an atom is by using words such as camel. Likewise, it is meaningless to specify creation as of the past or of the present or of the future. Creation is, therefore, the work of *avidyā*.

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असतः कारणं नास्ति सतोऽनातिशयत्वतः ।
कौटस्थ्याज्जन्मनाशानामनवस्था जनेर्जनौ ॥

For the non-existent, there is no cause. For the existent there is no new state (as origination). Since origination, destruction, etc., (do not have origination, destruction, etc.), and since they are (for that reason) immutable, (creation is not real). If there is origination for origination, it will result in infinite regress.

That creation of the world is not real is now argued in a different way. The world must have been existent or non-existent as such before its origination. It cannot be said that what is non-existent (*asat*) comes into being. The non-existent, just because it is non-existent, cannot have relation with cause. In the absence of its relation with cause, how could it be said that what is non-existent comes into being? Nor is it possible to say that what is existent (*sat*) comes into being. Since it is already an existent, it cannot have origination. If neither the existent nor the non-existent comes into being, to speak of the creation of the world does not make any sense.

The question of the creation of the world may be examined from another point of view. The things of the world are subject to the sixfold change (*ṣaḍ-bhāva-vikāra*) such as origination (*janma*), destruction (*nāśa*), etc. Is there origination for origination? Is there destruction for destruction? The admission of origination for origination, destruction for destruction, involves the fallacy of infinite regress (*anavasthā*). If there is no origination for origination, destruction for destruction,

etc., it must be said that they are immutable. We proceed on the assumption that there is the sixfold change, though in truth it is illusory (*bhāvavikāraśśarve'pi kalpitū eveti paramārthaḥ*).

[147]

कालत्रयस्याविद्यायाः समुत्थानादहेतुता !

ऋगदेवेश्वरादीनामत एवानिमित्ता ॥

Time which is threefold cannot be the cause (of the world), because it comes into being from *avidyā*. For the same reason, *karma*, deity, *Īśvara*, etc., cannot be the cause.

There are various views about the causality of the universe. But only four of them are mentioned in this verse.

There is the view that there is no cause for the world (*kāraṇam nāsti*). There are those who think that non-being (*abhāva*) or the void (*śūnya*) is the cause of the world. The Cārvāka explains the world in terms of naturalism (*svabhāva-vāda*). Some others who subscribe to accidentalism (*yadṛcchāvāda*) say that the existence of the world is an accident. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher holds the view that the constituents of the natural world are composed of material atoms and that God (*Īśvara*) is the prime mover of these atoms. According to the Sāṅkhya, *Prakṛti* is the cause of the world. The Yoga holds the view that God, who is one of the *Puruṣas* and who is not related to anything, brings about the connection of *Prakṛti* with *Puruṣa* which is necessary for the evolution of the world from *Prakṛti*. The Mīmāṃsaka maintains that *karma* or *adṛṣṭa* is the cause of the world. Some schools of Vedānta hold that God is the efficient cause of the universe and that *Prakṛti* is the material cause. Those who accept the reality of time say that time (*kāla*) is the cause of the world. Others who are the worshippers of *Prajāpati*, *Gaṇapati*, and other gods (*prajāpatya-gaṇāpatya-dayaḥ*) consider these gods as the cause of the world.

None of the views stated above is satisfactory. If there is no cause for the world, one could argue by the same logic that even a pot comes into being without a cause. This is absurd. So the view that the

world exists without a cause cannot be accepted as it goes against the evidence of perception. Non-being (*abhāva*) cannot be the cause of anything; but only a positive entity can be the cause of some object. The view that a positive something comes out of non-being is contradicted by perception (*abhāvāt bhāvotpattiriti pratyakṣa virodhaḥ*). The view that the void (*sūnyā*) is the cause of the world is no more intelligible than the assertion that a plant comes into being without a seed. The variegated and the intelligently ordered universe cannot be an accident or a chance; nor could it be said that it comes into being of its own accord. Neither the atoms, nor *Prakṛti*, nor *karma*, nor *kāla*, can account for the universe, for they are all non-intelligent. If God (*Īśvara*) being only an efficient cause were to create the world out of some primordial matter which is different from, and external to him, he would be conditioned thereby. God who is *one* of the *Puruṣas* and who is not related to anything cannot be the cause which brings about the connection between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*.

Since it is not possible to account for the world in any of the ways stated above, Advaita concludes that the world is an illusory appearance of Brahman due to *māyā*.

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जनिस्थित्यप्यया ह्येते जगतः स्युः प्रतिक्षणम् ।
धिया जनयते कर्ता कर्मभिश्चेति हि श्रुतिः ॥

These three states of origination, existence, and dissolution occur, indeed, to the world every moment. *Śruti*, indeed, declares that the Creator creates (the world) through (i.e., in conformity with) knowledge and works.

Neither *kāla*, nor *karma*, nor *Īśvara*, nor anything else, can be the cause of the world. Brahman which is immutable cannot also be the cause of the world. The creation of the world must, therefore, be the work of *māyā*. The world is *anādi*. So long as the knowledge of Brahman is not attained, the *jīva* is subject to worldly existence and

goes through the cycle of birth and death. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (II, ii, 7) says that the creatures are reborn in accordance with their work and in conformity with their knowledge (*yathā karma yathā śrutam*).

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अनादिमध्यनिधनाविद्यासन्दृषितात्मनः ।

ब्रह्मणो जायते व्योम तिमिरादिव चन्द्रमाः ॥

From Brahman-Ātman which has neither a beginning nor a middle nor an end, and which is concealed by *avidyā*, ether comes into existence, like the (double) moon arising from the eye-disease.

But for the eye-disease (*timira-doṣa*) there is no cognition of the moon as double. Similarly, but for the association of *avidyā*, the principle of obscurance, with Brahman, there is no creation of the world.

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नालं क्षणमपि स्यातुं कार्यं तद्ध्रुवता कुतः ।

रज्ज्वेव भोग्यविद्योत्यो मूढदृष्टेर्ध्रुवायते ॥

What comes into being is not competent to stay even for a moment; then how is permanency for that? To the deluded vision it appears permanent like the serpent caused by *avidyā* out of the rope.

Ākāśa and other elements which come into being from Brahman-Ātman are not permanent. They are no better than the illusory snake. Just as the snake seen in a rope due to *avidyā* appears to be permanent, so also the world which is projected by *avidyā* appears to be permanent to the ignorant.

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तिमिरोपप्लुतो यद्वद्विज्ञामिव समीक्षते ।

चन्द्रिकामात्मनस्तद्वत्कार्यम्भिन्नं समीक्षते ॥

Just as a person who is suffering from eye-disease sees the moon as double, so also (due to *avidyā*) one sees the effect (viz., the world) which comes into being from the Self as different from it.

The pot which is an effect of clay is not seen as different from it. As an effect which comes into being from Brahman-Ātman, the world should not be seen as different from it. But inasmuch as it is seen to be so, it is argued, it is not an effect which comes into being from Brahman-Ātman.

This argument is without force. Though the world as an effect is not really different from Brahman-Ātman, it appears to be so due to *avidyā*. An unreflective person says that the pot, which is a modification of clay, is different from it, but one who knows the real state of affairs says that the pot is really non-different from the clay. In the same way, a wise man (*vidvān*) says that the world which, being an appearance of Brahman, does not have a status of its own is non-different from Brahman.

[152]

यद्यद्भूतं यथासङ्ख्यं तत्तत्तावद्गुणं स्मृतम् ।
पूर्वैर्व्योप्तानि कार्यत्वादुत्तराणि यथाक्रमम् ॥

Every element as it occurs in the numerical order is known to have that (number of) quality. Each of the succeeding elements, being of the nature of an effect, is pervaded by the preceding one in the order of sequence.

The element which comes first has one quality; that which comes second has two qualities; that which is third has three qualities. The remaining two elements must be understood in the same way.

The following is the sequence of creation: the first to come into being was ether; from ether came air; from air was born fire; from fire emerged water; and from water was created earth. Each element has its own distinct quality as well as the quality or qualities of the

preceding element. The distinct quality of ether is sound. Air has touch as well as sound. Fire has three qualities — its own quality, viz., colour and the two earlier ones of air. Water has four qualities — its own quality, viz., taste and the three earlier ones of fire. Earth is endowed with five qualities — its own quality, viz., smell and the four earlier ones of water.

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आकाशादेश्च कार्यत्वान्न वाय्वादि प्रजायते ।

त्रियद्रूपान्मरुज्जन्म तस्मादात्मन एव तत् ॥

Since ether, etc., are effects, air and other elements do not come into existence therefrom. Air is born from (the Self which has assumed through *avidyā*) the form of ether. Therefore, it is from the Self alone that it has come.

All the five elements—ether, air, fire, water, and earth—are effects. Just as the Self through *māyā* is the cause of ether, so also it is the cause of the remaining four elements. When *śruti* says that from ether was produced air (*ākāśādvaāyuh*), it does not mean that air has come into being from the mere element *ākāśa*. Rather it means that from Brahman which has for its adjunct *ākāśa*, the product of *avidyā*, air comes into being (*avidyāpariṇāmākāśa-upādhikāt brahmaṇo vāyuh*). Brahman in association with *māyā* is the material cause of all the elements. Air is said to be created from ether, since the latter is the proximate adjunct of Brahman. In the same way, from Brahman which has for its adjunct *vāyu*, fire came into being. The same explanation holds good in the case of the remaining elements.

[154]

पञ्चैव खलु भूतानि व्योमादीन्युपलक्षयेत् ।

कार्यकारणरूपेण भूतेभ्यो नान्यदिष्यते ॥

There are, indeed, only five elements such as ether indicated above. Nothing else is desired than these (five) elements which appear in the form of causes and effects.

In the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* (III, 8) reference is made to ten elements of matter (*bhūta-mātra*). But these are not primary or basic elements which are only five. There is no need to accept any other element besides these five. All the objects of the world which are related as causes and effects are made up of these five elements.

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वाय्वादिषु तु यः शब्दः खस्थं तमविचक्षणाः ।
वाय्वादीनामिवेक्षन्ते स्रग्गुणानिव भोगिनः ॥

The sound which is in air, etc., is that of ether. But those who are ignorant about it think as if it were the quality of air, and so on, in the same way as the qualities of a garland are thought of as if they were of a snake.

While the distinct quality of ether is sound (*śabda*), that of air is touch (*sparsa*). If in addition to touch there is sound in air, it is because of the association of ether with air. Colour (*rūpa*) is the distinct quality of fire. Because of the association of ether and air, it has sound and touch in addition to colour which is its own quality. Water has taste (*rasa*), which is its distinct quality, as well as sound, touch, and colour due to its association with the preceding three elements. In addition to its distinct quality, viz., smell (*gandha*), earth has the qualities of the preceding four elements which are associated with it.

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चतुर्गुणात्मिका पृथ्वी न चतुर्ष्वपि सा यथा ।
ब्रह्मात्मकज्जगत्सर्वं ब्रह्मैवं न जगन्मयम् ॥

Earth is of the nature of the four elements, but it is not itself present in these four elements. Similarly, the whole world is of the nature of Brahman, but Brahman, thus, is not of the nature of the world.

The word *guṇa* which occurs in the first half of the verse means element.

Every effect is of the nature of the cause, but not *vice versa*. Earth, for example, is constituted by the nature of the four elements — ether, air, fire, and water. But we cannot reverse this and say that earth constitutes the nature of these four elements, because they are not the effect of earth. In the same way, the whole world, being the effect of Brahman, is of the nature of Brahman. Just as the illusory snake does not have a nature of its own apart from the rope on which it is superimposed, so also the illusory world does not have a nature of its own apart from Brahman on which it is superimposed. But this does not mean that Brahman is of the nature of the world, for it is not an effect of the world. On the ground of its being the cause of the elements, it cannot be argued that Brahman is *savišeṣa*, that it is constituted by the nature of the elements (*bhūta-mayatva*).

[157]

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं यत्प्रत्यज्ञायि पुरैकलम् ।

अनन्यानुभवम्ब्रह्म तत्सिद्धं न्यायतः स्फुटम् ॥

Brahman which was declared earlier as real, knowledge, and infinite, as one and self-luminous, is clearly established through reasoning.

Brahman is the only thing which is absolutely real. It is the cause of the world in the sense that it is the substratum on which the entire world is superimposed. So the world is illusory. The reasoning employed in the *ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa* of the *Brahmasūtra*, II, i, 14-20, establishes conclusively that the world is non-different from Brahman and that it does not exist apart from Brahman. So the truth is that Brahman alone is — Brahman, the one without a second.

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दिगादिकरणो देवः पञ्चभूतशरीरभृत् ।

सर्वोऽस्मीत्यभिमानेद्धो विराडेवमजायत ॥

The *Virāj*, the god who has the cardinal points, etc., as his organs, who wears a body formed of the five elements, and who shines with the notion "I am all", thus, came into existence.

One and the same reality, the Absolute, may be viewed in four ways, as *Brahman*, as *Īśvara*, as *Hiranyagarbha*, and as *Virāj*. The Absolute conceived as it is in itself, independent of any creation, is called *Brahman*. In its causal aspect it is called *Īśvara*: that is, *Brahman* is *Īśvara* when viewed as creative power. As the innermost essence of the world in a subtle condition, it is called *Hiranyagarbha*. When it is thought of in the manifested state as the universe, it is called *Virāj*. So these are the four poises of the one Reality.

After narrating the creation of the five subtle elements the *Upaniṣad* says that herbs came into existence from earth (*pṛthivyā oṣadhayaḥ*). This does not mean that herbs and food came out of the subtle elements directly. The five subtle elements get transformed into the five gross elements through quintuplication (*pañcīkṛta-pañcamahā-bhūta*). It is from the quintuplicated earth (*pañcīkṛta-pṛthivī*) that herbs came into being. But the *Virāj*, the cosmic being, whose limbs are the different parts of the universe and who has a body made of the five gross elements must have preceded the creation of herbs and food. It is called *Virāj* because it manifests in a diverse manner (*vividhaṁ rājamānatvāt*).

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अस्मात्पूर्वम्भवेत्सूत्रं तस्मिन्सति विराडद्यतः ।

श्रुत्यन्तरानुरोधाच्च विज्ञानमिति लिङ्गतः ॥

Prior to this (*Virāj*) must have been the *Sūtrātman*; for, that existing, the *Virāj* could come into being. This must be so, since it is in accordance with another *śruti* text, and also because there is the indication "mind" (*viññānam*).

The cosmic being in the unmanifest subtle condition is the basis of the *Virāj*. It is called *Sūtrātman* because it runs through all;

Hiraṇyagarbha, because of its power of knowing and desiring; and *Prāṇa*, because of its power of acting. The *Virāj* could come into being only after the *Sūtrātman* had come into being.

That the *Sūtrātman* must have preceded the *Virāj* is brought out in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (III, vi, 1). Yājñavalkya tells Gārgī that the elements are pervaded by the world of the Gandharvas, this again by the sun, the sun by the moon, the moon by the stars, the stars by the world of the gods, this again by the world of *Indra*, and the world of *Indra* by the world of the *Virāj* (*Prajāpati*). When Gārgī asks Yājñavalkya: "On what then, pray, are the worlds of *Prajāpati* woven, like warp and woof?" Yājñavalkya replies: "On the worlds of *Brahmā* (*Hiraṇyagarbha*).” The idea is that the *Sūtrātman* is the basis of the *Virāj*.

Further, the *Taittirīya* text (II, v, 1), which occurs in the sequel, says: "Knowledge actualises a sacrifice, and it executes the duties as well. All the gods meditate on the first-born Brahman conditioned by knowledge" (*viññānam yajñān tanute, karmāṇi tanute'pi ca, viññānam devāḥ sarve, brahma jyeṣṭhamupāsate*). The word *viññānam* here means the *Sūtrātman* which is the first-born.

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व्युत्थाप्यान्नमयादिभ्यो ह्यन्नम्प्राणमितीरणात् ।
उपासनोपदेशाच्च सूत्रमत्र विवक्षितम् ॥

Here, the *Sūtrātman* is sought to be conveyed, since by making us proceed inward from the *annamaya-kośa*, etc., *śruti*, indeed, speaks of food, vital force, and so on, and since meditation (on the *Sūtrātman*) is enjoined.

In the *Bhṛguvallī*, which is the concluding chapter or the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, an account is given as to how Bhṛgu is gradually led to realize Brahman as bliss by discarding *annamaya*, etc., which are not-Self. Bhṛgu first thought of food (i.e., the *Virāj*, the cosmic being in its gross aspect) as Brahman; then he thought of the vital force (i.e., the

Hiraṇyagarbha, the cosmic being in the subtle aspect) as Brahman. The subtle body of the *Sūtrātman* is associated with the sheaths of vital force, consciousness, and self-consciousness, while the sheath of food is associated with the gross physical body of the *Virāj*. When Bhṛgu requested his father to teach him Brahman, the latter said: "Food, vital force, eye, ear, mind, speech" (*annatī prāṇaś cakṣuḥ śrotraś mano vācamitī*). The idea is that after mentioning the body (*annam*) and the vital force (*prāṇam*) which is within the body, Varuṇa mentions eye, ear, mind, and speech as the aids to the realization of Brahman. Here the word *prāṇa* refers to the *Sūtrātman*.

Reference has already been made in the previous verse to the *Taittirīya* text (II, v, 1) where meditation on the *Sūtrātman*, the first-born, is enjoined.

The word *vijñāna* which occurs in this text cannot mean the act of knowing (*dhātvartha*) for two reasons. A mere act cannot be an object of meditation. Further, the word *vijñāna* is qualified as "Brahman, the first-born" (*vijñānaś brahma jyeṣṭham*). Such a qualification is not possible if the word *vijñānam* means the act of knowing. Nor can it refer to the individual soul, for one cannot meditate on oneself. It cannot even be said that it refers to Brahman, the first cause, because the first cause cannot be spoken of as *vijñāna* (*kāraṇabrahmaṇasca vijñāna-padena agrahaṇāt*). So the word *vijñāna* in this text means only the *Sūtrātman*.

[161]

कार्योत्पादात्पुरा सूत्रं मृद्वत्सदविभागवत् ।
कारणं कार्यमुत्पाद्य कार्यतामिव गच्छति ॥

Prior to the origination of its effect (viz., the *Virāj*), the *Sūtrātman* remains undifferentiated from Being (i.e., Brahman) which is its cause. After giving rise to the effect, as clay (gives rise to its effect), it becomes *as it were* the effect.

If the *Sūtrātman* exists prior to the *Virāj*, why is it, it may be asked, that it is not known to be such? It is only when it gives rise to

the *Virāj* which is its effect that it becomes fit enough to be spoken of as the cause of the *Virāj*, in the same way as clay when it changes into the form of a pot becomes fit enough to be spoken of as the cause of something. Till then it remains undifferentiated from its own cause, viz., Brahman, and does not manifest itself as an effect. And so nothing could be said about it till it manifests as the *Virāj*.

[162]

कार्येऽसति तु तत्सूत्रं प्रज्ञानघनरूपभृत् ।

अवच्छिन्नं स्वकार्येण समष्टिव्यष्टितां व्रजेत् ॥

But as long as the effect has not come into being, the *Sūtrātman* remains in the form of the knowledge-self (*prajñānaghana*). When it is in a conditioned form by its effect, it manifests itself in cosmic and individual forms.

Prior to the rise of the *Virāj*, the *Sūtrātman* remains in a potential condition as motion and knowledge (*kriyāvijñāna śaktirūpeṇa*), that is, as *prajñāna-ghana*, in Brahman, the first cause. It cannot be referred to either as the effect or as the cause. But it can be spoken of as the *Sūtrātman* differentiating it from Brahman, the first cause, and the *Virāj* only when it assumes the cosmic (*samaṣṭi*) and the individual (*vyaṣṭi*) forms, *Vaiśvānara* and *Viśva* respectively.

See verses (238) and (239) for an explanation of *kriyā-śakti* and *vijñāna-śakti* of the *Sūtrātman*.

Advaita inquires into the states of waking, dream, and sleep with a view to bring out the nature of the Self which is constant and unchanging in all the three states. These three states are characterized as gross (*sthūla*), subtle (*sūkṣma*), and causal (*kāraṇa*) respectively. Though Brahman-Ātman is one and non-dual, it is referred to variously both at the cosmic and individual levels because of the difference in respect of the adjuncts. The individual forms of Brahman-Ātman are: *Viśva* in the waking state, *Taijasa* in the dream state, and *Prājña* in the state of sleep. The cosmic forms of the Absolute are: *Vaiśvānara* in the gross form, the *Sūtrātman* in the subtle form, and *Īśvara* in the causal form.

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वृष्ट्यादिसव्यपेक्षया भुवः पञ्चगुणात्मिकाः ।
 व्रीहिप्रभृतयः सर्वा भवन्त्योषधयः क्रमात् ॥

All herbs such as the grains which are constituted by the nature of the five elements come into being in orderly succession from earth with the co-operation of rain, etc.

The *śruti* text, "From earth were born the herbs," (*prthivyā oṣadhayaḥ*) is explained in this verse.

It is only from the quintuplicated (*pañcīkṛta*) earth that herbs, etc., come into existence. This idea is conveyed when it is said in the verse "from earth with the co-operation of rain, etc." (*bhūvo vṛṣṭīyādi savyapekṣatvam pañcīkṛtatvam*).

The five subtle elements, viz., ether, air, fire, water, and earth come into existence from Brahman-Ātman. These subtle elements get transformed into gross elements by a certain process of mixing up called quintuplication. In each gross element all the remaining elements are represented. Each in its gross aspect is mixed up with the remaining elements. In a particle of gross earth, for example, one half is earth, and the remaining half consists of ether, air, fire, and water in equal proportion. The same is true of the other gross elements.

[164-165]

अदनाहं तथाऽन्नञ्च ताभ्यः समभिजायते ।
 जग्धादन्नाद्रसोत्पत्तिः शोणितञ्जायते रसात् ॥
 जायते रुधिरान्मांसं मेदसश्च ततो भवः ।
 मेदसोऽस्थीनि जायन्ते मज्जाप्यस्थिसमुद्भवा ॥
 ततः शुक्रस्य निष्पत्तिर्बीजं मात्रसृजा सह ॥

In that manner from herbs comes food which is fit to be eaten. From the food that is digested, *rasa*, an essential fluid of the body, comes into being. And from *rasa*

comes blood. From blood comes flesh; and from this (flesh), fat comes into being. From fat, bones are produced. And marrow comes out of bone. From marrow comes the semen which, along with the mother's blood, gives rise to the seed.

These two verses explain the *śruti* texts which say: "From the herb was produced food. From food was born man" (*oṣadhībhyah annam, annāt puruṣaḥ*).

[166-168]

निजाविद्यामहाजालसंवीतधिषणः पुमान् ।

मोहोत्थानलकामाख्यबडिशपहताशयः ॥

तमसा कामशार्ङ्गेण सङ्कल्पाकर्षणेन सः ।

रागाख्यविषलेपेन ताडितो विषयेषुणा ॥

ग्रहाविष्ट इवानीशश्चोदितो जन्यकर्मणा ।

योषिदमिम्पतत्याशु ज्योतिर्लोभात्पतङ्गवत् ॥

The person whose mind is enveloped by the mighty net of the inherent *avidyā*, whose heart is captivated by the fish-hook of the insatiable desire which is born of non-discrimination, who is assailed by ignorance, who is struck down by the arrow of the sense-object smeared with the poison of attachment and discharged from the bow of desire, and attracted by purposeful thought, who is powerless like the one who is possessed by a demon, who, being impelled by the *karma* of the person that is to be born, falls in haste into the fire of woman, like a moth (which rushes into fire) covetous of its flame.

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आकृष्य देहात्तच्छुक्रं यथाकर्म यथाश्रुतम् ।

रेतोवहप्रनाडयाथ योनौ पुंसा निषिच्यते ॥

The semen which is extracted from the body is poured into the womb through the genital organ by man, in the manner determined by (the former) *karma* and knowledge.

The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (II, ii, 7) says that so long as the *jīva* does not attain Brahman-realization it is subject to transmigratory existence and takes rebirth in conformity with the previous *karma* and *upāsana* which it has performed. Ānandagiri points out that the previous *karma* and *upāsana* of the offspring, or of the parent, or of the two parents of the forthcoming child are the determining factors (*janyajanakayorvā strī-puṃsayorvā yathākarma yathāśrutam*).

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तस्य योनौ निषित्तस्य निमित्तावशवर्तिनः ।

जायते कललावस्था ततो बुद्बुदरूपिणी ॥

From the semen poured into the womb and acted on by the (two) causes (viz., previous *karma* and *upāsana*) comes the embryonic state of *kalala* and thence the *budbuda* form.

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बुद्बुदाज्जायते पेशी पेशीतो जायते घनम् ।

घनादङ्गाभिनिष्पत्तिः केशरोमाणि चाङ्गतः ॥

From the *budbuda* form arises the foetus, and from the foetus comes the solid body. From the solid body, organs come into being; and from the organs come out hairs on the head and body.

[172]

पूर्वजन्मनि यान्यासन्भूतानि करणानि च ।

तान्येवेहापि देहाय तद्यथेति श्रुतेर्बलात् ॥

With whatever elements of matter and with whatever sense-organs the soul was associated in the former birth, the same elements and the same sense-organs appear in this life for (the origination and action of) the body; and we hold this view on the authority of the *śruti* text, "Just as a (goldsmith.....)."

When a *jīva* is reborn, the same five elements of matter (*bhūtapāṇ-caka*) which constituted its former body form the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) of the present body, and the same sense-organs (*karaṇāṇi*) that functioned in the former body become manifested in the present one.

The *śruti* text quoted in the verse is from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (IV, iv, 4) which says: "Just as a goldsmith, taking a piece of gold turns it into another, newer, and more beautiful shape, so does this Self, after having thrown away this body and dispelled its ignorance, make unto himself another, newer, and more beautiful shape."

In the course of his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (IV, iv, 2), "It is followed by knowledge, work, and past experience" (*taṁ vidyā-karmaṇi samanvārabhete pūrvaprajñā ca*), Śaṅkara observes that knowledge, work, and past experience accompany the departing self in its journey to the next life. "Hence these three — knowledge, work, and past experience — are the food on the way to the next world, corresponding to the load of the carter. Since these three are the means of attaining another body and enjoying (the results of one's past work), one should cultivate only the good forms of them, so that one may have a desirable body and desirable enjoyments."

[173]

सर्वात्मनोऽप्यवच्छेदो विराजः सूत्रजन्मनः ।

इयानस्मीति संमोहात्कामकर्मसमन्वयात् ॥

Though infinite, the *Virāj* which has evolved from the *Sūtrātman*, becomes a limited being due to ignorance and thinks, "This much I am," in virtue of *kāma* and *karma*.

The *Virāj* is the cosmic being (*samaṣṭi*) in its gross physical aspect. It has come out of the *Hiraṇyagarbha*, the cosmic being in its subtle aspect. And so it is infinite; it is the self of all. Nevertheless, on account of its association with *avidyā*, it becomes a limited being when it assumes the individual form (*vyakṣṭi*), the physical body of man. The *Taittirīya* text (II, vi, 1) says that "He (the Self) wished — Let me be many; let me be born" (*so'kāmayata, bahu syām prajāyeyeti*). Further, it says that after creating the world He entered into that very being (*tatsṣṣṭvā tadeva anuprāviśat*). The desire (*kāma*) and the action (*karma*) on the part of the cosmic being are intelligible only in the context of its association with *māyā*. It is the principle of *māyā* that accounts for the finitude and the diversification of the Absolute.

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लिङ्गात्मकतया तद्वत्समष्टिव्यष्टिरूपिणः ।

तदवच्छेदहेतोः स्यादव्यक्तस्य सुषुप्तता ॥

In the same way for the *Sūtrātman*, who is manifested both as cosmic and individual beings (in a subtle form), there is the limitation by the form of the *liṅga-sarīra*. The *Avyakta*, the Unmanifested, (as limited in the human body) is identical with *avidyā* in the state of sleep.

What is true of the *Virāj* is equally true of the *Sūtrātman*, the cosmic being in its subtle aspect. While in its cosmic subtle aspect it is referred to as the *Sūtrātman*, in its individual subtle aspect it is called *Taijasa*. Though the *Sūtrātman* is infinite, it suffers limitation due to *avidyā*. In the individual form, it has the subtle body (*liṅga-sarīra*) as its adjunct. The subtle body is composed of seventeen factors — *buddhi*, *manas*, the five organs of knowledge (*jñānendriya*), the five organs of action (*karmendriya*), and the five vital airs (*prāṇa*).

Buddhi is the principle which stands for certitude, while *manas* stands for desire and doubt. These two, which are modes of the internal organ, are derived from the *sattva* aspect of the elements taken

collectively. The five organs of knowledge spring from the *sattva* aspect of the elements taken separately. The five organs of action come from the *rajas* aspect of the elements taken separately. The five vital airs — *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna*, and *samāna* — come into being from the *rajas* phase of the elements taken together.

The subtle body can be described in a different way as being constituted by three sheaths — the sheath of self-consciousness (*viññāna-maya-kośa*), the sheath of consciousness (*manomaya-kośa*), and the sheath of vitality (*prāṇamaya-kośa*). The seventeen factors mentioned above are apportioned among the three sheaths. The *viññānamaya-kośa* consists of *buddhi* and the five organs of knowledge. The *manomaya-kośa* is composed of *manas* and the five organs of knowledge. The *prāṇamaya-kośa* is made up of the five organs of action and the five vital airs.

The *Avyakta*, the unmanifest *māyā*, is the cause of the limitation of the cosmic being who assumes the individual form both in its gross (*sthūla*) and subtle (*liṅga*) aspects. It is known as *kāraṇa-ajñāna* in the state of sleep. The individual form of the Self in the state of sleep is called *Prājña*.

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परात्मनोऽप्यनन्तस्य क्षेत्रज्ञत्वमविद्यया ।
क्षेत्रज्ञञ्चापि मां विद्धीत्येवं सत्युपपद्यते ॥

The supreme Self, though it is infinite, attains the status of the *kṣetrajña*, the knower of the body, by means of *avidyā*. Only thus, the declaration (of Kṛṣṇa), "Know me also as the *kṣetrajña*," is tenable.

Brahman-Ātman which transcends the cause-effect relation is infinite. The Self in the body is called the *kṣetrajña*. It is the semblance of the supreme consciousness (*caitanya-ābhāsa*). Though in truth it is no other than the supreme Brahman-Ātman, it appears to be a finite self enclosed by the body due to *avidyā*. It is this idea that is conveyed by the *Gītā* text (XIII, 2) quoted in the verse.

[176]

न जानामीत्यविद्यैकाऽनित्या तत्कारणं मता ।

स्वप्नसिद्ध्यैव सा सिद्ध्येन्निशूलूकीव वासरे ॥

Avidyā in the form "I do not know", which is impermanent, is considered to be the only cause of the limitations (mentioned above). It is established by the self-luminous consciousness itself, just as (the darkness of) the night is established in the daytime by the consciousness of the owl.

It is *avidyā* that makes the all-pervasive Self appear as the limited *kṣetrajñā* in the body, just as the same *avidyā* makes the cosmic being appear in the individual forms limited by gross and subtle bodies.

Avidyā is known to us in our experience (*prasiddha*), for everyone says: "I am ignorant" (*aham ajñāḥ*). It is "beginningless" (*anādi*). But it can be terminated by the knowledge obtained through a *pramāṇa*. Since it is removable by the knowledge obtained through a *pramāṇa*, it is not *pramāṇa-siddha* (*pramāṇa-nivartyatvāt avidyāyāḥ na pramāṇataḥ siddhiḥ*). It is revealed by the self-luminous Witness-consciousness (*sākṣibhāṣya*). Our consciousness is the sole evidence for the existence of *avidyā* in the same way as the consciousness of the owl is the evidence for the existence of darkness which it experiences during the daytime.

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प्रमाणोत्पन्नया दृष्ट्या योऽविद्यां द्रष्टुमिच्छति ।

दीपेनासौ ध्रुवम्पश्येद् गुहाकुक्षिगतं तमः ॥

He who desires to see *avidyā* through the knowledge generated by a *pramāṇa* could as well certainly see the darkness in the interior of a cave by means of a lamp.

Avidyā is made known by the Witness-consciousness. According to Advaita, Brahman-Ātman is the sole reality. This Brahman-

Ātman which is of the nature of consciousness (*svarūpa-caitanya*) is the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of *avidyā*. While *svarūpa-jñāna* is not opposed to *avidyā*, *vṛtti-jñāna*, the knowledge which arises through the mental mode, is opposed to it. So *avidyā* cannot be known through the knowledge generated by a *pramāṇa*, for such a knowledge which has to come through a mental mode (*vṛtti*) is opposed to it. Any such attempt to know *avidyā* through *pramāṇa-jñāna* is as futile and absurd as the attempt to see the darkness of a mountain-cave by means of a lamp. The light of a lamp will remove darkness. In the same way *pramāṇa-jñāna*, instead of revealing *avidyā*, will remove it.

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अनात्मेतीह यद्विद्यति तदविद्याविजृम्भितम् ।

तस्मादविद्या सांप्युक्ता विद्या त्वात्मैकरूपिणी ॥

That which is known here as the not-Self is the result of *avidyā*. Hence it can be said that it is also *avidyā*. But knowledge is identical with the Self.

If the sole reality that exists is Brahman-Ātman, then anything other than Brahman is due to *avidyā*. It is, indeed, a product of *avidyā*. And so the not-Self, whatever it may be, may be characterized as *avidyā*. But knowledge (*vidyā*) is the Self alone.

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आत्माग्रहातिरेकेण तस्या रूपं न विद्यते ।

अमित्रवदविद्येति सत्येवं घटते सदा ॥

Its nature does not consist in anything other than the non-perception of the Self. Only if it is said that the term *avidyā* is like the term *amitra*, it is always tenable.

Avidyā is not negative (*abhāva*), but something positive. It should not be interpreted negatively as the prior non-existence of knowledge (*jñāna-prāgabhāva*). It is a positive entity which conceals the nature of the Self. Concealment (*āvaraṇa*) is what it does; and it constitutes the

nature of *avidyā*. The work of concealment will not be possible in the case of a negative entity, what is non-existent. The Advaitin does not admit the existence of any negative entity at all. Therefore, the term *avidyā* does not mean the absence or non-existence of knowledge, since the mere absence or non-existence of knowledge cannot do the work of concealing or veiling the Self (*abhāvasya ācchādanatvāyugāt*).

The word *avidyā* must be explained in the same way as the word *amitra* is explained. The negative prefix *a* in the word *amitra* conveys the idea that the person denoted by the word is *other than* or *opposed to* a friend (*anyatvaṁ tadviruddhatvaṁ vā nañō'rthah*). In the same way, the negative prefix *a* in the word *avidyā* conveys the sense that the thing denoted by the word is something other than *vidyā* (*vidyāto'nyaivam*) or something opposed to *vidyā* (*vidyāvairuddhatvam*). It does not convey the idea of the absence of *vidyā*.

Ānandagiri explains the expression *ātماغreha* which means non-perception of the Self as the concealment of the Self (*ātmano'graho nāma āvaraṇam ācchādanam*).

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तस्मात्सदसदित्यादिविकल्पो मूढचेतसाम् ।

निरूप्यमाणो निर्वाति न वेद्मीत्यग्रहात्मनि ॥

So, the differentiation such as being and non-being (in respect of the not-Self) which is worked out by the deluded mind ends in the non-perception (which is *avidyā*) in the form, "I do not know."

The only reality which exists is Brahman-Ātman. It alone is Being (*sat*). The not-Self, i.e., anything other than the Self, is only an illusory appearance due to the non-perception of the ultimate reality. Nevertheless, a deluded person works out a distinction among the things of the world as being (*sat*) and non-being (*asat*). He looks upon certain objects as being and some others as non-being (*asat*), though there is no justification for such a distinction; for all of them, being not-Self, are illusory appearance due to *avidyā*. This distinction is meaningful

only so long as the nature of the Self is not known, i.e., so long as there is the functioning of *avidyā* in the form of the non-perception of the nature of the Self.

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तया संवीतचित्तोऽयं त्यक्त्वा देहम्प्रातनम् ।
लिङ्गात्मा प्राविशेद्योनिं कर्मादिमरुतेरितः ॥

This *jīva* whose discriminating knowledge is obscured by *avidyā*, after leaving his former body, enters the womb (of the mother) with the *liṅga-sarīra*, being wafted by the wind of *karma*, etc.

The nature of *avidyā* was explained in verses (176) to (180).

It is *avidyā* that is responsible for the transmigratory existence of the *jīva*.

The word *citta* which occurs in the verse means, according to Ānandagiri, *viveka-jñāna* (*citta-śabdena viveka-jñānam gṛhyate*). The word *liṅgātmā* means the *jīva* with the adjunct of the *liṅga-sarīra* (*liṅga-upahito jīvaḥ*).

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अन्नमम्भस्तथा तेजो मुक्तम्प्रत्येकशस्त्रिधा ।
त्रिवृत्कृतं तथैकैकम्परिणामम्प्रपद्यते ॥

The solid, watery, and fiery substances eaten (by the mother) are each one of them divided into three portions; and each one of these three portions undergoes transformation in three ways separately.

With a view to give an account of the growth of the subtle and gross bodies of the *jīva* that has got into the womb, it is first of all stated that food and other things eaten by the mother undergo three-fold transformation.

The solid food (*anna*) eaten by the mother becomes threefold — the grossest, subtle, and the subtlest. The *Chāndogya* (VI, v, 1-3)

speaks of these portions as *sthaviṣṭho dhātuh*, *madhyamo dhātuh*, and *aṇiṣṭho dhātuh*. The watery and fiery food when eaten becomes threefold in the same way.

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पुरीषमांसबुद्ध्यंशैर्मूत्रासृक्प्राणरश्मिभिः ।

तथास्थिमज्जावाग्भागैरन्नाप्तेजांसि कालतः ॥

In course of time, (the grossest, subtle, and the subtlest portions of) the solid food get transformed into faeces, flesh, and intellect respectively. Similarly (the grossest, subtle, and the subtlest portions of) the watery food get transformed into urine, blood, and the vital airs respectively; and in the same way (the grossest, subtle, and the subtlest portions of) the fiery food are transformed into bone, marrow, and speech respectively.

The transformation that takes place with regard to food and other substances is at two stages. First of all, food and other substances when consumed become threefold. Secondly, each one of these three portions undergoes transformation in a particular form.

In the course of his commentary on the *Chāndogya* text (VI, v, 3) Śaṅkara says that we consume heat in the shape of oil, butter, etc.

Since mind is a development of food, it is material, though very subtle. It is, therefore, wrong to hold, as in the *Vaiśeṣika*, that the mind is eternal and impartible (*annopacitatvān manaso bhautikatvam eva, na vaiśeṣika-tantroktā-lakṣaṇaṁ nityaṁ niravayavaṁ ceti gṛhyate*).

[184]

मनोबुद्धीन्द्रियाणां स्यात्कर्मशक्तेश्च भारती ।

प्राणश्च प्राणभेदानामुपलक्षणसिद्धये ॥

The word "mind" is used (in the *śruti* text) to imply *buddhi* and the organs of knowledge. And, the word "speech" is used (in the *śruti* text) to imply the organs of

action. And also, the word “vital air” is used (in the *śruti* text) to imply the different vital airs.

The *Chāndogya* text (VI. v, 1) says that the subtlest portion of food becomes mind (*yo’ṇiṣṭhaḥ tanmanah*). Here the word “mind” is indicative of *buddhi* and the organs of knowledge. Similarly, the *Chāndogya* text (VI, v, 3) says that the subtlest portion of heat becomes speech (*yo’ṇiṣṭhaḥ sã vāk*). Here also, the word *vāk* is used to indicate the remaining organs of action. There is, again, the *Chāndogya* text (VI, v, 2) in the same context which says that the subtlest portion of water becomes vital air (*yo’ṇiṣṭhaḥ sa prāṇah*). The word *prāṇa* here is used to indicate the vital air in its fivefold aspect.

[185]

कर्मेत्थभावनाभिस्तु चोद्यते यद्यदिन्द्रियम् ।
जायते तदहङ्काराद्यथाकर्म यथाश्रुतम् ॥

The sense organ which is said to arise through the impressions which are generated by *karma* evolves from the *ahaṅkāra*, in conformity with (the former) work and knowledge.

It is not from pure *ahaṅkāra* that the senses come into existence, but only from the *ahaṅkāra* which carries the reflection of consciousness (*sābhāsa-ahaṅkāra*).

[186]

श्रोतास्मीत्यभिमानाद्भि जायते श्रवणेन्द्रियम् ।
परिशिष्टेषु चाप्येवमिन्द्रियेषूपधारयेत् ॥

The sense of hearing comes into being, indeed, from the self-conceit, “I am the hearer.” And in the same way (this mode of explanation) must be applied in respect of the remaining sense organs.

Verses (185) and (186) explain the evolution of the senses.

It is not the case, as the Sāṅkhya holds, that the various senses evolve from the *ahaṅkāra* as such. But it is only from *ahaṅkāra* which is acted on by, or connected with, the reflection of the consciousness (*caitanyābhāsānuviddhasya*) that senses come into being.

[187]

देहोत्पत्तिमनूत्पन्नो व्योमवद्घटजन्मना ।
अस्त्यादयोऽप्यतो न स्युः सति जन्मनि ते यतः ॥

The Self is said to be originated (as it were) following the origination of the body, in the same way as ether is said to be originated following the origination of a pot. Hence, existence and other (mutable) states do not exist (for the Self) since these states would be possible only if there is origination (for the Self).

It is wrong to think that the Self is also originated like the senses. The Self is eternal (*nitya*). It is immutable (*kūṭastha*). But it appears to have birth (*janma*) due to the limiting adjunct (*upādhi*), viz., the body, which has birth and other mutable states. Every object is subject to six changes (*ṣaḍbhāva vikāra*) — (1) birth (*janma*), (2) existence (*sattā*), (3) growth (*vardhi*), (4) transformation (*pariṇāma*), (5) decline (*apakṣaya*), and (6) death (*vināśa*). Only if an object has birth or origination, the subsequent states such as existence, growth, etc., will be possible for it. Since the Self has no birth, it is free from the subsequent states which follow it (*ātmano janmābhāvāt taduttara-bhāvinaḥ pañcavikārā na bhavanti*).

[188]

यावद्यावदयं देहो वर्धते गर्भशायिनः ।
तावत्तावदभिव्यक्तिर्लिङ्गस्याप्युपजायते ॥

As this (physical) body (of the *jīva*) lying in the womb grows, his *liṅga-sarīra* also manifests itself more and more.

Both the visible physical body and the invisible subtle body (*liṅga-sarīra*) grow simultaneously.

[189]

समग्रकरणस्याथ नवमे मासि देहिनः ।

व्यतीतानेकजन्मोत्था व्यङ्ग्यन्ते वासनाः क्रमात् ॥

To the *jīva* who has the body with all the organs (developed), the (latent) impressions gathered up in the past innumerable births manifest themselves gradually in the ninth (or the tenth) month.

The *jīva* who has entered into the womb, being impelled by his past *dharma* and *adharma*, comes to have gross and physical bodies equipped with all senses. When he lies in the womb, fully awake in all his senses, the latent impressions (*vāsanās*) accumulated in the innumerable previous births present themselves to him.

The word *atha* which occurs in the first line of the verse is used with a view to suggest tenth month as an alternative to the ninth month (*atha-sabdo māsavikalpārthah*). The *Chāndogya* text (V, ix, 1), for instance, says that "the foetus enclosed in the membrane, having lain within for ten or nine months, more or less, then comes to be born."

The description of the condition of the *jīva* in the mother's womb is given with a view to create a feeling of disgust against worldly existence.

[190]

आविर्भूतप्रबोधोऽसौ गर्भदुःखादिसंस्कृतः ।

हा कष्टमिति निर्विण्णः स्वात्मानं शोशुचीत्यथ ॥

Then, the *jīva*, being thus awakened (to his past experience stored up in the form of the latent impressions) and experiencing the misery of existence in the womb and the like, bewails himself in disgust by thinking, "Ah what a suffering!"

[191]

अनुभूताः पुरासह्या मया मर्भन्छिदोऽसकृत् ।

करम्भवालुकास्तप्तः या दहन्त्यशुभाशयान् ॥

(Feeling dejected, the *jīva* wails over his lot as follows): Earlier (in the previous births) unbearable pains striking the vital parts of the body, similar to those caused by the heated mud and sand which burn the wicked, were often experienced by me.

Verses (191) to (196) give an account of the way in which the *jīva*, which suffers unbearable misery when it lies in the womb, grieves over its pitiable condition.

[192]

जाठरानलसन्तप्ताः पित्ताख्यरसविप्लवः ।

गर्भाशये निमग्नं ता दहन्त्यतिभृशं तु माम् ॥

But the drops of the bilious fluid, heated by the digestive fire of the abdomen, burn me, who am placed in the womb, much more intensely.

[193]

औदर्यकृमिवक्त्राणि कूटशाल्मलिकण्टकैः ।

तुल्यानि वितुदन्त्यार्तं पार्श्वस्थिक्रकचादितम् ॥

The mouths of the worms in the womb, which are similar to the thorns of the *kūṭasālmali* tree, torture me who am already tormented by the saw-like bones of the sides.

It is said that the wicked souls are tortured in the world of Yama with the thorns of the *kūṭasālmali* tree.

[194]

गर्भे दुर्गन्धभूयिष्ठे जाठरग्निप्रदीपिते ।

दुःखं मयाप्तं यत्तास्मात्कनीयः कुम्भिपाकजम् ॥

The misery suffered in the *kumbhīpāka* hell is less than that experienced by me in the womb which is full of foul odour and which is burning with the digestive fire of the abdomen.

[195]

पूयासृक्श्लेष्मपायित्वं वान्ताशित्वञ्च यद्भवेत् ।
अशुचौ किमिमावश्च तत्प्राप्तं गर्भशायिना ॥

The state of being a worm in an impure thing, drinking pus, blood, and phlegm, and eating what is vomited, was obtained by me lying in the womb.

[196]

गर्भशय्यां सनारुह्य दुःखं यादृङ्मयापि तत् ।
नातिशेते महद्दुःखं निःशेषनरकेषु यत् ॥

The intense pain suffered in all the hells put together cannot exceed the pain experienced by me who am lying on the bed of the womb.

[197]

अस्थियन्त्रविनिष्पिष्टः परीतः कुक्षिवह्निना ।
क्लेदासृग्दिग्धसर्वाङ्गो जरायुपटसंवृतः ॥

In the womb, the *jīva* is crushed by the machine of the bones, is surrounded by the fire of the stomach, has all the limbs smeared with the liquid discharges and blood, and is covered by the outer skin of the embryo.

In the course of his commentary on the *Chāndogya* text (V, ix, 1), which speaks about the foetus enclosed in the membrane for about nine or ten months, Śaṅkara writes: "Enclosed in the membrane and such qualifications have been added for the purpose of creating a feeling of disgust (against worldly existence). The idea is that it must be extremely painful for the embryonic personality to lie within the

mother's womb — having all his faculties, strength, virility, energy, intelligence, and activity held in complete check, growing through the absorption of the food and drink taken by the mother, having its source in very unclean blood and semen, covered by the most unclean clothing of the membrane, the body smeared with the urine, excreta, wind, bile, and phlegm contained in the womb. Then the actual birth consisting in painful coming out through the *vagina* must be still more painful. All this gives rise to feelings of disgust. Such suffering is unbearable even for a single moment — what to say of lying in the womb for such a long time as ten or nine months!"

[198]

निष्क्रामन्मृशदुःखार्तो रुदन्नुच्चैरधोमुखः ।
यन्त्रादिव विनिर्मुक्तः पतत्युत्तानशाय्यधः ॥

Afflicted by excessive pain, crying aloud, and with the head downward, the *jīva*, emerging out of the womb like the one released from a snare, falls down lying on the back.

This verse gives an account of the birth of the *jīva*.

[199 - 200]

अकिञ्चिज्ज्ञस्तदा बालो मांसपेशीसमः स्थितः ।
श्वमार्जारादिदंष्ट्रिभ्यो रक्ष्यते दण्डपाणिभिः ॥
पितृवद्राक्षसं वेत्ति मातृवडूडाकिनीमपि ।
पूयं पयोवदशनाति धिक्पापिष्ठं हि शैशवम् ॥

The baby (that is born) knows nothing then. It remains like a ball of flesh. It has to be protected against the teeth of dogs, cats, and other animals by others with sticks in hand. It looks upon a demon as father, and a female imp as mother. It drinks the pus as milk. What a pity! Infancy is, indeed, miserable.

These two verses describe the miserable state of infancy. The new-born baby cannot distinguish one object from another. It has to be taken care of at every stage.

[201 - 202]

दृष्टोऽथ यौवनम्प्राप्य मन्मथज्वरविह्वलः ।
गायत्यक्स्मादुच्चैः स तथाकस्माच्च बलगति ॥
आरोहति तहं वेगाच्छान्तानुद्वेजयत्यपि ।
कामक्रोधमदान्धः सन्न किञ्चिदपि वीक्षते ॥

Then, attaining the state of youth, he becomes haughty, and becomes delirious because of the fever of sexual passion. All on a sudden he sings aloud; likewise, he gallops without any reason. He climbs a tree at no time. And also he makes good people feel annoyed. Remaining blind on account of desire, anger, and passion he pays no heed to anything.

The misery of youth (*yauvana-duḥkham*) is brought out in these two verses.

[203]

महापरिभवस्थानं जराम्प्राप्याथ दुःखितः ।
श्लेष्मणा पिहितोरस्को जग्धमन्नं न जीर्यति ॥

Then, on attaining old age which is a state of great disgrace, he becomes miserable. With the chest covered by phlegm, he does not digest the food eaten by him.

The suffering of old age (*jarā-duḥkham*) is described in verses (203) to (209).

[204]

भग्नदन्तो भग्नदृष्टिः कटुतिक्तकषायभुक् ।
वातभुग्नकटिग्रीवाकरोरुचरणोऽबलः ॥

With fallen teeth and affected vision, eating what is pungent, sour, and astringent, with hip, neck, hands, thighs, and legs bent down due to gout, he is helpless.

[205]

गदायुतसमाविष्टः परिभूतः स्त्रबन्धुभिः ।
निःशौचो मलदिग्धाङ्ग आलिङ्गितधरोषितः ॥

Afflicted by innumerable diseases, humiliated by his kinsmen, precluded from all ablutions, and smeared with dirt all over the body, he lies on the ground embracing it as it were.

[206 - 209]

कासाधोवायुमुरजा सितश्मश्रुकचाम्बरा ।
श्वासोत्थस्वनवंशा च जाठरध्वनिगेयिका ॥
वलीपलितवच्चर्मवरकञ्चुकधारिणी ।
दण्डतृतीयपादेयं प्रखलन्ती मुहुर्मुहुः ॥
अग्निपाकिकरुक्माढ्या सूक्ष्मत्वक्पटसंवृता ।
गुल्फजान्वस्थिसङ्घर्षचलन्नूपुरघोषिणी ॥
प्रज्ञां मेधां धृतिं शौर्यं यूनां जग्ध्वा बलं तथा ।
कृतार्थेव प्रहर्षेण जरायोषित्प्रनृत्यति ॥

Having consumed understanding, memory, courage, valour, and the strength of youth, this damsel of old age feels as if she has achieved her goal and dances with joy to the drum of cough and flatulency, to the flute of the sonorous breath, to the song of the abdominal sound, with the garment of white beard and hair, wearing the best blouse of the wrinkled and grey-haired skin, having a third leg as it were in the staff, falling down again and again,

with the bright gold-ornaments of projecting knots of flesh, covered by the cloth of the thin skin, and with the twinklings of moving anklets due to the rubbing of the ankle and knee bones.

[210]

ततोऽपि मृतिदुःखस्य दृष्टान्तो नोपलभ्यते ।

यस्माद्विभ्यति भूतानि प्राप्तान्यपि परां रुजम् ॥

There is no parallel to the pangs of death which follow it (i. e., old age). Even a creature suffering from the worst disease is afraid of it.

Verses (210) to (212) describe the misery of death (*marāṇa-duḥkhami*).

[211]

हियते मृत्युना जन्तुः परिष्वक्तोऽपि बान्धवैः ।

सागरान्तर्जलगतो गरुडेनेव पन्नगः ॥

Though surrounded by the relatives, the creature is snatched away by death in the same way as a serpent which has gone underneath the ocean is captured by Garuḍa, the enemy of serpents.

[212]

हा कान्ते हा धनं पुत्र क्रन्दमानः सुदारुणम् ।

मण्डूक इव सर्पेण गीर्यते मृत्युना नरः ॥

Even as the man is weeping frightfully saying: "Ah, my dear wife! ah, my wealth! ah, my son!" he is swallowed by death in the same way as a frog is swallowed by a serpent.

[213]

मर्मसूतकृत्यमानेषु मुच्यमानेषु सन्धिषु ।

यद्दुःखं म्रियमाणस्य स्मर्यतां तन्मुमुक्षुभिः ॥

Let the pangs of the dying person, which occur when his vital parts are rooted out and when his joints are loosened be remembered by those who are desirous of liberation.

The seeker after liberation must do the right and pursue the good with a view to overcome the throes of death.

[214]

दृष्टावाक्षिप्यमाणायां संज्ञया ह्रियमाणया ।

मृत्युपाशेन बद्धश्च त्रातारं नोपलप्स्यसे ॥

When your visual sense is snatched away, when your consciousness is captured, and when you are bound by the cord of death, you cannot find a protector.

[215]

संरुध्यमानस्तमसा महच्छुभ्रमिवाविशन् ।

उरो म्रतस्तदा ज्ञातीन्द्रक्ष्यसे दीनचक्षुषा ॥

Obstructed by darkness as when entering a deep pit, you will, with pitiable eyes, see your relatives who are beating their breasts.

The relatives of a dying person cannot play the role of a saviour, for they are equally helpless.

[216]

अयःपाशेन कालेन स्नेहपाशेन बन्धुभिः ।

आत्मानं कृष्यमाणं त्वमभितो द्रक्ष्यसे तदा ॥

At that time you will see yourself being pulled by the iron cord of death as well as by the cord of attachment of your relatives on both sides.

A person who is in the throes of death is utterly helpless. He has no freedom whatsoever to do the right at that time, for he is pulled in one direction by the affection of his kinsmen and in another by death.

[217]

हिक्किकाबाध्यमानस्य श्वासेन परिशुष्यतः ।

कृष्यमाणस्य पाशेन न खल्वस्ति परादणम् ॥

There is, indeed, no refuge for the person who is afflicted by hiccough, who is getting dried up by hard breathing, and who is dragged by *pāśa* (on both sides).

[218]

संसारयन्त्रमारूढो यमदूतैरधिष्ठितः ।

क्व यास्यामीति दुःखार्तः कालपाशेन योजितः ॥

Mounted on the wheel of *samsāra*, led on by the messengers of Death, and bound by the cord of death, the *jīva* grieves: "Where am I to go?"

The *jīva* who is caught in the wheel of transmigratory existence has no freedom when he leaves the gross body at the time of death with a view to reap the fruits of his previous *karma*.

[219]

मातापितागुरुसुताः स्वजनो ममेति

मायोपमे जगति कस्य भवेत्प्रतिज्ञा ।

एको यदा व्रजति कर्मपुरःसरोऽयं

विश्रामवृक्षसदृशः खलु जीवलोकः ॥

When the *jīva* goes alone (after death), his *karma* leading him on, what happens to his declaration in this world of *māyā*: "My mother and father, my teacher and my sons, my kinsmen"? This world where people live in is, indeed, similar to a tree which serves as a place of rest.

Man lives with the assurance that his parents, children, and kinsmen will stand by him at all times. But none is able to come to his rescue when he goes alone after death.

[220]

सायं सायं वासवृक्षं समेताः
 प्रातः प्रातस्तेन तेन प्रयान्ति ।
 त्यक्त्वाऽन्योन्यं तञ्च वृक्षं विहङ्गाः
 यद्वत्तद्वज्जातयोऽज्ञातयश्च ॥

Every evening the birds meet together on a tree which is their place of rest. Every morning they go out in their own way. Just as the birds leave the tree and part from one another, so also the *jīva* parts company with his relatives and non-relatives.

In the previous verse the world we live in was compared to a tree which serves as a resting place. The similarity between the two is worked out in this verse.

[221]

मृतिबीजं भवेज्जन्म जन्मबीजं तथा मृतिः ।
 घटीयन्त्रवदश्रान्तो बम्भ्रमीत्यनिशं नरः ॥

Birth is the cause of death. In the same way, death is the cause of birth. Like a water-carrying contrivance (which goes on revolving), man goes round and round (through the wheel of birth and death) always without any rest.

So far, a detailed account has been given about the miserable life in the womb, the pangs of birth and death, and the sufferings in the states of infancy, youth, and old age with a view to generate a feeling of disgust against transmigratory existence.

[222 - 223]

द्युपर्जन्यधरामर्त्योषिदग्निषु दैवतैः ।
 श्रद्धोदुराजवर्षान्नरेत आख्यं हविर्हुतम् ॥

पञ्चम्यामाहुतावेवं पुंवचा जायते पुमान् ।

क्रमात्तस्य महानर्थसंसृत्युच्छित्तिरुच्यते ॥

The oblations of faith, the moon, rain, food, and semen are offered by the gods in the fires of heavenly region, cloud, earth, man, and woman (respectively). Thus from the fifth oblation comes into being the person called man. The destruction of the jīva's bondage which causes great suffering will be explained gradually (in the sequel).

It is not only in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, but in the *Chāndogya* as well that man is said to have evolved from food (*annāt puruṣaḥ*). There is an account of the process of birth in Chapter V (Sections 4 to 8) of the *Chāndogya*. The heavenly region is conceived as a sacrificial fire in which *faith* is offered as oblation by the gods. From this offering arises the moon. Again, in the sacrificial fire of cloud, the gods offer the *moon* as oblation, and from this offering comes rain. *Rain* is offered as oblation in the fire of earth, and from this offering arises food. By the offering of *food* in the fire of man, there arises semen. And from *semen* which is offered as oblation in the fire of woman, man comes into being.

It is with a view to overcome the great evil of bondage (*samsāra*) that the *Upaniṣad* proceeds to describe in the sequel the five sheaths (*pañca-kōśa*) of man and the way in which each one of these sheaths can be resolved into that which is inward to it till one attains Brahman-Ātman which is the support of all.

[224]

इत्याद्या विक्रियाः सर्वा लिङ्गदेहसमाश्रयाः ।

अतद्वानपि संमोहात्तद्वानित्यभिमन्यते ॥

All the transformations from the beginning (of life in the womb stated above) belong to the subtle and gross bodies. Though they are not of the Self, it is thought due to ignorance that they are of the Self.

The Self must be differentiated from the not-Self. The difference between the Self on the one hand and the subtle and gross bodies on the other is brought out in this verse.

The pure Self is free from all changes such as the dwelling in the womb (*garbha-vāsādyā vikriyāḥ*) which have been stated at length earlier. These changes belong to the *liṅga-sarīra* and the *sthūla-sarīra*, and not to the Self. Without discriminating the Self from the subtle and gross bodies a person, due to ignorance, associates these changes with the Self which is immutable.

[225]

ज्ञातास्मीत्यभिमानाद्धि चेष्टते ज्ञानकर्मणि ।

मन्तास्मीति ततो मोहात्कुरुते मानसीः क्रियाः ॥

Owing to the conceit "I am the knower", the *jīva*, indeed, performs the acts of cognition. Again, on account of the delusion "I am the thinker", he does all mental activities.

The mechanism of identification of the Self with the two bodies (*sarīra-dvaya*), gross as well as subtle, takes place at different levels. It has already been stated that the subtle body is composed of three sheaths — the sheath of self-consciousness (*viññānamaya-kośa*), the sheath of consciousness (*manomaya-kośa*), and the sheath of vitality (*prāṇamaya-kośa*).

While *buddhi* along with the organs of knowledge constitute the sheath of self-consciousness, *manas* taken with the same organs of knowledge constitutes the sheath of consciousness. The Self or the "I" is different from the intellect (*buddhi*) and the mind (*manas*). If it is identified with any of them, it is a case of superimposition (*adhyāsa*) due to ignorance. On account of the erroneous identification with *buddhi*, the Self looks upon itself as a knower, engages in the acts of cognition, considers itself as the agent and the enjoyer of the fruits of actions. In the same way, its identification with *manas* makes it think that it performs the various mental operations such as *upāsana*. So the Self must be differentiated from the *viññānamaya-kośa* and the *manomaya-kośa*.

[226]

प्राणाद्यात्माभिमानेन कर्मचेष्टाम्प्रपद्यते ।

चक्षुराद्यभिमानो च रूपाद्यालोचनापरः ॥

By the conceit of the Self in *prāṇa*, etc., the *jīva* gets involved in all vital actions. And with the conceit of the Self in the visual sense, etc., he is engrossed in thinking of colour, etc.

On account of ignorance, the Self identifies itself with the sheath of vitality (*prāṇamāya-kośa*). The five vital airs are *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna*, and *samāna*. The five organs of action are the tongue, the hands, the feet, the anus, and the generating organ. The vital airs along with the five organs of action constitute the sheath of vitality. Though the Self is free from all actions, identifying itself with *prāṇa*, *apāna*, etc., it considers itself as the doer of the actions performed by them. In the same way, identifying itself with sight and other senses, the Self looks upon itself as what is involved in perceiving colour, etc.

[227]

तथा देहस्य दाहादौ दग्धोऽस्मीति च मन्यते ।

श्यामोऽस्मीति च देहस्य श्यामत्वं मन्यतेऽबुधः ॥

Similarly, when the physical body is burnt, the ignorant man thinks, "I am burnt." And also ascribing the blackness of the body to his Self, he thinks, "I am black."

Just as the Self must be differentiated from the subtle body, so also it has to be differentiated from the gross body (*sthūla-sarīra*).

An ignorant person is one who is incapable of discriminating the Self from the physical body. He superimposes the characteristics of the body such as its birth and death, its blackness and whiteness, on the Self. When the body is burnt he thinks that the Self or the "I" is burnt. Finding that the body is black in colour, he thinks that the Self or the "I" is black. It is in terms of the erroneous identification of the Self with the body, which is not-Self, that we have to explain the locutions of the ignorant man: "I am burnt," "I am black."

[228]

गोधनाद्यभिमानेन तद्वानसीत्यविद्यया ।
 ब्रह्मचारी गृहस्थोऽहं तापसोऽस्मि तथा मुनिः ॥
 देहलिङ्गात्मसंस्कारान्मन्यते सङ्गकारणात् ॥

By the conceit of the Self in cattle, wealth, and the like, a person thinks due to ignorance: "I own them." In the same way, because of attachment he thinks of the purificatory rites of the gross and subtle bodies (as those of the Self) and considers himself to the effect "I am a bachelor," "I am a householder," "I am an ascetic," "I am a sage."

An ignorant man suffers from two kinds of conceit or erroneous notion. The first is *ahamābhimāna* which is erroneous identification of the Self with the intellect, or the mind, or the vital air, or the senses, or the body. This has been explained in verses (225) to (227) with a view to show that the Self has to be differentiated from each one of them.

The second one is *mamābhimāna* which is explained in this verse. On account of this erroneous notion, he looks upon the external things as his own and says: "This is my cow," "This property belongs to me," "These are my kinsmen," etc. Just as the Self cannot be identified with the intellect, mind etc., which are not-Self, so also the Self cannot be related to any of the external things of the world. The Self has no relation whatsoever with anything, subjective as well as objective.

The Self by its very nature is pure, and so there is no scope for any purificatory rite with regard to the Self. But there are various acts of purification (*samskāra*) for the gross and subtle bodies such as *snāna*, *ācamana*, and so on. Consequent on the various purificatory acts, a person considers himself in terms of various statuses such as a celebrate student, a householder, etc. Neither the purificatory acts nor the different statuses have anything to do with the Self. In the celebrated

introduction contained in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, Śaṅkara says that distinctions such as a *brāhmaṇa*, a *kṣatriya*, and the like, and the *śruti* texts such as "A *brāhmaṇa* is to sacrifice" (*brāhmaṇo yajeta*) are operative only on the supposition that on the Self are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, stage of life, age, outward circumstances and so on.

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भिन्नात्मनान्तु भूतानां शरीरं कार्यमुच्यते ।

ममाहमिति संमोहादनर्थमप्रतिपद्यते ॥

The body is said to be a modification of the different elements of matter. Because of the delusion a person regards the body as "I" and "mine" and attains the evil.

The Self by its very nature is pure, eternal, and free. But due to ignorance a person identifies himself with the body which is impure, perishable, and bound, and says: "I am stout," or "This body is mine." It is a case of superimposing the attributes of the body on the Self. Man subjects himself to suffering due to his erroneous self-identification (*tādātmya-adhyāsa*) with the body, the senses, and the mind.

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सर्वेषाञ्चान्नकार्यत्वे ब्रह्मजत्वे समे तथा ।

कर्मज्ञानाधिकारित्वात् पुमानेवेह गृह्यते ॥

Though all beings alike are products of food and have evolved from Brahman, still man alone is mentioned here (in the *śruti* text), because he is qualified for rites and knowledge.

Every being has come out of Brahman, and also every being is a modification of the essence of food. Why is it, it may be asked, that *śruti* says: "From food was born man. That man, such as he is, is a product of the essence of food" (*annāt puruṣaḥ, sa vā eṣa puruṣo'nnarasa-mayaḥ*) as though this is true only of man? There is a special reason for

mentioning man alone, leaving out other animals. Man alone is qualified for rites and duties as also for knowledge, and so he alone is mentioned by the *śruti* text.

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अनेकानर्थनीडेऽस्मिन्निमग्नं ब्रह्मविद्यया ।

सङ्क्रामयितुमिष्टत्वादब्रह्मान्तरतमं नरम् ॥

Since *śruti* desires to help man, who has plunged into this (ocean of *samsāra*), the repository of all evil, attain the innermost Brahman by means of Brahman-knowledge, (man alone is mentioned in the *śruti* text).

By virtue of his ability to follow the teaching of Scripture, man alone is competent for performing *karma* and attaining knowledge. He seeks to attain the results which *karma* and *jñāna* are intended to secure. The disinterested performance of *karma* leads to the attainment of a pure mind, and only a person who has a pure mind is competent to inquire into the *Vedānta*. From the study of the *Vedānta* he attains Brahman-knowledge which leads to liberation. Therefore, the human being alone who has the ability to follow the teaching of Scripture and who desires to attain the result as taught in Scripture is qualified for *karma* and *jñāna*, and not any other being. The *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* (II, iii, 2-5) brings out the distinction between man and other animals as follows: "In man alone is the Self most manifest, for he is the best endowed with intelligence. He speaks what he knows. He sees what he knows. He knows what will happen tomorrow. He knows the higher and lower worlds. He aspires to achieve immortality through mortal beings. He is thus endowed with discrimination, while other animals have consciousness of hunger and thirst only."

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तरुशाखाग्रदृष्ट्यैव सोमं यद्वत्प्रदर्शयेत् ।

निष्कोशं कोशदृष्ट्यैव प्रतीचि ब्रह्म दर्शयेत् ॥

Just as a person is made to see the moon through seeing the edge of a branch of a tree alone, so also he is made to see Brahman which is identical with the inward Self and which is devoid of sheaths through the knowledge of the sheaths alone.

It is Brahman-knowledge which is required for attaining liberation. Scripture seeks to impart this knowledge through an exposition of the nature of the five sheaths (*kośa-pañcaka*). Though these five sheaths are other than the Self, they have been looked upon all along due to ignorance as of the nature of the Self. Through an explanation of the nature of these sheaths, Scripture seeks to impart the knowledge of the Self which is beyond the five sheaths. Understanding the real nature of the sheaths as not-Self is the means to the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman (*ātmaññāne kośānām anātmāññānameva mukhyo-pāyaḥ*). The method of instruction that is adopted here is to teach what is not known through what is known, to teach what cannot be easily comprehended through something more tangible and easily understood. Consider the case of a person who does not know the moon. We help him to see the moon by first pointing out the edge of a branch of a tree and then telling him that the moon is near the edge of that particular bough. In the same way, *śruti* helps us to realize Brahman-Ātman by explaining first of all the nature of the five sheaths. So the exposition of the nature of the sheaths serves a very useful purpose.

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अनादाविह संसारे वासनारज्जिता मतिः ।

प्रतीच्युपायतः कर्तुं शक्या तस्मात्स उच्यते ॥

The human mind which is tainted by the impressions accumulated in this beginningless transmigratory existence must be enabled to realize the Self through the means (of explaining the nature of the sheaths). Hence it will be explained in the sequel.

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द्वैतास्पृक्षप्रत्यगात्मैकः प्रतीचीव परागपि ।

युष्मदस्सद्धिभागाभ्यां मिथतेऽविद्यया मृषा ॥

The inward Self which is not touched by duality even objectively, in the same way as it is not touched by duality subjectively, is one. Owing to *avidyā*, the Self is illusorily divided into two categories of "Thou" and "I".

If *śruti* intends to explain the nature of the five sheaths as a means to the attainment of Brahman-knowledge, this amounts to, the critic argues, the admission of duality, because Brahman is different from the sheaths. This objection does not hold good. There is no other reality besides Brahman-Ātman, whether we view it subjectively by analysing the individual, or objectively from the standpoint of the cosmos or the outside world. Brahman-Ātman, the ultimate reality, is divided into two categories — the subject and the object, the "I" and the "Thou", due to *avidyā*. The two words "I" (*asmat*) and "Thou" (*yuṣmat*) are used to bring out the absolute opposition between the subject and the object. The pronouns of the first and the third person can be placed in a co-ordinate relation in a sentence as when we say: "It is I," "I am he whom you speak about..." But language does not allow of any such co-ordination between the pronouns of the first and the second person. The subject is said to have for its sphere the notion of "I", while the object is said to have for its sphere the notion of "Thou".

The subject or the "I", which can be characterized as the microcosm, is ordinarily understood as being constituted by five sheaths, though the Self or the real "I" is beyond these five sheaths. These five sheaths of the subject or the "I" (*asmatpañcakam*) are the products of *avidyā* and therefore are not real. The outside world, the macrocosm, may also be analysed into five sheaths corresponding to the five sheaths of the individual. These five sheaths of the external world (*yuṣmatpañcakam*) which are also products of *avidyā* are not real. Since the subject-

object distinction and all that it involves arise only as a result of *avidyā*, they are not real. So Brahman-Ātman, the ultimate reality, which transcends subject-object distinction is one and non-dual. When the Self is not realized in its true nature as one and non-dual, it appears differentiated as the subject and the object, the ego and the non-ego. Since the five sheaths, both at the individual and cosmic levels, are not real, there is no room for duality.

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अस्मद्विभागे पञ्चास्य यथैवान्नमयादयः ।

तथा तत्प्रत्यगात्मानो युष्मदन्नादयः स्मृताः ॥

Just as there are five sheaths such as the *annamaya* in the "I" or the subject division of the inward Self, so also there are (five sheaths) like the *anna*, etc., (as the causes of the former five sheaths) in the "Thou" or the object division of the inward Self.

The non-dual Self is divided as it were into two divisions — the subject or the "I" division (*asmadvibhāga*) and the object or the "Thou" division (*yuṣmadvibhāga*). The former which has for its content the notion of "I" (*aham-buddhi-grāhya*) consists of five sheaths — the sheath of food (*annamaya*), the sheath of vitality (*prāṇamaya*), the sheath of consciousness (*manomaya*), the sheath of self-consciousness (*viññānamaya*) and the sheath of bliss (*ānandamaya*). The other division which has for its content the notion of "Thou", that is, any object which is referred to as "this" as distinguished from "I" (*yuṣmadidam-buddhi-grāhya*) also consists of five sheaths of food, vitality, consciousness, self-consciousness, and bliss. The first list of five sheaths mentioned above is from the individual standpoint (*vyaṣṭi*), while the second list of five sheaths is from the cosmic standpoint (*samaṣṭi*). Each sheath in the first list is a modification (*maya*) of its counterpart in the second list. For example, the *annamaya-kośa* at the individual level is a modification of the *anna-kośa* at the cosmic level:

that is to say, while the former is the effect, the latter is the cause (*prakṛti*). The relation among the remaining sheaths must be explained in the same way. So there are ten sheaths — five at the individual level and five at the cosmic level.

Since food, vitality, etc., at the cosmic level serve as the cause of the five sheaths at the individual level, they are also referred to as sheaths (*kośa-upādānatvāt annādīnāmapī kośatva-vyavahārah*).

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आध्यात्मिकान्विलाप्याथ यथास्वं प्रत्यगात्मसु ।

अन्नादीन्पर्युपासीत ह्युत्तरोत्तररूपगान् ॥

Then, after resolving the five sheaths of the individual in their respective causes which constitute their selves (i.e., their essence), one must, indeed, think of the sheaths of *anna*, etc., as of the nature of subsequent sheaths.

How the knowledge of the sheaths at the individual and cosmic levels should be made use of for realizing Brahman-Ātman which is beyond the *kośas* is explained in this verse.

The classification of the sheaths into two groups —one group consisting of causes and the other group consisting of their effects or modifications — is intended to show that all these sheaths could be merged in one another in such a way that ultimately the non-dual Self alone will remain. The guiding principle in this process of merging one sheath in another is provided by the discrimination that the effect does not exist as something different from its cause (*kṛaṇātirekeṇa kāryam nāsti*), that the effect is non-different from its cause.

The process of merging is done at two stages. The five sheaths of the individual, i. e., the sheaths of the subject or the “I” division, must first be resolved in thought into the five sheaths of the cosmic level, i. e., the sheaths of the object or the “Thou” division. The second stage consists in resolving each of the five sheaths of the cosmic level into its respective cause.

The five sheaths of the object at the cosmic level constitute respectively the material essence (*svārūpa*) from which the five sheaths of the

subject group at the individual level have evolved. That is to say, the five sheaths of the individual are the modifications of the corresponding sheaths at the cosmic level. The *annamaya-kośa* of the individual is a modification of the *anna-kośa* of the cosmic level. The *prāṇamaya-kośa* of the individual is a modification of the *prāṇā-kośa* of the cosmic level. The other *kośas* must be understood in the same way. Since the effect is non-different from its cause, one must realize that the *annamaya-kośa* is not different from the *anna*, its material cause, that the *prāṇamaya-kośa* is not different from the *prāṇa* which is its material cause, and so on. As a result of this merging, we will be left with only five sheaths at the cosmic level.

Now we come to the process of merging at the second level. *Anna* has evolved from *prāṇa*, *prāṇa* from *manas*, *manas* from *vijñāna*, and *vijñāna* from *ānanda*, the first cause. Since the effect is non-different from its cause, one has to resolve *anna* in *prāṇa*, *prāṇa* in *manas*, and so on; that is, one must look upon *anna* as nothing but *prāṇa*, its material cause; similarly one must look upon *prāṇa* as nothing but *manas*, and so on. This process of merging will finally help the spiritual aspirant to realize the non-dual Self which is neither a cause nor an effect.

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जग्ध्वा कार्यात्मतामेवं कारणात्मतया स्थितः ।

आत्मनालिङ्गते ब्रह्म वाक्याज्जग्ध्वा च तामपि ॥

Thus, after resolving what is of the nature of the effect (in its cause) and remaining of the nature of the cause (viz., *ajñāta-brahma*), and finally resolving even that by the knowledge conveyed by the *śruti* text, the wise man attains Brahman which is of the nature of the Self.

When a person resorts to the process of resolving every effect in its cause, he will eventually come to *ānanda*, the first cause, otherwise called *ajñāta-brahma*. It means that at this stage he identifies himself with the first cause which constitutes the essence of everything in the

world. But this is only the penultimate stage. The knowledge of non-difference between Brahman and Ātman conveyed by the principal text *tat tvam asi* helps him to transcend even this stage by resolving the first cause in Brahman from which it is non-different, and realize the non-dual Brahman which is identical with the Self and which is free from cause-effect relation.

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अन्नं विराडिति ज्ञेयं प्राणात्तदभिवर्धते ।

ऋग्यजुःसामरूपोऽतो वेदात्मान्तर्मनोमयः ॥

Food must be known as the *Virāj*. It has evolved from the vital air. Mind which is inward to the vital air constitutes the essence of the *Veda* in the form of *R̥g*, *Yajur*, and *Sāma*.

Food (*anna*) or the physical matter represents the *Virāj*, the cosmic being in its gross aspect. Food or the *Virāj* has come out of the vital air (*prāṇa*) which constitutes the vehicle of all activities (*kriyā-śakti*) of the *Sūtrātman*.

The *Sūtrātman* is endowed with two kinds of potency — *kriyā-śakti* and *vijñāna-śakti*. *Kriyā-śakti* is the potency involved in all outgoing activities due to the vital air in its various aspects. The word *prāṇa* which occurs in the verse refers to the *kriyā-śakti* of the *Sūtrātman*. It is from *prāṇa* that food has evolved. *Vijñāna-śakti* which is the potency involved in all kinds of knowledge is of two kinds — *manas* and *vijñāna*. One and the same internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is referred to as *manas* and *vijñāna* depending upon the nature of the knowledge it gives rise to. It is called *manas* when it gives rise to all concrete and differentiated (*savikalpaka*) thought (*savikalpaka-jñānotpādana-śaktimadantaḥkaraṇam manasāśabda-vācya*). The *R̥g-veda*, the *Yajur-veda*, and the *Sāma-veda* are the expressions of the work of the internal organ in its aspect called *manas*. It is from *manas* that *prāṇa* has evolved.

The nature of *vijñāna* is explained in the next verse.

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वेदार्थविषया बुद्धिर्विज्ञानं निश्चयात्मकम् ।

ज्ञानकर्माभिनिर्वृत्ता आनन्दः फललक्षणः ॥

The intellect which knows the content of the *Veda* is called *viññāna* which is decisive by its very nature. Bliss which results from knowledge and action is the fruit.

Viññāna is that aspect of the internal organ which gives rise to all abstract, undifferentiated knowledge (*nirvikalpaka-jñānotpādana-śakti-madantaḥkaraṇam viññānam*). The knowledge ascertained through *viññāna* is decisive. The truths embodied in the Vedas are ascertained through the internal organ in its aspect called *viññāna* or *buddhi*.

Ānanda is the *Avyākṛta*, the ultimate cause of all.

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त्रीण्येवान्नानि चैतानि प्राजापत्यानि सर्वशः ।

प्राणो मनस्तथा वाक्च विराडन्नात्मतां गतः ॥

Prāṇa, *manas*, and *vāk*, spoken of as the three kinds of food of the *Prajāpati* constitute the *Sūtrātman* completely. The *Virāj* is of the nature of *anna*. And (the *avyākṛta* is the *kāraṇa*, the ultimate cause).

The five sheaths mentioned here are also stated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. In the *saptāṇna-brahmāṇa* (I, v, 1) it is said that the Father of creation produced seven kinds of food through meditation and rites, and that "three he made for himself." What does this mean? This is explained in I, v, 3 as follows: "It means: the mind, the organ of speech, and the vital force are three kinds of food." Here the organ of speech refers to *viññāna* (*vāksabdena viññānam gṛhyate*). The idea is that *manas*, *viññāna*, and *prāṇa* constitute the *Sūtrātman*.

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (I, ii, 5) "I shall make very little food" (*kanīyo'nnam kariṣye*), the word *anna* refers to the *Virāj*. Again, the

Bṛhadāraṇyaka text (I, iv, 7), "This (universe) was then undifferentiated," refers to the *Avyākṛta* constituted by *ānanda*.

Ānandagiri explains that the letter *ca* which occurs in the second line of the verse must be understood as referring to the *Avyākṛta*.

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चतुर्णाम्प्रत्यगात्मैवमानन्दमय उच्यते ।
प्रज्ञानघनरूपत्वात्स्याद्भेदोऽप्यस्य कार्यतः ॥

Thus, the sheath formed of bliss (of the subject group) is said to constitute the innermost essence of the (remaining) four sheaths, since it is a mass of consciousness unified. But the difference (in the manifested forms of bliss) results from the (previous) acts of the individual.

Earlier reference was made to the division of the sheaths into two groups — the subject group and the object group. Of the five sheaths of the object group (*yusmad-vibhāga*), the sheath of bliss (*ānanda-kośa*) constitutes the essence of the remaining four sheaths. The same thing is true of the sheaths of the subject group (*asmad-vibhāga*): that is to say, the *ānandamaya-kośa* constitutes the essence (*pratyagātman*) of the remaining four sheaths.

The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* (V) describes the *jīva* in the state of deep sleep called *Prājñā* as one whose sphere is deep sleep (*suṣuptasthāna*) in whom all experiences become unified (*ekībhūtaḥ*), who is mass of consciousness unified (*prajñānaghana*), who is formed of bliss (*ānandamaya*), who experiences bliss (*ānandabhuk*). The *jīva* in the state of deep sleep is nothing but a mass of consciousness because of the absence of all distinctions at that time. It is not conscious of anything either outside or inside. But it is just unified consciousness. It is constituted by bliss without any differentiation whatsoever. If so, how is it, it may be asked, that the *Upaniṣad* in the sequel (II, v, 1) speaks about the difference in the manifested forms of bliss such as joy (*priyam*), enjoyment (*modaḥ*),

exhilaration (*pramodaḥ*), and bliss (*ānanda*)? The answer is that these differences arise in the other two states as a result of the past deeds (*karma-phala-bhedāt*) of the individual.

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शिरआदिप्रकृतस्तु स्यादुपासनकर्मणे ।
तस्मादेवञ्चित्तीरेता मानसीव्याचक्षिरे ॥

But the imagery of head and so on is for the practice of meditation. Hence in this way the wise have explained these (limbs such as head and so on) as mental representations.

The *śruti* text *tasyedameva śiraḥ* is now taken up for explanation.

Scripture speaks of each sheath employing the imagery of a bird which consists of a head, the two wings, the trunk, and the tail. These imaginary representations given by *śruti* are for the purpose of meditation. Representing the *annamaya-kośa* in the form of a bird, the *Upaniṣad* says: "This itself is his head; this is the right wing; this is the left wing; this is the tail, the support."

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शिरो मूर्धा भुजौ पक्षावात्मा कायश्च मध्यमः ।
शेषमुच्छमिति ज्ञेयं चित्तिमेवं विचिन्तयेत् ॥

It must be understood that the head (of the human body) corresponds to the head (of the bird), that the two arms correspond to the two wings, that the middle portion (trunk) of the body is the self, and that the rest is the tail. In this way, the sheath of food in the form of the mental representation (given above) must be contemplated.

The mode of contemplation on the sheath of food (*annamaya-kośa*) is explained in this verse by working out the similarity between the

figure of a human being, who is a modification of the essence of food, and that of a bird.

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उपासीनश्चितीरेवं विद्वानेता यथाक्रमम् ।
पूर्वपूर्वप्रहाणेन ह्यन्तरन्तः प्रपद्यते ॥

The wise man who thus meditates in the proper order on these (sheaths) in the mind will, indeed, go inward from one sheath to another by abandoning the outer ones one by one.

The utility of contemplation on these sheaths is explained in this verse.

A spiritual aspirant who resorts to the uninterrupted contemplation on these *kośas* in the way and in the same order in which contemplation has been indicated by *śruti* attains purification of mind. Only when the mind of the spiritual aspirant gets purified, he will have discriminating knowledge (*viveka-buddhi*) which will enable him to go inward by giving up one by one the different sheaths, starting from the outermost, viz., the *annamaya-kośa*. Such a person who has abandoned all the sheaths knowing that all of them are not-Self attains Brahman-realization through the knowledge of non-difference between the Self and Brahman conveyed by the principal texts such as *tat tvam asi*.

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श्रुतेरनतिशङ्क्यत्वात्सम्भाव्येत यथोदितम् ।
लिङ्गप्रत्यक्षगम्ये हि स्यादाशङ्का नृबुद्धितः ॥

Since *śruti* can never be doubted, (the fruits) as declared (by *śruti*) will take place. There is, indeed, scope for doubt in respect of what is known through inference and perception which are dependent on man's intellect.

The *Upaniṣad* says in the sequel (II, ii, 1) that "those who meditate on food as Brahman acquire all food" (*sarvāṇi vai te'nnam āpnuvanti*

ye'nnam brahmopāsate). When *śruti* specifically declares that the attainment of food is the fruit that accrues to one who meditates on food as Brahman, how could it be said, so the critic argues, that meditation on the *kośas* leads to the attainment of Brahman-realization? It is the contention of the critic that one and the same meditation cannot give rise to two different fruits — the attainment of food as well as Brahman-realization.

This objection is wrong. Since *śruti* declares that both the fruits accrue to one who practises meditation as specified, it must be so, and there can be no doubt about that. Scripture which is impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) is free from defect and distortion. So the teaching of Scripture can never be doubted. But there is scope for doubt with regard to what is known through perception, inference, and other sources of knowledge because of the association of the human factor with them. Unlike *śruti*, every one of these sources of knowledge is dependent on the mind and the senses of the person, which are liable to defect and distortion.

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स्वभावतो वा सम्प्राप्तमनूद्योपासनं श्रुतिः ।
नामादाविव भूमानं विधत्ते ज्ञानमात्मनि ॥

Or, just as Scripture teaches the knowledge of the infinite Brahman by re-stating the meditation on name (*nāma*), etc., to which man resorts of his own accord, so also here *śruti* teaches the knowledge of the Self (by re-stating the meditation on food, etc.).

The purport of the teaching of meditation on the *kośas* may be explained in a different way also. In the seventh chapter of the *Chāndogya* meditation on name, speech, mind, etc., to which man naturally (*svabhāvataḥ*) resorts without Scripture enjoining it is re-stated with a view to lead the spiritual aspirant gradually from name to speech, from speech to mind, and so on, till the knowledge of the infinite Brahman is attained. In the same way, taking advantage of the fact that man

naturally identifies himself with the *kośas*, Scripture enables the spiritual aspirant to attain Brahman-realization by resolving each outward *kośa* in its inner one through the process of contemplation thereon. The purport of the teaching of Scripture is in the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman, because this is the main teaching which is intended to be taught (*pradhānatvāt vivakṣitam*). So the fruits of meditation mentioned in connection with the several *kośas* should not be supposed to accrue as declared.

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श्रुत्यन्तराद्वा सम्प्राप्तं मोक्षादव्यक्फलाय तु ।
तदनूद्य परं श्रेयः प्राप्तये ज्ञानमुच्यते ॥

Or, by re-stating the meditation which is intended for securing fruits inferior to *mokṣa* as known from another *śruti* text, the knowledge (of Brahman-Ātman) is spoken of (here in the *Taittirīya*) for attaining the highest good.

This verse explains the purport of the teaching of meditation on food, etc., as Brahman in yet another way. Meditation on the *Virāj* and the *Sūtrātman* has been taught in the first chapter of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. Such a meditation gives rise to fruits inferior to *mokṣa*, the highest good. When the *Taittirīya* speaks about meditation on food, etc., as Brahman, it is only re-stating what is already known from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. But its main aim is to impart the knowledge of the Self as the means of attaining *mokṣa* which is the highest good.

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ब्रह्मविद्योऽप्येनैव कोशानर्थमहोदधेः ।
निनीषन्ती परम्परं स वा इत्यभ्यधादथ ॥

Then, desiring to help man reach the farthest shore of the great ocean of sheath (*kośa*) full of evil only through the raft of Brahman-knowledge, *śruti* has said : "He, verily, (is this man consisting of the essence of food)."

Ānandagiri says that the word *atha* which occurs in the second line of the verse means "after ascertaining that man alone is qualified for *jñāna* and *karma* and not other animals." The idea conveyed in this verse is that *śruti* endeavours to help man, who alone is qualified for knowledge and rites, to overcome the transmigratory existence by means of Brahman-knowledge.

The *śruti* text which says that man comes into existence from food (*annātīpuruṣaḥ*) has already been explained. The subsequent text, "He, verily, is this man consisting of food" (*sa vā eṣa puruṣo'nnarasamayaḥ*) is now taken up for explanation.

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मूलात्मानं स शब्देन स्पृष्ट्वा तत्स्मृतयेऽथ वै ।
कोशात्मतां समापन्न एष इत्यभिधीयते ॥

Conveying the highest Self by the word "he" and then using the particle "verily" for the sake of the recollection of that, *śruti* refers to the same Self, which has become the *jīva* constituted by the sheaths, by the word "this".

The meanings of the three words *saḥ*, *vai*, and *eṣaḥ* contained in the *śruti* text which was mentioned in the previous verse are explained now.

The *śruti* text, "He, verily, is this man consisting of food," brings out the real nature of the *jīva*. The *jīva* in its essential nature is no other than Brahman. But owing to *avidyā* it appears as something different constituted by five sheaths. Brahman is thought of as what is remote, whereas the *jīva* consisting of the five sheaths is thought of as what is immediate. The word *saḥ* refers to that Brahman, the ultimate reality, the cause of the world. The particle *vai* recollects to our mind that well-known Brahman as taught in all the Upaniṣads. The word *eṣaḥ* states that this *jīva* consisting of the five sheaths is no other than that Brahman. Brahman which transcends the cause-effect relation, which is beyond the sheaths, and which is free from attributes and limitations appears in the form of the *jīva*, as what is subject to the

cause-effect relation, as what is constituted by the five sheaths, and as endowed with attributes and limited by adjuncts due to *avidyā*.

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अविद्यायातदर्होऽपि रज्जुः सर्पात्मतामिव ।
कोशपञ्चकतां यातस्तमनुक्रोशतीव हि ॥

Just as a rope attains the form of a serpent through *avidyā*, though it is not really competent to become that, so also the Self attains, indeed, the form of the *jīva* consisting of the five sheaths and suffers as it were in that form.

Every object being what it is, it will not be possible for one object to become another. A rope can never actually become a serpent. But it may *appear* to be a serpent due to *avidyā*. In the same way, the Self which is free from the sheaths appears to be endowed with them due to *avidyā*.

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मयइत्र विकारार्थे निषिद्धोऽसौ परात्मनः ।
युक्त्यागमाभ्यामन्नस्य कार्यं देहः प्रतीयते ॥

Here (in the *śruti* text) the suffix *mayat* is used in the sense of modification. This modification is denied of the supreme Self through reasoning and Scripture. The body is known as a modification of food.

The *śruti* text says that the supreme Self is this man who is a modification of the essence of food. Since the body which serves as the adjunct (*upādhi*) of the Self is a modification of the essence of food, the supreme Self itself which is in the form of the *jīva* is spoken of as a modification of the essence of food (*annarasamayāḥ*).

That the Self is not subject to modification can be shown not only by citing scriptural evidence, but by reasoning as well. The *Kaṭha*

Upaniṣad (1, ii, 18) says: "The intelligent Self is neither born nor does it die. It did not originate from anything, nor did anything originate from it. It is birthless, eternal, undecaying, and ancient." The Self is partless (*niravayava*), and so it is not subject to modification. There is also another reason in justification of this view. The Self has no relation with anything whatsoever, for there is nothing else besides the Self. The Self, that is to say, is free from the threefold difference — *sa-jātiyā*, *vi-jātiyā*, and *svagata-bheda*. Since the Self is one and non-dual, it is impossible to think of its relation with anything for the purpose of saying that it is a modification of some other thing.

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इदमेव शिरस्तस्य मा भूदध्यासलक्षणम् ।

° प्राणकोशदेवेति तस्मादेवावधार्यते ॥

Of him, this (actual head) is, indeed, the head. Since it should not be thought that head, etc., are to be imagined as in the case of the sheath of vital force, there is the emphasis by means of *eva*.

In the case of the *prāṇamaya* and other kośas, what is not actually the head must be imagined to be so. For example, *śruti* says in the sequel that *prāṇa* is the head of the sheath of the vital force. But this is not true with regard to the *annamaya-kośa*. Here the head, arms, and the like which are well-known to us as the organs of the human being are referred to, and they are to be meditated upon as head, the two wings, etc. The word *eva* which occurs in the *śruti* text *tasya idameva śiraḥ* is intended to emphasize this idea.

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विराट्पिण्डात्मनोरैक्यं श्रुत्यन्तरवशादिह ।

उपासनोपदेशाच्च जानीयात्पिण्डदेवताम् ॥

Since the identification of the *Virāj* and the Self of the individual human organism is known from another *śruti*

text and since meditation (on food as Brahman) is also taught, here the individual human organism must be viewed as the *Virāj*, the cosmic being.

The expression *annarasamaya* refers not merely to the outward visible physical body (*piṇḍa*) of the individual, but to the gross physical body of the *Virāj* as well. So the *jīva* with the physical body at the individual level is one which the *Virāj*, the cosmic being in its gross aspect. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (I, iv, 1), "In the beginning, this (universe) was only the self (the *Virāj*) in the shape of a person," lends support to this identification. The *Taittirīya* text (II, ii, 1) in the sequel teaches meditation on food as Brahman. The imagery of head, and so on is for the sake of meditation. In view of the teaching of meditation on food as Brahman, the expression *annarasamaya* must be understood as referring to the *Virāj*, the cosmic being in its gross aspect.

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विराडात्मकतां याते पिण्डेऽध्यात्मावसायिनि ।
प्राणो वाय्वात्मतामेति प्रध्वस्तघटदीपवत् ॥

When the individual human organism attains the nature of the *Virāj*, the indwelling vital force becomes one with *vāyu* (the *Hiraṇyagarbha*), in the same way as the light of a lamp enclosed in a pot (becomes the one diffused light) when the pot is broken.

As a result of meditation on food, the individual physical organism becomes one with the *Virāj*, the cosmic being in its gross aspect. Then *prāṇa*, the vital force, which is inward and limited by the gross physical body, becomes one with the *Hiraṇyagarbha* in its unlimited aspect of *vāyu*, the source of all activity (*kriyāpradhāna-vāyurūpaḥ*). Here the self identifies itself with the *Hiraṇyagarbha*, the cosmic being in its subtle aspect, which again must be transcended. By overcoming the limiting adjuncts of the *Hiraṇyagarbha*, the Self finally remains in its own condition as what is free and unlimited. An example is given in order to drive home this point. The light of a lamp that is kept in a pot is

confined within it. When the pot which limits the light is broken, the light that is within becomes pervasive.

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त्रिद्यादन्नमयेनैव भूषायां द्रुतताम्रवत् ।
सर्वान्प्राणमयादींस्तान्चितान्पुरुषाकृतीन् ॥

All the sheaths like the *prāṇamaya*, etc., which lie within the *annamaya* assume the human shape only through the *annamaya*, just as the molten copper poured into a crucible (assumes the form of the crucible).

The self constituted by the essence of food is well-known to have a human shape consisting of a head, arms, and other limbs. But the *prāṇamaya* and other sheaths which lie within the sheath of food are also spoken of as having a human shape with head, arms, and other limbs, though they do not have that shape naturally of their own accord. Just as the molten copper poured into a crucible assumes the form of the crucible, so also the *prāṇamaya* and other sheaths which lie within the *annamaya-kōśa* may be imagined to be moulded after that. The *annamaya-kōśa* is compared to a crucible, and the other sheaths which lie within it are compared to the molten copper poured into the crucible. The imaginary representation of the sheaths in the human shape is intended to facilitate meditation on, and the discrimination of, the four *kōśas* (*upāsanārtham padārthaviveka-saukaryārtham ceyami kalpanetyarthaḥ*).

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यथोदितानुवादी तु श्लोकोऽप्यत्र निगद्यते ।
ब्राह्मणोक्तार्थविज्ञानद्रढिम्ने हितकाम्यया ॥

Here (in this context) a verse which re-states what has been said is uttered with the good intention of strengthening the teaching stated in the *Brāhmaṇa* portion.

Here reference is made to the verse consisting of fourteen pādas, which occurs at the commencement of the second *anuvāka*. This verse which belongs to the *Mantra* portion is quoted with a view to confirm what has been taught in the *Brāhmaṇa* portion in respect of the sheaths and the meditation thereon.

The explanation of the first *anuvāka* of the *Brahmavallī* which began in verse (19) comes to an end with this verse.

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अन्नादेव प्रजाः सर्वा जायन्तेऽन्नेन बृंहिताः ।
वर्धन्ते त्वन्नमेवैताः प्रविलीयन्ति सर्वशः ॥

All beings are born, verily, from food. They grow through food. And they completely merge, indeed, in food.

Verses (257) to (277) cover the second *anuvāka* of this chapter.

The first four lines of the *mantra* beginning from *annādvai prajāḥ prajāyante* till *athainadapi yantyantah* are explained in this verse.

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भूतेभ्यः पूर्वनिष्पत्तेर्ज्येष्ठमन्नं विराड्भवेत् ।
स वै शरीरी प्रथमस्तथा पौराणिकी स्मृतिः ॥

Food which is the eldest is the *Virāj*, since it was the first to evolve before all beings. Hence, the statement of the *Purāṇa*, "He is, indeed, the first embodied one."

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ओषणादग्निरोषः स्याद्धातूनुष्यति येन सः ।
धानात्तस्यान्नतत्त्वज्ञैरौषधं शब्द्यते सदा ॥

Agni is called *oṣaḥ* since it burns; for, the fluids of the body are burnt by it. Since fire is appeased by food, the

latter is called a medicine by those who know the truth of food.

This verse explains why food is characterized as a medicine for all.

The abdominal fire otherwise called the digestive fire begins to burn, that is, feed upon the very constituents of the body when it is not provided with food. But it is assuaged by the food that is eaten. It is the food that alleviates the bodily discomfort of all, and so food is called a medicine for all.

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सर्वेषां जाठराग्न्याख्यं वत्सं चोष्यादिभिः स्तनैः ।
अन्नं गौर्ययते यस्मात्सर्वौषधमतो भवेत् ॥

Since the cow of food satisfies the calf of the digestive fire of all beings through the (four) udders of consuming food by sucking, etc., it is a medicine for all.

Food is consumed in four ways — by sucking, by mastication, by swallowing, and by licking.

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उद्भूतिस्थितिहानिभ्यो जगतोऽन्नं हि कारणम् ॥
कार्यस्य कारणाद्ब्रह्म तद्ये नित्यमुपासते ।
आप्नुवन्त्यखिलं तेऽन्नमध्यात्मं दैवतात्मना ॥

Food, indeed, is the cause of the origination, maintenance, and destruction of the world. Since food is the cause of all beings which have come into being, it is Brahman. Those who always meditate on it attain the entire food of all individual beings as the *Virāj*.

These two verses state the reason for identifying food with Brahman and the fruit which accrues to one who meditates on food as the *Virāj* in the way in which it is taught by Scripture. One who meditates on

the food as the *Virāj* attains the nature of the *Virāj*, the cosmic being in its gross physical aspect.

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सैषा विराडिति ह्युक्तमन्नात्तृत्वं हि ताण्डिकैः ।
कार्यं सर्वं यतो व्याप्तं कारणेनात्तृरूपिणा ॥
इति हेतूपदेशाय ह्यन्नं हीत्युच्यते पुनः ॥

The nature of eating of food (by the *Virāj*) is, indeed, stated by those who follow the *Tāṇḍika* in the words, “*saiṣā virāḥ*.” Every effect is pervaded by its cause. With a view to state the reason that by the *Virāj*, as the eater (all food is pervaded), there is, indeed, the repetition of the text beginning with *annam hi*.

In the *Upaniṣad*, the text, “Food, indeed, is the first among the created beings. Hence it is called a medicine for all,” is repeated. The repetition is for the sake of conveying the idea that to one who meditates on food as the *Virāj* there is the acquisition and enjoyment of all food in the form of the *Virāj*. It is well-known that the cause pervades its effect. The *Virāj*, the cosmic being in its gross physical aspect, encompasses all physical objects which are made of food. When a person who meditates on food as the *Virāj* attains the form of the *Virāj*, he attains and enjoys all food.

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अद्यतेऽन्नं प्रधानत्वाददितित्वात्तथात्ति च ।
अन्नान्नादत्वहेतोस्तदन्नं हीत्युच्यते बुधैः ॥

Food is eaten by (all beings), because it is an object necessary for living. And also it eats (other beings), because it is the subject. It is, indeed, called *annam* by the wise, because of being eaten (by creatures) and of eating (the creatures).

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* texts, “*adyate'tti ca bhūtāni, tasmādannam taducyate.*”

All creatures live on food. So food is the object which is consumed by them. A person who indulges in over-eating becomes a victim to the very food he has consumed for the sake of his living. In this case food consumes the person. It becomes, that is to say, the subject, and the person who is eaten by it becomes the object (*jīvana-hetuvāt annam adyate; niyamābhāvena yo'nnamatti tam tadatīti, adyate atīti ca vyūpattiḥ*).

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आप्नोति सर्वकार्याणि कारणात्मतया विराट् ।
ततोऽप्यन्तः प्रवेशाय तस्मादित्यभिधीयते ॥

The *Virāj*, being of the nature of the cause, attains all effects. For the purpose of going inward even from that (sheath of food), the text beginning with *tasmāt* is uttered.

The sheath of food has been explained with a view to divert the mind of a person from external objects in which it is engrossed. A spiritual aspirant must first overcome attachment to external objects such as wealth, son, kinsmen, and so on. By meditating constantly on the sheaths of food as Brahman as taught by *śruti*, one can withdraw from the external objects. So the knowledge of the sheath of food in the individual as well as the cosmic aspect is the first step to the knowledge of Brahman.

The next step consists in going inward through understanding from the sheath of food to the sheath of vital force. Realizing that the sheath of food or the *Virāj* is non-different from its cause, viz., the sheath of vital force or the *Hiranyagarbha*, the spiritual aspirant must transcend it in thought and take his stand on that which is inward to it. It is with a view to lead the aspirant from the sheath of food to that of vital force that *śruti* says: “Than that, verily, — than this one formed of the essence of food, — there is another self within, which is formed of *prāṇa*.”

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वैशब्देनैव संस्मार्य दवीयोदेशवर्तिनम् ॥

तस्माच्छब्देन वैराजमादायाध्यात्मरूपिणः ।

एतस्मादिति शब्देन वैराजत्वम्प्रबोध्यते ॥

Referring to the nature of the *Virāj*, which is farther away, by the word *tasmāt*, and recalling to memory (the *Virāj*) by the particle *vai*, *śruti* teaches that the individual being is of the nature of the *Virāj* by the word *etasmāt*.

The meanings of the three words *tasmāt* (than that), *vai* (verily), and *etasmāt* (than this) which occur in the *śruti* text *tasmādvai etasmādan-narasamayāt* are explained in these two verses. By the word *tasmāt* is conveyed the *Virāj*, the cosmic being which is manifested as food or the gross physical matter. Being external to the individual, it is thought of as what is remote, what is farther away. The particle *vai* is used to help us recollect in our memory that cosmic being which has been described above. The word *etasmāt* denotes the individual physical being which is immediate and which is a modification of the cosmic being. The two words *tasmāt* and *etasmāt* are put in co-ordinate relation. The text, therefore, conveys the idea that the human being, a product of food (*annamaya*) at the individual level is identical with the *anna* or the *Virāj*, the cosmic being (*kāryabhūto'nnarasamayakośo virājah kārāṇādabhinna iti tātparyam*).

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कार्याणां कारणात्मत्वमेवं स्यादुत्तरेष्वपि ।

ब्रह्मानन्तम्भवेदेवं साङ्ख्यराद्धान्तमन्यथा ॥

Thus, in respect of the subsequent (sheaths) too, the effects are of the nature of their cause. In this way the infinitude of Brahman is established. If it is otherwise, the view of the Sāṅkhya will get established.

Just as in the case of the sheath of food, the co-ordinate relation between the two words *tasmāt* and *etasmāt* indicates the non-difference of cause (viz., *anna* or the *Virāj*) and effect (viz., *annamaya* or the individual human being), so also in respect of the remaining sheaths stated in the sequel the two words *tasmāt* and *etasmāt* which are in co-ordinate relation convey the oneness of cause and effect; they convey, that is to say, that the *prāṇamaya-kośa* which is the effect is non-different from *prāṇa*, its cause, that the *manomaya-kośa* which is the effect is non-different from *manas*, its cause, and so on.

Making use of the principle of the non-difference of the effect and its cause, the entire universe can be finally resolved into the first cause called the *Avyākṛta* or *Ajñātābrahma*. Adopting the same principle, even the first cause can be resolved into Brahman which is infinite and which transcends the cause-effect relation. The purport of the teaching of the *kośas* is in establishing the non-dual nature of the ultimate reality.

If the view that the effect is non-different from its cause is not accepted, that is, if it is held that the world is different from Brahman, one will be compelled to subscribe to the Sāṅkhya standpoint according to which the *Puruṣa* is radically different from the *Prakṛti*. But the Sāṅkhya view is not acceptable as it is opposed to the Vedic testimony (*śruti*) as well as reasoning (*yukti*).

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पूर्वकार्यातिरेकेण स्वात्मना चान्वयोक्तिः ।

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां यथोक्तार्थः समर्थितः ॥

In the absence of the effect (viz., the *annamaya*) mentioned before, (the cause, viz., the *prāṇamaya*) can exist. And the effect is pervaded by its cause. The idea as stated above (viz., the non-difference of the effect and its cause) has been established by the methods of *anvaya* and *vayatireka*.

That the effect is not different from its cause can be shown by the methods of *anvaya* and *vayatireka*. Since the cause constitutes the nature

of the effect, wherever there is effect, there is also its cause, as can be seen in the case of clay and pot which are related as cause and effect. When the effect is present, its cause also is present. This is what is known as the *anvaya* relation between the effect and its cause. The effect, that is to say, cannot exist independently of its cause. But the cause can exist independently of its effect. In short, while the effect is non-different from its cause, we cannot reverse this relation and argue that the cause is non-different from its effect.

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यथोक्तान्नमयादस्मादन्यः स्यात्तद्विलक्षणः ।

अन्तरः प्रत्यगित्येतदात्मा चात्मसमन्वयात् ॥

The word *anya* (in the *śruti* text) means different from this *annamaya* as described. The word *antara* means its inward self. It is called *ātmā*, since it pervades (the *annamaya-kośa*).

This verse explains the meanings of the words contained in the text *anyo'ntara ātmā*. The meaning of the text is that the sheath of vital force (*prāṇamaya-kośa*) which is inward to the sheath of food (*annamaya-kośa*) is different from it. Being the cause, it pervades the *annamaya-kośa*, and so it is the self or the essence (*svārūpa*) of the *annamaya-kośa*.

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कोशैश्चतुर्भिः संव्याप्तो यथैवान्नमयः पुरा ।

जानीयादुत्तरानेवं त्रिद्वयेकार्थसमन्वयात् ॥

Just as the sheath of food, as explained earlier, is pervaded by the four sheaths, so also the subsequent sheaths must be known as being pervaded by three (sheaths), two (sheaths), and one (sheath) respectively.

The human body consists of five sheaths— *annamaya-kośa*, *prāṇamaya-kośa*, *manomaya-kośa*, *vijñānamaya-kośa*, and *ānandamaya-kośa*. Starting from the *annamaya-kośa*, which is the outermost sheath, these sheaths are arranged one inside the other. The *prāṇamaya-kośa* is inward to the *annamaya-kośa*; the *manomaya-kośa* is inward to the *prāṇamaya-kośa*, and so on. Further, the sheath which is inward is the cause of that which is outward. That is to say, the outward sheath is pervaded by what is inside it which is its cause. For example, the sheath of food (*annamaya-kośa*) is permeated by the four sheaths of vital force, consciousness, self-consciousness, and bliss. The sheath of vital force (*prāṇamaya-kośa*) is pervaded by the sheaths of consciousness, self-consciousness, and bliss. The sheath of consciousness (*manomaya-kośa*) is pervaded by the sheaths of self-consciousness and bliss. Finally, the sheath of self-consciousness (*vijñānamaya-kośa*) is pervaded by the sheath of bliss. It will be shown in the sequel that the non-dual Self is the support of the sheath of bliss.

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तेन प्राणमयेनैष पूर्णो रज्ज्वेव पन्नगः ।

कार्यतोऽन्नमयः क्लृप्तो वाचारम्भणशास्त्रतः ॥

By the sheath of vital force, this (sheath of food) is filled in the same way as the serpent is filled by the rope. The sheath of food which is an effect is illusory, as known from the *vācārambhaṇa* text.

That the sheath of food is pervaded by the sheath of vital force is shown by the *śruti* text *tenaiśa pūrṇaḥ* which occurs immediately after the text *anyo'nīara ātmā prāṇamayah*. The relation between the *prāṇamaya-kośa* and the *annamaya-kośa* is on a par with the relation between the rope and the illusory serpent which is superimposed thereon. Just as the rope and the snake are related as cause and effect, so also the sheath of vital force and the sheath of food are related as cause and effect. Like the rope which constitutes the nature (*svatūpa*) of the snake, the sheath of vital force constitutes the nature of the sheath of food.

It may be argued that the rope-snake example which has been cited is not apt; for, while the snake is illusory, the sheath of food is not so. But this argument will not do. The sheath of food is also illusory, because it is an effect, and whatever is an effect is illusory. Being an effect is what makes a thing illusory, and being a cause is what makes a thing real. This is the central idea contained in the teaching of the *vācārambhāṇa* text of the *Chāndogya* (VI, i, 4) which says that an effect or a modification is only a name arising from speech.

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स वै पुरुषविधो ह्युक्तो योऽयम्प्राणमयः स्मृतः ।
अमूर्तत्वात्कुतो न्वेतद्धेतुस्तस्येति भण्यते ॥

This sheath of vital force that is spoken of is, indeed, said to be truly of a human form. How is this possible since it is incorporeal? The reason for this is given in the text beginning with *tasya*.

This verse explains the meaning of the text, "This self, verily, is certainly of a human form," (*sa vā eṣa puruṣavidha eva*).

The sheath of vital force which is within the sheath of food is also said to be of a human form, possessing a head and other organs. Since the *prāṇamaya-kośa* is incorporeal (*amūrta*), how is it possible, it may be argued, to speak of it as having a human shape (*puruṣavidha*)? The answer to this objection is stated by the *śruti* itself in the text: "Its human form takes after the human form of that (*annamaya-kośa*)" (*tasya puruṣavidhatām, anvayam puruṣavidhaḥ*). The self constituted by the essence of food is well-known to have a human shape. Just as an image cast in a mould takes on the shape of the mould, so also the *prāṇamaya-kośa* is moulded as it were after the human form of the *annamaya-kośa*.

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प्राणस्तस्य शिरःश्रैष्ठ्यात्प्राणो यस्मान्मुखालयः ।

व्यानोऽस्य दक्षिणः पक्ष उत्तरोऽपान उच्यते ॥

सामान्यं वीर्यवत्ता स्यादितरस्यातथात्मता ।

आकाश इति चात्र स्यात्समानोऽम्बरसाम्यतः ॥

Of this (sheath of vital force), *prāṇa* is the head because of its pre-eminence as abiding in the head. *Vyāna* is its right wing. *Apāna* is said to be its left wing. *Vyāna* is characterized by general strength, while others (such as *prāṇa*) are not like that. Here *ākāśa* means *samāna*, because of the similarity (of *samāna*) to *ākāśa*.

As in the case of the *annamaya-kośa*, the *prāṇamaya-kośa* is now represented as possessing a head and other organs continuing the imagery of a bird.

The vital force is described as fivefold because of the five different functions it performs. The function of *prāṇa* is connected with the heart and is capable of moving to the mouth and nostrils. *Prāṇa* literally means going forward. *Apāna* functions below the heart and extends up to the navel. It is called *apāna*, because it helps excretion. *Vyāna*, which means going in all directions, is everywhere in the body. It regulates the functions of *prāṇa* and *apāna* and is the cause of actions requiring strength. *Udāna* which means going upward is in the throat as the departing breath. It causes nutrition, rising up, and so on. *Samāna* is in the interior of the body. It equalizes what is eaten or drunk.

Here the *prāṇa* aspect is represented as the head because of its eminence as abiding in the mouth and nostrils which are located in the head (*mukha-nāsikā-randhreṣvavasthitāḥ*). The *vyāna* aspect is compared to the right wing because of its superior strength. The *apāna* aspect is represented as the left wing. The *samāna* aspect is called *ākāśa* because of its similarity to *ākāśa*. Since it is pervasive like *ākāśa*, it is called *ākāśa*.

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प्राणानां तत्प्रतिष्ठानादात्मासौ श्रुतितो भवेत् ।
 पृथिवी देवता पुच्छं सैषेति श्रुतिदर्शनात् ॥

असोराध्यात्मिकस्यैवा स्थितिहेतुः प्रकीर्तिता ।
 अन्नात्मनोवेहाप्याह श्लोकं प्राणमयात्मनि ॥

This (*saṁāna*) is the self as known from another *śruti* text, because the five vital airs abide therein. The deity of the earth is the tail. Since it is said in the *śruti* text, "That deity which is in the earth...", this (deity in the earth) is said to be the cause of the stability of the vital force of the individual. As in the case of the self formed of food, here also the (following) verse is quoted in respect of the self formed of the vital force.

The *saṁāna* aspect of the vital force which is called *ākāśa* is represented as the self (*ātman*) in the *śruti* text when it says *ākāśa ātmā*. *Prāṇa* and other aspects of the vital force rest on *saṁāna* as stated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (III, ix, 26). The body and the heart, it is first of all stated here, rest on *prāṇa*. Then *prāṇa* is said to rest on *apāna* which, again, is said to rest on *vyāna*. To the question, "On what does the *vyāna* rest?" the answer is given that *vyāna* rests on *udāna*. And finally *udāna* is said to rest on *saṁāna*. It is this *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* passage that is referred to in the verse in support of the view that all the vital airs abide in *saṁāna*. *Samāna* is represented as the self as it were, because it is the abiding place of the functions of the vital force and also because it is in the middle place when compared with the other functions which are in the periphery. It is usual to refer to the middle or the trunk of an organism as the self.

After explaining that *ākāśa*, i.e., the *saṁāna* aspect of the vital force, is the self of the *prāṇamaya-kośa*, *śruti* says that "the earth is the tail, the support" (*prthivī puṣṭham pratiṣṭhā*). *Prthivī* here means the deity of the earth (*prthivī devatā*). That the deity of the earth is the stabilising

factor of the vital force is brought out in the *Praśna Upaniṣad* (III, 8): "The deity that is in the earth favours by attracting (keeping under control) *apāna* of a human being."

At the end of the first *anuvāka* reference was made to the verse dealing with the nature of the self made of food which occurs at the commencement of the second *anuvāka*. Here also reference is made to the verse relating to the self made of the vital force, which occurs at the commencement of the third *anuvāka*.

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प्राणमप्राणन्तमन्वेव देवाः प्राणन्ति न स्वतः ॥

The gods (such as fire) remain alive, not by themselves, but only by following (the functioning of) the vital force which possesses the power of sustaining life.

The explanation of the third *anuvāka* begins from this verse.

The meaning of the *śruti* text *prāṇam devāḥ anu prāṇanti* is explained in this verse. Fire and other gods perform their functions only by depending upon, and by becoming identified with, the vital force (*mukhyapraṇāmanusṛtya svayam svasvavyāpāreṣu prabhavanti*).

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वर्षसीह यदैव त्वमथेमाः प्राणते प्रजाः ।
मनुष्याः पशवोऽन्ये च प्राणन्त्यसुसमाश्रयात् ॥

When you (O *Prāṇa*) pour down here as rain, then only these creatures live. Human beings and also animals and others live by depending on *prāṇa*, the vital force.

The text that is cited in the verse is from the *Praśna Upaniṣad* (II, 10). It says: "O *Prāṇa*, when you pour down as rain, then these creatures of yours continue to be in a happy mood thinking that there will be food according to their desire."

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अध्यात्ममधिदैवञ्च करणान्यधिदैवताः ।
प्राणस्वरूपमापद्य जहुर्मृत्युमिति श्रुतिः ॥

Śruti says that the sense-organs (such as the visual sense) in the individual and the cosmic forms get rid of death by attaining the nature of *prāṇa* in its cosmic aspect.

Reference is made in this verse to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (I, iii, 10-16) which contains an account as to how the vital force carries the gods of speech and the rest beyond death by way of stating the result of meditation on the vital force as one's own Self.

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घटतेऽसाविदं सर्वं सर्वस्यायुर्यतो ह्यसुः ।
तस्मात्तं तद्विदः प्राहुः सर्वायुषमनेकशः ॥

Since the vital force is, indeed, the life of all, all this is justifiable in *prāṇa*. Hence those who know it call it quite often as the life of all.

Life lasts, as it has been stated in the *Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad* (III, 2), so long as the vital force remains in the body. So the vital force is called the life of all (*sarveṣāmāyuh*).

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सर्वायुषगुणेनासुं य आत्मानमुपासते ।
ते तं सर्वायुषम्प्राणं प्राप्नुवन्त्यभियोगतः ॥

Those who meditate on the self formed of the vital force as endowed with the attribute of being the life of all attain *Prāṇa* who is the life of all as a result of that meditation.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* texts *sarvameva tā āyuryanti, ye prāṇam brahmopāsate*. Those who, after detaching themselves from the physical body, meditate on Brahman in the *upādhi* of the individual *prāṇa* get the full span of life in this world; and those who meditate on Brahman in the *upādhi* of the *Hiraṇyagarbha*, i.e., the *prāṇa* at the cosmic level, attain to the status of the *Hiraṇyagarbha* in the future birth and enjoy the full span of life till the cosmic dissolution.

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तस्य त्वन्नमयस्यैष योऽयम्प्राणमयः स्मृतः ।

भवः शरीरे शरीर आत्मा तेनात्मवान्यतः ॥

Of the body made of food, what is known as the sheath formed of the vital force is the *śārīra ātmā*, i.e., the self which exists in the body, because the body becomes ensouled by it.

This verse explains the meaning of the text *tasyaiṣa eva śārīra ātmā yaḥ pūrvasya*. The sheath of vital force (*prāṇamaya-kośa*) which has been described above is the self dwelling in the body made of food (*annamaya-kośa*). There is first of all the notion that the physical body made of food is the self. This erroneous notion is removed when the spiritual aspirant is able to realize through meditation that the *prāṇamaya-kośa* which is inward to the physical body is the self which dwells in the body. In the same way, the false identification of the self with the sheath of vital force must be removed by realizing that what is inward to it is the self which dwells therein, and so on, till one realizes the non-dual Self which is beyond the sheaths.

Following Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the text *tasyaiṣa eva śārīra ātmā*, etc., Sureśvara first explains the *śruti* text in this verse from the standpoint of the *Vṛttikāra*. But this explanation is acceptable neither to Śaṅkara nor to Sureśvara. The correct interpretation of the text from the standpoint of Advaita is given in the following verse.

It is not the purport of *śruti* to enjoin meditation (*upāsana*) here. Rather, it purports to teach the non-difference of Brahman and Ātman

as it can be seen from the harmony between the beginning (*upakrama*) and the end (*upasaṁhāra*) of the chapter. Nor could it be said that *śruti* enjoins meditation in the middle of the chapter, for that would lead to the fallacy of sentence-split (*vākya-bheda*). *Śruti* cannot have its import in Brahman-knowledge as well as in meditation. It is true that *śruti* speaks about the fruit that will accrue to one who practises meditation as taught. But it has to be explained as a case of *arthavāda*. Inasmuch as the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman is what is intended to be taught, the scriptural statement about the fruit such as food and the full span of life which one attains is *arthavāda*.

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सत्यादिलक्षणो वात्मा गौणो ह्यात्मासुतोऽपरः ।
सर्वान्तरत्वान्न्याय्यैवं यः पूर्वस्येति हि श्रुतिः ॥

Rather, Brahman which has been defined as real, etc., is the Self. Anything other than this is the self, indeed, in a secondary sense. This explanation is proper, (since the supreme Self) lies within all. The *śruti* text, verily, says *yaḥ pūrvasya* (He who is the Self of the former).

The *śruti* text *tasyaiṣa eva sārīra ātmā, yaḥ pūrvasya* is now explained from the standpoint of Advaita. According to the explanation given in the previous verse, each inward sheath must be treated as the self of its outward sheath. On this account, the sheath of vitality is the self of the sheath of food; the sheath of consciousness is the self of the sheath of vitality, and so on. Strictly speaking, this explanation which may be characterized as the first and superficial view (*āpāta-darśana*) of the problem is not tenable. Since each inward sheath is subtler than, and constitutes the essence of, its outward one, it is spoken of as the embodied self of another. There are several reasons to show why the above interpretation has to be rejected. First of all, the word *ātman* in the above interpretation must be understood as used only in a secondary and not in the primary sense. When we characterize the sheath of vital force as the self of the physical body, it is only in a secondary sense, for

what is insentient can never be the self in the real sense of the term. Secondly, pure consciousness alone on which all sheaths are superimposed can be the primary sense of the word *ātman*; for, while it is inward to everything (*sarvāntaratvāt*), there is nothing which is inward to it. Thirdly, the word *eṣa* which occurs in the *śruti* passage referred to above must be explained as calling up to our memory Brahman-Ātman which is the main subject of discussion in the context. The chapter purports to set forth the nature of Brahman as identical with the supreme inward Self of all, and not that of the *prāṇamaya* as the self of the *annamaya-kośa*. And lastly, the *śruti* passage *yaḥ pūrvasya* should be interpreted without rendering it superfluous. In the previous explanation the *śruti* text must be construed as *tasya pūrvasya annamayasya yaḥ prāṇamayaḥ eṣa sārīra ātmā*. When construed in this way, the word *eṣa* refers to the *prāṇamaya-kośa*. But the latter, for the reason stated above, cannot be the self in the real sense of the term. And that the *prāṇamaya* is the self of the *annamaya* can be obtained from the *śruti* text *tasyaiṣa eva sārīra ātmā* even without *yaḥ pūrvasya*. So if the *śruti* passage *yaḥ pūrvasya* is to be made significant and if the word *eṣa* must be understood as recalling to our memory Brahman-Ātman, the main subject of discussion in the context, the entire *śruti* text has to be construed as *pūrvasya (annamayasya) yaḥ ātmā eṣa eva tasya (prāṇamayasya) ātmā*. If so, on this construction we get the idea that Brahman-Ātman which is the Self of the physical body through *ākāśa*, etc., is, indeed, the Self of the sheath of the vital force.

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मिथ्यात्मनां हि सर्वेषां सत्यादिगुणलक्षणम् ।

व्याविद्धाशेषसंसारमात्मानं तं प्रचक्ष्महे ॥

All (the five sheaths) being illusory, we consider that which has been defined as real, etc., and which is free from all transmigratory existence as the Self.

All the five sheaths are effects and as stated in the *vācārambhaṇa* text of the *Chāndogya* (VI, i, 4), all effects which exist only in name

are illusory. So none of the sheaths can be designated as the Self in the primary sense of the term. If any of them is looked upon as the Self, it is a case of false self-identification due to *avidyā*.

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न ह्यात्मवान् भवेत्सर्पो दण्डाद्यध्यासरूपिणा ।
आत्मना वितथेनैव सर्पो रज्ज्वात्मनात्मवान् ॥

The (illusory) snake does not, indeed, have its nature determined by the illusory stick, etc., which are false appearances. The snake (which is superimposed on the rope) has its being determined by the rope.

A rope which is in front may first of all be mistaken for a stick and then for a snake. The illusory stick which is itself a false appearance, which owes its existence to something else, cannot really account for the illusory snake. It is the rope and not the illusory stick which is the substratum for the illusory snake. So the rope alone which is in front constitutes the nature of the self of the illusory snake. In the same way, the *prāṇamaya-kōśa* whose status is similar to the illusory stick mentioned above cannot be the real basis, that is to say, cannot constitute the nature of the self, of the *annamaya-kōśa*. Brahman-Ātman alone on which all the sheaths such as the *annamaya* are superimposed is the Self of all.

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प्राणाद्धेवेत्यतो न्यायाद्वक्ष्यमाणश्रुतीरितात् ।
व्युत्थाप्यान्नमयं तुच्छं प्राणोऽस्मीति व्यवस्थितः ॥
यस्तं मनोमयात्मानं सङ्क्रामयितुमुच्यते ॥

In accordance with the principle expressed in the *śruti* text, "For, from the vital force, indeed, ...," which will be stated (in the next chapter), the person, having

moved from the false physical body, thinks "I am the vital force;" and with a view to unite him to the sheath of mind the *śruti* text which follows is stated.

It is the aim of Scripture to lead the spiritual aspirant to Brahman-Ātman step by step from the sheath which is outward to that which is inside it. In the third chapter called the *Bhṛguvallī* there is an account of the step-by-step progress which Bhṛgu makes by discarding one after another the different sheaths which are not-Self, for none of them answers to the definition of Brahman given by his father, Varuṇa. When Bhṛgu requested Varuṇa to teach him Brahman, the latter defined Brahman as that from which all beings are born, that by which they live, and that into which they merge. Thinking that food answered to the definition of Brahman, Bhṛgu first of all thought of food as Brahman. When he realized that food which must have had a beginning could not be Brahman, he thought that the vital force (*prāṇa*) from which all beings are born, by which they live, and into which they merge, must be Brahman. This realization enabled him to discard his earlier notion that *anna* was food. Employing the same reasoning contained in the definition of Brahman as stated by Varuṇa, Bhṛgu then moved on to the next stage and thought of mind as Brahman, and so on.

The spiritual aspirant must give up the *prāṇamaya-kośa* also as false in the same way as he gave up the *annamaya-kośa*, and then move on to the next one, viz., *manomaya-kośa*. The *śruti* texts which follow beginning from *tasmādvā etasmūt prāṇamayāt, anyo'ntara ātmā manomayaḥ* are intended to help him attain this progress through discrimination.

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तस्मादित्यादिवाक्यस्य त्वर्थम्पूर्वमवादिषम् ।

प्राधान्यं यजुषो ज्ञेयं हविःप्रक्षेपकारणात् ॥

The meaning of the sentence *tasmāt*, etc., was stated earlier. The Yajur-mantras must be known as pre-eminent, since an oblation is offered (along with a *Yajur-mantra*).

The *śruti* text *tasmādvā etasmāt prāṇamayāt, anyo'nntara ātmā manomayaḥ* is now taken up for explanation.

The meanings of the words *tasmāt*, *vai*, and *etasmāt* must be construed in the same way as explained earlier in verses (266) and (267). The word *tasmāt* refers to the being at the cosmic level; the particle *vai* has been used to help us recollect that being; and the word *etasmāt* refers to the being at the individual level. Since the two words *tasmāt* and *etasmāt* are put in co-ordinate relation, the idea which is conveyed here is the non-difference between the being at the cosmic level and that at the individual level.

Śruti says that than this one formed of *prāṇa* (*etasmāt prāṇamayāt*) there is another (*anyaḥ*) inner (*antaraḥ*) self (*ātmā*) formed of *manas*. The *manomaya-kośa* is not only different from, but is also inward to, the sheath of vitality. It is said to be the self of the *prāṇamaya*, since it is pervaded by the supreme Self (*paramārthātma-vyāptatvāt*) and since it does not have a nature of its own different from that Self (*tadatirikta-svarūpābhāvāt*).

Like the sheath of vitality, the *manomaya-kośa* also is represented as of a human shape, with the Yajur-mantras as its head, the Ṛg-mantras as the right wing, the Sāma-mantras as the left wing, the *Brāhmaṇa* portion of the Vedas as the self, and the *Mantra* portion seen by the *Atharvāṅgiras* as the tail.

The number of letters and feet as well as the length of lines are not restricted in the *Yajur-mantra*. The latter is represented as the head of the *manomaya-kośa* because of its importance; and its importance is due to the fact that an oblation is offered uttering the *Yajur-mantra*.

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स्वाहा स्वधा वषट् चेति सन्निपत्योपकुर्वते ॥

The mantras, viz., *svāhā*, *svadhā*, and *vaṣaṭ*, help the offering of oblation directly.

Swāhā and *vaṣaṭ* are uttered at the time of offering oblation to gods, and *svadhā* at the time of offering oblation to the manes.

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शिरआदिप्रकृतृसिस्तु वाचनिक्यथ वास्तिवह ।

वचनम्बलवद्यस्मात्पौरुषेयी हि कल्पना ॥

Or, the imagery of head and so on is based on the authority of the scriptural utterance here, since the scriptural utterance is of a higher authority (than that which is based on the imagination of a person). Imagination is, indeed, dependent on the person.

It was stated earlier that the Yajur-mantras are said to constitute the head of the *manomaya-kośa* because of their pre-eminence. One may raise an objection as to how the Yajur-mantras, etc., which stand for the aggregate of external sounds known by those names could be looked upon as head, etc. The answer is that the imagery presented here has to be accepted as it is, inasmuch as it is based on the authority of *śruti*. It is not like human thinking or imagination which seeks to work out an analogy between two things on the basis of similarity.

The *manomaya-kośa* is made up of *manas* and the organs of knowledge. *Manas* is that mode of the internal organ which stands for desire and doubt (*saṅkalpa-vikalpātmikāntahkaraṇavṛttiḥ*). The different states of the mind, of which *saṅkalpa* and *vikalpa* are indicative, are enumerated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (I, v, 3) as follows: "Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, want of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shame, intelligence, and fear — all these are but the mind."

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पदवाक्यस्वरस्थाननादवर्णादिसंयुता ।

यत्नोत्थमानसी वृत्तिर्यजुःसङ्केतवर्त्मना ॥

ऐश्वरज्ञानसन्दृब्धा पदवाक्यानुवर्जिता ।

श्रोत्रादिकरणद्वास्था यजुरित्यभिधीयते ॥

What is called *Yajus* is that state of the mind which is constituted by sound, the organ of utterance, accent, letters, words, sentences, etc., and which arises due to volition. The mental state in the form of words and sentences, which is illumined by the consciousness of *Īśvara* (the Self) and which is grasped by the organs of hearing (and mind) is called *Yajus*.

The word *Yajus*, it may be argued, refers to the *Yajur-veda* which is outside the mind. If so, how could it be said that the *Yajur-veda* is the head of the *manomaya* which is internal? The answer to this objection is stated in these two verses.

When *śruti* says that the *Yajus* represents the head of *manomaya-kośa*, it does not refer to the external *Yajur-mantra*, the aggregate of external sounds which are known by that name and which are uttered with a particular effort, pitch, and accent, but to a particular mental mode (*mānasī vṛtti*) representing the *Yajur-veda*. And this particular mental mode is internal. The same explanation holds good in the case of *Rg* and *Sāma* mantras. That is to say, the *Yajur-mantra*, etc., are only particular modes of mind associated with consciousness; or they are all mere consciousness in the form of particular modes of mind (*caitanyoparaktā viśiṣṭā buddhivṛttiḥ, caitanyaṁ vā prāgukta-buddhi-vṛttiviśiṣṭaṁ yajurādisa-bdāvācyam*).

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ज्ञानात्मत्वे हि मन्त्राणां घटते मानसो जपः ।

ज्ञानस्याशब्दरूपत्वाद्गावृत्तिर्न सिद्ध्यति ॥

अशक्यत्वान्न चावृत्तिर्घटादेरिव शक्यते ॥

Only if mantras are considered as mental states illumined by consciousness, their mental repetition is, indeed, tenable, for the mental state illumined by consciousness is not of the nature of the (external) sound. If the *Rg-mantra*, etc., are external sounds, their (mental) repetition can-

not take place because it is impossible, in the same way as the (mental) repetition is not possible in the case of a pot, etc.

This verse gives the reason for viewing the *Yajur-mantra*, etc., as mental states illumined by consciousness, and not as external sounds or objects.

Japa, which means repetition of mantras, is often enjoined in connection with sacrificial rites. It is by its very nature a mental act. If mantras were not states of mind, their repetition would not be possible. Only a mental act or a state of mind can be repeated, but not an external thing such as a pot (*kriyāiva āvartayate, na dravyam*). The mind has no freedom of action on external objects, and so it cannot directly act upon them. If the *Yajur-mantra*, etc., are treated as external sounds or objects like a pot, then it is impossible to speak of a mental repetition of them in the same way as it is impossible to speak of a mental repetition of an external object like a pot.

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आवृत्तिश्चोद्यते चर्चा श्रुतौ त्रिः प्रथमामिति ॥

And, the mental repetition of the *R̥g-mantra* is enjoined in the *sruti* text, "The first *R̥g-mantra* is to be repeated thrice."

The passage cited in the verse is from the *Taittiriya-saṃhitā*, II, v, 7, 1. So the objection that the mental repetition of the *mantra* is not enjoined does not hold good.

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अथर्चोऽविषयत्वेऽपि स्मृतेरावृत्तिरिष्यते ।
ऋगर्थविषयायाश्चेन्मैव गौणी हि सा भवेत् ॥

If it be argued that, though the *R̥g-mantra* is not the content of repetition, the repetition of the memory which has

for its content the meaning conveyed by the *R̥g-mantra* is desired, it is not so, because repetition (in that case) will, indeed, be in the secondary sense.

It may be argued that though the *mantra* itself which is external cannot be repeated, the repetition of the meaning of the *R̥g-mantra* which is in memory is quite possible. But this argument is wrong. *Śruti* enjoins the repetition of the *mantra* and not the repetition of the memory of the letters which constitute the *mantra* (*akṣara-viśayaka-smṛti*) or the memory which has for its content the meaning conveyed by the *R̥g-mantra* (*ṛgārtha-viśayaka-smṛti*). Repetition of a *mantra* is one thing, and the repetition of what is in memory is quite another thing. If the repetition of what is in memory is undertaken, it is to practise repetition, not in the primary, but in a secondary sense of the injunction.

[296]

भूयोऽल्पीयःफलत्वञ्च बाह्यमानसयोर्जपे ।

अतो मानसमुख्यत्वमितरस्यास्तु गौणता ॥

Further, mental repetition and oral repetition (of mantras) are said to yield abundant and meagre fruits (respectively). Hence the importance of mental repetition. The other one is in the secondary sense.

This verse gives yet another reason to show why the *Yajur-mantra*, etc., must be understood in the sense of mental states. *Japa* is of two kinds — *mānasika* and *vācanika*. If a *mantra* is repeated mentally, it is called *mānasika-japa*. But if it is repeated orally, i.e., through the word of mouth, it is called *vācanika-japa*. It has been said that the *mānasika-japa*, i.e., the mental repetition of a *mantra*, is a thousand times more effective than the repetition of it through the word of mouth. It means that mental repetition is what is primarily enjoined. This again lends support to the view that the *Yajur-veda*, etc., must be understood as particular mental states and not as an aggregate of external sounds.

[297]

नात्मानं लभते गौणी मुख्यार्थेऽसति कल्पना ।
तस्मादैश्वरविज्ञानं यजुर्बुद्ध्याद्युपाश्रयम् ॥

If the primary sense is not possible, the secondary sense has to be suggested. (When the primary sense holds good), there is no scope for the secondary sense. So, the *Tajus* is the consciousness of *Īsvara* (the Self) manifested in the intellect.

[298]

एवं च सति नित्यत्वं वेदानां घटतेऽञ्जसा ।
वाचकत्वमशब्दस्य सिद्धं न स्फोटरूपतः ॥

Only if it is explained in this way, the eternality of the Vedas is truly justifiable. Revelation (of *dharma*; etc.) by the Vedas which are not external sounds is established (in this way), but not so from the *sphoṭa*.

If the *Ṛg* and other mantras are viewed as mental states, not only is *jāpa* possible, but it can also be proved that the Vedas are eternal. It was stated earlier that the mantras are particular mental states and that the mental states are pervaded or illumined by the consciousness of the Self. The eternal consciousness which is limited by, or reflected in, certain mental states comes to be viewed as the *Tajus*, etc. That is to say, the *Tajus*, etc, are one with the consciousness which has neither a beginning nor an end. The mind and its different states which are superimposed on Brahman-Ātman are non-different from it. So, as identical with Brahman-Ātman, the *Tajus*, etc., which are mental states, are eternal. Though these mental states are one with the Self, they are referred to differently as the *Tajur-veda*, the *Ṛg-veda* and so on, because of the difference arising from the mental modes which serve as the limiting adjuncts (*yajurādi-bhedastūpādhinimitta-vṛttibheda-kalpitaḥ*).

The eternal Vedas which are not to be treated as an aggregate of external, insentient sounds are our source of knowledge in respect of *dharma* and *adharma*. The grammarian philosophers who subscribe to the theory of *sphoṭa* argue that the *Veda* conveys its meaning only through *sphoṭa*. According to them, a word which is uttered conveys its meaning through an unperceived, partless, unitary symbol called *sphoṭa*. The different letters of a word reveal this latent symbol to the mind as they are uttered in succession one after another; and this symbol called the *sphoṭa*, which is different from the letters, directly presents the meaning of the word. So a word does not directly convey its meaning, but it only serves to arouse the symbol (*sphoṭa*) which conveys the meaning.

There is no need, according to Advaita, to postulate *sphoṭa* for the purpose of explaining how the meaning of a word is grasped at one moment, even though the letters of a word come into consciousness one after another. It is true that the letters of a word are uttered in succession one after another, and that they are perceived one by one. But the unitary meaning which a word conveys can be explained in terms of the function of the mind which has the power of synthesizing the different elements which were originally perceived at different moments of time. A word, whether secular or scriptural, which is nothing but consciousness delimited by the mental mode conveys its meaning, and the unitary meaning of a word is grasped by the intellect which is illumined by the consciousness. And so there is no need for *sphoṭa* at all (*arthāwabodhasya vṛttyupahita-caitanyātmakena padena vākyaena laukikena vaidikena vā sambhavadāt, nārthāwabodhanārthaṁ varṇātiriktaḥ kaścit sphoṭo nāma abhyugantavyaḥ*). Further, there is no evidence (*pramāṇa*) for the existence of *sphoṭa*.

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सर्वे वेदाश्च यत्रैकम्भवन्तीति श्रुतेर्वचः ।

आदेशो ब्राह्मणं विद्याद्यस्मात्स विधिरूपभृत् ॥

There is also the utterance of *śruti* that "in the Self (which abides in the mind) all the Vedas become united."

The word *ādeśa* means the *Brāhmaṇa* portion (of the Vedas) since it is in the form of injunction.

The *Yajur-mantra* and the like are eternal only because they are identical with the eternal Self. That they are identical with the eternal Self is clearly set forth in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* (III, xi, 1) quoted in the verse.

The word *ādeśa* which occurs in the *śruti* passage *ādeśa ātmā* means the *Brāhmaṇa* portion of the Vedas, which consists of injunctions.

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ब्रह्मणो वा परस्येयमाज्ञा ब्राह्मणलक्षणा ।
तस्माददेश इत्येवं ब्राह्मणं सम्प्रचक्षते ॥

Or, this *Brāhmaṇa* portion is so-called because it is the command of the supreme Brahman. Hence, by the word *ādeśa* is referred to the *Brāhmaṇa* portion.

Why the *Brāhmaṇa* portion is of the nature of the command is explained in this verse.

[301]

अथर्वङ्गिरसाभ्यां ये दृष्टाः पुष्ट्यादिकारिणः ।
एत एव हि मन्त्राः स्युरथर्वङ्गिरसोऽत्र तु ॥

Here, by the word *atharvāṅgīrasaḥ* is meant, indeed, the mantras, which cause prosperity, etc., as seen by the sages Atharvan and Aṅgiras.

This verse explains the meaning of the text *atharvāṅgīrasaḥ puccham pratiṣṭhā*. The mantras of the *Atharva-veda* seen by the two sages Atharvan and Aṅgiras constitute the support, the stabilizing tail, because they deal mainly with rites, which promote man's prosperity.

[302]

मनोमयात्मसाक्ष्यत्र श्लोकः पूर्ववदुच्यते ।
यथोक्तवेदसिद्धयर्थं लिङ्गं श्लोकोऽपि कीर्त्यते ॥

As before, this verse (which occurs in the sequel) is uttered as evidence concerning the nature of the self constituted by the mind. This verse, too, is uttered as an indication of the fact that the *Veda* is of that nature as stated above.

Earlier a verse from the *Mantra* portion which brings out the nature of the *annamaya-kōśa* was quoted. See verse (256). Again a verse which sets forth the nature of the *prāṇamaya-kōśa* was cited earlier. See verse (277). Similarly, the nature of the *manomaya-kōśa* as described above is brought out by a verse which occurs at the beginning of the fourth *anuvāka*.

The explanation of the third *anuvāka* which began in verse (288) comes to an end with this verse.

[303]

अभिधाननिवृत्तिर्हि ब्रह्मणो नान्यतो यतः ।
सदावगमरूपत्वान्मनो यस्मान्निवर्तते ॥

It is, indeed, Brahman and not anything else which is inaccessible to words. Since Brahman is eternal consciousness, the mind turns back from that (Brahman).

The fourth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad* is covered by verses (303) to (312).

This verse brings out the meaning of the *Mantra* text, *yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha*, which occurs at the beginning of the fourth *anuvāka*. The *manomāya*, according to this *mantra*, is inaccessible to words and mind. This will be tenable only if the states of the mind

in which the eternal consciousness is reflected are looked upon as identical with the eternal consciousness which cannot be comprehended by the mind and words.

[304]

यद्दि वाचानभ्युदितं मनुते मनसा न यत् ।
ब्रह्मणोऽविषयत्वं हि श्रुतिर्वाङ्मनसोऽवदत् ॥

Brahman is "that which is not expressed by speech," that which is not comprehended by the mind. *Śruti*, indeed, speaks of Brahman as what is not comprehended by speech and the mind.

The passage quoted in the first line of the verse is from the *Kena Upaniṣad* (I, 5). It says: "That which is not expressed by speech, that by which speech is revealed, know that alone to be Brahman, and not what people worship as an object." The second line of the verse refers to the text *yato vāco nivartante*, etc.

[305]

नागोचरं ययोरस्ति ब्रह्म मुक्त्वा निरञ्जनम् ।
ते मनोमयनिर्दिष्टे विद्याद्वाङ्मनसे बुधः ॥
इतीममर्थञ्चोद्दिश्य श्लोकं श्रुतिरुदाहरत् ॥

Or, *śruti* has quoted this verse with a view to teach that the wise man should know that the *manomaya* is indicated by speech and mind, beyond whose reach nothing lies except Brahman which is free from blemish.

[306]

ब्रह्मणोऽनवरत्वात्तु नेह मन्त्राभिधेयता ।
वृत्तिप्रधानो वेदात्मा वृत्तिमान्स्यादथोत्तरः ॥

Since Brahman is the supreme, it is not referred to here by the *Mantra*. The *manomaya* which is in the form of

the Vedas is mainly composed of the mental modes. And the next one (viz., the *viññānamaya*) is the owner of the mental modes.

It should not be thought that this *Mantra* text *yato vāco nivartante* refers to the supreme Brahman. Considering the fact that the topic here deals with the *manomaya-kośa*, it has to be said that it describes the nature of the *manomaya-kośa*, and not that of the supreme Brahman. Further, it can be shown on several grounds that what is stated by the *Mantra* text holds good with regard to the *manomaya-kośa*. First of all, the mind does not need speech or other senses for its manifestation, since it is directly illumined by the Witness-consciousness. It means that the mind does not fall within the scope of speech. That is why it has been said *yato vāco nivartante*, whence all words turn back. Nor can it be said that the mind is grasped by itself. One and the same entity cannot at the same time be both the subject which knows and the object which is known. It is for this reason that the *Mantra* text says that the mind, too, turns back without reaching it (*apṛāpya manasā saha*). Thirdly, since the *Sūtrātman*, the cosmic being, is infinite, and since the mind is in essence identical with it, the word "Brahman" may be applied to *manas*. And lastly, a person who meditates on the *manomaya* as Brahman attains bliss which is Brahman as the fruit of the *upāsana*, dwells in the state of *Hiraṇyagarbha*, and is not subject to fear at any time. This is the meaning of the remaining part of the *Mantra* text *ānandaṁ brahmaṇo vidvān na bibhēti kadācana*. Therefore, the *Mantra* text quoted at the commencement of the fourth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad* deals with the *manomaya-kośa*.

The expression *vṛttimān* which occurs in the second line of the verse refers to the *viññānamaya-kośa*.

[307]

व्यवसायात्मिका बुद्धिर्वृत्तिमानित्युदीर्यते ।

यज्ञं तनुत इत्येतत्कर्तृत्वे सति युज्यते ॥

The intellect which is of the nature of certitude is said to be the *ṛttimān*, that which possesses the mental modes. The expression *yajñam tanute* is justifiable only if there is agency (for the *viññānu*).

Buddhi or the intellect is that mode of the internal organ which stands for certitude or determinative cognition (*vyavasāya*). The *viññānamaya-kośa* which is inward to the *manomaya-kośa* consists of *buddhi*, which is otherwise called *viññāna*, and the organs of knowledge. The word *viññāna* here does not mean the mental mode (*ṛtti*), but that which has the mental mode (*ṛttimān*). The *Upaniṣad* says in the sequel, "Intelligence actualises a sacrifice," (*viññānam yajñam tanute*). This statement will be intelligible only if *buddhi* or *viññāna* which carries the reflection of the consciousness is treated as an agent who performs a sacrifice.

[308]

आत्मचैतन्यरूपा धीः कर्त्र्यात्मा न ध्रुवत्वतः ।
यज्ञारम्भस्य हेतुत्वात्तदभावाद्वृथा यजिः ॥

The intellect which contains the semblance of the Knowledge-self is the agent; the Self is not the agent, because it is immutable. (The intellect must be regarded as the agent), because it is the cause of the commencement of a sacrificial rite, and in the absence of it no sacrificial rite would be possible.

The Self which is immutable cannot be the agent. But the intellect alone which is illumined by the consciousness is the agent (*kartā*) who performs *yajña*, etc. If it be said that the intellect, too, is not the agent, no sacrificial rite would be possible, for there is no other agent who could do it. It has, therefore, to be said that the intellect which carries the semblance of the consciousness is the agent, for it has the power of knowing and acting. It is this *viññāna* or *buddhi* which is commonly spoken of as "I" (*aham*). The first *upādhi* which limits as it were the transcendent Self in its transmigratory existence is *viññāna*. The next is

manas. And thereafter, there is *prāṇa*. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (IV, iv, 5) says: "That self (which transmigrates) is, indeed, Brahman identified with the intellect (*vijñānamaya*), the mind (*manomaya*), the vital force (*prāṇamaya*), etc.

[309]

श्रद्धाया उत्तमाङ्गत्वं स्मृतिरश्रद्धयेति च ॥

Faith is its head. The *smṛti* text beginning with "without faith" also emphasizes its pre-eminence.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* text *tasya śraddhāiva śīraḥ*. Head is considered to be the principal or the most important limb (*uttamāṅga*) among the human organs. It has already been stated that *vijñāna* stands for certitude, determinative cognition. So *vijñānamaya* is constituted by well-ascertained knowledge. Such a knowledge is necessary before one undertakes to do any course of action. In the case of a person who has well-ascertained knowledge, there arises first of all faith (*śraddhā*) with regard to the things to be done by him. Since faith is the first and primary factor with regard to any thing to be done, it is characterized as the head as it were of *vijñānamaya*. The importance of faith is well brought out in the *Gītā* (XVII, 28) when it says that "whatever is sacrificed, given, or done, and whatever austerity is practised, without faith (*aśraddhayā*) is called *asat*."

[310]

सत्यं हि श्रदिति प्राहुर्घत्ते धोः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।

तद्यतस्तां महात्मानः श्रद्धामित्यूचिरे धियम् ॥

Truth, indeed, is what is meant by *śrat*. Since the intellect holds the truth in it, the wise speak of the intellect as faith. (Or, by *śrat*, Brahman is meant.) The intellect holds it in the inward Self.

This verse explains the meaning of the word *śraddhā*. *Śrat* means truth, and *dhā* means to hold. *Śrat* may also mean Brahman which is

implied by the word *satyam*. The intellect which is purified by the practice of *sama*, etc., can hold the truth or know the inward Self as Brahman. Hence the intellect is referred to by the word *śraddhā*.

[311]

योगो युक्तिः समाधानमात्मा स्यात्तदुपाश्रयात् ।
श्रद्धादीनि यथोक्तार्थप्रतिपत्तिक्षमाणि च ॥

Yoga, which means concentration, composure, is the self, the central part of the body. By depending on it, *śraddhā*, etc., become fit for the acquisition of the knowledge of the real as stated.

Of the *viññānamaya-kōśa*, faith is said to be the head; righteousness (*ṛtam*) is the right wing; truth (*satyam*) is the left wing; concentration (*yoga*) is the self; *mahat* is the tail, the support.

The meanings of the words *ṛtam* and *satyam* have already been explained in verses (46) and (47) of the *Śikṣāvallī*.

The meaning of the word *yoga*, which is said to be the self of the *viññānamaya-kōśa*, is explained in this verse.

[312]

महत्तत्त्वं महो ग्राह्यं नीडं कार्यस्य तद्यतः ।
व्याचष्टे तन्महद्यक्षं श्रुतिः प्रथमजं तु यत् ॥

By the word *mahaḥ* that principle called *Mahat* must be understood, because it is the source of all effects. *Śruti* has explained it as great, adorable, and the first-born.

Mahat here refers to the *Sūtrātman*. The *śruti* text quoted in the second line of the verse is from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (V, iv, 1) which says: "He who knows this great, adorable, first-born (being) as the *Satya-Brahman*, conquers these worlds..." The *Sūtrātman* is called the great (*mahat*) because it is the cause or the source of all effects.

[313]

विज्ञानं तनुते यज्ञं कर्माण्यन्यानि यानि च ।
सर्वे च देवा विज्ञानं ब्रह्म ज्येष्ठमुपासते ॥

The person who has intelligence performs a sacrifice and also other deeds. All the gods meditate on intelligence as Brahman, the first-born.

The fifth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad* is now taken up for explanation from this verse onwards.

At the commencement of the fifth *anuvāka* there is the *Mantra* text which sets forth the nature of the *vijñānamaya-kośa* as taught in the *Brāhmaṇa* portion. This verse brings out the meaning of the first four sentences of the text.

[314]

परमेव हि तद्ब्रह्म बुद्धिकञ्चुकभृत्स्वयम् ।
घटादाविव विज्ञसौ धीरात्मानं ततोऽर्पयेत् ॥

It is, indeed, the supreme Brahman alone which has put on the garment of the intellect of its own accord. As in the case of pot and other objects, the intellect, then, should place itself in Brahman which is consciousness.

Brahman that is referred to here is the supreme Brahman as conditioned by the intellect (*buddhyuparaktabrahma*). The intellect illumines pot and other objects by assuming their form, by becoming one with them. In the same way, it causes the knowledge of Brahman by assuming the undifferentiated form of consciousness which is Brahman.

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अग्रजम्ब्रह्म विज्ञानं देवा अग्न्यादयः सदा ।
उपासते तदाप्त्यर्थं ते देवा इति च श्रुतिः ॥

Agni and other gods always meditate on Brahman, the first-born, which is conditioned by the intellect for the sake of attaining it. And the *śruti* text says: "The gods meditate (upon that immortal light of lights)."

The *śruti* text quoted in the verse is from the *Eṣhadāraṇyaka* (IV, iv, 16). It says: "He behind whom the year revolves with the days, on Him the gods meditate as the light of lights, as immortal time."

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यथोक्तेन प्रकारेण विज्ञानं ब्रह्म वेद चेत् ।
प्रमाद्यति न चेत्तास्मादुक्तकोशात्मशक्तिः ॥

If one meditates on Brahman as conditioned by the intellect in the specified manner, and if one does not deviate from the above mentioned self of the *viññānamaya-kośa*, (one's sins are destroyed).

Meditation on Brahman as conditioned by the intellect is conducive to two results — the destruction of sin (*pāpakṣaya*) and the fulfilment of all desires (*sarva-kāmāvṛpti*). A person who meditates on the *viññānaṁ brahma*, on Brahman in the *upādhi* of *viññāna*, should not at any time view the *annamaya*, etc., as Brahman. It means that such a person has overcome the false identification of the Self with the body which is the cause of all sins, and so he has destroyed all his sins.

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पाप्मनामाश्रयो यस्माद्रूपनामक्रियात्मकः ।
देहोऽतस्तत्प्रहाणेन हानिः स्यात्सर्वपाप्मनाम् ॥

Since the body which is made up of form, name, and action is the abode of all sins, the destruction of all sins takes place by abandoning it.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* text *śarīre pāpmano hitvā*.

The removal of cause brings about the removal of effect. If the body which is the cause of all sins is removed, it automatically results in the removal of all sins. "Abandoning all sins in the body" (*śarīre pāpmano hite*) means abandoning or leaving in the body itself all sins born of the body, all sins arising from the erroneous identification of the Self with the body. A person who constantly meditates on Brahman in the *upādhi* of *vijñāna* till his death and who has overcome the erroneous notions such as "I am a man," "I am the doer," "I am happy," is rid of all merit and demerit leading to the misery of future birth even as he remains in the body in this life.

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विज्ञानमहमस्मीति तावन्मात्राभिमान्यतः ।
शरीरे पाप्मनो हित्वा सर्वान्कामान्समश्नुते ॥

One who has merely the notion, "I am Brahman as conditioned by the intellect," fully attains all desires by abandoning all sins in the body.

The other result, viz., the fulfilment of all desires, which accrues to one who meditates on the *vijñānam brahma* is explained in this verse.

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अणिमादिगुणैश्वर्यो बुद्ध्यात्मा कार्यरूपिणः ।
कार्यं हि कारणव्याप्तमतः कामान्समश्नुते ॥

Having become Brahman as conditioned by the intellect, who is endowed with the divine powers like *animan*, etc., he fully attains all objects of desire which are effects, because the effect is pervaded by the cause.

Vijñānam brahma is the *Hiranyagarbha*, the cosmic being in its subtle aspect, which is all-pervasive and which is the cause of all fruits of

action (*sarva-karmaphala-kāraṇa*). When as a result of the meditation the devotee becomes one with the *Hiraṇyagarbha*, he fully enjoys all objects of desire.

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ज्ञानकर्मफलोपाधिविज्ञानमप्रत्यगात्मनः ।
आनन्दमय इत्यत्र भग्यते कर्तृशान्तये ॥

With a view to remove the idea of agency from the Self, *śruti* here speaks of the *ānandamaya* which is the semblance of the inward Self in the adjunct, viz., the intellect (which is in the form of joy), the fruit of meditation and action.

This verse sets forth the nature of the sheath made of bliss (*ānandamaya-kośa*).

Happiness, etc., are the fruit of meditation and action (*jñāna-karma-phalam*). The internal organ is the adjunct of the inward Self. When, carrying the reflection of the consciousness, it is in the form of joy, etc., it is called the *ānandamaya*.

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विज्ञानमयशब्देन कर्ता व्याख्यायि पूर्वया ।
तस्य प्रत्यक्तया चाथ श्रुत्या भोक्तोच्यतेऽधुना ॥

By the expression *vijñānamaya*, the self as the agent was described by the earlier *śruti* text. And now by the self which is inward to it, the enjoyer is spoken of by the *śruti* text.

The Self as identified with the *vijñāna* has been explained earlier as the agent (*kartā*). *Vijñāna* is the particular state of the internal organ formed of the cognizing principle and the *guṇa* of *rajas*. Identifying the Self with the *vijñāna*, a person thinks, "I am the agent." That is, he thinks of the Self as the agent. It is with a view to remove the notion

of agency from the Self that the *śruti* text beginning from *anyo'ntara* *ātmanā ānandamayaḥ* gives an account of the *ānandamaya-kosa*, which is inward to the *viśvānāmaya-kosa*, in its aspect as the enjoyer.

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शुद्धस्यापि स्वतो बुद्धौ प्रियाद्याकारतोदये ।
जायते तदुपाधित्वाद्भोक्तात्मा स्यादविद्यया ॥

Though pure by its very nature, when the form of joy and so on rises in the intellect, there takes place (the semblance of the consciousness therein). Because of the adjunct, the Self becomes an enjoyer through *avidyā*.

This verse explains how the Self comes to be viewed as an enjoyer (*bhoktā*), though it is neither an agent nor an enjoyer in itself.

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अपरे पण्डितं मन्याः परमेतस्प्रचक्षते ।
इहैवोपरमादूर्ध्वं भृगुश्च वरुणस्य च ॥

Others who consider themselves learned say that this (sheath of bliss) is the supreme Self, because in the sequel the knowledge realized by Bhṛgu and imparted by Varuṇa terminates here itself.

This verse as well as the next one states the view of the opponent who holds that the *ānandamaya* does not refer to the *jīva*, the semblance of the Self in the *upādhi* of the intellect, but to the supreme Brahman. The opponent seeks to defend his standpoint by focussing attention on what is said in the *Bhṛguvalli*. He says that what is discussed here in the *ānandamaya-kosa* of the *Brahmavallī* is again considered in the next chapter called the *Bhṛguvalli*. Bhṛgu requested his father Varuṇa to teach him Brahman. Varuṇa defined Brahman as that from which all beings are born, that by which they live, and that into which they finally merge. By practising concentration Bhṛgu first thought of food as

Brahman, and then one after another he thought of *prāṇa*, *manus*, and *viññāna* as Brahman. And finally he realized bliss (*ānanda*) as Brahman. Bhṛgu and Varuṇa closed their discussion at this stage. That is to say, the knowledge of Brahman imparted by Varuṇa and realized by Bhṛgu terminates in *ānanda*. If the *ānandamaya* does not stand for Brahman, then the instruction on Brahman contained in the *Bhṛguvallī* should not have ended with *ānanda*, but should have continued, argues the opponent, still further.

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अपि चानन्दरूपस्य ब्रह्मत्वम्बहुशः श्रुतम् ।
तथा चानन्दब्रह्मीति व्यपदेशोऽपि युज्यते ॥

Further, bliss is often declared in *śruti* to be of the nature of Brahman. And there is also the appropriateness of the name *Ānandavallī* (given to this chapter of the *Upa-
niṣad*).

The opponent adduces other reasons, too, in support of his view. The second chapter of the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* is called *Brahmavallī* or *Ānandavallī*. The name *Ānandavallī* is given to this chapter, because Brahman, which is bliss, is the principal theme taken up for discussion and elucidation in this chapter, and not the *jīva*. Further, that bliss is Brahman has been stated in many a *śruti* text. Consider, for instance, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, (III, ix, 28. 7), "Knowledge, bliss, is Brahman." The *Chāndogya* (VII, xxiii, 1) says, "That which is infinite is bliss." There is yet another reason. The suffix *mayā* in the expression *ānanda-
maya* has to be understood in the sense of abundance (*prācūryārtha*), and this interpretation which is quite tenable conveys the idea, according to the opponent, that Brahman is full of bliss.

The opponent's view is refuted in verses (325) to (341).

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कार्याधिकारगत्वात् नैतद्ब्रह्म परम्भवेत् ।
अज्ञादिमयवत्कार्यं स्यादानन्दमयोऽप्ययम् ॥

But this (*ānandamaya*) cannot be the supreme Brahman, because it occurs in the context of evolved principles. Like the *annamaya*, etc., this *ānandamaya* also is an effect.

The opponent's view is not acceptable. If we consider the context (*prakaraṇa*), it will be obvious that it deals with effects or evolved principles which have come into being through modifications. This is the case with regard to the *annamaya* and the other *kośas*. Each one of them is a conditioned self — the self in the *upādhi* of the physical body, or the vital force, or the mind, or the intellect. None of them should be identified with the supreme Brahman-Ātman. Since the *ānandamaya* occurs in the same context of evolved principles (*vikāra prakaraṇa*), it cannot be construed as the supreme Brahman.

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मयट् चात्र विकारार्थे यथैवान्नमयादिषु ।
वैरूप्यलक्षणो दोषः प्रायोऽर्थत्वे प्रसज्यते ॥

As in the case of the *annamaya*, etc., here also the suffix *mayat* is used in the sense of modification. The defect of (adopting) a different explanation will arise, if it is construed in the sense of abundance.

It is true that the suffix *mayat* is used in the sense of modification (*vikārārtha*) as well as in the sense of abundance (*prācurvārtha*). Though both the usages are permissive, we adopt here the former usage because of the context in which it occurs. Just as the suffix *mayat* is understood in the sense of modification in the case of the *annamaya* and other *kośas*, so also it has to be understood in the case of the *ānandamaya*. One is not at liberty to shift from the sense of modification to that of abundance in the same context just because such a change would support one's view. That the term *ānanda* stands for Brahman is not denied. But there is no justification for interpreting *ānandamaya* as Brahman.

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अपि सङ्क्रमणादस्य कार्यताध्यवसीयते ।
कार्यात्मनां हि सङ्क्रान्तिर्युज्यते कारणात्मनि ॥

Since (the *ānandamaya*) is also transcended, its being a modification is well-established. The transcending of effects in their cause is, indeed, appropriate.

There is also another reason to show that the *ānandamaya* is not the supreme Self. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* says in the sequel (II. viii, 5) that a person after departing from this world transcends the *annamaya*, the *prāṇamaya*, the *manomaya*, the *vijñānamaya*, and the *ānandamaya*. This transcending (*saṅkramaṇa*) is possible only in the case of what happens to be an effect or a modification. Further, only if there is a cause, the act of transcending, or passing from, the effect is tenable. It is well-known that an effect can pass into, or merge in, its cause. It means that there is something other than the *ānandamaya* which serves as its cause, support, or resting place. So it is not the *ānandamaya* that is Brāhman, but its support is Brahman.

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अत्ययो वाथ सम्प्राप्तिः सङ्क्रान्तिः स्यात्परात्मनः ।
नात्मत्वादात्मनः प्राप्तिस्तदु नात्येति कश्चन ॥

The *saṅkrānti* of the supreme Self must be either transcending it or attaining it. Since (the *jīva*) is the Self, there is no attainment of the Self. *Śruti* declares: "None ever transcends that (Brahman)."

If the *ānandamaya* is said to be the supreme Self, then what is the meaning of the word *saṅkrānti* which has been used in this context by *śruti*? It must mean either transcending it or attaining it. The former does not hold good, because no one, as stated in the *Kaṭha*

Upaniṣad (II, i, 9), can transcend the supreme Brahman. For one thing, the *jīva* is non-different from Brahman. One cannot transcend oneself. If so, how can the *jīva* transcend Brahman with which it is identical? Further, since Brahman is all-pervasive, it can never be transcended. It cannot be said that the word *saṅkrānti* has been used in the sense of attaining it. Since Brahman is non-different from the *jīva*, there is no attainment of it by the *jīva*. So when the *Upaniṣad* says in the sequel *etān ānandamayamātmanān upasaṅkrāmati*, it only refers to the conditioned self and not to the supreme Self inasmuch as *saṅkrānti* is not possible with regard to the latter.

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न चात्मना स्वमात्मानमुपसङ्क्रामतीश्वरः ।

नालं स्वस्कन्धमारोढुं निपुणोऽपीह साधकः ॥

Īśvara never passes into His own Self by Himself. No adept, however clever, is competent to mount upon his own shoulder.

The idea which is conveyed by these examples is that one can never transcend or attain one's Self (*svenaiva svasyātikramo vā prāptirvā na sambhavati*).

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शिरआद्याकृतेरत्र मूर्तामूर्ताद्यसम्भवात् ।

असम्भवः परे तत्त्वे नेति नेतीति शास्त्रतः ॥

Head and other forms are untenable in the supreme Being, since gross and subtle forms, etc., are impossible therein as stated by the *śruti* text, "not this, not this."

Here is another reason to show that the *ānandamaya* is not Brahman, the supreme Being. Since the *ānandamaya-kośa* is represented as possessing head and other limbs, it is *saviśeṣa*, a qualified or a differentiated

entity. But Brahman is *nirviśeṣa*, the undifferentiated Being. It is devoid of form and specification, free from attributes. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (II, iii, 6), "Not this, not this," denies not only the gross and subtle forms of Brahman, but also all specifications of it that one may think of. So the *ānandamaya* which is endowed with a certain form cannot be the supreme Self.

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अदृश्येऽनात्म्य इत्येवम्पूर्वोत्तरविरुद्धता ।

न स्यादाकारवत्त्वाद्धि अस्ति नास्तीति संशयः ॥

(Since Brahman will be described in the sequel as) imperceptible, incorporeal, there will be contradiction between the earlier and later statements, (if the *ānandamaya* is explained as Brahman). Since the *ānandamaya* has form, there can be no doubt whether it exists or not.

This verse adduces two other reasons to show that the *ānandamaya* is not Brahman.

If the *ānandamaya* which is described here as having a definite form is interpreted as Brahman, it will contradict a subsequent text occurring in the seventh *anuvāka* (II, vii) which says that Brahman is imperceptible, incorporeal, inexpressible, etc. If Brahman has a definite form, it should not be described as imperceptible (*adr̥śya*), incorporeal (*anātmya*), inexpressible (*anirukta*). If, on the other hand, Brahman is imperceptible and so on, then it should not be thought of as having a definite form possessing head and other limbs.

There is also another point to be considered here. In a subsequent section of this *Upaniṣad* (II, vi) there is the *Mantra* text which refers to the possibility of doubt with regard to the existence of Brahman. If Brahman were identical with the *ānandamaya* which is endowed with head and other limbs, there cannot be any room for doubt whether it exists or not. In view of the fact that this possibility of doubt with

regard to Brahman is admitted, the *ānandamaya* which is *savišeṣa* and which is immediately experienced cannot be the supreme Brahman.

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कार्यात्मायमतो ब्राह्मो यथोक्तन्यायगौरवात् ।
भृगोरुपरमाच्चेति कार्यात्मत्वेऽपि युज्यते ॥

So this (*ānandamaya*) must be understood as the conditioned self because of the weighty reasons mentioned above. Bhṛgu's closing (of the investigation with *ānanda*) stated earlier is appropriate even if it (i. e., *ānanda*) is taken as the conditioned self.

One of the reasons given by the opponent in verse (323) with a view to show that the *ānandamaya* is Brahman was that Bhṛgu closed his investigation with *ānanda*. Had it been the conditioned self, he would not have stopped with that, but would have proceeded further in his investigation, because his goal was Brahman. Inasmuch as he stopped his investigation with *ānanda*, the fifth in the series, the latter must be the supreme Brahman. And it would follow, according to the opponent, that the *ānandamaya* also, which is the fifth in the series here, is the supreme Brahman.

The second line of the verse refutes the argument stated above. The question to be considered is whether *ānanda* here stands for the supreme Self or the conditioned self. Even if it is assumed as the conditioned self (*kāryātmā*), it is possible for us to justify why the instruction given by Varuṇa and the investigation pursued by Bhṛgu stopped with *ānanda*. This will be explained in the subsequent verses.

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आनन्दवल्लयां ब्रह्मोक्तं तदुपायविधिस्तथा ।
अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेत्यवोचद्वरुणभृगुः ॥

Brahman is (first) described in the *Ānandavallī*. And with a desire to teach the means of realizing it, *śruti* makes Bṛgu ask Varuṇa: "Revered sir, instruct me about Brahman."

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व्याख्यातत्वादुपेयस्य ह्युपायोऽत्रावशिष्यते ।

उपायः कोशः पञ्चापि यस्मात्तैस्तम्प्रपद्यते ॥

Since the end, viz., Brahman, has already been explained, the means thereto, indeed, remains to be taught. And the five sheaths are the means, because through them it is attained.

The nature of Brahman-Ātman has already been stated at the commencement of the second chapter called the *Brahmavallī*, also known as the *Ānandavallī*. The knower of Brahman, it was declared by *śruti*, attains the highest. *Śruti* also defined Brahman as the real, knowledge, and infinite. After defining Brahman, it proceeded to indicate its location by saying that Brahman exists in the intellect. So what remains to be taught is the means (*sādhana*) through which the end, viz., the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman, is to be attained. The next chapter called the *Bṛguvallī* is intended for giving instruction on the five sheaths which are the means to Brahman-knowledge.

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अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां कोशैरात्मसमीक्षणम् ।

क्रियते हि यतस्तेषामुपायत्वम्प्रतीयते ॥

Since the realization of the Self is, indeed, brought about by the sheaths through the method of agreement and difference, they are regarded as the means thereto.

While the *Brahmavallī* teaches the end to be attained, the *Bhṛguvallī* sets forth the nature of the sheaths as the means thereto. That is the real which is uniformly present in all things. What is present in some objects and absent in others cannot be the real. One must inquire into the nature of the five sheaths in terms of these principles with a view to find out that factor which is uniformly present (*anvaya*) in them as distinguished from that which is present in some and absent in others (*vyatireka*). It has already been stated that these five sheaths are related as cause and effect, and that what is considered to be an effect is not different from its cause. While the cause is present in its effect, we cannot reverse this relation and say that the effect is present in its cause. Though the *prāṇamaya* is the cause of the *annamaya*, it is in its turn the effect of the *manomaya*. Though the *vijñānamaya* is the cause of the *manomaya*, it is in its turn the effect of the *ānandamaya*. It is Brahman which is the cause, the support, of the *ānandamaya*. Applying the principles of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* it has to be said that none of the sheaths is ultimately real, for all of them are evolved principles. When Bhṛgu came to the *ānanda*, the fifth step in the series (*pañcamaparyāya*), he stopped his investigation with that, realizing that Brahman is the cause or the support of the *ānanda*. The five sheaths from the *anna* to the *ānanda* constitute the means for realizing Brahman. The *ānanda* with which Bhṛgu stopped does not stand for the supreme Brahman, but only for the *ānandamaya-kośa*. It is, therefore, wrong to argue that the *ānandamaya* in the *Brahmavallī* refers to the supreme Brahman on the supposition that the *ānanda* in the *Bhṛguvallī* refers to Brahman.

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स्वातन्त्र्यं यत्र कर्तुः स्यात्तत्रैवासौ नियुज्यते ।

फलं कर्त्रनधीनत्वात्सम्बन्धायैव शस्यते ॥

A person can be commanded to do only that thing in respect of which he has freedom of will. Since the fruit

(viz., Brahman-knowledge) is not dependent on the will of the agent, only the relation (between the means and the end) is made known.

It may be argued that the *Bhṛguvallī* does not enjoin the investigation of the means through the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. On the contrary, it enjoins Brahman-knowledge which is to be attained. This is obvious from the *śruti* statement, "He knew bliss as Brahman." (*ānando brahmeti vyajāñāt*). That is to say, the purport of *śruti* here is in the injunction of Brahman-knowledge and not in the means thereto. If this be not the case, so the critic argues, why should it be said even at the commencement of the *Ānandavallī* that the knower of Brahman attains the highest?

This argument is not satisfactory as it fails to understand the scope of an injunction. A person can be commanded to do only that thing which is dependent on his will, which falls within the scope of his actions and in respect of which he has freedom of will. Man has the "liberty of indifference" in respect of that which is dependent entirely on his will, for he has the freedom in this case to do, or not to do, or do it differently. It is open to an individual to do a certain action, or not to do it, or do it differently. But there is nothing to be done by him in respect of the end or fruit (*phalam*). This is the case whether we take into consideration an end like heaven (*svarga*) or Brahman-knowledge. Since the performance of a scriptural rite falls within the scope of the will of the individual, it is intelligible to say that there is injunction thereto, but there can be no injunction with regard to heaven. Further, knowledge is object-dependent and not person-dependent, and so Brahman-knowledge does not fall within the scope of an injunction. The work of *śruti* comes to an end as soon as it reveals the means-end relation — that understanding the nature of the sheaths through the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* is the means, and that the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman is the end. This is how the relation between Bhṛgu's investigation contained in the *Bhṛguvallī* and the opening statement in the *Brahmavallī* has to be understood.

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पञ्च कोशानतस्तस्मै वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्ताये ।

स्वतः प्रसिद्धेः शेषस्य ह्युपरेमे भृगुस्ततः ॥

So, the five sheaths were taught to him (by Varuṇa) as the means of comprehending Brahman-knowledge conveyed by the *śruti* text. Thereafter, Bhṛgu stopped his investigation (with *ānanda*), since the remainder, viz., Brahman knowledge, takes place of its own accord (from the text itself).

When Bhṛgu realized that the five sheaths are not-Self and that Brahman is the support of the *ānandamāyā-kōśa*, he stopped his investigation with *ānanda*. When he was able to discriminate the Self from the not-Self, the knowledge of the supreme Self flashed to him from the *śruti* text itself independently of any injunction.

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ब्रह्मतानन्दरूपस्य केन वा प्रतिषिध्यते ।

निरस्ताशेषभेदस्य रूपं तत्परमात्मनः ॥

Who can deny that bliss is of the nature of Brahman? That bliss which is free from all difference constitutes the nature of the supreme Self.

It was argued earlier that the term *ānanda* as used in the text, "He knew bliss as Brahman," (*ānando brahmeti vyajānāt*) could be interpreted as referring to the conditioned self and not to the supreme Brahman. Even if it is explained as standing for the supreme Brahman, there is no inconsistency. This explanation also is tenable, because *ānanda* by its very nature is free from differentiating characteristics such as joy, enjoyment, and the like, which are mentioned as limbs of the *ānandamāya-kōśa*. Though it is quite justifiable to explain *ānanda* as Brahman, we cannot say that the *ānandamāya* is Brahman. It is true that, just as the *ānandamāya* is the fifth in the series, the *ānanda* spoken of in the

Bhṛguvallī is also fifth in the series. But it is no argument to say that because of the fifth place (*sthāna*) the *ānanda* must be construed, like the *ānandamaya-kośa*, as the conditioned self. *Śruti* specifically declares here that Bhṛgu knew bliss as Brahman. Of *śruti* and *sthāna*, the former is more authoritative than the latter. So the *ānanda* spoken of in the *Bhṛguvallī* stands for Brahman.

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प्रियाद्यानन्दरूपाणां भेदो यत्र निवर्तते ।
अमनोविषयेऽत्यन्तं तमानन्दम्प्रचक्ष्महे ॥

That we call bliss which is not comprehended by mind and in which the distinctions of the forms of happiness such as joy and so on are completely absent.

Since *ānanda* is free from specifications and distinctive forms, it is *nirviśeṣa* and is identical with the supreme Brahman.

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कोशपञ्चक एतस्मिन्निषिद्धेऽज्ञानहेतुके ।
नानन्दमयता न्याय्या धियां वाचामगोचरे ॥

Since the five sheaths are excluded from this bliss as having their origin in *avidyā*, the bliss which is not comprehended by mind and speech should not be construed as of the nature of the *ānandamaya*.

Just because *ānanda* comes as the fifth in the series after *vijñāna*, it should not be construed as *ānandamaya* following the pattern of the series of the sheaths stated in the *Brahmavallī*. When we explain the *ānanda* spoken of in the *Bhṛguvallī* as Brahman, we give priority to the *śruti* declaration and not to *sthāna*. But the *ānandamaya* is not Brahman.

It must be borne in mind that there is a close parallelism between the *Brahmavallī* and the *Bhṛguvallī* in respect of the discussion of the

sheaths with a view to set forth the nature of Brahman. In the *Brahma-vallī* the emphasis of the fifth *paryāya* is on Brahman and not on the *ānandamaya*. Similarly in the *Bhṛguvallī*, Brahman is straightaway mentioned as *ānanda* immediately after *vijñānamaya*, and so it must be understood that the fifth *kośa*, though not stated explicitly, is implied.

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परानन्दस्वभावेन पूर्णा ह्यन्नमयादयः ।
कार्यात्मानोऽपि तद्धेतोरानन्दमयता भवेत् ॥

Just as the *annamaya* and other sheaths which are effects are also filled by Brahman which is of the nature of bliss, so also the *ānandamaya*, for the same reason, is filled by Brahman.

The sheath of bliss is on a par with the other four sheaths which are effects or evolved principles. Just as Brahman constitutes the essence or the self of the other sheaths, so also it constitutes the essence or the self of the sheath of bliss, because it is also an effect like the other four sheaths. That Brahman is the cause, the support, which permeates the *ānandamaya* is brought out by the *śruti* text *brahma pucchaṃ pratiṣṭhā*. So the *ānandamaya* is not Brahman, but only the conditioned self.

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तस्माज्ज्ञानक्रियाकार्यं प्रियाद्यारक्तबुद्धिगम् ।
आनन्दमयमात्मानं श्रुतिः सोपाधिकज्जगौ ॥

So, *śruti* has spoken of the self formed of bliss which is associated with the adjunct, viz., the intellect, the latter manifesting itself in the form of joy, etc., which are the result of meditation and action.

Three points are emphasized in this verse. First of all, the self formed of bliss is the conditioned self with *buddhi* as its *upādhi*. Second,

the intellect which carries the reflection of the consciousness has assumed the form of joy, etc. Third, the manifestation of the different forms such as joy is due to the *upāsanā* and *karma*, performed in the previous life.

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प्रियादिवासनारूपो ह्यानन्दमय ईक्ष्यते ।
विज्ञानमयसंस्थे यः स्वप्ने वै स्वप्नदर्शिभिः ॥

The *ānandamaya* which is formed of the latent impressions of joy and other forms is seen, indeed, in dream, which is located in the *viññānamaya*, by those who have dream experience.

The self formed of bliss presents itself to consciousness in the state of dream. Since it is perceived by the Witness-consciousness in dream, it cannot be the supreme Self.

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पुत्रादिविषया प्रीतिर्वासना शिर उच्यते ।
प्रियलाभनिमित्तोत्थो हर्षो मोदः प्रकीर्तितः ॥
प्रकर्षगुणसंयुक्तः प्रमोदः स्यात्स एव तु ।
सुखसामान्यमात्मा स्यादानन्दो भेदसंश्रयात् ॥

Joy which is revived by the latent impressions in respect of objects such as a son is said to be the head (of the *ānandamaya*). The exultation which arises consequent on the acquisition of a desired object is called enjoyment. The same exultation alone is known as exhilaration when it is in association with the best qualities. Bliss, which is happiness in general, is the self (i.e., the middle part), since it is the basis of the different forms of happiness.

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उत्कृष्यमाण आनन्दो निष्ठां यत्राधिगच्छति ।
तदेकं सकलं ब्रह्म पुच्छं सर्वाश्रयत्वतः ॥

That one, all-pervasive Brahman, wherein the ever-increasing bliss reaches the end, is the tail, since it is the support of all.

This verse explains the meaning of the text *brahma puccham prati-
ṣṭhā*.

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आनन्दः पर एवात्मा भेदसंसर्गवर्जितः ।
स एव सुखरूपेण व्यज्यते पुण्यकर्मभिः ॥

Bliss which is free from the association of diversity is the supreme Self. It alone is manifested in the form of happiness by good deeds.

Whatever happiness a person experiences is the result of the good deeds which he has performed. And this happiness is not unsurpassable. It is not the highest. But the highest bliss which is free from all distinctions and which is identical with the supreme Self is unsurpassable (*niratisaya*). But this does not mean that the former, that is, the happiness which is surpassable (*sūtisaya*), is different from the latter, the supreme bliss which is unsurpassable (*niratisaya*). It is the highest bliss which manifests itself in the different forms of happiness such as joy, enjoyment and so on, assumed by the mind due to the past good deeds in the presence of objects such as a son, a friend, and the like.

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यावद्यावत्तामोऽपैति बुद्धौ धर्मसमाहृतम् ।
तावत्तावद्धियः स्वास्थ्यं तावत्तावत्सुखोन्नतिः ॥

Due to the action of *dharma*, as darkness vanishes from the intellect more and more, the intellect becomes tranquil more and more, and happiness also becomes more and more excellent.

The mind becomes tranquil when it is freed from darkness (*tamas*). The practice of austerities, meditation, continence, and faith make the mind pure, placid, and tranquil. The more the mind is purified, the greater is the happiness that is experienced.

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तारतम्यं सुखस्यापि वैचित्र्यादुपपद्यते ।
पुण्यस्य कर्मणस्तस्मादात्मैवानन्द उच्यते ॥

तस्मात्कामादिहानेन ह्युत्तरोत्तरवृद्धिः ।
श्रोत्रियस्येति वाक्येन काष्ठानन्दस्य भण्यते ॥

The gradations of happiness are justifiable because of the variety of the good deeds (which evoked them). So the Self itself is bliss. The acme of the happiness which increases progressively due to the destruction of desire, etc., is stated (in the sequel) by the *śruti* text, "Of the man versed in the Vedas..."

The highest bliss is no other than the supreme Self. The *jīva* in its essential nature is non-different from the supreme Brahman-Ātman. A person who knows Brahman enjoys the highest bliss, that is to say, remains as Brahman which is bliss, since he is free from all desires. This idea will be stated in the sequel when the *Upaniṣad* (II, viii) refers to a hierarchy of happiness all of which falls within the scope of a person who is well-versed in the Vedas and who is not smitten by desires (*śrotriyaśya*, *akāmahatasya*). Freedom from desire is the pre-eminent condition for the attainment of the highest bliss which is Brahman.

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तत्रैतस्मिन्यथोक्तेऽर्थे श्लोकोऽप्युच्चैर्निगद्यते ।
मन्त्रद्वारेण वाक्यार्थं कथं नाम प्रपत्स्यते ॥

With regard to the teaching as stated above (in the *Brāhmaṇa* portion), the (following) verse is also uttered with a view to make clear the meaning of the statement through the *Mantra* text in the way it can be understood.

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असत्समोऽसौ भवति योऽसद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् ।
अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद सन्तं तम्ब्राह्मणा विदुः ॥

If a person knows Brahman to be non-existing, he becomes equal to the non-existent. But if he knows that Brahman exists, the knowers of Brahman know him as existing.

Verses (352) to (414) deal with the sixth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad*.

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सदप्यात्मस्वरूपेण ब्रह्मासदिति वेद चेत् ।
सोऽसन्नेवेह भवति कोशात्मत्वाभिमानभाक् ॥

If a person who identifies himself with the sheaths thinks that Brahman is non-existent, even though it exists in the form of the Self, he surely becomes non-existent here (in this world).

One who knows Brahman as other than the sheaths does really exist; but one who identifies himself with the sheaths and thinks that there is no such thing as Brahman other than the sheaths does not really exist.

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न हि कोशात्मना सत्त्वमृते ब्रह्म समश्नुते !
कुतः सर्पात्मना सत्त्वमृते रज्जुं सदात्मिकाम् ॥

Without Brahman the *jīva* cannot exist in the form of the sheath. How can the (illusory) serpent have a being without the rope which is existent?

The rope is the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for the appearance of the snake. But for the rope, the illusory serpent cannot come into existence. In the same way, Brahman is the substratum for the appearance of the sheaths which are illusory. In the absence of Brahman, one cannot think of the existence of the sheaths. The idea which is sought to be conveyed here is that no illusion can arise without a substratum which is real (*adhiṣṭhānam vinā bhrānterasambhava iti bhūvaḥ*).

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असद्ब्रह्मः खलु कोशेभ्यः सदेकम्ब्रह्म वेद चेत् ।
दृशे रूपान्तरासत्त्वात्सन्तं तम्ब्राह्मणा विदुः ॥

If a person knows Brahman which is one and existent as, indeed, different from the sheaths which are non-existent, the knowers of Brahman think of him as existing, since there is no other form to the Self (than that of Brahman).

The Self which is consciousness is not different from Brahman. Distinguishing the Self from the sheaths which are not-Self, if a person realizes the Self which is real, one, and non-dual, he is, indeed, existing, for he is one with the Self.

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यस्मादेवमतो हित्वा कोशानज्ञानकल्पितान् ।
निर्विकारमनाद्यन्तं परमात्मानमाश्रयेत् ॥

Such being the case, one should resort to the supreme Self which is free from change and which has neither a beginning nor an end by abandoning the sheaths which are set up by ignorance.

The Self is real, being identical with the supreme Brahman. The sheaths which are products of *avidyā* are not real. So by attaining the discriminating knowledge, the seeker after liberation must abandon the sheaths and realize the supreme Brahman which is no other than the inward Self.

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यतः कोशातिरेकेण नासत्त्वं त्रिद्यते परम् ।
मृत्युर्वा असदित्येवं घटते श्रुत्युदीरणम् ॥

Inasmuch as there is no other non-being than the sheaths, the scriptural declaration, "Death, verily, is the non-being," is thus appropriate.

It was stated earlier that if a person identifies himself with the sheaths he becomes non-existent; if, on the contrary, he identifies himself with the supreme Self, he is existent. Could it not be said, it may be argued, that a person is non-existent, even in the form of the Self? The answer is: no. The *jīva* is non-existent only in the form of *kośas* and not in the form of Brahman-Ātman, for there is no non-being other than the *kośas*. In other words, if the *jīva* were to be non-existent, it must be only in the form of the sheaths. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (I, iii, 28) is cited in the verse in support of this view. In this *śruti* text *mṛtyurvā asat*, the word *mṛtyu* refers to the five *kośas*. Since the five sheaths alone are non-being, the *jīva* who identifies himself with the sheaths is non-being or non-existent.

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अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्यः सदेवेति च शासनम् ।
ब्रह्मात्मव्यतिरेकेण सत्त्वमन्यत्र दुर्लभम् ॥

There are also *śruti* declarations: "The Self is to be realized as existing," and "Being alone (was in the beginning)." It is impossible to have being anywhere except in Brahman-Ātman.

Two *śruti* texts are quoted in the verse in support of the view that the *jīva* in the form of Brahman-Ātman has being. The first text is from the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, II, iii, 13, while the other passage is from the *Chāndogya*, VI, ii, 1.

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तस्यैव एव शरीरो योऽशरीरः सदेकलः ।

आनन्दान्तस्य पूर्वस्य ह्यात्मा नात्मवतः परः ॥

That one which has no body, which is existent and non-dual, is the embodied Self, indeed, of all the preceding sheaths ending with the sheath of bliss. There is no other Self than this.

The *śruti* text *tasyaiṣa eva śarīra ātmā* which occurs in this *anuvāka* must be explained in the same way as it was explained earlier. The non-dual Brahman-Ātman alone is the Self, in the real sense of the term, of all the sheaths including the *ānandamaya*. See verses (284) and (285).

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उक्तम्ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परं नाज्ञोऽसदाश्रयः ।

इत्यस्य निर्णयार्थाय परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥

The following portion (of the *Upaniṣad*) is begun with a view to establish what was said earlier, viz., that the knower of Brahman attains the highest, but not the ignorant man who resorts to the non-existent.

This verse explains the purport of the discussion which follows in the sequel beginning from the *śruti* text *athāto'nuprasnāḥ*.

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साधारणम्परं ब्रह्म विदुषोऽविदुषश्च चेत् ।

प्राप्त्यप्राप्ती समे स्यातां नियमे हेत्वसम्भवात् ॥

If the supreme Brahman is common to the wise and the ignorant alike, then attainment as well as non-attainment (of Brahman) must be equal to both of them, because there is no reason for restriction.

Who is it that reaches Brahman — a man of knowledge or an ignorant man? If a man of knowledge and an ignorant man are of the nature of Brahman, then both of them, it may be argued, attain Brahman. If this be not the case, the other alternative will be that neither attains Brahman. If so, there is no justification to make a distinction between the two and say that only an enlightened man attains Brahman. The purport of the sequel, first of all, is to show that a man of knowledge alone attains Brahman,

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कार्यमात्रावबद्धान्तःकरणत्वात्तान्स्विनः ।

न शक्यास्तीति धीः कर्तुं स्वतःसिद्धात्मवस्तुनि ॥

अतोऽस्यास्तित्वसिद्ध्यर्थं कल्पनातीतरूपिणः ॥

Since the mind of an ignorant person is confined to the mere products (viz., the five sheaths), he is not able to know the existence of the Self, even though it is eternal. Hence, (the aim of the sequel is) to prove the existence of the Self which is beyond our imagination.

An ignorant man who identifies himself with the kośas is not able to know the existence of Brahman-Ātman which is beyond the kośas. He doubts the existence of Brahman though it is ever-existent. The sequel is intended to answer the doubt whether Brahman exists or not and also to answer the two questions that follow in respect of the man of knowledge and the ignorant man.

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अथात इत्यनुप्रश्ना वक्ष्यन्ते निर्णयार्थिनः ॥

In the text *athāta* the questions of one who wishes to determine the final view will be stated.

The disciple first of all receives the instruction from the teacher. He is told: "If anyone knows Brahman as non-existing, he himself becomes non-existent. If anyone knows that Brahman exists, then the wise think of him as existing." After getting the instruction from the teacher, the disciple asks certain questions with a view to clarifying his doubts. He does not accept the teaching blindly without reflection. The hearing (*śravaṇa*) of the instruction is followed by rational reflection (*manana*) thereon. The *śruti* text, "Then, therefore, follow these questions," (*athāto'nupraśnāḥ*) refers to the questions raised by the disciple after receiving the instruction from the teacher.

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अथानन्तरमस्यैव साधारण्याप्रमेयतः ।

आचार्योक्तिमनुप्रश्नाः शिष्यस्य गुरुसन्निधौ ॥

Then, that is, after hearing from the teacher, questions of the disciple raised in the presence of the teacher follow immediately after the teacher's instruction, because Brahman is common (to the man of knowledge and the ignorant man alike) and also because Brahman is unknowable.

This verse explains the meanings of the words contained in the *śruti* text *athāto'nupraśnāḥ*.

The word *atha* means after hearing from the teacher that the knowledge of the non-difference between Brahman and Ātman is fruitful.

The disciple seeks clarification from the teacher because of two difficulties he has. The knower of Brahman, he was told, attains the Supreme which is the source of all beings, which is the essence of all.

It means that Brahman which constitutes the nature or the essence of all is common to both the man of knowledge and the ignorant man. It would follow from this that the attainment of Brahman must be possible for both. If so, why should it be said that the knower of Brahman alone attains the supreme Brahman? Further, since Brahman is unknowable, how could one talk about the knower of Brahman? In view of these difficulties the disciple raises certain questions following upon the teacher's exposition. The word *atah*, which means therefore, states the reasons for the doubts on the part of the disciple.

Anuprasnāḥ means questions after what the teacher has spoken.

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अप्यविद्वानमुं लोकम्प्रेत्य कश्चित्समश्नुते ।
न चेदविद्वानाप्नोति विद्वानेतीति का प्रमा ॥
स्यान्न वेत्यपरः प्रश्नस्त्रित्वाद्धि बहुवागियम् ॥

Does any one who is ignorant, after departing from here, attain the yonder world? If it be said that an ignorant man does not attain it, what is the evidence for saying that an enlightened man attains it? Whether Brahman exists or not is yet another question. Since there are three questions, there is the usage of the plural number (in *anuprasnāḥ*).

The *śruti* text as it is contains only two questions, viz., (1) Does any ignorant man, after departing from here, go to the other world? and (2) Does any man of knowledge, after departing from here, go to the other world? But in view of the plural number of the word *praśna* contained in the *śruti* text, the questions, though apparently only two, have to be re-formulated bringing out the implications in such a way as to justify the plural usage of the word *praśna*. This can be done in two ways. The question relating to the ignorant man is not really one, but two — (1) Does an ignorant man, after departing from here, attain the supreme Brahman? (2) Or, does he not? The latter follows by implication from the first. Similarly, the question relating to the

man of knowledge is not one, but two. The two questions are: (1) Does the man of knowledge, after departing from here, attain the supreme Brahman? (2) Or, does he not? There are, on the whole, four questions, and so the plural usage of the word *praśna* is justified. This is one interpretation offered by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *śruti* text.

Śaṅkara gives an alternative interpretation which is followed by Sureśvara here. There are, on the whole, only three questions — the first question relating to the ignorant man, the second one with regard to the man of knowledge, and the third one which is implied relating to the existence of Brahman. It is but proper on the part of the disciple to raise the third question; for, from the expressions “one who knows Brahman as non-existing” and “one who knows Brahman as existing”, the doubt arises whether Brahman exists or not.

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प्लुतिश्चात्र विचारार्था विचार्य वस्त्वदं यतः
एतेषां खलु चोद्यानामुत्तारार्थोत्तरा श्रुतिः ॥

The extended pronunciation here is to show that it is what is to be inquired into, because this subject is worthy of investigation. The subsequent *śruti* texts are, indeed, by way of answer to these questions.

Pluti means prolation, protracted pronunciation of a vowel. There is the sign indicating extended pronunciation at the end of the text *kaścana gaṇhati*, as also at the end of the text *kaścitsamaśnutā*.

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द्वयोः सद्भावपूर्वत्वादस्तित्वं तावदुच्यते ॥

As the other two questions presuppose the existence (of Brahman), the existence (of Brahman) is first of all spoken of (by *śruti*).

Of the three questions mentioned above, the last question relating to the existence of Brahman is taken up first of all, as the other two questions, viz., whether an ignorant man attains Brahman or not and whether an enlightened man attains Brahman or not, presuppose the existence of Brahman. Only if it is proved that Brahman exists, it will be proper to raise the questions about its attainment or non-attainment.

The question whether Brahman exists or not is discussed in verses (368) to (434).

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घटाङ्कुरादि यत्कार्यं दृष्टं सत्कारणं हि तत् ।
आकाशादि च नः कार्यं तदप्येवं प्रतीयताम् ॥

It is seen that a pot, a sprout, and other objects which are effects have an existent thing as their cause. Ether, etc., are also effects, according to us. And so these must also be understood in the same way (as having an existent thing as their cause).

The existence of Brahman is sought to be proved by means of an inference as follows: Ether and other objects must have a cause, because they are effects like a pot, and every effect has a cause. It is not enough to say that ether and other objects as effects require a cause. But it is necessary to identify it. The cause of ether, etc., cannot be a finite entity limited by space, time, and other objects, by virtue of its being their cause, and so it cannot be anything other than Brahman which is infinite in the real sense of the term.

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असत्तश्चेदिदं कार्यं सर्वं स्यादसदन्वितम् ।
असतः कारणत्वं च निरात्मत्वान्न सिद्ध्यति ॥

If all this is the effect of non-being, it would likewise be non-being. And non-being cannot be a cause, because it has no reality.

It cannot be argued that non-being is the cause of the world, and not Brahman. Non-being cannot be the cause of the world which is something positive, for it has no existence or reality (*nirātmatvāt*). Further, cause is always prior to the effect in point of time. This is not possible in the case of non-being which is void (*śūnya*). That is why the *Chāndogya* text (VI, ii, 2) says: "How could being be produced from non-being?" Since the creation of something out of nothing is impossible, non-being cannot be the cause of the world.

[370]

ध्रुवः सन्कुरुते कार्यमयस्कान्तो मणिर्यथा !
कारणत्वं भवेदेवं कुर्वतोऽतिशयः कुतः ॥

Just as a magnet, remaining immutable, can produce an effect, so also Brahman (though immutable) may be the cause. If the cause be ever active, where is room for anything new?

It may be argued that Brahman which is immutable cannot be the cause of the world, for a cause must undergo modification, and what is immutable cannot be a cause. Clay, for instance, gives rise to a pot only through the modification of its state. Again, a seed is the cause of the sprout only through the transformation which it undergoes. If Brahman is immutable (*kūṭastha*), it cannot be the cause of the world.

This argument is untenable. Consider the case of a piece of magnet which is the cause of the movement of the iron filings, though it remains all the time immutable. Similarly Brahman, though immutable, may nevertheless be the cause of the world.

A thing which is immutable, it may be urged by the critic, cannot be the cause. A cause is that which is fit enough to do an action; and an object which is professedly immutable cannot be a cause. So, what is active and thereby brings about an effect cannot be immutable, and what is immutable cannot be a cause.

This argument will not do. Is it the case that the cause is ever active and brings about the effect all the time? If the cause is ever active (*sadākurvaccetkāraṇam*), then it is of the same nature for ever; and what remains the same for ever is, indeed, immutable. Thus a thing which is immutable must be said to be a cause. Further, if the cause of the world is ever active, there must be creation all the time with the result that there cannot be any such thing as dissolution. If, on the contrary, it be said that a cause is active only on particular occasions (*kadācitkurvaccetkāraṇam*), even then what is inactive or immutable is the cause, for it is admitted that it must have been inactive or immutable before it became active. The state of inactivity must have preceded the state of activity. The former is the cause of the latter. It follows, therefore, that what is immutable or inactive is the cause. If so, Brahman which is immutable can be the cause of the world.

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साविद्यः प्रत्यगात्मा यो वियद्योनिः पुरोदितः ।

सोऽकामयत नाविद्यां विना कामोऽस्ति कस्यचित् ॥

It is the same inward Self, which is associated with *avidyā* and which was spoken of before as the cause of ether, that desired. Without *avidyā* desire cannot arise in any being.

It is not pure Brahman, but Brahman in association with *māyā* which is said to be the cause of the world. There is no room for the objection that Brahman which is said to be the cause must be insentient like clay and other objects which are causes. Since *śruti* says that "He desired" (*so'kāmayata*), Brahman cannot be insentient. An insentient object cannot have desires, and one who has desires cannot be insentient.

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अलातस्यैकरूपस्य वैश्वरूप्यं यथान्यतः ।

रूपाभिधानभ्रान्त्युत्था बहुतेयम्परात्मनः ॥

प्रजायेयेत्यतो वक्ति नामरूपात्मना प्रभुः ॥

Just as a firebrand, while remaining of one shape, appears in different forms due to other causes, so also the plurality of forms of the supreme Self is due to the illusion of name and form. Hence, the Lord says, "Let me be born," through the manifestation of name and form.

Just as Brahman is said to have desires only through *māyā*, so also it puts on a plurality of forms only through *māyā*. The desires of Brahman are nothing but the transformations of *māyā* (*māyāśaktireva kāmānūkāreṇa vikriyāṃśpadyate*). The world of name and form is a product of *avidyā*. Though Brahman is partless, one, and non-dual, it appears as many through the illusory name and form projected by *avidyā*. The example of a firebrand is given in order to drive home this idea. If a firebrand is moved swiftly, it makes a circle, a straight line, or a crooked line depending upon the nature of the movement. But when it is not in motion, it does not take any form, straight or crooked, but remains just a burning faggot. So it puts on different forms due to other causes, viz., the kind of motion that is involved. Similarly, Brahman which is pure undifferentiated consciousness appears as the world of name and form through *avidyā*. The following passage from the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* (IV, 47-48) is relevant in this context: "As a firebrand, when set in motion, appears as straight, crooked, etc., so also consciousness, when set in motion, appears as the perceiver, the perceived, and the like. As the firebrand, when not in motion, is free from all appearance and remains changeless, similarly consciousness, when not in motion, is free from all appearances and remains changeless."

[373]

आत्मस्थे नामरूपे ये देशकालाद्यपेक्षिणी ।

जगत्कर्मवशादीशाद्व्यज्येते बहुधात्मनः ॥

These names and forms residing in the Self manifest in many forms from the Self, the Lord, at their appropriate time and place due to the previous *karma* of all beings in the universe.

This verse and the following one explain the manifestation of the world of name and form through *avidyā*, the inscrutable potency of Brahman. The Lord takes into account the previous *karma* of the creatures at the time of creation. The nature of the rebirth of a creature is dependent on its previous *karma*. As the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (III, ii, 13) puts it: "Verily, one becomes good by good action, bad by bad action."

[374]

व्याकृत्यो तयोर्विष्णोः प्रत्यहं नामरूपयोः ।
भूयो भवनमेतस्यान्मायिनोऽनेकता यथा ॥

The daily differentiation of names and forms from out of *Viṣṇu* must be understood as the manifold forms (of Brahman) like the manifold forms of a magician.

The evolution of name and form (*nāmarūpa-vyākaraṇam*) is the appearance of Brahman as many. See the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (I, iv, 7): "This universe was then undifferentiated. It differentiated only into name and form — it was called such and such and was of such and such form."

The word *viṣṇu* which occurs in the verse means the all-pervasive Brahman.

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न ह्यनवयवस्यास्य बहुत्वं युज्यतेऽञ्जसा ।
तस्माद्वाक्तृबहुत्वं स्याद्वयोमनो यद्वद्वटादिभिः ॥

Plurality of forms in the real sense is not tenable for Brahman which is, indeed, without parts. Hence the plurality of forms (of Brahman) is only in the figurative sense like the plurality of forms of ether through pot and other objects.

Brahman, as stated in the *Chāndogya* (VI, ii, 1), is one and non-dual. It is free from *sajātiya-*, *vijātiya-*, and *svagata-bheda*, and so it is

partless. It means that Brahman does not become the many in the real sense. It becomes the many due to names and forms projected by *avidyā*. Though the ether is one, it is spoken of as many like pot-ether, pan-ether, and so on, due to the limiting adjuncts such as pot and pan.

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श्रौतं सृष्ट्यादिविषयनीश्वरालोचनं तपः ।

कार्यत्वाल्लौकिकस्येह तपसोऽसम्भवो भवेत् ॥

The *tapas* which *śruti* speaks of is the thought of *Īśvara* relating to creation. The *tapas* (meaning penance) of the common parlance is out of place here (in the case of Brahman), since it is an effect (which is to come after creation).

In verses (371) to (375) the two *śruti* texts *so'kāmayaṭa, bahu syām prajāyeyeti* were explained. The subsequent text *sa tapo'tapyata* is now taken up for explanation.

The *Upaniṣad* says that Brahman practised *tapas*. The word *tapas* does not mean here penance or austerity as it is ordinarily understood in common parlance, but reflection or thought (*ālōcanam*). *Tapas* in the usual sense of austerity is possible only after the creation of the world involving the distinctions of *varṇa* and *āśrama*. So the *tapas* of Brahman before creation has to be explained as reflection or thought concerning creation.

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यथाश्रुति समालोच्य ससर्ज जगदीश्वरः ।

यथाक्रमं यथारूपं यथाकर्म यथाकृति ॥

Having reflected according to *śruti*, *Īśvara* created the universe taking into consideration the proper order, colour, the previous deeds, and shape (of the beings to be born).

The Lord created the universe as it was before (*dhātā yathā pūrvam-ahalpayat*) in the proper order from *ākāśa* onwards — the universe consisting of different beings such as men, gods, animals, and birds in accordance with their previous *karma* and *upāsana*. The *Chāndogya* text (V, x, 7) says: "Those whose conduct here has been good will quickly attain a good birth of a *Brāhmaṇa*, the birth of a *Kṣatriya*, or the birth of a *Vaiśya*. But those whose conduct here has been evil will quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog, the birth of a hog, or the birth of a *Caṇḍāla*."

[378]

मायावी जगदुत्पाद्य माययैवैश्वरेश्वरः ।

सर्पादीन्कल्पितान्स्वयत्तदेवानुविवेश सः ॥

He, the supreme Lord, the Magician, having created the universe through *māyā*, entered that very universe in the same way as a garland (is said to enter) the illusory serpent, etc.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* text *tatsrṣṭvā, tadevānuprāviśat*.

The entire universe is a product of *māyā*, and *Īśvara* who has the power of *māyā* is the Wonder-worker. The *Svetāśvatara* text (IV, 10) says: "Know then that *prakṛti* is *māyā* and the wielder of *māyā* is the great Lord."

The garland-snake illustration that is given is intended to show that the entry of Brahman into the universe is not real, but only apparent. Just as a garland without undergoing any transformation appears as a snake, so also Brahman without undergoing any transformation appears as the world of name and form.

[379]

मृद्वच्चेत्कारणं ब्रह्म कार्यं सर्वं तदात्मकम् ।

तदात्मतातिरेकेण प्रवेशोऽन्यो न विद्यते ॥

If it be said that Brahman is the cause (of the world) like clay, then the entire world of effects must be of the nature of Brahman. (On this view) apart from remaining in the form of the world, it has no other entry (into the world).

Śruti says that having created the universe, Brahman, the Creator, entered into that very universe. How are we to understand the entry of Brahman into the universe? Is it in the sense that the Creator entered into the universe in the same form as Creator or in a different form? Different possible answers which may be suggested are examined one by one by the opponent. Rejecting all of them, he arrives at the conclusion that the *śruti* text which speaks about the entry of Brahman into the world is meaningless and has, therefore, to be rejected.

The opponent's view begun in verse (379) is concluded in the first line of verse (390).

One may answer the question by saying that the Creator entered into the universe in the same form as Creator. The example of clay may be cited in support of this answer. Just as clay which is the cause enters into the pot which is its effect, so also Brahman, the cause, enters into the world which is its effect. But this view is untenable. The clay which is the material cause gets transformed as a pot and remains as a pot. Once the pot has been produced, the clay cannot enter over again into it as a separate entity. In the same way, if Brahman, like the clay, is the cause of the world, it is transformed into, and remains as, the world. If so, it cannot be said that subsequent to the creation of the world Brahman enters into it once again. But *śruti* says that, having created the world, Brahman then entered into that very world.

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न चान्यः प्राविशद्विष्णोः श्रूयते ह्येककर्तृता ।

सृष्ट्वा जगत्तदेवानुप्राविशच्चेति हि श्रुतिः ॥

It cannot be said that some one other than Brahman entered into the universe, because only one agent is heard

of (both for creation and entrance). *Śruti*, indeed, declares that having created the universe into that very thing He entered.

The objection which was raised earlier may be re-stated as follows. The effect is non-different from its material cause. If Brahman is the material cause of the universe, then it is pervasive throughout its effect, for it is transformed as the effect. How then could it be said to have entered into the universe after having created it ?

With a view to overcome the above objection, it may be argued that some one other than Brahman entered into the universe. But such a view would flatly contradict the *śruti* text according to which there is only one agent who is at once the creator of the universe and the one who entered into it, after having created it. The participial form "having created," i.e., the use of the suffix *ktvā*, indicates that the Creator himself entered into the universe and not some one else (*ktvā-pratyayabalāt sarjana-praveśayoreka-kartṛkatvasya śrūyamāṇatvāt anyasya praveśāsambhavaḥ*).

[381]

कपालाद्यात्मना कुम्भं मृद्वच्चेत्प्राविशज्जगत् ।
मृदोऽनेकात्मकत्वात् घटते नैकतो दृशेः ॥

If it be said that Brahman entered into the universe (in a different form) in the same way as clay enters into the pot in the form of sherd, etc., it is not so. Since clay is in many forms, its entry is tenable, but not so for Brahman which is one.

The entry of Brahman into the universe is now sought to be explained in yet another way. It is argued that just as clay which is the cause enters into the pot in the form of sherd (*kapāla*), dust (*cūrṇa*), etc., so also Brahman entered into the universe in some other form.

This explanation, too, is untenable. The analogy between clay and Brahman does not hold here. Clay can exist in many forms — as a lump

of clay, as sherds, as dust, and so on. But this is not possible in the case of Brahman which is one undifferentiated consciousness. While clay is made up of parts, Brahman is partless. It is no argument to say that Brahman entered into the universe in the form of the *jīva*, for the latter is in its essential nature non-different from Brahman. So it cannot be said that Brahman entered into the universe in some other form.

[382]

अनाप्तदेशवन्मृद्वत्प्रवेशो व्यापिनः कथम् ।
प्रवेशश्रवणात्तर्हि परिच्छिन्नम्प्रकल्पताम् ॥

How could there be entry for the all-pervasive Brahman similar to the clay which has places not attained by it? Since *śruti* speaks about the entry (of Brahman into the universe), let us suppose that Brahman is finite.

The first line of the verse states another reason to show why the analogy between clay and Brahman does not hold good. Clay is finite and therefore is not all-pervasive, i.e., has places not attained by it. But inasmuch as Brahman is all-pervasive, there is no place which it has to enter into anew.

The second line of this verse and the first line of the next verse refer to another explanation that may be offered. According to this explanation, we have to admit the entry of Brahman into the universe on the authority of *śruti*, and since the entry of Brahman can be accounted for only if it is supposed that Brahman is finite, we have to assume that Brahman is finite. Being finite and having dimension, the entry of Brahman into the universe is quite intelligible like the entry of the hand into the mouth.

[383]

मुखे हस्तादिवच्चायं प्रवेशोऽपि घटिष्यति ।
अमूर्तस्यापि नैवं स्यात्कार्यव्यापित्वहेतुतः ॥

Like the hand, etc., entering the mouth, the entry of Brahman is also possible. But this cannot be, since Brahman is without form and since it has pervaded the effect.

The second line of this verse refutes the foregoing explanation.

Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Brahman is finite, its entry into the universe cannot be made intelligible unless it is granted that it has form. It is a matter of common experience that an object which has form enters into another object which has also form. But since Brahman is devoid of form, it is absurd to speak about the entry of Brahman into the world. There is yet another reason to show why the above explanation has to be rejected. Since Brahman is all-pervasive, it has filled in the entire universe. It means that there is no place in the world which is devoid Brahman. And so it is meaningless to speak about the entry of Brahman into the universe.

[384]

व्यापि वाव्यापि वा कार्यं व्याप्नोत्येव हि कारणम् ।
न ह्यात्मशून्यो देशोऽस्ति यं जीवेनाविशेत्परः ॥

Whether finite or infinite, the cause, indeed, does pervade the effect. There is verily no place devoid of the Self which the supreme Self may enter in the form of the *jīva*.

The assumption that Brahman is finite is of no avail for explaining the entry of Brahman into the world. The material cause, whether finite or infinite, pervades the effect into which it gets transformed. A pot which is made of clay is pervaded by the clay which is its material cause. If Brahman as the material cause is transformed into the world, it has no further entry into it over and above its transformation in the form of the world.

It is no argument to say that, though Brahman is all-pervasive, it may nevertheless enter into the world in the form of the finite *jīva* which is not all-pervasive. Apart from the world into which Brahman has been transformed, there is no other place which is devoid of Brahman. If any such place were available, one might suggest that Brah-

man entered into it in the form of the finite *jīva*. Further, as stated earlier, the *jīva* is no other than Brahman, and its finitude is caused by the limiting adjunct.

[385]

अथ कारणरूपेण कार्यमीशः समाविशेत् ।
अहं ब्रह्मेतिवज्जह्यात्कार्यं कार्यरूपतां तथा ॥

If it be said that the Lord enters the effect in the form of the cause, in that case the effect will cease to be an effect as in the case of (the *jīva* when it realizes) "I am Brahman."

The entry of Brahman into the world may be explained in yet another way. It may be argued that *Īśvara* so entered the universe which He created that it assumed the form of the cause.

Even this explanation is not convincing. If the effect assumes the form of the cause, it ceases to be an effect. A pot, for example, ceases to be a pot when it assumes the form of the clay which is its material cause. Or, consider the case of the *jīva* who thinks that he is an agent, and enjoyer, and so on, so long as he is subject to *avidyā*. When the *jīva* realizes on the onset of knowledge that he is no other than Brahman, then he ceases to be a *jīva*, inasmuch as realizing Brahman he remains as Brahman. In the same way, if the universe which Brahman has created assumes the form of the cause, viz., Brahman, then it ceases to be an effect. And in the absence of the effect, it makes no sense to speak about the entry of Brahman into it. Further, such an explanation goes against what is stated in the *śruti* text. The latter does not speak about the entry into the cause; rather it says that the Lord entered into the effect, the very thing which he created.

[386]

मतं जीवात्मकं कार्यं याति कार्यान्तरं यदि ।
विरोधान्नैवमप्येतन्नैति कुम्भः शरावताम् ॥

The view that the *jīva* which is an effect assumes the form of another effect is also not tenable, because it is opposed to reason. A jar does not attain the nature of a tray.

This verse and the following one state and refute another explanation that is offered in this regard. According to this explanation, Brahman first becomes an effect in the form of the *jīva* which again gets transformed into other effects such as *ahanākāra*. So the entry of Brahman, it may be said, consists in the *jīva*, which is an effect of Brahman getting transformed into other effects such as *ahanākāra*.

This argument is wrong. One effect cannot become another effect. A pot, for example, cannot become another pot. If the *jīva* is an effect, then it cannot assume the form of *buddhi* which is also an effect.

[387]

नामरूपादिकार्याच्च व्यतिरेकानुवादिनी ।

श्रुतिः कुप्येत मोक्षश्च तदापत्तौ सुदुर्लभः ॥

Further, the *śruti* text which distinguishes the *jīva* from the world which is an effect consisting of names and forms will not tolerate this. If the *jīva* were to become another thing, liberation, too, would be impossible.

The view that the *jīva* becomes another effect in the form of *ahanākāra* cannot be accepted as it runs counter to the *Chāndogya* text (VI, iii, 2) which says that "entering in the form of the *jīva* it developed names and forms." It is obvious from this text that the *jīva* is different from the world of names and forms. Further, on such a view the attainment of liberation has to be ruled out. One object can become another only by altering its nature, and this will amount to the destruction of one's being (*svarūpa-nāśa*). *Mokṣa* consists in realizing the non-difference of Brahman and Ātman. If without attaining such a realization the *jīva* were to assume another form comprising body and other features, liberation would be impossible to it.

[388]

जलार्कवत्प्रवेशश्चेन्नापरिच्छिन्नरूपतः !

अमूर्तत्वाच्च नास्यैवं प्रवेश उपपद्यते ॥

If it be said that the entry (of Brahman) is like that of the sun into the water, it is not so. Since Brahman is infinite and without form, its entry cannot thus be explained.

Let us consider another explanation according to which the entry of Brahman into the world is like that of the reflection of the sun in the water. But this explanation is not acceptable as it is based on false analogy. It is true that there is the entry of the sun into the water through its reflection (*pratibimba*), but we cannot in the same way speak about the entry of Brahman into the world through its reflection. An object such as the sun which is finite and which has form can be reflected in another object which is capable of reflecting it. But there can be no reflection of Brahman which is without form (*amūrta*). Further, since Brahman is infinite (*aparicchinna*), there is no object which is away from Brahman to serve as a reflecting medium. So even this explanation does not hold good.

[389]

एवं तर्हि प्रवेशोऽस्य श्लिष्यते न कथञ्चन ।

न च गत्यन्तरं विद्मो येन वाक्यं समर्थ्यते ॥

This being so, its entry cannot be explained in any way. Nor do we know any other way by which the text can be made intelligible.

After a critical examination of the different explanations that may be offered of the text which speaks about the entry of Brahman into the world, the opponent comes to the conclusion that there is no way in which the text *tatsṛṣṭvā tadevānuprāviṣat* can be made intelligible.

[390]

आनर्थक्यादिदं तर्हि त्यज्यतां शिशुवाक्यवत् ।
प्रवेशवाक्यं नैवं तद्व्यन्तरसमाश्रयात् ॥

Then, as conveying no meaning, this text dealing with the entry (of Brahman) has to be discarded like the babbling of a child. (The *Siddhāntin* answers:) It is not so, since it can be explained in some other way.

The opponent concludes his critical review, which was begun in verse (379), by saying that the text dealing with the entry of Brahman into the world has to be summarily rejected as meaningless.

The statement of the final position (*siddhānta*) according to Advaita, which is begun in the second line of the verse after rejecting the opponent's view, will be concluded in verse (401).

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ब्रह्मवित्परमाप्नोतीत्युक्त्वा सत्यादिलक्षणम् ।
प्रावेशयद्गुहां तच्च तदनात्मत्वशान्तये ॥

After stating that the knower of Brahman attains the supreme Brahman which has been defined as real, etc., *śruti* makes it enter the cave with a view to free it from being not-Self.

The central theme of the *Upaniṣad* is the non-difference of Brahman and Ātman. It is this knowledge of Brahman-Ātman which the *Upaniṣad* seeks to convey. The account of creation is given only with a view to state the truth of non-duality. Since the entry of Brahman into the universe can be explained in some other way, there is no room for the defects mentioned above.

After stating that the knower of Brahman attains the supreme Brahman, the *Upaniṣad* defined Brahman as real, knowledge, and infinite. It would appear from this definition that Brahman is what is remote from us. With a view to establish that Brahman is not mediate,

but immediate, that it is not far away from us, but is our inward Self, the *śruti* text in the sequel said that Brahman which has been defined as real, etc., is seated in the cave, i.e., in the intellect (*nihitam guhāyām*). By emphasizing that Brahman is no other than Ātman, the inward Self, the *Upaniṣad* tries to remove the wrong notion that Brahman is different from the Self (*anātmavāsānti*).

[392]

अब्रह्मत्वनिवृत्त्यर्थं ब्रह्मात्मेति विशेषणम् ।
तन्निवृत्ताववाक्यार्थं कैवल्यमप्रतिपद्यते ॥

With a view to remove the notion that the Self is other than Brahman, the Self is qualified by Brahman (in the *śruti* text "This Self is Brahman"). When each is thus freed (from the wrong notion), the non-verbal knowledge which is liberation is attained.

While the *śruti* text *yo veda nihitam guhāyām* removes the wrong notion that Brahman is different from Ātman, the *Māṇḍūkya* text (II) "This Self is Brahman," (*ayamātmā brahma*) removes the wrong notion that Ātman is different from Brahman (*ātmano'brahmatvam*), inasmuch as the word Ātman is qualified by the word Brahman. When a person realizes the non-difference of Brahman and Ātman, he attains liberation.

[393]

यस्मादेवम्फलं तस्माज्ज्ञानमत्र विवक्षितम् ।
गुहायामद्वयम्ब्रह्म तस्मान्निहितमुच्यते ॥

For attaining such a fruit, the knowledge (productive of the desired result) is, therefore, intended to be taught here. So the non-dual Brahman is said to be located in the cave (intellect).

The entry of Brahman into the cave of the intellect is taught with a view to impart the knowledge of non-difference between Brahman

and Ātman, and it is this knowledge which leads to the attainment of liberation.

[394]

तदूपानुगमयान्नमयान्तं कार्यमाह हि ॥

In order to impart that knowledge (of non-difference of Brahman and Ātman), the various modifications ending with the sheath formed of food are, indeed, stated.

Śruti purports to convey the knowledge of the non-difference of Brahman and Ātman, and with a view to impart this knowledge it gives an account of the different sheaths starting from the *ānandamaya-kośa* and ending with the *annamaya-kośa*, which are all modifications. Instruction about the nature of the sheaths is the means (*upāya*) for attaining Brahman-knowledge which is the end (*upēya*).

[395]

पूर्वपूर्वातिरेकेण त्रीन्कोशानतिलङ्घ्य च ।

विज्ञानमयरूपायां गुहायां दर्शितः परः ॥

Passing over one after another from the outward sheath, and transcending the three sheaths, the supreme Brahman is shown as located in the cave of the intellect.

The text relating to the entry of Brahman (*praveśavacanam*) into the universe is, as stated earlier, for the purpose of imparting the knowledge of non-difference of Brahman and Ātman. The *annamaya-kośa* is the outermost sheath of the *jīva*. Within the *annamaya*, there is the *prāṇamaya-kośa*. Inside the *prāṇamaya* there is the *manomaya-kośa*. And within the *manomaya*, there is the *vijñānamaya-kośa*, the sheath of intellect. Thus as we go inward by transcending the sheaths of food, vitality, and mind, we come to the sheath formed of the *vijñāna* wherein the supreme Brahman is laid. The sheath formed of the *vijñāna* is the cave of the intellect (*vijñānamayarūpā yā buddhilakṣaṇā guhā*). When *sruti* says that Brahman has entered into the sheath of *vijñāna* or the intellect, it is to emphasize the non-difference of Brahman and Ātman.

[396]

तत्रानन्दमयो यस्माद्ब्रह्मयते राहुचन्द्रवत् ।

मानुषादधि यत्रेदं सुखं निष्ठां प्रपद्यते ॥

उत्कृष्यमाणं क्रमशस्तद्ब्रह्मासीति बोधयेत् ॥

Therein is manifested the *ānandamaya*, like *Rāhu* which is manifested in the moon. "You are that Brahman where-in this happiness of human beings rising higher and higher by degrees reaches the culmination" — thus the teacher should instruct the disciple.

The self formed of bliss (*ānandamaya*) is manifested in the intellect. The different forms of bliss such as joy, enjoyment, and so on are the manifestations of the supreme undifferentiated bliss which is Brahman. If the different kinds of happiness are arranged in a hierarchy, the highest bliss which is unsurpassable is Brahman-Ātman. The *ānandamaya* self which is manifested in the intellect is a pointer to the undifferentiated bliss which is Brahman. Brahman which is undifferentiated, which is free from any distinctive attribute, cannot be cognized anywhere else except in the intellect. We are aware of the existence of *Rāhu* only at the time of the eclipse when it is supposed to seize the moon or the sun. Just as the knowledge of *Rāhu* arises from its association with the moon or the sun, so also the knowledge of Brahman arises because of its association with, or manifestation in, the intellect. Why is it, it may be asked, that Brahman is manifested only in the *vijñānamaya* or the intellect and not in any other sheath? The intellect alone which is proximate to the Self and which has the power of illumination can reflect the Self, and not any other sheath.

[397]

विकल्पयोनवेतस्यां निर्विकल्पोऽधिगम्यते ।

तस्मात्तस्याम्प्रवेशोऽस्य कल्प्यते नाञ्जसोच्यते ॥

Brahman which is without differentiation is cognized in this (intellect) which is the source of all differentiation.

Hence, the entry of Brahman into the intellect is an imaginary representation. It is not conveyed in the literal sense.

Every cognition which we get through the intellect is a differentiated one, for it is the cognition of something as such-and-such. When the mental modes are illumined by the consciousness, we have the cognition of this or that object. The intellect which carries the reflection of, or is associated with, the consciousness is the source of all our cognitions of the various objects which are differentiated, which are qualified by some attribute or other. It causes the cognition of Brahman, when it is rid of all differentiations, when it is made to remain one and unitary (*akhaṇḍākāra*).

The entry of Brahman into the intellect should not be understood in the literal sense. If *śruti* speaks as though Brahman has entered into the intellect, it is for the purpose of imparting the knowledge of non-difference between Brahman and Ātman. It is only when Brahman which is of the nature of consciousness is reflected in the intellect that the *jīva* can realize that it is no other than Brahman which is free from *avidyā* and its manifestations.

[398]

प्रकाशात्मक एतस्मिन् द्रष्टृश्रोत्रादिलक्षणम् ।
मोहादीक्षामहे यस्मात् प्रविष्टस्तेन कल्प्यते ॥

Since in the luminous intellect we perceive Brahman as the seer, hearer, and so on due to illusion, the entry by Brahman is imaginarily suggested (by *śruti*).

Though the intellect is insentient, it is credited with the power of illumination, since it carries the reflection of the Witness-consciousness. Or, since its nature is such that it can reveal or manifest consciousness, it is said to be luminous (*caitanyaḥbhivyāñjaka-vṛtti-pariṇāmitvāt prakāśāt-maka ityuktam*). The Self by its very nature is neither a seer nor a hearer. But it is said to have these distinctive features due to its association as it were with the intellect consequent on the work of the visual and

auditory senses. Similarly, the intellect which is material is neither a seer nor a hearer by itself; but it comes to be looked upon as a seer and a knower only due to the reflection or semblance of consciousness therein. In other words, the consciousness delimited by the intellect (*buddhyupahiṇa-caitanya*) or the intellect which carries the reflection or semblance of consciousness (*cidābhāsa*) is a seer, a knower, and so on.

[399]

तस्यैव एव शरीर आत्मेत्येवम्ब्रुवाणया ।
एकात्म्यमुच्यते श्रुत्या हृत्प्रविष्टाप्रविष्टयोः ॥

Stating in this way that this Brahman is, verily, the embodied self of it (the fivefold sheath), the identity of the one who has entered the heart and the one who has not entered the heart is conveyed by *śruti*.

With reference to the question of the existence of Brahman it has been stated earlier in verse (352) that he who knows Brahman as non-existing becomes non-existent, and that he who knows it as existing is existent. This idea has been conveyed by the *śruti* text *asanneva sa bhavati*, etc., at the commencement of the sixth *anuvāka*. Following this is the text *tasyaiṣa eva śārīra ātmā*. The word *eṣa* in this text refers to Brahman. The word *tasya* means *pūrvoktasya kośapañcakasya*, the fivefold sheath mentioned earlier. This text, therefore, intimates that Brahman is the Self of the *jīva* who is made up of the five sheaths. Since Brahman has assumed the form of the *jīva* by entering into the five *kośas*, it follows that the *jīva* is non-different from Brahman, that He who has entered into the heart, the cave of the intellect, is no other than He who has not entered into the heart.

[400]

प्रवेशहेतुदोषाणामध्यस्तानाम्परात्मनि ।
यदाहीत्यादिना ध्वंस एवं सत्युपपद्यते ॥

Only thus the removal of the defects (like agency and so on) which are superimposed on the supreme Self consequent on its entry is tenable, as taught by the text *yadā hi* (in the sequel).

That Brahman in itself is free from agency and other features that are ascribed to it due to its association as if were with the intellect, is taught in the sequel (seventh *anuvāka*) by the *śruti* text *yadā hi*, etc., according to which Brahman is changeless, bodiless, and inexpressible, and that when a spiritual aspirant gets established in Brahman he reaches the state of fearlessness.

[401]

अप्रविष्टस्वभावस्य प्रवेशस्तेन कल्प्यते ।
क्षेत्रज्ञेश्वरहानेन ह्यैकात्म्यं स्यात् कथं द्विति ॥

The entry of one who by nature cannot have entered (into the universe) is stated in such a way as if it has entered with a view to teach the oneness of the Self and *Īśvara* by discarding the distinction between them.

Brahman is free from transmigratory existence. Since the *jīva* is non-different from Brahman, its bondage is not real, but illusory. Liberation consists in realizing the oneness of Brahman and *Ātman*. *Śruti* speaks as if Brahman has entered into the universe with a view to impart this knowledge of oneness by removing the distinction between the *kṣetrajña* and *Īśvara*.

[402]

मूर्तामूर्तात्मकं कार्यं यत्सृष्ट्वा प्राविशत् प्रभुः ।
रजतं शुक्तिकेवात्मा तदात्मेवाभवन्मृषा ॥

Having created the world of effects comprising gross and subtle forms, the Lord entered into it. The Self illu-

orarily became those forms in the same way as nacre illusorily becomes silver.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* text *tadanupraviśya sacca tyaccābhavat*.

The five elements, viz., ether, air, fire, water, and earth of which the universe is constituted, may be divided into two groups — gross (*mūrta*) and subtle (*amūrta*). The creation of the two forms, gross and subtle, is due to *avidyā*. Brahman which is the cause appears in the two forms in the same way as a piece of shell appears in the form of silver. Just as a piece of shell does not really become silver, so also Brahman does not really assume the two forms, gross and subtle. In both cases, the one becoming another is an illusion.

[403]

मूर्तम्भूतत्रयं सत्स्यादितरस्यदिहोच्यते ।
अव्याकृतादाशरीरादेतावद्वस्तु नापरम् ॥

The term *sat* stands for the three elements which are gross. The other elements are stated here by the term *tyat*. All things from the *Avyākṛta*, the Unmanifested being, down to the body are comprised by these two forms; they are not different from them.

According to Advaita, ether and air are subtle (*amūrta*), while fire, water, and earth are gross (*mūrta*).

[404]

समानेतरजातीयान्निर्धार्येदन्तयोच्यते ।
यन्निरुक्तं तदत्र स्यादनिरुक्तमितोऽन्यथा ॥

That object which can be stated as “this” by distinguishing it from things of its own class and also from things

of other classes is here referred to by the term *nirukta*. By *anirukta* is meant what is different from this.

The meaning of the text *niruktam cāniruktam ca* is explained in this verse.

Niruktam is the definable, and *aniruktam* is the undefinable. What can be fully explained as, "This is a pot made of clay, having a particular shape, and capable of holding water," is the definable. That which cannot be stated to be such-and-such is the undefinable.

[405]

साक्षात्परोक्षरूपे तु मूर्तामूर्ते पुरोदिते ।
निरुक्तेतररूपे ये तयोरेव विशेषणे ॥

The definable and its opposite are only attributes respectively of the gross form which is immediate and the subtle form which is mediate, mentioned above.

Earth, water, and fire which are referred to by the term *sat* are directly perceived. The other two elements, viz., air and ether, which are referred to by the term *tyat* can be known only mediately.

[406]

निलयो मूर्तधर्मः स्यादुत्तरोऽमूर्तसंश्रयः ।
विज्ञानञ्चेतनं विद्यादविज्ञानमचेतनम् ॥

Nilaya, which means abode, is an attribute of the gross form. The latter, i.e., *anilaya*, which means non-abode, is related to the subtle form. *Vijñānam* means a sentient being, and *avijñānam*, an insentient object.

This verse explains the meaning of the texts *nilayanam cānilayanam ca*, *vijñānam cāvijñānam ca*.

[407]

व्यावहारिकमेवात्र सत्यं स्यादधिकारतः ।

परमार्थिकसत्यस्य वाक्यान्ते समुदीरणात् ॥

The word *satyam* (which occurs at the beginning of the sentence) means empirical truth because of the context and also because of the fact that the absolute truth is spoken of at the end of the sentence.

This verse explains the meaning of the text *satyam cānṛtam ca satyamabhavat*. The word *satyam* occurs twice in this text. In deciding the meaning of the word *satyam* which occurs first in the text, we have to take into consideration the context in which it occurs. Since it occurs in the context of the explanation of the gross and subtle forms, it must refer only to the empirical truth, i.e., relative truth as found in the empirical world. Further, it occurs in close proximity to the word *anṛta* which means the false, the unreal. There is also another reason to be considered here. In the same sentence the word *satyam* occurs once again at the end. The *śruti* text says that *satyam* became the true and the false. And this *satyam*, it is obvious, refers to Brahman, the absolutely real, the absolute truth (*paramārtha-satyam*). Hence the word *satyam* which occurs first in the sentence refers to the relative truth in the empirical world.

[408]

मृगतृष्णादिवन्मिथ्या तदिहानृतमुच्यते ।

इत्येतदभवत् स्रष्टा ह्यविद्योत्थमविद्यया ॥

What is illusory like mirage is stated here as *anṛtam*. The Creator, indeed, became through *avidyā* all this which has sprung from *avidyā*.

Brahman, the absolutely real, has become through *avidyā* the world of name and form — what is gross as well as subtle, what is definable

as well as undefinable, what serves as an abode as well as what is not an abode. The non-dual Brahman is the basis for the pluralistic universe which is superimposed thereon.

[409]

प्रत्याख्यानं सर्वस्य सत्यदाद्यात्मकस्य हि ।
व्यावृत्ताखिलानात्महं ब्रह्मेति बोध्यते ॥

By negating the entire universe of gross and subtle forms, etc., the absence of all plurality (in the Self) is, indeed, taught by affirming that the Self is Brahman.

The Self is the infinite Brahman which is devoid of all specifications, which is neither gross nor subtle. This would be tenable only if it is said that the Self has become the entire universe through *avidyā*.

[410]

नैतदस्ति न नास्तीदं द्वयोर्मोहोद्भवत्वतः ।
न सत्तन्नासदित्येवं प्राह विश्वेश्वरोऽपि हि ॥

Since the two modes of our speaking as "This is not existent" and "This is not non-existent" have their origin in ignorance, the Lord of the world, too, has said: "It (Brahman) is not said to be existent or non-existent."

If the world which exists is illusory, Brahman also, it may be argued, is illusory because it is existent like the world. But this argument is wrong. So long as there is *avidyā*, we sometimes speak of the world as existent and at other times as non-existent. But the world which we see cannot be characterized as existent, for it is subject to contradiction. The world as such ceases to be when Brahman, its substratum, is realized. Nor can the world be characterized as non-existent, for what is cognized can never be dismissed as non-existent. In short, the world which is viewed sometimes as existent and at other

times as non-existent is not eternal. But Brahman which is eternal is, as stated in the *Bhagavadgītā* (XIII, 12), neither existent (*sat*) nor non-existent (*asat*). Being different from the gross and the subtle (*mūrtamūrta-bhinnam*), it can never be characterized as *sat* or *asat*.

[411]

आविर्भावतिरोभावौ बुद्धेर्यत्साक्षिकाविह ।
तमेकमन्तरात्मानं विद्यादव्यभिचारिणम् ॥

The inward Self which is one, which is ever-existent, and which is the witness of the manifestation and disappearance of the intellect should be known.

When the modification of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is illumined by the Witness-consciousness, we have cognition through the mental mode (*vr̥tti-jñāna*) which enables us to claim that something exists or does not exist. The states or modifications of the internal organ are not constant. They come and go, one after another. That these modifications are never constant, that they appear and disappear, are known only through the Witness-consciousness which alone is eternal.

[412]

तस्मादस्ति परं ब्रह्म यस्याविद्याविकल्पिताः ।
सन्तीव सत्तामालम्ब्य कार्यकारणलक्षणाः ॥

Hence there exists the supreme Brahman by depending upon whose existence the objects of the world, which are related as causes and effects and which are projected by *avidyā*, exist as it were.

The entire world, starting from ether down to a particle of earth, which can be designated as not-Self is an illusory appearance due to *avidyā*. The immutable Brahman is the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) on

which the entire world is superimposed. If the things of the world appear to exist, it is because of the existence of Brahman, the substratum. So the existence of Brahman can never be denied.

[413]

विवादगोचरापन्नं यत्किञ्चिद्रचनात्मकम् ।

तत्सर्वं बुद्धिमत्पूर्वं तदात्मत्वाद्घटादिवत् ॥

Whatever involves intelligent planning presupposes an intelligent being. The subject under dispute, viz., the universe, presupposes an intelligent being, because it involves intelligent planning as in the case of objects like pot, etc.

The existence of Brahman is sought to be proved by means of inference (*anumāna*) in this verse.

[414]

तत्रैतस्मिन् यथोक्तेऽर्थे श्लोकः पूर्ववदुच्यते ।

श्रुत्युक्तार्थानुवादी तु द्रष्टुं पृथिव्यधुना ॥

As in the earlier contexts, with reference to this idea stated above, the following verse which is of the nature of a re-statement of the teaching of *śruti* is now uttered with a view to strengthen the understanding of the person.

The existence of Brahman which has been taught in the *Brāhmaṇa* portion above and which has also been shown to be tenable by means of inference is further discussed in a subsequent verse which occurs at the beginning of the next *anuvāka*.

[415]

यदिदंशब्दधीगम्यं प्रागसत्तदभूज्जगत् ।

असच्छब्देन चात्र स्याद्ब्रह्मैवानामरूपकम् ॥

The universe which is referred to by the word "this" was in the beginning *asat*. By the word *asat*, Brahman which has not manifested itself as the world of names and forms is meant here.

The seventh *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad* is covered by verses (415) to (479).

This verse explains the meaning of the text *asadyā idamagra āsī* which is a part of the verse occurring at the commencement of the seventh *anuvāka*. In the beginning, this world of name and form which we experience was *asat*, the unmanifested Brahman. The word *asat* should not be explained as the void (*śūnya*), for the world of name and form cannot come out of the void.

[416]

नामरूपात्मकं कार्यमनात्मत्वात् स्वतो ह्यसत् ।
यत् सदेकम्परं ब्रह्म ततो वै सदजायत ॥

The world which is an effect composed of names and forms is in itself non-existent, because it is not-Self. It is from the one supreme Brahman which is existence that the manifested world was, indeed, born.

This verse explains the meaning of the text *tato vai sadajāyata*.

The world of name and form, as stated in the *vācārambhaṇa* text of the *Chāndogya* (VI, i, 4), is illusory and does not exist on its own. But it *appears* to have come into being and to be an existent something. The world which is not-Self has no existence of its own apart from the non-dual Brahman which has been defined as *satyam*, *jñānam*, and *anantam*.

[417]

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं यत्तादुपेतमविद्यया ।
स्वात्मनैव स्वमात्मानं सत्त्यद्रूपमचीकलृषत् ॥

Brahman which is real, knowledge, and infinite creates itself by itself as the gross and the subtle, being associated with *avidyā*.

The meaning of the text *tadūtmānaṁ svayamakurta* is explained in this verse.

The non-dual Brahman which is free from modification appears in the twofold form of gross and subtle things (*sat* and *tyat*) due to *avidyā*.

Since *śruti* speaks of Brahman as one and non-dual (*ekameva dvitīyam*), as partless and without activity (*niṣkalaṁ niṣkriyam*), it is impossible to think of the origination or creation of the world in the primary sense of the term. It is not the case that the world was really born (*ajāyata*) from Brahman, or that Brahman really created (*akuruṁ*) the world. It only means that the world was born *as it were*, that Brahman created, *as it were*, the world. The literal meanings of the words *ajāyata* and *akuruṁ* will not hold good here.

[418]

यस्मात् स्वयमिदं सर्वमकरोन्निपुणः प्रभुः ।
सुकृतम्प्रभुमेवातो महात्मानः प्रचक्षते ॥

Inasmuch as the expert Lord created all this (world) by Himself, the great, therefore, call Him as *Sukṛta*, the Self-creator.

This verse explains the meaning of the text *tasmāttat-sukṛtamucyate iti*.

Brahman alone is the cause of the world, for without the help of anything else, *Īśvara* has created the world. *Īśvara* is both the material and the efficient cause rolled into one. There exists nothing over and above Brahman — neither a material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world similar to clay, nor an efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) like a potter. Since *Īśvara* has created the world by Himself, He is called the Self-creator. The word *sukṛtam* means *svayam karṭṛ* (*susabda'tra svayamśabda-paryāyaḥ*, *kṛtaśabdaḥ karṭṛśabda-paryāyaḥ*, *sukṛtaṁ svayam karṭṛ brahma*).

[419]

यदि वेश्वरनिर्वृत्तं कार्यं सुकृतमुच्यते ।

निष्ठासंश्रवणात् साक्षान्न तु कर्तेश उच्यते ॥

Or, the act accomplished by *Īśvara* is said to be *sukṛtam*, that is, well done, because the suffix *ta* which denotes the object directly is used (here in the word *sukṛta*). It does not refer to the Lord who is the agent.

In the previous verse the word *sukṛtam* was explained in the sense of *sva-kṛtam*. The same word is now explained in the sense of "well-done" (*suṣṭhu-kṛtam*). According to this explanation, the word *sukṛtam* does not refer to the Lord, but to the act of the Lord, which has been well-done.

[420]

लोकेऽपि स्वामिना साक्षाद्यत् कृतं कर्म यत्नतः ।

तदेव सुकृतम्प्राहुर्न तु भृत्यैस्तथा कृतम् ॥

Even in common parlance that act alone which is done by the master directly by himself with effort is said to be well-done, but not that which is done likewise by the servants.

The second explanation given in the previous verse is justified now in terms of common usage in our day-to-day affairs.

[421]

यद्वै तत्सुकृतम्प्रोक्तं सत्त्यदादिस्वभावकम् ।

नीरसस्यास्य कार्यस्य रसोऽसौ परमः स्मृतः ॥

The one, verily, which has been said to be *sukṛtam* is in the form of gross and subtle objects. This supreme Brahman is said to be *rasa*, the source of joy of this world of effects, which in itself is devoid of *rasa*.

The *śruti* texts *yadvai tat sukṛiam, raso vai saḥ* are now taken up for explanation.

Rasa means flavour. It is what causes satisfaction. It is the source of joy. Whatever happiness a person derives from the things of the world is due to Brahman which is the source of joy. And so Brahman must exist.

[422]

रसः सारोऽमृतं ब्रह्म आनन्दो ह्लाद उच्यते ।
निःसारं तेन सारेण सारवद्भक्ष्यते जगत् ॥

Rasa is said to be essence, the immortal Brahman, bliss, joy. By Brahman which is *rasa*, the world which in itself is devoid of happiness is said to have happiness.

[423]

रसस्यातीन्द्रियस्यास्य त्वानन्दत्वं कुतो न्विति ।
अतस्तत्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं रसं हीत्युत्तरं वचः ॥

How is it, it may be asked, that this supersensuous *rasa* is bliss? So with a view to establish this, there is the subsequent text *rasam hi*, etc.

Brahman is supersensuous. It cannot be comprehended by mind or speech. If *rasa* is said to be Brahman, it would follow that it is also supersensuous. If so, how can it be identified, it may be asked, with bliss or happiness which is immediately experienced by every one of us? The answer to this question is contained in the text *rasam hyevāyam labdhvā*, etc.

[424]

एतस्मादपि हेतोस्तदस्तीत्यभ्युपगम्यताम् ।
इतश्चास्ति परं ब्रह्म रसत्वस्य प्रसिद्धितः ॥

For this reason also it has to be admitted that Brahman exists. And so the supreme Brahman exists, since its being of the nature of *rasa* is well-known.

The existence of Brahman is argued not merely on the ground that it is the cause of the world, but also on the ground that it is the cause of happiness in this world.

The second line of the verse here is only an explanation of the first line.

[425]

तृप्तिहेतू रसो नाम मधुराम्लादिलक्षणः ॥

Rasa in the form of sweetness, sourness, and so on, is the cause of satisfaction.

The word *rasa* primarily means flavour, distinctive taste such as sweetness, sourness, and the like.

[426 - 427]

अन्नादिरसलाभेन यथा तृप्ताः समासते ।

आनन्दिनः कामहीना निरीहाः साध्यसिद्धये ॥

अपविष्टैषणास्तद्वद्वाह्योपादानवर्जिताः ।

निःसम्बोधं परानन्दं प्राप्ताः सन्न्यासिनोऽमलाः ॥

Just as people get satisfied by obtaining *rasa* such as food, so also those who are without desires, who do not exert themselves in accomplishing the desired object, who have discarded desires and also external sources of pleasure who have renounced everything, who are pure, who have attained the supreme bliss which cannot be specified, remain satisfied

Objects such as food, water, and the like, which have distinctive flavours or tastes make a person happy when he attains them having a

desire for them. In the same way the *sannyāsin* remains happy when he attains the supreme bliss which is Brahman. What is non-existent cannot be the cause or source of satisfaction. Since Brahman as the supreme bliss makes a *sannyāsin* happy—i.e., it is the cause or source of satisfaction to a *sannyāsin*—its existence has to be admitted (*asatātṛptihetutvayogāt, brahmaṇasca rasatvena tṛptihetutvādasti brahmetyarthah*).

[428]

नूनं तेषां परं स्वास्थ्यं चेतांस्याह्लादयत्यलम् ।
प्रह्लादचेतसां यानि तानि लिङ्गानि तेषु हि ॥

Certainly, the supreme satisfaction which they have must fully delight their minds. All the indications of delightful minds are, indeed, in them.

A *sannyāsin* who has given up all desires has the greatest satisfaction, for one can see in him all the features indicative of the satisfaction which reigns supreme in him.

[429]

उपाग्निं पामनस्येव सुखसंसक्तचेतसः ।
लिङ्गं कण्डूयमानस्य लक्ष्याभ्यात्मवेदिषु ॥

In those who have realized the Self, I find the indication of satisfaction, as we find in a man who is suffering from skin disease and sits near the fire scratching his body with his mind possessed of joy.

The *sannyāsins* who have realized the Self are to be seen in possession of the supreme satisfaction even in the absence of any external source of happiness, in the same way as a person suffering from some skin disease enjoys himself while scratching his body.

[430]

अज्ञातानन्दतत्त्वानामनुमानमिदम्भवेत् ।
साक्षात्कृतात्मतत्त्वानां प्रत्यक्षतममेव तत् ॥

This inference (about the experience of bliss) is intended only for those who are ignorant of the true nature of bliss. But, for those who have realized the true nature of the Self, it is, indeed, the most immediate experience.

Happiness which human beings seek to attain as an end (*puruṣārtha*) is a matter of immediate experience. If its existence is going to be established by means of inference, it will, it may be argued, cease to be a *puruṣārtha*.

This objection will not do, as it has not taken into consideration the purpose of inference here. If we resort to inference with a view to establish the experience of bliss from certain outward features, it is only for the sake of the ignorant people. From the standpoint of the wise, i.e., those who have realized the true nature of the Self, there is no need for inference, for bliss which is Brahman is immediately experienced by them.

[431]

बाह्येन्द्रियाणामध्यात्मं संहतिर्येह लक्ष्यते ।

एकार्थवृत्तिरूपेण सा दृष्टासंहते सति ॥

What is known as the human body, which is a conglomeration of the external senses, is seen functioning (as a unity) for the purpose (of enjoyment) of a person; and this holds good only if the person concerned is not a part of the conglomeration.

Any object like a cot or a structure like a house, which is a collection of a number of materials, is intended for the enjoyment of a person who is different from it and who does not form a part of the materials which constitute the object. Such an object or a structure does not come into existence of its own accord. It has come into being because someone, an intelligent being, built it, and yet did not form a part of it. Similarly, the human body which is constituted by the sense-organs, the vital force, and the internal organ, is intended for the enjoyment of a person who is different from, and does not form a part of,

the conglomeration. This also serves to prove the existence of Brahman which is consciousness. The argument can be stated in the form of an inference as follows: The conglomeration called the human body is for the benefit of consciousness which does not form a part of it, because it is a conglomeration like a cot, and whatever is a conglomeration is for the benefit of consciousness which does not form a part of it.

[432]

अतः साक्षेपमाहेयं को ह्येवान्यादिति श्रुतिः ।
आकाशे परमे व्योम्नि ह्यानन्दो न भवेद्यदि ॥

Therefore in a challenging tone *śruti* asks: "Who, indeed, will inhale (etc.) if bliss be not there in *ākāśa*, the supreme ether (within the heart)?"

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* texts *ko hyevānyāt kaḥ prāṇyāt, yadeśa ākāśa ānando na syāt*.

If the inward Self which is of the nature of the incomparable bliss and which is the Witness-consciousness of all the mental modes were not there in the ether enclosed in the heart, no bodily action would take place through the functioning of the vital airs like *prāṇa* and *apāna*. In other words, Brahman exists as the source of our physical activity through the *upādhi* of the *viññānamaya-kośa*.

The word *ākāśa* which occurs in the text *yadeśa ākāśa ānando na syāt* may be explained in the locative or nominative sense. The *śruti* text may be construed to mean, "If in the *ākāśa* bliss does not exist, who could inhale?" Or, it may also be construed to mean. "If the *ākāśa*, the bliss, does not exist, who could inhale?"

[433]

आब्रह्मस्तम्बलोकेऽस्मिन् पुण्यकर्मानुरूपतः ।
आनन्दः परमो यस्मादानन्दयति नः सदा ॥

Inasmuch as the happiness attained by all beings in this world from the *Hiranyagarbha* down to an insect is according to their meritorious deeds, there must be the supreme Brahman which always makes us happy.

This verse explains the *śruti* text *eṣa hyevānandayati*.

The empirical happiness enjoyed by all creatures is limited and transient. It is only a part of the supreme bliss which is infinite and eternal. What is limited and transient points to what is infinite and eternal. The former is not possible in the absence of the latter.

[434]

सोऽयं लौकिक आनन्दो निष्ठां साधनसम्पदा ।
यत्र प्रपद्यते भूम्नि सोऽस्त्यानन्दः परो रसः ॥

There exists Bliss, the supreme *Rasa*, in which this worldly happiness obtained through various means reaches its culmination.

This discussion whether Brahman exists or not which was taken up for consideration in verse (368) is now concluded with this verse.

[435]

अस्तित्वे हेतवः सम्यग्रहणोऽभिहिता यतः ।
उताविद्वानिति प्रश्नः श्रुत्याविक्रियतेऽधुना ॥

Since valid reasons for the existence of Brahman have been stated, (the question whether Brahman exists or not has been answered). Now the (remaining two) questions stated in the text beginning with *utāvidvān* are taken up by *śruti* for consideration.

Of the three questions raised in the sixth *anuvāka*, the question relating to the existence of Brahman was examined by the *śruti* texts

beginning from *so'kāmayata* in the sixth *anuvāka* till *eṣa hyeva ānandayāti* which occurs in the seventh *anuvāka*. The other two questions whether an ignorant man, after departing from here, goes to the other world or not, or whether an enlightened man, after departing from here, attains that world or not, will be examined by *śruti* in the sequel beginning with the passage *yadā hyevaiṣa etasmin*.

[436]

विद्वानेवैति तद्ब्रह्म ह्यभयं भयहेतु यत् ।

तमोमात्रावरुद्धत्वात्तत्प्राप्तेर्नान्यदस्ति हि ॥

Only the wise man attains Brahman in which there is no fear, but which is the cause of fear, because its attainment is obstructed only by the darkness of ignorance; and surely there is no other obstacle.

Śruti maintains that only the man of knowledge (*vidvān*) attains Brahman, but not one who is ignorant of Brahman. This idea is brought out in the *śruti* passage beginning with *yadā hyevaiṣa etasmin* and ending with *abhayaṁ gato bhavati*.

The only obstacle to the attainment of Brahman is *tamas*, the darkness of ignorance. Attainment here consists in knowing the true nature of Brahman, and non-attainment is only ignorance of Brahman. In other cases like reaching a village, one may think of time (*kāla*) and space (*deśa*) as obstacles. Getting the knowledge of the village which a person wants to reach does not mean reaching it at the same time. The village and the person are separated by distance. There is also the factor of time involved in reaching the village. It is, therefore, clear that in the case of reaching a village ignorance of the place to be attained is not the only obstacle. There are other obstacles like time and space as well. The position is quite different in the case of Brahman. Attainment of Brahman is not something which takes place after knowing Brahman. To know Brahman is to attain it; not to know it amounts to not attaining it. Hence, there is no other obstacle to attaining Brahman than *avidyā*.

[437]

व्यवधानं हि यद्यस्मात्तत्तन्मोहैकहेतुकम् ।

यस्मात्तस्मादविद्यैव मोक्षाप्तेर्व्यवधिर्भवेत् ॥

Whatever obstacle there may be (in the case of attaining Brahman), it is caused solely by ignorance. This being so, *avidyā* alone is the obstacle to the attainment of liberation.

This verse reiterates the idea stated in the second line of the previous verse.

[438]

अविद्यासाक्ष्यपि प्रत्यक् सदानस्तमितोदितः ।

अविद्यया व्यवहितस्तद्वलेनैव तद्वचः ॥

Though the inward Self whose light ever shines and never sets is the witness of *avidyā*, it is nevertheless obstructed by *avidyā*. And we speak about that (obstruction) only on the strength of *avidyā*.

The pure consciousness is helpful (*sādhaka*) to *avidyā* inasmuch as it serves as the locus (*āśraya*) of *avidyā*. It is what reveals *avidyā*. While the pure consciousness (*svarūpa-jñāna*) is not opposed to it, the consciousness delimited by the mind (*antaḥkaraṇāvachchinna-caitanya*) is opposed to it. In other words, the knowledge which arises through the mental mode (*vr̥tti-jñāna*) removes ignorance, being opposed to it. That is why the inward Self is said to be the witness of *avidyā*.

We fail to know the inward Self which is always self-luminous by nature because of the obstruction of *avidyā*. How do we know, it may be asked, that *avidyā* is the obstruction which veils the real nature of the Self? The answer is that we come to know of this only through *avidyā*. When we say, for example, that "I am ignorant of the true nature of the Self," we admit that ignorance is the veil which conceals the true nature of the Self (*ātmano yathokta-lakṣaṇasyaivāvidyā-vyavahitatvaṃ avidyā-balādevocyate*).

[439]

विद्वत्ताव्यतिरेकेण यदि तत्प्राप्तिरुच्यते ।
चोद्यमेतत्तदा युक्तं न त्वेवं सति युक्तिमत् ॥

This question (as to why an ignorant man does not attain Brahman) is proper only if it be said that Brahman could be attained without being a knower (of Brahman). But this being the case (that knowledge alone leads to the attainment of Brahman), it is not reasonable.

It was argued earlier in verse (361) that since Brahman is common to both a man of knowledge and an ignorant man, the latter also must attain Brahman like the former. It is necessary to examine this contention carefully. This argument must mean one of two things: either it means that an ignorant man, like a man of knowledge, attains Brahman by removing *avidyā*, which is the cause of bondage, or it means that, since Brahman constitutes the essential nature of an ignorant man in the same way as it constitutes the essential nature of an enlightened one, an ignorant man also attains Brahman in this sense. The first alternative is untenable. If knowledge were not the means to the attainment of Brahman, then it could be argued that a wise man and an ignorant one must be viewed alike in respect of the attainment of Brahman. But since we maintain that Brahman can be attained only through knowledge, the contention that a person who is ignorant can also attain it is untenable.

[440]

या तु साधारणी प्राप्तिरात्मत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः स्वतः ।
विदुषोऽविदुषो वासावस्माभिर्न नियम्यते ॥

But the common attainment (of Brahman as the Self of all) is not restricted by us, since Brahman by nature is the Self of the wise man as well as of the ignorant one.

The second alternative which seeks to explain the attainment of Brahman as the Self of all, the wise as well as the ignorant, is quite

acceptable. If the attainment of Brahman is interpreted in this sense, we do not wish to restrict it only to a man of knowledge. Since Brahman which is the inward Self of all is present in both a man of knowledge and an ignorant man, it is attained as such by both alike.

[441]

अतोऽदिचानिषेधेन सर्वदावाप्तरूपिणः ।
प्राप्तिः स्यादात्महेतुत्वादिति पूर्वमयादिषम् ॥

It has already been said that, since Brahman is the Self of all, from knowledge there is attainment of Brahman, who is always present, by removing ignorance.

The *śruti* text, "The knower of Brahman attains the Supreme," restricts the attainment of Brahman to a man of knowledge. Attainment of Brahman in this sense is not common to both a man of knowledge and an ignorant one. When we say that Brahman-knowledge is the means to the attainment of Brahman, what is meant is that knowing or realizing Brahman is attaining it.

Ānandagiri says that the word *ataḥ* which occurs in the first line of the verse recalls to our memory the knowledge of Brahman, which is the means to the attainment of Brahman (*tattva-jñānaḥ pañcamyā pāramṛśyate*).

[442]

अतः परीक्ष्यते श्रुत्या तदिदानीम्प्रयत्नतः ।
विद्वानेवैति नाविद्वान् यदा हीत्येवमाद्यया ॥

Hence, the truth that only a wise man attains Brahman, and not an ignorant one, is established with great effort by *śruti* in the following passage beginning with *yadā hi*.

The subsequent portion of the *Upaniṣad* beginning with *yadā hyevaiṣa etasmin*, etc., purports to prove that only a wise man attains Brahman by removing *avidyā*.

[443]

विषयानुपातिनी या तु ह्यशेषकरणाश्रया ।
लौकिकत्वात् पदार्थस्य दृशिरत्राभिधीयते ॥

Knowledge here means the cognition of objects obtained through any of the senses, since objects are known through empirical means of knowledge.

The *śruti* text reads: *yadā hyevaiṣa etasminnadṛśye'nātmnye'nirukte anilayane'bhayaṁ pratiṣṭhām vindate*. With a view to explain the meaning of the word *adṛśya* which occurs in this text, the meaning of *dṛśi* is first of all explained in this verse. The meaning of *adṛśya* can be known only if we know the meaning of *dṛśya*, and the latter can be known only if we know the meaning of *dṛśi*. The word *dṛśi* means sense-knowledge, that is, cognition of empirical objects obtained through the visual sense and the like (*dṛśisabdena viśayaviśayaṁ cakṣuḥśrotrādijanyaṁ sarvaṁ jñānamucyate*).

[444]

विशेषवद्भवेद्दृश्यं तद्धि दर्शनमर्हति ।
नित्या दृष्टिरभावो वा नैव दर्शनमर्हति ॥

An object which is perceived possesses certain characteristics, for only such an object is fit to be seen. Neither eternal consciousness nor non-existence is ever perceptible.

Only an object which possesses certain characteristics (*saviśeṣa*) can be perceived. *Dṛśya* is any object which is perceived. What is it, then, which cannot be perceived? *Abhāva* or non-existence cannot be perceived, for it is not an existent entity to be perceived. Nor can Brahman which is pure undifferentiated consciousness be perceived.

Brahman is *adṛśya*, that is, it is not an object of perception, because perceptible characteristics are absent in it.

[445]

दृश्यान्वयि हि यद्वस्तु तदात्म्यमिति भण्यते ।

स्वतो ह्यस्यात्मदारिद्र्यादर्हार्थे लभते च यत् ॥

That characteristic which is commonly present in particular objects which are perceptible is, indeed, said to be the universal. Having no existence in itself, it comes to have existence (only through the particular) as conveyed by the suffix *yat*.

With a view to explain the meaning of *anātmya*, the meaning of *ātmya* is first explained. *Ātmya* means the universal (*sāmānyamātmyaśabdavācya*). The universal is what is uniformly present in the different particulars, as, for example, "cowness" in the different cows. The universal has no existence in itself. It is revealed only through the particulars which it characterises.

Brahman is *anātmya*, because there is no universal or class characteristic in it (*anātmyamiti niḥsāmānyam brahma*).

[446]

स्याद्वा जाग्रदवस्थेयं दृश्यत्वेन प्रसिद्धितः ।

कोशत्रयमिहात्म्यं स्यादात्मार्थत्वसमन्वयात् ॥

Or, by *dr̥śya* is meant (the gross physical universe seen in) the waking state, since it is well-known as perceptible. *Ātmya* here refers to the three sheaths (of vitality, consciousness, and self-consciousness which constitute the subtle body), since they are subservient to the Self.

Sureśvara explains the meaning of the two words, *dr̥śya* and *ātmya* in a different way in this verse.

The word *dr̥śya* stands for the physical universe in its gross aspect (*annamaya*) constituted by the five quintuplicated elements. The perceptible universe is identified with the *Virāj*, the cosmic self of the physical universe in its gross aspect. The word *ātmya* may be under-

stood in the sense of the *Sūtrātman*, the cosmic being in its subtle aspect composed of the *prāṇamaya*, the *manomaya*, and the *vijñānamaya*, the cosmic self of the subtle universe constituted by the five unquintuplicated elements. In short, while *dṛśya* stands for whatever is gross, *ātmya* stands for the subtle (*samastameva sthūlān kāryān dṛśya-sabda-vācyam, sarvameva sūkṣmān kāryān ātmya-sabda-vācyam*).

[447]

पञ्चमोऽत्र निरुक्तः स्यात् पारिशेष्यात् कलात्मकः ।
अत्यानन्दमयं ब्रह्म त्वनिरुक्तम्परम्पदम् ॥

The word *nirukta* here stands for the fifth sheath (viz., the *ānandamaya-kośa*), the enjoyer of the fruit (of *upāsana* and *karma*), because it is what is left over. Brahman, the supreme goal, which transcends the *ānandamaya*, is *aniruktam*.

Of the five sheaths, *dṛśya* stands for the *annamaya-kośa*, *ātmya* for the next three *kośas* and *nirukta* for the *ānandamaya-kośa*, the *jīva* who is the semblance of the pure consciousness.

The word *anirukta* refers by implication to the pure consciousness which is beyond cause and effect and which is implied by the word "Thou" (*kārya-kāraṇa-vinirmuktaṁ tvampada-lakṣyam cinmātramanirukta-sabda-vācyam*).

[448]

निलीयते जगद्यस्मिन्निलीनं जायते यतः ।
निलयं तत् परम्ब्रूमः कोशपञ्चककारणम् ॥

That supreme Unmanifested Brahman in which the universe is merged, whence the submerged universe comes into being, and which is the cause of the five sheaths — that we call *nīlayana*.

The *Avyākṛta*, the Unmanifested Brahman, is the cause of the universe. It is that in which the universe is merged at the time of *pralaya*. It is from the same *Avyākṛta* that the dissolved universe comes into be-

ing at the time of creation. Since it is the abode for the entire universe, it is called *nilayana*.

The word *anilayana* refers to Brahman, the eternal, ever-free, pure consciousness, which is implied by the word "That" and which constitutes the *svarūpa* of the *jīva* (*anilayana-sabdena totpada-lakṣyam, nitya-suddha-buddha-mukta-svabhāvam tvampadārīha-svarūpabhūtam brahmocyate*). Since in the *śruti* text *anirukte anilayane abhayaṁ pratiṣṭhāṁ vindate*, the two words *anirukta* and *anilayana* are in co-ordinate relation, they refer to one and the same being, viz., Brahman-Ātman.

[449]

सच्च त्यच्चादि वापेक्ष्य निषेधोऽयमिहोच्यते ।
प्राप्तिर्ह्यभवदित्युक्ता चारु प्राप्तनिषेधनम् ॥

Or, in respect of the gross and subtle forms, etc., (mentioned earlier), their negation is stated here (in this text). Since it was said that Brahman became this all, the existence of the world (in Brahman) has been stated. The negation of what is given is proper.

The *śruti* text *etasminnadr̥ṣye'nātmye'nirukte'nilayane* is now explained in a different way.

Brahman, it was stated earlier, became the gross and the subtle. From this it may be thought that the universe of gross and subtle forms exist in Brahman. What is given or suggested alone can be negated. The negative words *adr̥ṣya*, *anātmya*, and so on are intended to deny the existence of gross and subtle forms in Brahman, because Brahman is *nirviśeṣa*, free from specifications, and *nirvikāra*, free from forms. Since the *śruti* text which we are explaining here is in the negative form, such an interpretation is quite sound.

[450]

मूर्तामूर्तौ हि राशी द्वौ सच्च त्यच्चादिनोदितौ ।
श्रुत्यन्तरेण सङ्गानात्तयोरेवास्त्वपह्नुतिः ॥

By *sat* and *tyat*, etc., the two categories, viz., the gross and the subtle forms, have been spoken of. Since this (explanation) is in agreement with another *śruti* text, the denial of these is meant (here).

The gross and the subtle are the two forms of Brahman. The gross form (*mūrta*) indicated by the word *sat* includes earth, water, and fire. The remaining two elements, air and ether, constitute the subtle form (*amūrta*) indicated by the word *tyat*. After explaining the two forms of Brahman, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (II, iii, 6) describes Brahman as "not this, not this." The same *Upaniṣad* in a subsequent section (III, ix, 26) speaks of the Self as that which has been described as "not this, not this", and says that the Self is imperceptible (*agṛhya*), undecaying (*aśīrya*), unattached (*asaṅga*), and so on. The negative description of Brahman as *adr̥śya*, *anātmya*, *anirukta*, and so on, given in the *Taittirīya* is in agreement with the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* description of Brahman as *neti neti*.

[451]

अस्मिन्पक्षे तु निलयो वासनानिलयो भवेत् ।

एवञ्च नेति नेतीति साक्षात् स्याद्ब्रह्मदर्शनम् ॥

In this interpretation, *nilaya* means the internal organ which is the abode of all impressions. Thus, through the process of negation as "not this, not this", Brahman-realization becomes immediate.

Earlier in verse (448), the word *nilaya* was interpreted to mean the Unmanifested Brahman which is the source of the entire universe. Now it is explained in the sense of *antaḥkaraṇa* which is the abode of all impressions (*vāsanānilaya*). Since the two words *adr̥śya* and *anātmya* serve to negate the gross and the subtle, and since the denial of the Unmanifested Brahman, the primary cause, is included in the denial of the subtle, there is no need to negate it separately. So the word *anilayana* is now interpreted as negating the *antaḥkaraṇa*.

The significance of the four words—*adr̥śya*, *anātmīya*, *anirukta*, and *anilayana*—may be stated as follows. *Adr̥śya* and *anātmīya* serve to bring out the meaning implied by the word “That” through the process of clarification (*śodhana*). The remaining two words—*anirukta* and *anilayana*—bring out the meaning implied by the word “Thou” through the process of clarification.

In verse (447) the word *anirukta* was explained as negating the *jīva*. In order to get rid of the *jīvatva*, the *antaḥkaraṇa* which is the abode of all impressions should disappear. So the word *anilayana* is interpreted as negating the internal organ.

[452]

भावाभावात्मिका बुद्धिर्यत आत्मापचारिणी ।

भावाभावनिषेधेन प्रतीचि स्थाप्यते ततः ॥

Since the intellect, which is engrossed in the existence and non-existence of the things of the world, is the cause of misery to the Self, by negating both existence and non-existence (of things), it is made to dwell in the Self (by *śruti*).

The things of the world, which are related in terms of the causal principle, are not-Self. The mind will not be drawn towards the Self so long as it is interested in the things of the world—in their existence and non-existence. If the mind is to be drawn inward towards the Self, it is first of all necessary to deny the cause-effect-world which is not-Self. When the mind of a person dwells firmly in the Self, he attains Self-realization. Inasmuch as the negation of the world is necessary for the attainment of Self-realization, it is wrong to think that the denial of the world of plurality does not serve any purpose.

[453]

दृश्यादिप्रतिषेधोक्त्या प्रतीचि ब्रह्म बोध्यते ।

न तदन्यत्तादन्यस्य परमार्थात्मता कुतः ॥

Through the negation of the world which is perceptible, etc., the oneness of Brahman and the Self is taught (by *śruti*). Brahman is not different from the Self. How can any other thing (than the Self) be absolutely real?

Though the *śruti* text *etasminnadrśye'nūtmnye*, etc., serves to negate the cause-effect-world, its purport is in the revelation of the nature of the Self and not in the negation of the world. The negation of the things of the world which are perceptible, insentient, and finite is a logical preliminary to the revelation of the nature of the Self (*niṣedhasya vastusiddhau dvāratvāt na niṣedhaparāṃ vākyaṃ, kintu vastuparam*).

Śruti teaches that Brahman is in the Self (*praticī-brahma bodhyate*). It only means that Brahman is identical with the Self and not something different from it. If Brahman were to be something different from the Self, it would cease to be real.

[454]

न नञर्थो विकल्पो वा परमार्थमकल्पितम् ।
असम्प्रविश्य संसिद्धिं लभते कचिदन्यतः ॥

Neither negation nor an illusory appearance can be thought of anywhere without relation to Brahman, the absolute, the real.

There is no illusion without a substratum. In the absence of a rope which serves as the substratum, the illusory appearance of a snake does not take place. The snake which is illusory has no being of its own apart from the substratum on which it is super-imposed (*kalpitasya adhiṣṭhānameva svarūpam*). Negation, too, implies an object from which a thing is negated. We have to say that a horse is not in a cow, or that a pot is not on the ground. The denial of the world of plurality implies the Self from which it is negated, in the same way as the illusory appearance of the world implies this Self as the substratum for the appearance of the world-illusion. Brahman-Ātman alone is real.

[455]

दृश्यादिगुणहीनस्य स्वत आत्मत्वकारणात् ।
वेत्ति विन्दत इत्यस्मादैकार्थ्यादुपसंहतिः ।

Since Brahman, which is free from perceptible qualities and so on, is by its very nature identical with the Self, and since the words *veti* and *vindate* refer to one and the same thing, there is the conclusion (with *vindate*, after having begun with *veti*).

This verse brings out the purport of *śruti* which begins by saying that he who *knows* Brahman attains the Supreme (*brahmavidāpnotiparam*) and concludes by saying that a person who *obtains* a fearless ground in Brahman (*abhayam pratiṣṭhāni vindate*) becomes fearless. The significance of the words "knows" (*veti*) and "obtains" (*vindate*) must be noted here. Since Brahman which has been described as imperceptible and so on is no other than the inward Self, there is nothing else to be done with regard to that excepting to know its real nature. None but the Self can be gained by mere knowledge. To know it is to attain it, and to be ignorant of it is not to attain it. Here the object which a person knows is not different from the object which he obtains as his support or ground. It is the same Brahman-Ātman which a person knows and thereby attains as his fearless ground. It is to convey this idea that *śruti* in the beginning speaks about the person who knows Brahman and concludes by referring to him as one who obtains fearless ground in Brahman which is *adrśya*, *anātmya*, etc.

[456]

दृश्यादिगुणहीनेऽस्मिन्निरविद्यो यदाभयम् ।
साक्षाद्वेत्ति तदैवायमभयं विन्दते परम् ॥

When a person directly knows the fearless Brahman which is imperceptible, etc., (as his own Self), at that very moment itself, being free from *avidyā*, he attains the fearless supreme Brahman.

This verse explains the meaning of the expression *abhayaṁ vindate*.

[457]

ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठेति यदभाणि पुरा सकृत् ।
तेनैकवाक्यतार्थाय प्रतिष्ठामिति भण्यते ॥

The word *pratiṣṭhām* is uttered with a view to show that this text forms one sentence with the text, "Brahman is the tail, the support," which has been stated earlier once.

The word *pratiṣṭhā* which occurs in the text *abhayaṁ pratiṣṭhām vindate* conveys the idea that the end to be attained by Brahman-knowledge is Brahman itself.

Ekavākyatā means sentence-unity or syntactical unity. There is syntactical unity between the text *abhayaṁ pratiṣṭhām vindate* and the earlier one *brahma pucchaṁ pratiṣṭhā* which occurs at the end of the fifth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad*.

So the *śruti* passage *yadā hyevaiṣa etasmin... atha so'bhayaṁ gato bhavati* means that when a person attains Brahman-knowledge, he attains Brahman, the fearless, i.e., he becomes established in fearlessness.

To the question whether a man of knowledge attains Brahman or not, the answer is that he does attain Brahman. This issue has been dealt with in verses (436) to (457).

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अथाधुना यथाऽविद्वान् प्रेत्य नैति परं पदम् ।
व्याख्यायते तथा स्पष्टं हीत्येवमाद्यया ॥

That an ignorant person, having departed from this world, does not attain the highest goal is now explained clearly by the text beginning with *yadā hi*.

After establishing that the man of wisdom attains the supreme Brahman, *śruti* now proceeds to show that an ignorant man does not

attain Brahman. This is the purport of the *śruti* passage beginning with *yadā hyevaiṣa etasmīnnudaramantaram kurute*, etc.

[459]

सदा लब्धात्मकस्यापि यतोऽज्ञानमनातिकृत् ।

अवाधुच्चैरतः श्रुत्या विद्वानेतीति सादरम् ॥

Since ignorance makes what is ever attained appear as unattained, it is emphatically declared by *śruti* with great care that the man of knowledge attains (Brahman).

Though Brahman-Ātman is ever attained, due to ignorance a person thinks that it is not attained. If it is admitted that knowledge is the means to the attainment of Brahman, it would follow that the attainment of Brahman is not possible for one who is ignorant.

[460]

यस्मादेवं ततोऽविद्वाल्लभते न तमीश्वरम् ।

अविद्याव्यवधानाद्भि लब्ध एव न लभ्यते ॥

Such being the case, an ignorant man does not attain *Īśvara*; for, what is already attained is not attained because of the obstruction of *avidyā*.

Being the inward Self of every one of us, Brahman is always attained. So in the case of an ignorant man, if it appears to be unattained, it is because of *avidyā* which, veiling its real nature, makes it appear as though it is unattained.

[561]

यदा ह्येवैष आत्मैको दृश्यत्वादिविर्जितः ।

एतस्मिन्वर्तमानोऽपि वञ्चितोऽविद्ययैव हि ॥

Though this person as the non-dual Self, which is free from perceptible and other qualities, remains, indeed, in

this Brahman (as identical with it), being deceived only by *avidyā* (he thinks as if it is unattained).

This verse explains the meanings of the words *yadā hyevaiṣa etasmin*.

[462]

हस्तप्राप्तमपि द्रव्यमप्राप्तमिव मन्यते ।
मोहादेवमनासिः स्यादात्मनोऽपि ममात्मनः ॥

Just as a person thinks that an object which is in hand is unattained due to ignorance, even so Brahman which is one's inward Self appears to be unattained through ignorance.

The idea conveyed in the previous verse is now explained by means of an example.

[463]

अविद्यया तदोद्धृत्य रज्जू रज्जुमिव स्वयम् ।
अहित्वेनाद्वयाद्बोधात् कुरुते कर्तृभोक्तृभिः ॥

Just as a rope makes itself a serpent through *avidyā*, even so the *jīva*, separating, then, from the non-dual consciousness (which is Brahman) through *avidyā*, makes himself an agent and an enjoyer.

This verse explains the result that follows consequent on the work of *avidyā*. Though the *jīva* in his essential nature is identical with Brahman which is non-dual and eternal consciousness, he thinks, due to *avidyā*, that he is different from Brahman and considers himself an agent and an enjoyer.

[464]

अरं छिद्रं भिदान्यत्वं वेद्यवेत्तृत्वलक्षणम् ।
यस्मादुत्कुरुते मोहादात्मनो ब्रह्मणः स्वतः ॥

Since through ignorance he makes, though a slight difference between himself and Brahman as the knower and the known, (he is one in possession of illusory cognition).

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* text *udaramantaram kurute*. *Udaram* (*ut* plus *aram*) means even a slight. *Antaram* means *chidram*, that is, hole, separation, difference.

[465]

अन्योऽसावीश्वरो सत्तस्तस्माच्चाहमनीश्वरः ।

इति च्छिद्रयतोऽच्छिद्रं छिद्रेऽनर्थो भवेद्भयम् ॥

That *Īśvara* is different from me, and so am I different from *Īśvara* - - thus making a difference where there is no difference, he attains the evil of fear in that difference.

The *śruti* text *atha tasya bhayaṁ bhavati* states the result which follows consequent on the perception of difference between the *jīva* and Brahman. An ignorant man who thinks that he is different from Brahman, though this difference being the work of *avidyā* is not real, is subject to fear.

The word *anīśvaraḥ* which occurs in the first line of the verse means *īśvarādanyaḥ*, different from *īśvara*.

[466]

निर्भयोऽपि स्वतोऽविद्वानेकं सन्तमनेकधा ।

प्रकल्प्याविद्ययात्मानं तमेव भयमाप्नुयात् ॥

Though by his very nature he has no cause of fear, the ignorant man imagines the one existent Self as many through ignorance, and only because of *Hini* (the Self whom he sees as different) attains fear.

An ignorant man attains fear, that is, is caught up in the wheel of transmigratory existence since he looks upon the Self as different from Brahman.

[467]

भयहेतोर्द्वितीयस्य हिशब्देन परिग्रहात् ।
द्वितीयद्वै भयं हीति श्रुतिरुच्चैरतोऽन्वशात् ॥

Since by the word *hi* (in the *śruti* text) it is conveyed that a second object is the cause of fear, *śruti* has loudly declared, elsewhere, "From the second, verily, fear arises."

This verse brings out the significance of *hi* which occurs in the *śruti* text *yadā hyevaiṣa etasminnudaramantarān kurute*.

Since in the state of ignorance he sees in the Self something different, he is subject to fear. This idea has also been stated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (I, iv, 2) which is quoted in the second line of the verse.

[468]

ईशितव्याद्विभक्तो मद्यस्मादीशो भयङ्करः ।
इति कल्पयतस्तस्मादभयं जायते भयम् ॥

Inasmuch as he imagines that the Lord, being different from him who is ruled, is the source of fear, from Brahman in whom there is nothing to cause fear arises fear.

The all-pervasive Brahman is non-different from the inward Self of every being. Thinking that Brahman is different from his inward Self, if an ignorant man looks upon it as God, the Lord of the world, and considers himself as a worldly creature different from, and controlled by, Him, that very Brahman which is *abhayam* becomes a source of fear to him. The idea is that the perception of difference where there is no difference is the cause of fear.

[469]

अहो बलमविद्याया अतिशेते न कश्चन ।
अग्न्यादिभयहेतोर्या ब्रह्मणोऽपि भयङ्करी ॥

Ah! None lies beyond the power of *avidyā* which causes fear even to Brahman whom *Āgni* and other gods fear.

This verse and the next one bring out the power of *avidyā*.

It will be stated in the next *anuvāka* that *Āgni*, *Indra*, and other gods discharge their functions out of fear of Brahman, the ruler. That very Brahman, who is the inner controller of all gods, who is the source of fear to all of them, is overcome by fear due to *avidyā*.

[470]

निर्भयो भयकृदेव ईश्वराणामपीश्वरः ।

भयं तस्यापि जनयेन्नाज्ञानस्यास्त्यगोचरः ॥

Īśvara, the ruler of even the gods, is fearless and causes fear to the gods. Even to Him, *avidyā* causes fear. So none is beyond the reach of *avidyā*.

[471]

यज्ज्ञात्वा विन्दते विद्वानभयं हीत्यवादिषम् ।

तत्त्वेवाभयकृद्ब्रह्म स्यान्मोहादात्मनो भयम् ॥

It has been said that having known Brahman the man of knowledge attains, indeed, fearlessness. Nevertheless, that very Brahman who causes fearlessness becomes a source of fear to the Self due to ignorance.

In the light of what has been said above we must understand the meaning of the expression *tattveva bhayam* which occurs in the *śruti* text.

It was stated earlier that the wise man gets fearlessly established in Brahman which is *adr̥śya*, *anātmya*, and so on (*abhayaṁ pratiṣṭhām vindate*), and that he attains the state of fearlessness (*abhayaṁ gato bhavati*). While to the wise man Brahman is the fearless support, the very same Brahman (*tat eva*) is the source of fear to one who is ignorant. The central idea that the state of knowledge goes with the attainment of fearlessness and that the state of ignorance is connected with the state of fear is brought out through the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*.

[472]

निषिद्धदृश्यत्वाद्येकमभयं मोहनिहवात् ।
यत्तस्यैव भयं तत्स्यादविद्यावशवर्तिनः ॥

That Brahman which is one and fearless because of the removal of the perceptible qualities and also because of the removal of ignorance, turns out to be a source of fear to him who is under the control of *avidyā*.

[473]

अपि बालाग्रमात्रेण विदुषः प्रत्यगात्मनः ।
भिन्नब्रह्मेति संमोहादात्मैवास्य भयम्भवेत् ॥
व्याख्यानं वा पुरोक्तस्य च्छिद्रस्य क्रियतेऽनया ॥

To the (apparently) learned man, who, on account of ignorance, sees Brahman as different from the inward Self to such a small extent as the tip of a hair, his very Self becomes a source of fear. Or, another explanation of difference spoken of earlier is given by this (passage).

The two preceding verses have set forth the meaning of the expression *tattveva bhayam*. This verse explains the meaning of *viduṣo'man-vānasya* which is the remaining part of the *śruti* text.

Here the word *viduṣaḥ* means a person who is apparently learned. The learning of such a person is only outward. Though learned, he is still ignorant because he perceives difference between Brahman and the Self.

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अमन्वानस्य तद्ब्रह्म विदुषोऽपि भयङ्करम् ॥
वेद्यवेत्तृत्वशून्यत्वाद्विद्वत्तापि तमोमयी ।
रजतत्वादिवच्छुक्तावमन्वानो भवेदतः ॥

Brahman is the source of fear even to the learned man who is unreflective. Since Brahman is neither the knower nor the known, a person who thinks that he is a knower is full of ignorance in the same way as it is ignorance to see silver in the nacre. Hence, such a person is unreflective.

Brahman-Ātman is not an object which is known. If it were an object like a tree which is known, it would cease to be real. Nor is it a knower in the real sense of the term. Though we refer to it as the knower with a view to distinguish it from the not-Self which is known (*veāya*), even this mode of speech, strictly speaking, is not tenable. So long as there is *vyavahāra*, by presupposing objects which are known, we speak of Brahman-Ātman as the knower. Our mode of speech employing the logic of dichotomy between the Self as the knower and the not-Self as the known is meaningful only in the context of *avidyā*, which is presupposed in all our discourse and business of life. Brahman-Ātman by its very nature is free from attribute (*nirguṇa*), free from specification (*nirviśeṣa*). So it is neither the known nor the knower.

A person who claims that he knows the Self is really under illusion like the one who sees a piece of shell as silver, for his claim amounts to seeing in the Self what is not there. Just as there is no silverness in shell, so also there is no knownness (*vedyatva*) in the Self, which is *nirguṇa*. Such a person, though learned, is unreflective.

[476]

यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः ।
विदिताविदिताभ्यां तदन्यदेवेति हि श्रुतिः ॥

“It is known to him to whom it is unknown; he does not know to whom it is known.” *Śruti*, indeed, says that (Brahman) is different from the known and the unknown.

That a person who says, “I know Brahman,” does not know it, is stated in the *Kena Upaniṣad* (II, 3) which is quoted in the first line of the verse.

The second line of the verse refers to another text (I, 4) from the same *Upaniṣad* which says that Brahman is different from the known and that it is beyond the unknown. In the course of his commentary on this text, Śaṅkara observes: "Whatever is known is limited, mortal, and full of misery; and hence it is to be rejected. So when it is said that Brahman is different from the known, it amounts to asserting that it is not to be rejected. Similarly, when it is affirmed that it is different from the unknown, it amounts to saying that it is not a thing to be obtained." So the *śruti* text which says that Brahman is different from the known and the unknown means that Brahman is not an object to be rejected or obtained.

[477]

अन्यदेव हि तद्वेद्यादवेद्यादन्यदेव तत् ।
वेद्यवेत्तृद्वयाच्चान्यदिति क्षुत्यनुशासनम् ॥

The instruction of *śruti* is that Brahman is surely different from what is known, that it is different from what is not known, and that it is different from both the known and the knower.

The meaning intended to be conveyed by the text from the *Kena Upaniṣad* (I, 4) referred to above is brought out in this verse.

[478]

वेद्यावेद्यात्मता यस्माच्छब्दाद्यर्थानुपातिनी ।
वेद्यवेत्तृत्वमप्येवमन्यथा तदसङ्गतेः ॥

The nature of being what is known or unknown is true of sound and other objects which are insentient. In the same way the nature of being a knower of the known is true of the internal organ which is insentient. (So the Self is pure consciousness). If it is otherwise, (what *śruti* teaches about the Self) is untenable.

Śruti texts were cited to show that Brahman-Ātman is neither an object which is known, nor an object which is not known, nor a knower.

Why is it, it may be asked, that Brahman-Ātman is not any of these? The cognition which we have is always the cognition of insentient objects such as sound, colour, and so on. That is to say, the characteristic of being known (*vedyāmatvam*) holds good only with regard to insentient objects when they are objects of cognition. When we do not have the cognition of an object, that object is said to be unknown. The characteristic of being what is unknown belongs to an insentient object. So the known and the unknown would comprise insentient objects. The internal organ, which is the knower of objects, is also insentient. When the modification it undergoes is illumined by consciousness, it becomes a knower (*jñāī*). So the nature of being a knower (*vetṭṭva* or *jñānakarṭṭva*) is true of the internal organ alone, which carries the semblance of consciousness. In short, the knower, that which is known, and that which is not known are insentient. Since the Self is pure consciousness, it is neither a knower, nor what is known, nor what is unknown. If it were to be any of these, the teaching of *śruti* that the Self is immutable, non-dual, pure consciousness which is Brahman could not be justified.

[479]

व्युत्थाप्य वेद्याद्विद्याया वेत्तुश्चाज्ञानकल्पितात् ।
तदन्येभ्यश्च जानीयादहं ब्रह्मेतिवाक्यतः ॥

Distinguishing the Self from what is known and (the resulting) cognition as also from the knower, and again distinguishing the Self from their opposites, which are all set up by *ajñāna*, one should know, "I am Brahman," from the *śruti* text.

If the Self is free from all characteristics and specifications, how is it, it may be asked, to be known? This verse explains the mode of realizing the Self.

The Self is not a knower. It is not of the nature of the cognition obtained through the mental mode (*vṛtti-jñāna*). And also it is not what

is known. Just as the Self has to be distinguished from these three, even so it must be distinguished from their opposites, viz., that which does not know, ignorance, and that which is not known. All these in the two series, each of which comprises three factors, are due to the work of *avidyā*. So distinguishing the Self from these, one should know it as no other than Brahman, as taught in the *śruti* texts like *tat tvam asi*.

If a person sees Brahman as different from the Self, then it becomes, as stated earlier, a source of fear.

The explanation of the seventh *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad* commenced in verse (415) comes to an end with this verse.

[480]

यथोक्तबोधविरहादीश्वराणामपीश्वराः ।
प्रतीचो ब्रह्मणो भीताः स्वकर्माणि प्रकुर्वते ॥

For want of the knowledge (of non-difference) as stated above, even the lords of lords (such as *Agni*) do their respective works, afraid of Brahman, the inward Self.

The eighth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad* is covered by verses (480) to (594).

With a view to reiterate the teaching of the *Brāhmaṇa* portion, viz., that there is fear for him who sees Brahman as different from the Self, there is a verse *bhīṣā'smādvātaḥ pavate*, etc., at the commencement of the eighth *anuvāka*. It says: "Out of fear towards Him, the Wind blows. Out of fear the Sun rises. Out of fear towards Him runs Fire, as also Indra and Death, the fifth."

[481]

वातादयो महावीर्याः स्वतन्त्रा बहुशालिनः ।
तेऽपि भीताः प्रवर्तन्ते ब्रह्मणोऽपि महत्तमाः ॥

Wind and other gods are very powerful beings; they are independent, very mighty, and are endowed with great lustre. In spite of these, they, too, are engaged in their works being afraid of Brahman.

[482]

यस्माद्ब्रह्मण आनन्दाद्भीता वातादयोऽवशाः ।
स्वकर्मसु प्रवर्तन्ते भृत्याः स्वामिभयादिव ॥
तस्यानन्दस्य नीमांसा विचारः क्रियतेऽधुना ॥

Since Wind and other gods who are independent do their works being afraid of Bliss which is Brahman, in the same way as servants do their works being afraid of their master, the *mīmāṃsā*, i.e., an inquiry into bliss is now undertaken.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* text *saiṣā ānandasya mīmāṃsā bhavati*.

Mīmāṃsā means *vicāra*, inquiry. It is necessary to inquire whether bliss which is Brahman is sensuous, that is to say, whether it arises from the sense-object contact like empirical pleasure or whether it is natural (*svābhāvika*), i.e., ever existent.

[483]

उत्कर्षेतरहीनोऽसौ य आनन्दोऽधिगम्यते ॥

That bliss which is spoken of (here for the purpose of inquiry) is that which has neither a higher nor a lower.

Brahman-bliss is incomparable. It cannot, strictly speaking, be placed in a hierarchy of pleasures for the purpose of comparison. That is why it is said that there is nothing which is higher or lower than Brahman-bliss, which is free from specific characteristics (*sarvaviśeṣa-varjita*).

[484]

दृष्टः सातिशयस्तावदानन्दः कर्महेतुकः ।

आब्रह्मनरपर्यन्ते लोकेऽस्माभिः प्रमाणतः ॥

It is known to us from experience that the happiness (of all beings) in the world from Brahmā down to the human being is the result of their (previous) *karma*, and is comparable.

Brahman-bliss is incomparable (*niratiśaya*). But the happiness which is experienced by all creatures, being the fruit of their previous deeds, is comparable (*sātiśaya*), i.e., it admits of comparison.

[485]

उत्कृष्यमाणो यत्रायं परां निष्ठां प्रपद्यते ।

अनापन्नादिमध्यान्तं तद्ब्रह्मेत्यवधारयेत् ॥

That must be understood as Brahman-bliss, having no beginning, middle, and end, wherein this (empirical) happiness rising higher and higher reaches its culmination.

Brahman-bliss is not caused by, or dependent upon, the sense-object contact. It is not, therefore, finite or limited in nature having a beginning and an end in point of time. But the empirical happiness which we experience is limited. It also admits of gradation in respect of both quantity and quality. A particular pleasure may be rated as more intense than another or as superior to another. In short, the empirical happiness admits of comparison. Speaking in terms of the calculus of pleasure, we have to say that Brahman-bliss is at the end of the scale, that it represents the culmination of the ever-increasing empirical happiness arranged in a graduated scale from the lower to the higher.

[486]

ब्रह्मादिनरपर्यन्तं पुण्यकर्मानुरूपतः ।

उपजीवति लोकोऽयं यस्यानन्दस्य विप्रुषम् ॥

All beings in the world from *Brahmā* down to man live on a drop of this Brahman-bliss in accordance with their good deeds.

It should not be thought that there are two kinds of happiness — empirical happiness which is *sāttvika* and Brahman-bliss which is *nirātīva* — which are basically different. The infinite unsurpassable bliss appears to be limited admitting of various degrees as it springs forth in our minds in accordance with our previous meritorious deeds (*sa eva brahmānandaḥ śubhakarman-janīta-buddhivṛttiyavacchinnaḥ sāttvikaḥ*). What is unlimited and unsurpassable becomes limited and surpassable because of the mental mode (*buddhi-vṛtti*) in which it manifests. That whatever happiness a being enjoys is only a drop or a particle of the infinite bliss which is Brahman is clearly brought out by the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (IV, iii, 32) which says: "On a particle of this very bliss other beings live." So it is wrong to think that there are two kinds of happiness.

[487]

उत्तरोत्तरवृद्धयैवं मनुष्यादधि तं वयम् ।

प्रतिपद्यामहे साक्षादानन्दं स्वात्मनि स्थितम् ॥

Thus rising higher and higher (in the scale) from man upwards, we can directly experience that Brahman-bliss which is inherent in the Self.

This verse purports to show that the limited happiness which is surpassable is the means (*upāya*) for understanding the infinite happiness which is unsurpassable. Starting from the happiness of man, the *Upaniṣad* in the sequel will speak about the happiness of *manuṣya-gan-*

dharva, *deva-gandharva*, and so on, and finally of the happiness of the *Hiranyagarbha*. It will be stated that the happiness of *manuṣya-gandharva* is a hundred times better than that of man, the happiness of *deva-gandharva* a hundred times better than that of *manuṣya-gandharva*, and so on. That is Brahman-bliss which is at the end of the scale, which is infinite, and unsurpassable

[488]

विषयेन्द्रियसम्बन्धसमुत्थो वा भवेदयम् ।
लौकिकानन्दवत् स्याद्वा सर्वसाधननिस्पृहः ॥

Is this (Brahman-bliss) generated by the contact of the sense and the object like the worldly happiness? Or, is it independent of all means?

It was stated earlier in verse (482) that we have to inquire into the nature of Brahman-bliss which is the source of fear to *Agni* and other gods. This verse states the way in which it has to be inquired into.

[489]

तत्र लौकिक आनन्दो बाह्याध्यात्मिकसाधनः ।
सम्पन्निमित्तो यो दृष्टः सैषेति स इहोच्यते ॥

As to that, the worldly happiness obtained through external means and bodily accomplishments is here referred to by the word *ānanda* in the text *saiṣā*.

This verse explains the meaning of the word *ānanda* which occurs in the text *saiṣā ānandasya mīmāṃsā bhavati*.

[490]

उत्कृष्यमाणेनानेन ह्यस्मद्गोचरवर्तिना ।
असाधनमसाध्यं तमानन्दं व्याचक्ष्महे ॥

By increasing this happiness, which is, indeed, within our reach, to the highest point, we shall indicate that Brahman-bliss which is unaccomplished and which does not require any means.

First we start with the limited and surpassable happiness which human beings enjoy with a view to indicate thereby the infinite, unsurpassable Brahman-bliss. We start with what is familiar to us as the means to comprehending Brahman-bliss. If we go on raising human happiness higher and higher, we will at one stage reach a point beyond which we cannot proceed further. That highest point would represent Brahman-bliss. Brahman-bliss is ever-existent. It is not accomplished or produced by anything (*asādhya*). It does not require any means for its existence (*asādhana*).

[491]

निष्ठां सातिशयं यस्मात् स्वतोऽनतिशयात्मनि ।
गच्छदीक्षामहे यस्मादेवमानन्द ईक्ष्यताम् ॥

Inasmuch as we see that what is surpassable culminates in what is unsurpassable in itself, happiness too must therefore, be understood in the same way.

This verse and the following one state that what is surpassable and measurable is a pointer to what is unsurpassable and immeasurable. The same principle must be applied in the case of human happiness which is a pointer to Brahman-bliss.

[492]

येयं सातिशया सङ्ख्याऽसङ्ख्येयार्थावसायिनी ।
यथैवमस्मदानन्दः स्यात् परानन्दनिष्ठितः ॥

Just as whatever admits of a higher measure ends in what is immeasurable, even so our happiness culminates in the supreme bliss.

[493]

आविष्करिष्यन्त्याहात इममर्थं श्रुतिः स्वयम् ।
बहिष्प्रवणदृष्टीनां स्वतोऽसामर्थ्यदर्शनात् ॥

Therefore, *śruti* itself with a view to explain speaks about this idea, since those whose vision is directed outwards are unable to understand it by themselves.

Since the limited, surpassable bliss serves as the means to our understanding the infinite, unsurpassable Brahman-bliss, *śruti* itself in the passage *yuvā syāt*, etc., proceeds to give an account of it in its different gradations starting from the happiness of man.

It is true that Brahman-bliss is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) by its very nature, and does not therefore require any means for knowing it. But those who are drawn towards, and engrossed in, external objects are not able to understand its real nature. It is for their benefit that *śruti* proceeds to set forth the nature of Brahman-bliss starting with an inquiry into the nature of worldly happiness.

[494]

युवा प्रथमवयाः स्याद्यूनः साधुयुवेति किम् ।
पञ्चविंशाब्दिकः साधुरिति साधुयुवोच्यते ॥

The word *yuvā* (in the *śruti* text) means one in the prime of life. Why is it that an adjective "good" has been used to the word "youth" in the expression *sādhuyuvā*? (By youth is meant) one who has attained twentyfive years. By using the adjective "good", one who is good as well as young is referred to.

This verse explains the meaning of the word *yuvā*, which occurs in the *śruti* text. A youth is one who is in the prime of life and has attained twentyfive years.

Śruti uses the expression *sādhuyuvā*, a good youth. The reason for the use of the adjective "good" will be stated in the next verse.

[495]

मिशः सव्यभिचारित्वात् साधुयौवनयोरतः ।

विशेषणमिदं तस्मात् पुनः साधुयुवेति हि ॥

This qualification has been used, since goodness and youthfulness are mutually inconstant. Hence the *śruti* text refers again (to the youth) as, indeed, a "good youth".

A youth may be bad, and a good man may not be young. There is the possibility of one of them (goodness) being present, while the other (youthfulness) is absent: that is to say, they are mutually inconstant. In the present context we are concerned with a person who is both young and good. Hence the specification "a good youth" (*sādhuyuvā*). *Śruti* first of all begins by saying, "Suppose there is a young man." With a view to emphasize that the young man we have in view in this context must also be good, *śruti* immediately gives the specification by referring to the young man once again as a good youth.

[496]

अध्येति सर्वमध्येयमतोऽध्यायक उच्यते ।

क्षिप्रकार्यतिशायित्वादाशिष्ठोऽसौ भवेदतः ॥

A person studies all that has to be studied and is, therefore, said to be *adhyāyaka*. Since he is the best among those who are quick in action, he is *āśiṣṭha*.

This verse explains the meanings of the words *adhyāyakaḥ* and *āśiṣṭhaḥ*, which occur in the text. *Adhyāyakaḥ* means *ādhīta-vedaḥ*, one who has studied the Vedas.

[497]

समग्राशेषचार्वङ्गो द्रढिष्ठः परिकीर्त्यते ।
अभिभूय यतः सर्वान् बलिनो वर्तते ततः ॥
बलिष्ठेन विद्वद्भिः कीर्त्यते पृथुकीर्तिभिः ॥

One whose all bodily organs are beautifully formed is said to be *dradhiṣṭhaḥ*. Since he excels all strong men, he is said to be *baliṣṭhaḥ* by the wise who are praiseworthy.

Two other words *dradhiṣṭhaḥ* and *baliṣṭhaḥ* which are used by *śruti* as descriptive epithets of the young man in the context, are explained in this verse.

[498]

यावदाध्यात्मिकं किञ्चित्पुम्भिरापेक्ष्यते क्वचित् ।
दृष्टादृष्टेष्टभोगाय तेन सर्वेण संयुतः ॥

Such a youth, who is endowed with all bodily accomplishments which all persons would wish to have all in one place for the enjoyment of the objects of desire, both perceptible and imperceptible, is meant here.

In the previous verses (494) to (597) the meanings of the words which occur in the text *yuvā syāt*, etc., were explained. The purport of the text is now stated in this verse.

Śruti speaks of a young man who is good, learned in the sacred lore, quick in action, handsome, and strong — in short, of a person who is blessed with all bodily accomplishments which are required for the enjoyment of the objects of desire, both *dr̥ṣṭa* and *adr̥ṣṭa*. The end sought after may be of this world, like cattle and wealth; then it is

dr̥ṣṭa-iṣṭa. Or, it may be what is yet to come in the future, like heaven; then it is *adr̥ṣṭa-iṣṭa*. The end sought after, whatever be its nature, can be attained only if one is endowed with the necessary bodily accomplishments such as youth, learning, and so on.

[499]

तस्येयं पृथिवी सर्वा पूर्णा वित्स्य चेद्भवेत् ।
इति साधनमुक्तं स्याद्दृष्टादृष्टार्थकर्मणः ॥

Suppose that to him belongs the entire earth full of wealth. Thus the accessories for the performance of *karma* necessary for attaining perceptible and imperceptible ends have been stated.

The three texts beginning from *yuvā syāt* and ending with *vittasya pūrṇā syāt* seek to convey the twofold means necessary for the attainment of the objects of desire, *dr̥ṣṭa* as well as *adr̥ṣṭa*. Since the young man described above is in possession of all the riches of the world, he commands external accessories (*bāhya-sādhana*) for attaining his goal. Strength of body, ability to do things quickly, and the like, are the bodily accessories (*ādhyātmika-sādhana*) equally necessary for attaining the goal.

[500]

बाह्यैराध्यात्मिकैश्च सम्पन्नः साधनैः पुमान् ।
लभते यमसौ ह्लादं नरानन्दः स उच्यते ॥

The delight which a person attains, being thus endowed with the external and bodily accessories, is said to be (one unit of) human bliss.

The meaning of the text *sa eko mānuṣa ānandaḥ* is stated in this verse.

Śruti is going to work out a calculus of pleasure starting with the happiness enjoyed by a person who has all the bodily accomplishments

and who is the ruler of the entire world. The happiness enjoyed by such a person is reckoned as one unit of the highest human happiness (*manuṣyañānāṁ prakṛṣṭa-eka ānandaḥ*). *Śruti* does not take into consideration the happiness of other human beings who do not command all the resources required for the fullest satisfaction in all respects as the ruler of the entire earth can do. Consequently, the happiness enjoyed by the latter is considered to be the highest human happiness, and is calculated as one unit of human happiness (*eko mānuṣa ānandaḥ*).

[501]

य एते शतमानन्दा मानुषाणां समाहताः ।
नरगन्धर्वकाणां स्यात्तावानेकः प्रमाणतः ॥

One hundred such units of human bliss put together make one unit (of bliss) which human fairies possess.

This verse explains the *śruti* text *te ye sataṁ mānuṣā ānandāḥ* and also the next one.

Manuṣya-gandharva means a human fairy. Human fairies are those human beings who become gandharvas through the performance of *karma* and *upāsana* of a special sort (*manuṣyāḥ santaḥ karma-vidyā viśeṣād-gandharvatvaṁ prāptvāḥ manuṣyagandharvāḥ*). The happiness which they enjoy is a hundred times superior to the highest human happiness.

[502]

सुगन्धिनः कामरूपा अन्तर्धानादिशक्तयः ।
नृत्यगीतादिकुशला गन्धर्वाः स्युर्नृलौकिकाः ॥

These fairies of the human world are endowed with sweet odour. They can assume any form they like. They possess the power of becoming invisible and so on. And they are experts in dance, music, and the like.

A description of the gandharvas and the powers that they possess is given with a view to show why the bliss enjoyed by them is a hund-

red times superior to the highest human happiness. Since the gandharvas are endowed with extraordinary powers, they have fewer obstacles when compared with human beings. And also they could command any number of accessories for attaining their ends. It means that the mental tranquillity of a human fairy, which is necessary for the manifestation of pleasure, must be greater than that of a human being, whatever be the supremacy and the personal accomplishments of the latter over others.

[503]

भूयोद्वन्द्वप्रतीघातशक्तिसाधनसम्पदा ।
नारगन्धर्विको भूयानानन्दो मानुषादधि ॥

Since they are in possession of power and accessories to resist the numerous pairs of opposites, the bliss of the human fairies is greater than human bliss.

Because of the power and accessories they have, they will not be victims of the pairs of opposites such as pleasure and pain, heat and cold.

[504]

आविरिञ्चाद्भवेदेवं पूर्वस्मादुत्तरोऽधिकः ।
सहस्रदशभागेन ह्युत्तरोत्तरतः क्रमात् ॥

Of the stages which follow one after another in an order upto the *Hiraṇyagarbha*, each succeeding stage is, indeed, a hundred times superior to the one preceding it.

Starting from the human happiness, the *Upaniṣad* proceeds in an ascending order and speaks of the happiness of the human fairies, of the divine fairies, of the manes, of the gods in heaven, of the karma-devas, of the gods, of *Indra*, of *Bṛhaspati*, of the *Virāj*, and of the *Hiraṇyagarbha*. The happiness attained at each higher stage is a hundred times superior to that attained in its preceding lower stage.

[505]

श्रोत्रियोऽधीतवेदः स्यात् साध्वाचारः प्रसिद्धितः ।
कामानुपहतात्माऽपि स्यादकामहतस्तथा ॥

Śrotriyaḥ is one who is learned in the Vedas. It is well-known that he is one who observes Vedic duties. And also he is one who is not polluted by desire. So he is *akāmahataḥ*.

The *śruti* text *śrotriyasya cākāmahatasya* is explained in this verse.

[506 - 507]

मार्त्याद्भोगाद्विरक्तस्य ह्युत्तराह्लादकामिनः ।
सहस्रदशभागेन मानुषाद्गुणतो भवेत् ॥
इत्येतस्य प्रसिद्ध्यर्थमादावग्रहणं कृतम् ।
अकामहत इत्यस्य हेतोरानन्दवृद्धये ॥

Such a person who is detached from human happiness, but who has desire for the happiness of the next higher stage, attains the bliss which is a hundred times superior to (one unit of) human happiness. And with a view to convey this idea, *akāmahata* is not mentioned in the beginning in respect of attaining more happiness.

In the first stage, *śruti* speaks about the highest human happiness which accrues to one who is young, good, etc., and who commands the entire wealth available in the world. But here there is no reference to the Vedic scholar who is free from desire (*akāmahata*), whereas in each of the subsequent stages arranged in an ascending order there is reference to the Vedic scholar who is free from desire. That is to say, after stating *sa eko mānuṣa ānandaḥ*, *śruti* does not use the expression *śrotriyasya cākāmahatasya*, whereas after *sa eko manuṣyagandharvāṇāmānandaḥ*, *sa eko devagandharvāṇāmānandaḥ*, etc., it uses the expression *śrotriyasya cākāmahatasya*. What is the reason for the omission of this expression in

the first stage (*prathama-paryāya*)? *Śruti* conveys the idea that a Vedic scholar who is detached from the enjoyment of human happiness, but who nevertheless longs for the happiness of a human fairy attains it here itself, by virtue of the mental tranquillity which he has. He attains here itself the happiness which is equal to that of a human fairy.

If the expression *śrotriyaśya cākāmahatasya* were used in the first stage itself which speaks about the highest happiness of one who has all the personal accomplishments and who rules over the entire earth, it would mean that the happiness attained by the Vedic scholar, who is free from desire, is equal to the highest human happiness. Such a position is inconsistent. The Vedic scholar who is free from desire is detached from human happiness. It would be inconsistent to say that a person who is averse to human happiness attains the very same thing. It is with a view to avoid this absurdity that the expression *śrotriyaśya cākāmahatasya* is not mentioned in the first stage.

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श्रोत्रियावृजिनत्वे द्वे सर्वत्रैव समे अपि ।

कामानुपहतत्वस्य वृद्धौ हलादौ विवर्धते ॥

Both learning of the Vedas and sinlessness are common, indeed, to all levels. When desirelessness grows, happiness increases.

The three means of attaining happiness are: (1) knowledge of the Vedas (*śrotriyaṭvam*), (2) sinlessness (*avṛjinaṭvam*), and (3) desirelessness (*akāmahataṭvam*). The first two factors are common to all levels from that of the human being upto that of the *Hiraṇyagarbha*. They do not vary from level to level. But desirelessness (*akāmahataṭva*) varies from stage to stage. As we proceed from a lower to the next higher stage, desirelessness or mental tranquillity increases. Keeping pace with the growth of mental tranquillity, happiness, too, increases. So there is something unique about desirelessness as a means of happiness.

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यतोऽकामहतत्वं स्यात् सर्वातिशयिनोऽञ्जसा ।
सुखस्य प्राप्तये तस्मात्तदेवोत्कृष्टिकृद्भवेत् ॥

Since (total) desirelessness is the direct means of attaining the unsurpassable bliss, it alone causes the increase of happiness (from stage to stage).

The superiority of desirelessness over the other two factors is set forth in this verse.

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तस्माद्यथोदितानन्दप्राप्तये साधनत्रयम् ।
श्रोत्रियावृजिनत्वे द्वे तथाऽकामहतात्मता ॥

Hence for attaining the highest bliss which has been spoken of, the two factors, viz., the learning of the Vedas and sinlessness, and also desirelessness are the three means.

The *Taittirīya* text which we are considering here refers only to the study of the Vedas and desirelessness as the means of attaining bliss. It does not speak about sinlessness (*avṛjīnatvam*) as a means thereto. Nevertheless this, too, must be included in the list as it has been stated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (IV, iii, 33) where there is a similar account of the increasing grades of happiness. It says: the joy of the gods by action multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy for the gods by birth, as well as one who is versed in the Vedas, sinless, and free from desire... The joy in the world of *Prajāpati* multiplied a hundred times makes one unit of joy in the world of *Hiraṇyagarbha*, as well as of one who is versed in the Vedas, sinless, and free from desire."

[511]

तुल्ये आब्रह्मणः पूर्वे उत्कर्षस्तूत्तरस्य च ।
अकामहततैवातः पूर्वाभ्यां साधनम्परम् ॥

The first two (factors) are common to all stages upto *Brahmā*, but the third rises higher and higher. So desirelessness alone is the superior means when compared with the other two.

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चिरकालस्थितिर्येषां पितृलोकेषु ते स्मृताः ।
चिरलोकलोकास्तेऽपि स्युः पितृश्राद्धादिकारिणः ॥

Those who stay long in the world of the manes are referred to by the term *ciralokālokāḥ*. They are those who perform the ceremonies such as *pitr-śrāddha* (while here in this world).

After speaking about the happiness of the human fairies, which is a hundred times superior to that of the highest human happiness, *śruti* refers to the happiness of the divine fairies, which is a hundred times superior to that of the human fairies. Then it speaks about the happiness of the manes (*pitr-ñāmanandaḥ*), which is a hundred times superior to that of the divine fairies.

Long stay in the world of the manes is the result of the performance of ceremonies to the manes, etc. (*pitr-śrāddhādi-karmaphalam ciralokavāsaḥ*).

[513]

आजानो देवलोकः स्यात्तज्जा आजानजाः स्मृताः ।
स्मार्तकर्मकृतस्तत्र जायन्ते देवभूमिषु ॥

Ājāna is the world of the gods. Those who are born there are known as the *ājānaja* gods, gods by birth. Those who perform the deeds enjoined in *smṛti* are born in the regions of gods.

The happiness of those who are gods by birth is stated as the next stage. It is a hundred times superior to the happiness of the manes.

Birth as a god is the fruit of the performance of deeds such as the digging of streams, wells, tanks, and so on prescribed in *smṛti* (*vāpikūpa-taṭāḥkūdi-smārtakarma-viśeṣaphalaṁ devajanma*).

[514]

कर्मणैव त्वविद्वांसो ये जाताः सुरसद्मसु ।
कर्मदेवास्तु तान्द्विद्यादेवांश्चोत्तरमार्गमान् ॥

Karma-devas are those ignorant people who reach the worlds of gods by mere *karma* (such as *agnihotra*). Gods are those who go by the northern path.

This verse explains the meanings of the words *karma-deva* and *deva*, which occur in the *śruti* texts *sa ekaḥ karmadevānām devānāmānandaḥ* and *sa eko devānāmānandaḥ*.

Karma-devas are those who go to the world of gods by the performance of *karma* alone such as *agnihotra* (*agnihotrādi-kevalaṁ karma*) as enjoined by Scripture without the practice of *upāsana*. Those who resort to both the scriptural rites and meditation go by the *devayāna*, the northern path, which is the path of gods. See the *Chāndogya* (V, x, 1-3) for an account of the two paths, *pitryāna* and *devayāna*.

Śruti says that the happiness of the karma-devas is a hundred times superior to that of the *ājānaja* gods. In the same way, the happiness of gods is a hundred times superior to that of the karma-devas.

[515]

त्रैलोक्यदेहश्चात्र स्याद्विराडेव प्रजापतिः ।
समष्टिव्यष्टिरूपश्च ब्रह्मेह परिगृह्यते ॥

Here *Prajāpati* is the *Virāj* who has the three worlds for his body. The word *brahman* here must be understood as the *Hiranyagarbha*, who is in the cosmic and individual forms.

Prajāpati that is mentioned in the text *sa ekaḥ prajāpaterānandaḥ* stands for the *Virāj*, the cosmic being in its gross aspect, who has the

three worlds — earth, heaven, and the intermediate space — as his body. The term *brahman* which occurs in the text *sa eko brahmaṇa ānandaḥ* refers to the *Hiraṇyagarbha* or the *Sūtrātman*, who pervades the entire universe as the cosmic and individual persons.

Sureśvara skips over the stages of *Indra* and *Bṛhaspati*, as the meanings of these terms are well-known. *Indra* is the lord of the gods, and his preceptor is *Bṛhaspati*. The happiness of *Indra* is a hundred times superior to that of the gods. Similarly, the happiness of *Bṛhaspati* is a hundred times superior to that of *Indra*. The next two higher stages of the *Virāj* and the *Hiraṇyagarbha* must be explained in the same way.

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त एते सर्व आनन्दा यत्रैकत्वं व्रजन्ति नः ।

कामश्च तन्निमित्तोत्थो ज्ञानं यच्च द्रव्यात्मकम् ॥

तथाऽकामहतत्वं च निष्ठां यत्र प्रपद्यते ।

तमानन्दं विजानीयाद्वर्त्मनानेन वाक्यतः ॥

That bliss in which all our (surpassable) pleasures attain oneness, wherein all desires caused by ignorance and all knowledge of duality are removed, and wherein desirelessness reaches its culmination — that bliss must be known (as identical with Brahman) through the *śruti* text, in the manner in which it has been explained.

These two verses explain the nature of the supreme bliss which is Brahman-Ātman, which transcends the happiness of the *Hiraṇyagarbha*. The latter which is attained by a person who is well-versed in the Vedas and who is free from desire is only a part of the supreme bliss. It has already been stated that the existence of the unsurpassable Brahman-bliss may be inferred from the limited, surpassable happiness which we enjoy. This reasoning supports *śruti* texts which declare that the *jīva* in its essential nature is identical with Brahman, which is of the nature of the unsurpassable bliss. The idea is that knowing that the unsurpas-

sable bliss is identical with Brahman, the infinite, one must realize one's identity with that Brahman as taught in the *śruti* text *tat tvam asi*.

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आनन्दानन्दिनोश्चात्र न भेदः स्यान्मनागपि ।
श्रुत्यैवापोदितो यस्माच्छिद्रं कुर्वन्मनागपि ॥

Here (in Brahman) there cannot be even the slightest difference between bliss and that which has bliss, since it has been stated by *śruti* itself that one who makes a little difference (in Brahman is struck with fear).

The happiness which arises as a result of *karma* is different from the person who enjoys that happiness. The same thing, the critic argues, must hold good between the unsurpassable bliss and Brahman which has that bliss. If so, it is wrong to say, according to him, that the unsurpassable bliss is Brahman.

This argument is untenable. The unsurpassable bliss constitutes the very nature of Brahman which is non-dual, which is free from *sajātīya-vijātīya-svagata-bheda*. Brahman is bliss, and bliss is Brahman. It is, therefore, wrong to think of any difference between bliss and that which has bliss. That is why *śruti* itself has warned that he who makes even a little difference in Brahman is tormented by fear (*yadā hyevaiṣa etasminnudaramantaram kurute, atha tasya bhayaṁ bhavati*).

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न साधनमयं किञ्चित् स्वात्मसिद्धावपेक्षते ।
स्वतःसिद्धेरविद्याया हानमात्रमपेक्षते ॥

This (Brahman-bliss) does not seek any means for attaining its own existence, for it is eternal. The removal of ignorance alone is required.

We require accessories for getting happiness which is the result of *karma*. But we do not require any accessory or means for realizing

Brahman-bliss, since it is always attained by virtue of its being our inward Self. Though Brahman-bliss is ever-existent as identical with our inward Self, it does not manifest itself to be such since its real nature is veiled by *avidyā*. All that is required for attaining Brahman-bliss is the removal of *avidyā*.

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गुरुभारवसन्नस्य भारपनयतो यथा ।

उत्कृष्यते क्रमात् स्वास्थ्यं स्वात्मन्येवं तमःक्षयात् ॥

Just as the comfortableness of a person, who is sunk down under a heavy burden, increases by the gradual removal of the burden, (even so the manifestation of bliss) in one's own Self increases by the gradual removal of *avidyā*.

How the removal of *avidyā* leads to the manifestation of bliss in the Self is explained by means of an example.

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अथेदानीम्परीक्षाया अद्वैतानन्दलक्षणम् ।

उपसंह्रियते साक्षात्फलं साधननिस्पृहम् ॥

Now the conclusion of the inquiry (into bliss) is that Brahman, which is non-dual bliss and which is independent of all means, is what is directly realized (as identical with our immediate Self).

The substance of the three *śruti* texts *sa yaścāyam puruṣe, yaścāśāvā-dītye, sa ekaḥ* is stated in this verse.

The inquiry into the nature of happiness and its different gradations, which was commenced from the *śruti* text *saiṣā ānandasya mīmāṃsā bhavati*, has enabled us to conclude that the infinite, unsurpassable, non-dual bliss which is Brahman exists. And this Brahman is *sāk-ṣāṭṭhalam*, what is directly realized, because it is identical with our inward Self.

[522]

निर्धूताशेषसंसारः सत्यमित्यादिनोदितः ।
व्युत्थाप्यासत्यज्ञानादेर्बुद्धौ चात्मनि दर्शितः ॥

Brahman which has been spoken of as real, etc., which has been shown to be one with the Self located in the intellect, which has been distinguished from the unreal, the insentient, etc., and which is free from all bondage—(it is that Brahman which is stated in the end).

The *śruti* texts *sa yaścāyaṁ puruṣe*, etc., must be viewed not only as stating the conclusion of the inquiry into the nature and gradations of happiness, but also as setting forth the nature of Brahman in harmony with the initial passage *satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ brahma*, etc.

[523]

निष्कृष्याविद्योत्सङ्गस्थात्तत्साक्षिणमनात्मनः ।
साक्षात्तेनैव तं विद्मः प्रात्यक्ष्यात्सोऽयमित्यतः ॥

Distinguishing the Witness-self from the not-Self which lies at the lap of *avidyā*, we directly know Him by means of (i.e., as identical with) Brahman alone. Since the Witness-self is immediately known, He is referred to as “this” (in the *śruti* text).

The *Upaniṣad* purports to teach the truth of non-duality. We ascertain the purport of Scripture through the harmony between the initial and the concluding passages. In the beginning of this chapter, Brahman has been defined as real, knowledge, and infinite. If Brahman, the ultimate reality, is infinite in the real sense of the term, it must necessarily be one (*ekam*) and non-dual (*advitīyam*). The *śruti* passage *sa yaścāyaṁ puruṣe*, etc., which we are considering here, concludes in the same way. It says that Brahman-Ātman, which is in man and also in the sun, is one (*sa ekaḥ*). From the harmony between the initial and the concluding passages, we conclude that *śruti* purports to teach the truth of non-duality.

Since the Witness-self, being self-luminous, is directly known, it is spoken of as "this" one in the *śruti* text *sa yaścāyaṁ puruṣe*.

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अकामहत इत्येवं निरविद्योऽभिधीयते ।

तस्यामसत्त्वां तद्ब्रह्म स्वयमेवानुभूयते ॥

Thus in the expression *akāmahata*, (the inward Self of) the man free from *avidyā* is indicated (by the word "this" in the sequel). In the absence of *avidyā*, Brahman is experienced of its own accord.

The expression *śrotriyasya cākāmahatasya* occurs several times in this *anuvāka*. Giving an account of the calculus of happiness, *śruti* speaks of the man learned in the Vedas and free from desire in the last stage (*antye paryaya*). Such a person, having mental tranquillity at its best and being free from *avidyā*, attains Brahman-bliss. The supreme Brahman-bliss which is no other than the inward Self is referred to as "this" one in the man (*sa yaścāyaṁ puruṣe*) in the sequel. *Śruti* teaches that this inward Self is Brahman.

When *avidyā* is removed, the supreme bliss manifests itself to the person who is versed in the Vedas, sinless, and free from desire.

[525]

अज्ञातं ज्ञायते यत्र प्रमातृत्वाद्यनिह्वात् ।

तत्र मानान्तरापेक्षा न स्वतोऽवगमात्मके ॥

Where an unknown object is to be known, involving the knower, etc., there is the need of other means of knowledge, but not in the case of that (Brahman) which is self-luminous.

It was stated in the previous verse that, when *avidyā* which veils Brahman is removed, the latter manifests itself of its own accord without seeking the help of anything. This view, the critic argues, is

intenable. An object like a pot can be known only through a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The knowledge of an object involves *pramāṇa*, *pramāṇī*, etc. In the same way the help of a *pramāṇa*, it is urged by the critic, is required for knowing Brahman. It means that Brahman cannot reveal itself without a *pramāṇa*, etc. But this argument is wrong as it overlooks a basic difference between Brahman and other objects. Objects like a pot are insentient. So they can be known only through a *pramāṇa*. But Brahman, being self-luminous, does not require any *pramāṇa* for its manifestation.

[526]

प्रमैवात्मात्मिका यत्र त्वनन्यानुभवात्मिका ।
नात्र मानान्तरापेक्षा सैवानस्तमितोदिता ॥

But in this case, knowledge itself constitutes the nature of the Self and cannot be known by another object. It neither rises nor sets. So other means of knowledge is not required here.

The Self is knowledge by nature. Being eternal, it has neither a beginning nor an end. It is self-luminous in the sense that, while it is not illumined or made known by any other means, it illumines other objects (*ananyābhīśyatvam*, *anyābhīśakatvam*).

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आधेयार्थप्रधानेयं सप्तमी पुरुषात्परा ।
योऽयमित्यादिना तद्वत् श्रुतिरेवम्प्रवादिनी ॥

The locative case-ending after *purusa* indicates that the content (of the locus) is the principal. Just as by the texts such as "This Self identified with the intellect...", (the content is emphasized), even so *śruti* thus speaks of the Self.

In the *śruti* texts *sa yaścāyaṁ puruṣe*, *yaścāśvāḍītye*, the two words *puruṣe* and *āḍītye* are in the locative case. Though usually the locative case will convey that the locus (*ādharma*) denoted by it is the principal, here it is not the locus, but the content (*ādheya*) of the locus, that is

intended to be conveyed as the principal. In this context, the supreme Brahman referred to as existing in the person and in the sun is the principal. The text intends to convey the identity or oneness of the content in the two loci. This is not the only place wherein we interpret the locative case as having its emphasis on the *ādheya* and not on the *ādadhāra*. Consider, for example, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (IV, iii, 7) cited in the second line of the verse. It speaks about *yo'yaṁ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu*, etc., i. e., "this Self which is identified with the intellect and which is in the prāṇas." The locative case in the term *prāṇeṣu* conveys that the Self is the principal and that it is different from the prāṇas.

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अकामहतधीगम्यो योऽयन्बुद्धेः सदेक्षकः ।
अयं पुरुष इत्यत्र स एव त्वभिधीयते ॥

In the text, "And this one in the human person," He who is the constant witness of the intellect and who can be reached by the mind which is not smitten by desire is taught (by implication).

The text *sa yascāyaṁ puruṣe* refers, by implication, to the pure consciousness, which is the implied meaning of the term *tvam*.

[529]

प्रध्वस्तास्मद्विभागश्च रोचिष्णुर्यश्च भास्करे ।
सूर्य आत्मेति मन्त्रोऽपि योऽसाविति च साक्ष्यथ ॥

The *śruti* text, "That one who is in the sun," refers (by implication) to Brahman who shines brightest in the sun and is devoid of separation from us. (In justification of this) there is the *śruti* text, "The Sun is the Ātman."

The *śruti* text *yascāśāvāditye* signifies by implication Brahman, which is implied by the term *tat*. The *śruti* text quoted in the second line of the verse is from the *Taittirīya-samhitā*, II, iv, 14.

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क्षेत्रज्ञेश्वरभेदेन ह्यभिन्नं वस्त्वविद्यया ।
तस्मात्तद्भानतश्चैक्यं घटेतरखयोरिव ॥

Since the non-dual reality appears, through *avidyā*, in the different forms of *kṣetrajñā* and *Īśvara*, by removing it (we must realize their) oneness like the oneness of the ether enclosed in a pot and the ether outside it.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* text *sa ekaḥ*. Though the ultimate reality is one, it appears in the two distinct forms of *jīva* and *Īśvara* due to *avidyā*, in the same way as the ether which is one appears in two distinct forms as *ghaṭākāśa*, the ether within a pot, and *mahākāśa*, the vast ether outside it, due to the limiting adjunct, viz., the pot. Just as the removal of the limiting adjunct helps us to realize that the *ghaṭākāśa* and the *mahākāśa* are one, even so the removal of the *upādhi* of *avidyā* will help us to realize that the *jīva* and *Īśvara* are one.

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मूर्तामूर्तात्मकस्यास्य ह्युत्कर्षः परमो रविः ।
स्वान्तर्गतेन तस्यैक्यं तन्निमित्तानिषेधतः ॥

The sun is, indeed, the object of the highest excellence in the universe consisting of gross and subtle objects. The identity of the consciousness in the sun with the consciousness in us is conveyed by negating *avidyā* which is the cause (of their superiority and inferiority).

Why is it, it may be asked, that the sun has been singled out here by *śruti*? *Śruti* seeks to convey that distinctions such as superiority and inferiority arise because of the limiting adjuncts based on *avidyā*, and that by overcoming these distinctions through the removal of *avidyā* we can realize the non-difference between Brahman and Ātman. The universe

consists of gross and subtle objects, and the sun is the most excellent among them. Brahman-consciousness which is in the sun is considered to be superior because of the adjunct (*upādhi*). The same Brahman-consciousness which is in the mind of the *jīva* is considered to be inferior only because of the adjunct. The superiority (*ulkr̥ṣṭatvam*) in the case of the sun and the inferiority (*nikr̥ṣṭatvam*) in the case of the *jīva* are due to the adjuncts. When we say that Brahman-consciousness which is in the sun is identical with that in the *jīva*, the latter is no more inferior. And when it is realized that the *jīva* is not inferior, the superiority associated with the sun will also disappear. If we ignore the special features of the sun and the *jīva*, we will realize that Brahman-consciousness is the same both in the sun and in the *jīva*. It is this truth of non-duality that is taught by the *Upaniṣad* when it says: "And this one who is in the human person, and that one who is in the sun. He is one."

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अनूद्य स य इत्येवमपकृष्टं नृबुद्धिगम् ।
उत्कृष्टेश्वरेणाथ विशिनष्ट्यहिरज्जुवत् ॥

In the text, "This one who is in the human person," the *jīva*-consciousness which is considered to be inferior and manifested in the intellect of the person is restated. It is then identified with *Īśvara* (inherent in the sun), which is considered to be superior, as the serpent with the rope.

The sentence, "The serpent is the rope," purports to convey that the object in front which is seen as a serpent is only a rope. By removing the serpent-cognition, the object in front is identified with the rope. In the same way, the *jīva*-consciousness reflected in the *buddhi* and imagined to be inferior is identified with *Īśvara*-consciousness located in the sun and imagined to be superior, by removing the inferiority of the former, which arises because of the *upādhi*. With the removal of the alleged inferiority of the *jīva*-consciousness, the superiority of *Īśvara*-consciousness will also disappear. In short, when the elements which

contribute to the status of inferiority and superiority are dropped out, what remains is the pure consciousness.

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उत्कृष्टो यदपेक्ष्येयस्तत्तवह्नाध्यते बलात् ।

जहाति पश्चादुत्कर्षमपकृष्टाश्रयो हि सः ॥

That inferiority of the *jīva*, in relation to which *Īśvara* becomes superior, is, then, negated by virtue of the strength (of the identity of *Īśvara* with the *jīva*). Consequently *Īśvara* gives up His superiority, for it is dependent on the inferiority of the *jīva*.

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नादित्यस्थस्तदोत्कर्षो नापकृष्टिस्तथात्मनि ।

हित्वोभयमवाक्यार्थं नेति नेतीति विन्दते ॥

In that case, there is no superiority in the sun. In the same way, there is no inferiority in the *jīva*. By abandoning both as "not this, not this," one attains (the pure consciousness) which is the non-verbal sense of the sentence.

Brahman-Ātman, the pure consciousness, is the implied sense of the texts *sa yascāyaṁ puruṣe, yascāśāvāditye*. One must get at this implied or non-verbal sense (*avākyaārtham*) by negating the adjunct-based differences caused by *avidyā*.

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उत्कृष्टिर्वापकृष्टिर्वा नेह स्वात्मनि विद्यते ।

तमोपहतदृष्टीनामुत्कर्षेतरवीक्षणम् ॥

Neither superiority nor inferiority exists here in one's own Self. Those whose vision is affected by ignorance see superiority and inferiority (in the Self).

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अविद्यैव यतो हेतुरुत्कृष्टादेर्न वस्त्वतः ।
जग्धायां विद्यया तस्यां नानात्वं विनिवर्तते ॥

Since ignorance alone is the cause of superiority, etc. the latter do not exist in reality. When it (i.e., ignorance) is devoured by knowledge, plurality disappears.

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अतिशेते यतः सर्वानानन्दानाग्रजादधि ।
विकल्पभूमेर्व्यावृत्तैरेक्यं स्वात्मरविस्थयोः ॥

Since Brahman-bliss excels all other pleasures up to that of the *Hiranyagarbha*, one should know the oneness (of that Brahman-bliss) inherent in the *jīva* and in the sun by removing *avidyā* which is the source of all distinctions.

When a person realizes the non-difference between the Self in man and Brahman in the sun, *avidyā* which sets up all distinctions such as superiority and inferiority gets removed, leading to the attainment of the unsurpassable Brahman-bliss.

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सत्यं ज्ञानमिति ह्यस्मादसत्याद्यर्थवारणात् ।
भेदाश्रयस्य व्यावृत्तैरेक्यं स्वात्मरविस्थयोः ॥

Since from the text which defines Brahman as real and knowledge, the unreal, etc., get negated and since *avidyā* also, which is the ground of all distinctions is removed, the oneness (of Brahman-Ātman) inherent in the *jīva* and in the sun (is established).

This verse reiterates the non-dual nature of the ultimate reality as conveyed by the *śruti* text *sa ekah*.

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कार्येण रसलाभेन प्राणनाद्युपपत्तिभिः ।

अस्तीत्यपाक्रियैतस्य प्रादुर्भाष्यकृतः स्वयम् ॥

प्रश्नयोरस्ति नास्तीति व्याख्यातत्वादथाधुना ।

आहो विद्वानमुं लोकमित्यस्यापाक्रियोच्यते ॥

Since the existence of Brahman has been proved through reasonings based on the objects of creation, the acquisition of joy, the functioning of vital airs, etc., the question whether Brahman exists or not has been answered. Now the question whether anyone who has known Brahman, departing from here, attains it will be answered (in the subsequent text beginning with *sa ya evamvit*). This is what the author of the *Bhāṣya* himself says.

After listening to the instruction of the teacher, the disciple, it was stated earlier, asks three questions for the purpose of clarifying his doubts. See verses (364) and (365). The first question related to the existence of Brahman. The second question was whether an ignorant man, after departing from here, attains Brahman or not. And the third question was whether a man of knowledge does or does not attain Brahman after departing from here. After commenting on the three *śruti* texts *sa yaścāyaṁ puruṣe, yaścāśvāditye, sa ekaḥ*, Śaṅkara makes a reference to the three questions raised by the disciple earlier, and reviews the manner in which the *Upaniṣad* has answered and proceeds to answer in the sequel these questions before continuing his commentary on the text *sa ya evamvit*, etc. Sureśvara restates here in these two verses Śaṅkara's review of the position.

According to Śaṅkara, the question whether Brahman exists or not has been answered by the *Upaniṣad* by giving various reasons such as the phenomena of creation, acquisition of joy, functioning of life, attaining a state of fearlessness, and the experience of fear, all of which prove

the existence of Brahman. It is his contention that the *Upaniṣad* has so far dealt with this question, beginning from the text *so'kāmayā, bahū syāñ prajāyeyeti* occurring in the sixth *anuvāka*. Of the two remaining questions, that relating to the enlightened man will be answered in the sequel beginning from the text *sa ya evāpnoti*. Śaṅkara argues that the *Upaniṣad* does not answer separately the question whether an ignorant man attains Brahman or not. If it is said that the wise man alone attains Brahman, it will follow that an ignorant man does not attain it. Since the answer to the question relating to the wise man will also settle the question relating to an ignorant man, no separate attempt will be made to answer that question. This is the review of the position given by Śaṅkara, the author of the *bhāṣya* on the *Upaniṣad*.

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तद्वाणीभानुसम्प्लुष्टबहुलाज्ञानधीरहम् ।
यदा हीत्यादिना मन्ये उतेत्यादेर्विनिर्णयम् ॥

I, whose dense ignorance has been consumed in the fire of his (Śrī Śaṅkara's) speech, think that the questions relating to the ignorant man and the man of knowledge contained in the texts *utāvidvānamum*, etc., have been answered by the texts *yadā hyevaiṣa*, etc.

After restating Śaṅkara's view as to how the *Upaniṣad* answers the three questions raised by the disciple, Sureśvara offers his own interpretation which differs from Śaṅkara's.

Sureśvara is of the view that the questions relating to the ignorant and the wise have already been answered. The question whether the man of knowledge attains Brahman or not has already been answered by the *śruti* texts *yadā hyevaiṣa etasminnadr̥ṣṭe ... atha so'bhayaṁ gato bhavati*. See verses (435) and (436). The remaining question relating to the ignorant man has also been answered by the texts *yadā hyevaiṣa etasminnudaramantaraṁ kurute ... tattveva bhayaṁ viduṣo'manvānasya*. See verse (458).

It has to be noted here that, even while differing from Śaṅkara, Sureśvara acknowledges his indebtedness to Śaṅkara, who helped him to overcome his ignorance through the saving knowledge.

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उताविद्वानमुं लोकमिति प्रश्नविनिर्णयात् ।
अस्ति नास्तीति सिद्धः स्यात् प्रश्नयोरपि निर्णयः ॥

Since the questions (relating to the ignorant and the wise) stated in the text *utāvidvānamuṁ lokam*, etc., have been (directly) answered, the other question whether Brahman exists or not is also settled (thereby).

It was stated earlier that the *śruti* texts beginning from *yadā hyevaīṣa etasminnadīśye* and ending with *tattvāva bhayaṁ viduṣo'manvānasya* answer the two questions relating to the man of knowledge and the ignorant man. The advantage in this interpretation of Sureśvara is that both these questions are answered directly by the *śruti* text (*śabdāt*) and not by implication (*arthāt*). The question whether Brahman exists or not has also been answered here by these texts, since it is meaningless to talk about the attainment or otherwise of something which does not exist. Only on the basis that Brahman exists, the answer given by *śruti*, viz., that the wise man attains Brahman and that the ignorant man who thinks that Brahman is different from his Self does not attain it, becomes intelligible and tenable. In short, all the three questions of the disciple are answered by these texts.

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विद्वत्ताव्यतिरेकेण फलम्भिन्नं यथा तथा ।
अकामहततायास्तु परानन्दो न भिद्यते ॥

Just as the fruit (to be attained) is not different from being a knower of Brahman, so also the supreme bliss does not differ from the state of the absence of desire, (misery, and its source).

It was stated earlier that *frui* seeks to convey the non-difference of Brahman and Ātman when it speaks about "This one who is in the human person, and that one who is in the sun, He is one." The critic argues that, even though Brahman and Ātman are one, the knowledge of this oneness leads to two distinct results, viz., (1) the absence of misery along with ignorance, which is its source, and (2) the attainment of the unsurpassable bliss. These two results, the critic urges, are different from each other inasmuch as, while the one is negative, the other is positive.

This view is wrong. The *Muṇḍaka* text (III, ii, 9) says that the knower of Brahman becomes Brahman indeed. Knowing Brahman is, indeed, attaining it. There is no fruit yet to be attained apart from being the knower of Brahman. Brahman is infinite and non-dual. When a person realizes Brahman as non-different from his inward Self, he has attained the fruit, and there is nothing left to be attained by him. The fruit attained by the knower of Brahman may be described negatively as absence of desire and positively as the enjoyment of bliss. The latter is not different from the former. There appears to be difference between the two only in our manner of speaking. Just as the origination of pot-sherds is negatively referred to as the destruction of pot, so also the attainment of bliss is negatively spoken of as the absence of desire and evil along with ignorance, which is their source. It is necessary to emphasize here that the Advaitin does not admit the existence of negative entity. See verses (31) and (32) of the *Śikṣāvallī*.

The first line of the verse, according to Ānandagiri, has to be construed by adding the negative particle *nañ* as follows: *vidvattāvyatirekeṇa*, i.e., *vidvadrūpāt, phalaṁ yathā bhinnam na bhavati tathā* ... Ānandagiri explains the word *akāmahatatāyāḥ* which occurs in the second line of the verse as *samūlānarthanivṛtteḥ*.

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अनेकजन्मसंसिद्धः स यः कश्चिद्भवेदिह ।

यथोदितार्थवित् साक्षदस्माद्रागेतरात्मकात् ॥

लोकादाध्यात्मिकात् प्रेत्य यश्च स्यादधिभौतिकः ।
तदुत्क्रान्तेर्भवेद्धेतुरन्नसृष्टिस्थितिक्षयः ॥

When in this world a person, who has perfected himself in the course of many (previous) births, directly perceives his identity with Brahman as stated above, then as a result of this (experience) he gives up attachment for his body which is full of passion and other evils and also for the external world, and attains Brahman which is the cause of the creation, maintenance, and dissolution of the physical universe.

These two verses state the substance of the *śruti* passage *sa ya evānviit asmāḷlokaṭ pretya*, etc.

It is only one person in a thousand who, as a result of practising in several previous births the discipline necessary for attaining the true knowledge, realizes that he is no other than Brahman, the ultimate reality. Such a person is free from all attachment for everything — for his body as well as for the things of the world. Having overcome his attachment for all the five sheaths, he thus remains one with Brahman.

The Lord says in the *Gītā* (VII, 19): "At the end of many births, the man of wisdom comes to me, (realizing) that *Vāsudeva* is the all: he is the noble-souled, very hard to find." Commenting on this passage Śaṅkara observes: "At the end of many births occupied in spiritual regeneration as preparatory to the attainment of wisdom, the man of mature wisdom resorts to me, *Vāsudeva*, the innermost Self. How? Realizing that *Vāsudeva* is the all, he who thus comes to me, *Nārāyaṇa*, the Self of all, is a *mahātman*, a man of high soul; there is no other either equal to him or superior to him. Therefore such a man is very hard to find. It has been said that 'among thousands of men, one perchance strives for perfection' (*Gītā*, VII, 3)."

Pretya literally means after departing. Here it means giving up attachment, *abhimānam parityajya*.

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लोकादस्मात् समुत्क्रम्य ह्येवंविदिति वाचकः ।
सर्वशेषमिति न्यायं तद्व्याख्यानाय चोत्तरम् ॥

The expression “He who knows thus” means, indeed, the person who has given up attachment for the world (for the physical body). (By the same principle) it is proper to treat him as one who has given up attachment for all the remaining things (to be mentioned in the sequel). The subsequent *śruti* texts are for explaining this.

The *śruti* text says: *sa ya evamvit asmāḷlokāt pretya*. *Asmāḷlokāt* means from this world, i.e., from the totality of things seen and unseen, or from this physical body. The person who knows that his inward Self is identical with Brahman gives up attachment not only to the physical body, but also to the remaining things, viz., the *prāṇamaya*, the *manomaya*, the *vijñānamaya*, and the *ānandamaya*, stated in the sequel.

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गत्वेहान्नमयात्मानं तत्कार्यं यद्वदत्यगात् ।
अन्नेनान्नमयं तद्वद्विद्वान्प्राणमयात्मना ॥
तस्यापि ह्यन्तरात्मानमही रज्जुमिव स्वतः ।
मनोमयात्मना बाह्यमुपसङ्क्रामतीश्वरः ॥
पूर्वपूर्वप्रहाणं स्यादुत्तरोत्तरगामिभिः ॥

Just as the wise man, attaining the *annamaya* self and remaining one with it, gives up attachment to its effect (which is not different from its cause), so also, attaining the *prāṇamaya* self which is inward to it and remaining one with it, he abandons, indeed, the *annamaya* self. (Again, attaining the *manomaya* self) and remaining one with it, he gives up attachment to what is outside it (viz., the *prāṇa-*

maya), in the same way as the (illusory) snake loses its identity (as snake) by virtue of its being known as a rope. Thus by passing into what is inner and inner, there is the abandonment of the outer ones (by the wise man).

These two verses explain the mode of realizing the Self by giving up attachment to the five sheaths which are not-Self.

Ānandagiri says that the words in the instrumental case used in these verses must be understood in the sense of "remaining as such" (*sarvatra itthambhāve tṛṭya*).

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दृश्यादृश्यादिहीनेऽथ प्रतिष्ठां विन्दतेऽभयम् ॥

Then he attains the fearless permanent stay in Brahman which is beyond the perceptible, the imperceptible, and so on.

Verses (544) to (549) bring out the meaning of the *śruti* texts beginning from *sa ya evaṁvit* till *etamānandamayamātmānamupasañkrāmati*.

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योऽसावेवंविदित्युक्तः परस्मात्किमसौ भवेत् ।
स्वतो भिन्नोऽथ वाभिन्नो यदि बोधयलक्षणः ॥

Is that person who has been spoken of as one "who knows thus" different by his very nature from the supreme Brahman? Or, is he non-different from it? Or is he both different and non-different from it?

After commenting on the *śruti* passage *sa ya evaṁvit* ... *etamānandamayamātmānamupasañkrāmati*, Śaṅkara begins an independent discussion whether non-duality or duality is the truth by focussing attention on the term *evaṁvit*, the person "who knows thus". He says: "Now we have to discuss this point. Who is he that knows thus, and how does he

attain (Brahman)? Is the attainer different from, or the same as, the supreme Self?"

Verses (550) to (594) deal with this discussion initiated by Śaṅkara.

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भेदे श्रुतिविरोधः स्यादन्योऽसाविति निन्दनात् ।
कर्मकर्तृत्वमेकस्य दोषोऽभेदेऽपि विद्यते ॥

If it be said that he is different (from Brahman), it would go against *śruti* (which affirms the non-difference between the *jīva* and *Brahman*), and also against the *śruti* text, *anyo'sau* which decries (a person who sees difference). If it be said that he is non-different (from Brahman), there is the defect of one and the same person being both the agent and the object of an action.

Of the three alternatives in respect of the relation between the *jīva* and Brahman mentioned above, the first two are examined in this verse.

It cannot be said that the *jīva*, the person who knows Brahman, is different from Brahman for the following reasons. First of all, it is opposed to scriptural passages which affirm the truth of non-duality. Consider, for example, the *Chāndogya* text (VI, viii, 7) *tat tvam asi* which states the non-difference between the *jīva* and Brahman. Another text (VI, ii, 1) from the *Chāndogya* declares that the ultimate reality is "one only, without a second." There is yet another reason to show why the difference between the *jīva* and Brahman cannot be accepted. *Śruti* decries a person who thinks in terms of difference. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (I, iv, 10) declares: "He who worships another God thinking, 'He is one, and I am another,' does not know. He is like an animal to the gods." The idea here is that a person who worships another god, offering him praises, salutations, sacrifices, and so on, suffers not only from the evil of ignorance, but also degrades himself like

an animal to the gods whom he worships. Commenting on this passage Śaṅkara observes: "As a cow or other animals are utilized through their services such as carrying loads or yielding milk, so is this man of use to every one of the gods and others on account of his many services such as the performance of sacrifices. That is to say, he is therefore engaged to do all kinds of services for them."

Nor can it be said that "a person who knows thus" is non-different from Brahman. One and the same person cannot be both the agent and the object of an action, i.e., one who knows and also the object which is known.

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परस्य दुःखिता चैवं पराभावः प्रसज्यते ।
तस्मान्निर्धारणार्थोऽयं विचारः क्रियतेऽधुना ॥

On this view, there would also be misery to the supreme Brahman. Further, the supreme Brahman as such would cease to be. Therefore, this inquiry is now undertaken with a view to determine the correct view.

The view that the *jīva* and Brahman are non-different seems to be defective for other reasons too. What is the sense in which we have to understand the identity between the *jīva* and Brahman? If the *jīva* is viewed as identical with Brahman, then inasmuch as the former is subject to transmigratory existence, the latter, too, is not free from it. If it be said that Brahman is identical with the *jīva*, then Brahman as such would cease to exist.

The third alternative which seeks to explain the relation between the *jīva* and Brahman in terms of both identity and difference is not taken up for consideration in view of the obvious absurdity of the position.

Since none of the alternatives seems to be satisfactory, it is necessary to examine them carefully with a view to ascertain the real position. Hence the subsequent discussion.

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निश्चितं हि परिज्ञानं फलवत् स्यात् प्रसिद्धितः ॥

It is, indeed, well-known that indisputable knowledge alone is fruitful.

If we wish to ascertain the view which is free from defect, and therefore tenable, it is because of the fact that only a determinate and certain knowledge (*niscita-jñāna*) will be of benefit to us.

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नान्यस्यान्यात्मता यस्माद्ध्वंसे वाऽध्वंस एव वा ।
तस्मादनन्यो विज्ञेयः परस्मादात्मनो बुधः ॥

Since one object cannot become another, whether it gets destroyed or not, the wise man must know the *jīva* as non-different from the supreme Brahman.

It was stated earlier that the discussion of the relation between the *jīva* and Brahman would help us to ascertain the correct position. Let us, therefore, first of all consider the view according to which the *jīva* is different from Brahman. The advocate of this view cites the *Muṇḍaka* text (III, ii, 9), "He, verily, who knows Brahman becomes Brahman himself," in support of his view. This text, according to him, means that the *jīva* who is different from Brahman attains it through knowledge (*ananyo jīvo jñānadvārā brahma prāpnoti*).

But this view is untenable. It is necessary to inquire how the *jīva*, who is said to be different from Brahman, becomes Brahman. Is it the case that an object becomes another by ceasing to be what it is? Or is it the case that one object, remaining what it is, becomes another? Whatever be the alternative that is adopted, it cannot be shown that one object becomes another. A pot which continues to be what it is cannot become a cloth. Nor can it be said that it becomes a cloth when it is destroyed, i.e., when it ceases to exist. In the same way,

remaining what he is, a *jīva* cannot become Brahman. Nor can it be said that he becomes Brahman when he ceases to exist. The truth is that the *jīva* is always Brahman and not different from it. If the *jīva* is really different from Brahman, he can never become Brahman by any means, much less by knowledge.

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अनन्यश्चेद्भवेद्विद्वान् भूतत्वाद्भवतीति किम् ।
बाढं प्राप्तं परं ब्रह्म नानात्माप्नोति येन तत् ॥

If the knower of Brahman is non-different (from Brahman), he is already Brahman, and so why is it said that he becomes (Brahman)? Yes, the supreme Brahman is already attained by him, since one who is not already Brahman cannot attain it.

The first line of the verse states an objection. It was stated earlier that the *jīva* in his essential nature is always of the nature of Brahman. That is to say, he is always identical with Brahman. If so, it must be conceded, so the critic urges, that the *jīva* is identical with Brahman even prior to his realization of this identity through knowledge. And this would make the *Muṇḍaka* text (III, ii, 9), "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman himself," which speaks about the *jīva* attaining Brahman through knowledge, untenable.

The *siddhāntin* gives the reply in the second line of the verse. Admitting that the *jīva* in his essential nature is non-different from Brahman, he says that Brahman is always attained by him, for one who is not already Brahman cannot become Brahman. He will show in the subsequent verse that this view does not conflict with the *śruti* text cited by the opponent.

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दशमासिवदज्ञानात् स्वरूपादिव वर्ण्यते ।
विद्यया तदवाप्नोति यदनात्मविद्यया ॥

Like the attainment of the tenth man, who due to ignorance thinks that his being is unattained, that (Brahman) which is unattained by *avidyā* is described as attained by knowledge.

How the standpoint of the Advaitin is not in conflict with the *śruti* text *brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati* is explained by means of an example. The man who started counting with a view to find out whether the tenth man was missing was himself the tenth man; but he did not know this truth due to ignorance. When he was told by a passer-by that he was the tenth man, he realized the truth. The tenth man was missing due to ignorance, and his attainment was by knowledge. In the same way, though the *jīva* is all the time identical with Brahman, he thinks, because of ignorance, that he is different from Brahman. And like the attainment of the tenth man, his attainment of Brahman is said to be through knowledge. Since the non-attainment of Brahman is through *avidyā*, when *avidyā* is removed through *vidyā* we speak of Brahman as attained through *vidyā*.

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तमोहृत्यतिरेकेण नेह ग्रामाद्यवासित्वत् ।

तत्प्राप्तिसाधनं ज्ञानं ग्राममार्गप्रबोधवत् ॥

इत्येवं चेन्न वैधर्म्याच्च हि तत्रोपदिश्यते ।

गन्तव्यविषयं ज्ञानं यथा सत्यादिलक्षणम् ॥

Like reaching a village, etc., here (in respect of Brahman) there is no attainment apart from the destruction of ignorance. If it be said that, like the knowledge of the way to the village, the knowledge (of Brahman) is the means to its attainment, it is not so, because of the difference (between the two cases). Just as the knowledge of Brahman which is real, etc., is imparted here, the knowledge of the village to be reached is not imparted there.

Should it not be said, it may be asked, that the attainment of Brahman is analogous to the attainment of a village? The first line of verse (557) answers this question. The attainment of Brahman is not like the attainment of a village. One literally reaches the village covering the entire distance through walking, etc., and so its attainment is real. But in the case of Brahman, the attainment is figurative. '*Brahmaprāpti*' amounts to no more than the removal of *avidyā*. There is no attainment of Brahman apart from the removal of *avidyā*.

The critic may argue in a different way with a view to show that the attainment of Brahman is in the literal sense. Instruction about Brahman, it may be argued, is like instruction about the way to a village. Just as a person by getting information about the way to a village is able to reach it, so also a person by getting the knowledge of Brahman is able to attain it through the process of repeated contemplation on that knowledge. In this argument, the knowledge of Brahman is similar to the knowledge of the way to the village; and repeated contemplation on that knowledge is similar to the act of walking on the road. It follows, according to the critic, that the attainment of Brahman is real like the attainment of the village.

This argument is untenable as it overlooks a basic difference between the two cases. *Śruti* texts like *satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ brahma* impart the knowledge of Brahman which is to be realized. But in the example cited, no information about the village to be reached is given. On the contrary, information about the way to the village alone is given. So the analogy suggested by the critic breaks down. While a person literally reaches a village by getting information about the way to it, there is no such attainment of Brahman.

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कर्मापेक्षं परप्राप्तौ ज्ञानं स्यादिति चेन्न तत् ।
मुक्तौ न कर्मणः कार्यं यस्मादप्यपि विद्यते ॥

If it be said that knowledge (of Brahman) which is dependent on *karma* is the means to the attainment of

Brahman, it is not so, for in respect of (attaining) liberation, there is not even an iota of work to be done by *karma*.

It cannot be argued that the attainment of Brahman is literal and not figurative by bringing in *karma* as an aid to knowledge. It has already been stated that there is no scope for *karma* in respect of *brahma-prāpti* which is liberation. Knowledge does not require the help of *karma* in this regard.

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बुद्धं यस्मात् स्वतस्तत्त्वमतः शुद्धं स्वतो भवेत् ।
अतो मुक्तं स्वतो ब्रह्म नद स्यात् कर्मणात्र किम् ॥

Since Brahman, the ultimate reality, is of the nature of knowledge, it is by its very nature pure. So Brahman is free by its very nature. If so, tell, what is there to be done by *karma* here?

The work of *karma* is restricted to production (*ulpatti*), purification (*saṁskāra*), transformation (*vikāra*), and attainment (*āpti*) of something. Since none of these is possible in the case of liberation, *karma* is futile thereto.

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स्रष्टृप्रवेष्टृश्चैकत्वादभिन्नः स्यात् पराद्बुधः ।
विपश्चिद्व्यतिरेकेण यदीशोऽन्यो न विद्यते ॥
ततः स्यादभयप्राप्तिर्द्वितीयाद्वै भयश्रुतेः ॥

Since the person who created the universe and the one who entered into it are identical, the wise man is non-different from Brahman. Apart from the wise man, there is no other Lord. Then only the attainment of the state of fearlessness is tenable, for it is known from *śruti* that fear arises only from a second entity.

After refuting the view that the knower of Brahman is different from Brahman, the *siddhānta* is stated in this verse. The *śruti* text *tatsrṣṣvā tadevīnuprāṇīsat* stresses that the reality immanent in the created objects is identical with the supreme Brahman. There is also another reason to show that the knower of Brahman is non-different from Brahman. *Mokṣa* is the state of fearlessness. *Śruti* says that when the spiritual aspirant does not see anything else, "He gets established in the state of fearlessness" (*abhayaṁ pratiṣṭhām vindate*). This is appropriate only if it is said that the wise man, i. e., the knower of Brahman, is non-different from Brahman. *Śruti* does not stop with the statement that the wise man who does not see anything else and who gets established in Brahman attains the state of fearlessness. It also declares that he who makes "the slightest difference in Brahman is struck with fear" (*etasminnudaramantarāḥ kurute, atha tasya bhayaṁ bhavati*). The same idea is brought out in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (I, iv, 2): "Assuredly it is from a second that fear arises." The idea is that the perception of difference is the cause of fear. And a person who is in the state of fear has not attained *mokṣa*.

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द्वितीयञ्चेद्विद्योत्थमेकं वस्तु स्वतो यदि ।

न स वेदैकधैवेति विभागोक्तिस्तदा भवेत् ॥

Only if it is said that duality is due to *avidyā* and that the reality by its very nature is one, the distinction made by *śruti*, viz., "He does not know" (who thinks that the deity is one and I am another) and (it is to be known as) "One alone" will hold good.

Two passages from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* are quoted in the second line of the verse. *Na sa veda* refers to the text, I, iv, 10, which says: "So he who worships another god thinking, 'He is one, and I am another, does not know.'" A person who sees difference is, indeed, ignorant. In other words, duality, according to this text, is caused by *avidyā*. *Ekadhaiva* refers to the text, IV, iv, 20, which says: "It should be known as one alone." This passage emphasizes that non-duality is the truth. So these

two passages from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* seek to convey that oneness is the truth and that duality is illusory.

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यदि तैमिरिकादन्यैर्द्वितीयो नेक्ष्यते शशी ॥

चन्द्र एक इति ज्ञानं तदा स्यात् पारमार्थिकम् ।

तद्गृह्यते द्वितीयञ्चेन्न सुषुप्तेऽग्रहः श्रुतेः ॥

(It may be argued): "The knowledge that the moon is one is true only if a second moon is not seen by those whose vision is not affected by the disease called *timira*. But duality is seen." This is not acceptable, because it is known from the *śruti* text that in deep sleep there is non-perception (of duality).

One may argue in the following way to show that the perception of duality is not illusory. A person whose visual sense is not affected by any disease does not see a second moon. But one whose vision is affected by some disease sees a second moon. Since the perception of a second moon is due to the defect in the eye, we conclude that the perception of a second moon is illusory. The cognition of moon as one is valid since it is generated by the sense-organ which is free from defect. It is true that one whose visual sense is free from defect does not see a second moon. But it cannot be said in the same way that duality is not seen by people whose vision is normal. We do have the experience of duality in the waking state. Inasmuch as duality is perceived, it is wrong to say, according to this argument, that it is illusory.

This argument cannot be accepted. It is true that there is the experience of duality in the waking state. But in the state of deep sleep one does not perceive duality. It is said in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (IV, iii, 23): "But there is not that second thing separate from it which it can see (in deep sleep)." Since duality is not uniformly perceived in all states, the perception of duality must be illusory.

[565 - 566]

न चेहान्यमनस्ता स्यात् सर्वेषामग्रहो यतः !
 अस्त्येवैतद्धितीयञ्चेद्ग्रहणात् स्वप्नबोधयोः ॥
 अविद्योत्थानतो नैवं तदा तद्भावभावतः ।
 द्वयाबोधः सुषुप्तेऽपि त्वज्ञानादिति चेन्न तत् ॥
 स्वाभाविकत्वात्तास्यापि निमित्तास्यानपेक्षणात् ॥

Since there is non-perception of everything (in deep sleep), there is no mental preoccupation with something else here (in this state). If it be said that there is duality because of its perception in dream and waking states, it is not so, for it is caused by *avidyā*. When *avidyā* exists, then it exists. If it be said that the non-perception of duality in deep sleep is also because of ignorance, it is not so, because it is the natural state which is not dependent on other factors.

It is true, the critic argues, that in deep sleep there is non-perception of duality. But from this one should not conclude that there is no duality in that state. Just because one does not perceive an object, one should not draw the conclusion that it does not exist. It is well-known that, when the mind is preoccupied with something, one fails to notice other objects which are present. The non-perception of duality in the state of deep sleep has to be explained in the same way. It is not the case that there is no duality in the state of deep sleep. But one does not perceive duality in that state due to the preoccupation of the mind with something else.

This argument is refuted in the first line of verse (565). The assumption in the argument of the critic is that something is perceived in deep sleep and that the mental preoccupation with that object accounts for the non-perception of duality at that time. But this assumption is wrong. There is no perception of anything at all in deep sleep.

The second line of verse (565) states another argument of the critic, which is answered in the first line of verse (566).

The critic contends that, even though duality is not perceived in deep sleep, it is nevertheless perceived in dream and waking states. If the non-existence of duality is argued on the ground of its non-perception in deep sleep, why should it not be said, so the critic urges, that duality exists since it is perceived in the states of waking and dream? This argument will not do. The perception of duality in these states is due to *avidyā*. So long as there is *avidyā*, one perceives duality. But when *avidyā* is removed, duality ceases to exist. The perception of duality in waking and dream states is not real.

The second line of verse (566) states a fresh objection of the critic, which is answered in the last line.

If the perception of duality in dream and waking states is due to *avidyā*, the non-perception of duality in deep sleep, according to the critic, may equally be accounted for in terms of *avidyā*. An example will make this point clear. We do not perceive a pot which is enveloped by darkness. The pot does exist. But still it is not seen because of darkness. In the same way though there is duality in deep sleep, one does not, the critic says, perceive it because of *avidyā*. This argument cannot be accepted. Non-perception is the natural state of the Self. It exists in its own right without depending on other factors. It does not require to be accounted for. If any change takes place in the natural state of the Self on account of which it becomes a perceiver of things in waking and dream states, it is due to other operative factors such as the internal organ caused by *avidyā*. Given these conditioning factors, the Self becomes a knower. And in their absence, the Self remains in its natural state of non-perception. It is, therefore, wrong to say that the non-perception of duality in deep sleep is due to *avidyā*.

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अन्यापेक्षं हि यद्रूपं न तत्तस्य स्वतो भवेत् ।

विक्रियाविक्रिया त्वस्य तत्त्वमन्यानपेक्षणात् ॥

That form, viz., mutability, which is, indeed, dependent on some other factor, cannot be its real nature. But immutability is its real nature, because it is not dependent on another factor.

The Self is the knower only when it is in association with the *upādhi* like internal organ, etc. To be a knower it has to depend upon other factors. In other words, cognition which is an act involves change, and the Self which is by its very nature immutable comes to have change as it were when it assumes the status of a knower in waking and dream states through the *upādhi* of the internal organ. But in the state of deep sleep it does not perceive anything at all. It remains, then, in its natural state of immutability. That which is not dependent on external factors must be considered to be the real nature of a thing, and what is caused by external factors cannot be its real nature. This point can be made clear by means of an example. For remaining in its own state clay does not depend on external factors. It remains what it is without undergoing any change so long as external agencies like potter, etc., do not interfere with its natural state. It assumes the form of a pot through the work of a potter and other factors. In the absence of these factors it remains in its natural state as clay. In short, while its clay-form which is not dependent on other factors is real, its pot-form caused by external factors is illusory. It is this idea which has been conveyed by the *vācārambhaṇa* text of the *Chāndogya* (IV, i, 4) when it says that the clay alone is real, while the modification is only a name arising from speech. In the same way, the immutable condition of the Self without the perception of anything whatsoever in the state of deep sleep is its natural state and is, therefore, real.

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स्वप्नवन्न सुषुप्तोऽतः स्वत एवाद्वयत्वतः ।

द्रष्टृदृष्टेर्न लोपः स्यात् सत्यमेवं श्रुतेर्वचः ॥

So, the state of deep sleep is not like the dream state because the Self (therein) is non-dual by its very nature.

Only thus the utterance of the *śruti* text that the vision of the witness can never be lost will be true.

It may be argued that deep sleep is on a par with dream in so far as both of them are alike states of the Self. If the dream state is *mithyā* the state of deep sleep also, the critic urges, is *mithyā*, for there is nothing to distinguish the one from the other.

But this argument will not do. There is no parity between the state of deep sleep and the dream state. While the dream state of the Self is due to other external factors, the state of deep sleep of the Self is not dependent on other factors. The Self in deep sleep remains non-dual of its own accord. It is not conscious of anything in that state. It should not be thought that there is no Self in the state of deep sleep as nothing is seen at that time. In fact, Indra at one stage entertained this doubt when he was listening to Prajāpati's instruction about the Self, as narrated in the *Chāndogya* (VIII, xi, 1). Prajāpati said: "When a man is asleep, composed, serene, and knows no dream, that is the Self, that is the immortal, the fearless. That is Brahman." When Indra thought over this, he came to the conclusion that, if the Self does not know itself or the things external to it in the state of deep sleep, it has really gone to annihilation (*vināśamevāpīto bhavati*). It does not mean that there is no Self in the state of deep sleep. What is absent in this state is specific cognitions (*viśeṣa-vijñāna*) of objects, and not the Self itself. The Self "has gone to his own", i.e., remains in its natural state of non-duality at that time. That the Self is not absent in deep sleep is clearly brought out in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (IV, iii, 23) which is quoted in the second line of the verse, "The vision of the witness is never lost, because it is immortal."

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आत्मनोऽन्यो भवेद्येषामीश्वरः कारणात्तथा ।

कार्यम्भयानिवृत्तिः स्यादन्यहेतुत्वसंश्रयात् ॥

On the view of those who hold that *Īśvara* is different from the *jīva* and that the effect, likewise, is also different

from its cause, the *jīva* can never be free from fear, because it is dependent on an external cause.

It has been stated that the *jīva* is non-different from Brahman and that the view which holds them to be different is defective. This verse gives yet another reason to show the untenability of the *bheda* view. Fear arises only from a second entity. If *Īśvara* as the cause is different from the *jīva* which is the effect, the latter can never be free from fear, for there is a second entity.

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अन्यस्य भयहेतुत्वमधर्मापेक्षयेति चेत् ।
मैवं तस्यापि तुल्यत्वान्निवृत्तेः स्यादसम्भवः ॥

If it be said that the other, viz., *Īśvara*, is the source of fear only through (another auxiliary cause, viz.) *adharma*, it is not so; since that (*adharma*) too stands on an equal footing, the *jīva* can never be free from fear.

Though *Īśvara* is different from the *jīva*, He becomes the source of fear only through another auxiliary cause, viz., *adharma*, i.e., the previous demerit of the individual. When there is no *adharma*, so it is argued, *Īśvara* can never be a source of fear to the *jīva*.

This argument cannot be accepted. *Adharma* is the cause of the empirical condition of the *jīva*. So long as *jīvatva* persists, one must assume that there is the continuation of *adharma*. So long as there is *adharma*, which is a second entity, the *jīva* can never be free from fear.

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निर्निमित्ताभयञ्चेत् स्यान्न तस्यास्ति निवारणम् ।
ध्वंसेन वा निवृत्तिः स्यादात्मनो नेष्यते तथा ॥

If it be said that fear arises without a cause, then there is no remedy to it. (If fear be inherent in the Self),

it would cease only with the destruction of the Self. The destruction of the Self is not desired (by the followers of the *Veda*).

It is no argument to say that *Īśvara* is not the cause of fear and that fear arises without a cause. In that case fear will never cease to exist. Nor is it possible to argue that fear is inherent in the Self. In that case fear will cease to exist only with the destruction of the Self. No follower of the *Veda* would ever wish for the destruction of the Self. So *mokṣa* would be meaningless on the view which seeks to maintain the difference between the *jīva* and Brahman.

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एकत्वपक्षे त्वेतेषां दोषो नान्यतमो भवेत् ।
भयस्याज्ञानहेतुत्वाच्चन्निवृत्तौ निवर्तते ॥

On the contrary, in the theory of oneness (of the *jīva* and Brahman) none of these defects will arise. Since fear is caused by ignorance, it disappears when ignorance is removed.

If it is maintained that the *jīva* by its very nature is different from Brahman, it will always be in bondage. Consequently it can never attain release. Further, on this view no satisfactory reason can be given for the bondage of the *jīva*. In the same way, the attainment of release cannot be explained in a satisfactory way. There is yet another defect in this view. The standpoint of *bheda* goes against *śruti* which declares the non-difference between the *jīva* and Brahman. The standpoint of *abheda* between the *jīva* and Brahman is not open to any of these objections stated above. The *jīva*, according to Advaita, is caught in the wheel of transmigratory existence because of *avidyā*. When *avidyā* is removed through *vidyā*, it attains release. If *avidyā* is the cause of bondage, *vidyā* is what brings about release. Such a view is in perfect conformity with the standpoint of *śruti*.

The idea which is sought to be conveyed is this. When *avidyā* is removed through *vidyā*, the fear of transmigratory existence, too, gets

removed; and so the knower of Brahman is fearlessly established in Brahman.

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अन्यहेतुः स्वतो वा स्याद्भयं नोभयथापि हि ।

स्वातन्त्र्याभावादन्यस्मिन् स्वात्महानञ्च नेष्यते ॥

Is fear caused by an external object or by the Self itself? Indeed, in neither case, can one be free from it, for one is not free to remove the fear caused by an external object on which one is dependent, and also the destruction of the Self is not desired.

It was stated in verse (571) that if fear should arise without a cause it could never be removed. The critic who is interested in vindicating the standpoint of duality now argues that there is a cause for fear. If so, what is that? Two possibilities may be thought of. Fear, it may be said, is caused by an external object or by one's own Self. But neither of them is helpful to the critic to show that fear can be eliminated. If fear is caused by an external agency over which one has no control, one can never think of eliminating it with the result that fear is bound to continue for ever. If it be said that fear is caused by one's own Self and not by any external factor, it will never disappear unless the Self ceases to exist. But no one would wish for the cessation of the Self. In other words, fear is bound to persist.

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अनिवर्त्य स्वमात्मानं न भयस्य निराक्रिया ।

निवृत्तावपि नैव स्यान्निवृत्त्यैव समाप्तिः ॥

Without destroying one's Self, the removal of fear is not possible. Though fear is thus removed (through the destruction of the Self), it is of no use, because it has ended in the destruction (of the Self).

The untenability of the second alternative mentioned in the previous verse is reiterated in this verse.

If the removal of fear could be achieved only through the destruction of the Self, then there would be none to reap the fruit of the cessation of fear. The removal in this way of fear, which proves suicidal, is of no avail.

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अविद्यामात्रहेतौ तु सर्वमेतत् समञ्जसम् ।

तस्यामसत्यां तन्न स्यात् सत्यामेव हि भीर्यतः ॥

But if it is said that fear is caused only by *avidyā*, all this can be easily explained. When there is no *avidyā*, there is no fear, for fear arises, indeed, only when there is *avidyā*.

This verse emphasizes once again the soundness of the standpoint of non-duality as stated in verse (572).

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यदज्ञानाद्भयं यत्स्यात्तज्ज्ञानात्तत्कुतो भवेत् ।

रज्जुसर्पादिवत्तस्मादविद्यैव भयोद्भवः ॥

If fear arises because of the ignorance of an object, then how could it take place when that object is known, as in the case of the rope-serpent, etc.? Hence *avidyā* alone is the cause of fear.

The critic may argue in a different way to show that *avidyā* is not the cause of fear. The knower of Brahman, it must be admitted, is free from *avidyā*. Nevertheless, he has the experience of fear. If so, how could it be said, the critic argues, that fear is caused by *avidyā*.

This argument is wrong. Consider, for example, the case of the rope-serpent. A person mistakes a rope for a serpent. So long as he does not know that the object in front is only a rope, he has the fear of snake. But when he knows that it is only a rope, he is free from the fear of snake. In the same way when a person has realized the non-

dual Brahman, how can it be said that he has the experience of fear, which could arise only through duality set up by *avidyā*? Though others may see the knower of Brahman as though he has the experience of fear, from his own standpoint, strictly speaking, he has no such experience.

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विद्याविद्यात्मकम्ब्रह्म मतञ्चेन्न विरोधतः ।

पृथक्च दृश्यमानत्वादात्मनो घटरूपवत् ॥

If it be said that Brahman is of the nature of both knowledge and ignorance, it is not so, because they are opposed to each other, and also because they are cognized as different from the Self, in the same way as the colour of a pot (is cognized as different from the percipient).

The critic now argues in a different way. If fear is caused by *avidyā*, and if it is removed through *vidyā*, why should it not be said, asks the critic, that ignorance and knowledge are both inherent in the Self? This argument is now taken up for consideration with a view to show that neither knowledge nor ignorance is in the Self.

If it is said that both knowledge and ignorance inhere in the Self, is it in the sense that both of them constitute the nature of the Self? Or, is it in the sense that they are attributes of the Self? The first alternative is untenable. *Vidyā* and *avidyā* are mutually exclusive, and so it is wrong to say that both of them constitute the nature of the Self. There is yet another reason to show why this view is untenable. Very often we speak of "my knowledge" and "my ignorance". These locutions clearly indicate that we know them as different from the Self. Just as the colour of a pot, which is perceived, is different from, and therefore cannot constitute the nature of, the percipient, so also knowledge and ignorance which are perceived directly are different from, and therefore cannot constitute the nature of, the Self.

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प्रत्यक्षेण हि दृश्येते विद्याविद्ये मनोगते ।

न तयोरात्मधर्मत्वं तस्मात्ते नामरूपयोः ॥

Both knowledge and ignorance which inhere in the mind are cognized, indeed, by perception. Therefore, both of them are not the attributes of the Self. They belong to the sphere of name and form.

This verse refutes the second alternative.

Knowledge and ignorance are inherent in the internal organ which is a product of *avidyā*. So they are not the attributes of the Self, but of the internal organ.

Knowledge and ignorance must be brought under the category of name and form. Ānandagiri says that the expression *nāma-rūpa* refers to the beginningless *ajñāna* (*nāma-rūpasabdena anādyajñānamucyate*). Knowledge and ignorance are inherent in the internal organ which must be included in the category of *nāma-rūpa* projected by *avidyā*. So they, too, must be viewed as name and form.

[579]

अन्तरा नामरूपे ये ब्रह्मबाह्ये तयोर्हि तत् ।

न स्तो ब्रह्मणि ते भानावुदयास्तमयाविव ॥

The name and form are different from Brahman, and Brahman is different from them. They do not exist in Brahman in the same way as the rising and the setting do not exist in the sun.

That name and form are different from Brahman is clearly stated in the *Chāndogya* text (VIII, xiv, 1): "He who is called *Ākāśa* is the revealer of name and form. That which is distinct from them is Brahman."

Though *vidyā* and *avidyā* which belong to the sphere of *nāma-rūpa* are different from Brahman, one may suggest that they are nevertheless

related to Brahman. Even this possibility is ruled out, because *śruti* says that Brahman is unattached to anything (see the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, IV, iii, 15). Just as the rising and the setting are imagined to exist in the sun, so also knowledge and ignorance are imagined to exist in Brahman.

[580]

कर्मकर्तृकृतैकस्य दोषः स्यादिति चेन्न तत् ।

सङ्क्रान्तेर्ज्ञानमात्रत्वात्तद्धि भेदनिरासि नः ॥

If it be said that (on the view that the *jīva* and Brahman are non-different) the defect of one and the same thing being both the agent and the object of action will arise, it is not so, because the word *saṅkrānti* (here) means mere knowledge (of oneness of the *jīva* with Brahman). To us, knowledge, indeed, removes difference.

The possibility of the defect of one and the same entity being both the agent and the object of action (*karma-kartṛtvavirodha*) was mentioned in verse (551) in connection with the standpoint of non-duality. The opponent cites the *śruti* text "He attains this self made of bliss" (*etam-ānandamayamātmānam upasaṅkrāmati*) in support of his contention.

This objection will not hold good. The word *saṅkrānti* spoken of in the *śruti* text does not mean attainment or reaching, but mere knowledge. The context in which this text occurs is this. He who knows the person in the human being and in the sun as one resolves, as a result of the knowledge he has, the *annamaya* in the *prāṇamaya*, the *prāṇamaya* in the *manomaya*, the *manomaya* in the *vijñānamaya*, the *vijñānamaya* in the *ānandamaya* and the *ānandamaya* in Brahman. See verses (546) to (548) for the explanation of this *śruti* passage. The idea is that when a person attains the liberating knowledge "I am Brahman", *avidyā* and its effects erroneously ascribed to Brahman get removed. So the alleged defect of one and the same thing being the agent and the object of an action does not arise.

[581]

सुखदुःखादिसम्बद्धमात्मानं न वेत्ति चेत् ।
भवतो मुमुक्षुता कस्माद्विस्मभादेतदुच्यताम् ॥

If the Self does not see itself as subject to pleasure, pain, etc., how a seeker of *mokṣa* is possible for you may be explained with due consideration.

This verse states the objection of the opponent.

According to Advaita, the *jīva* in its essential nature is non-different from Brahman. It is also maintained that Brahman which is ever-free is not subject to pleasure and pain, which characterize the condition of bondage. Such a standpoint, argues the opponent, involves several difficulties. If Brahman is never subject to bondage, why should the Advaitin speak about the cessation of bondage resulting from knowledge? Since there is nothing other than Brahman, and since Brahman is eternally free from bondage, there is strictly speaking no *samsārīn* if one accepts the standpoint of non-duality. If so, there cannot be any seeker after liberation. If there is no spiritual aspirant desirous of liberation, Scripture will become useless. The opponent, therefore, concludes that the standpoint of Advaita which is vitiated by several difficulties cannot be accepted.

[582]

जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तेषु वस्तुवृत्तानुरोधतः ।
श्यामः सुखी न वेद्भीति वेत्त्यात्मानं प्रसिद्धितः ॥

In the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep, it is well-known that the Self through its consciousness knows itself as "I am black," "I am happy," and "I do not know."

The objection of the opponent is answered in this verse.

The experience of the *jīva* in the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep confirms the fact of bondage so long as *avidyā* lasts. On

account of the erroneous identification with the body and the senses, the *jīva* thinks of itself as black, blind, and so on. In the same way identifying itself with the mind, it thinks that it is subject to pleasure and pain. Further, the *jīva* has the experience of ignorance not only in the waking and dream states, but also in the state of deep sleep. Waking up from deep sleep, a person recollects his experience by saying: "I did not know anything." The Witness-consciousness which is uniformly present in all the three states manifests all these. It only means that so long as there is *avidyā* the *jīva* is in bondage. Being involved in transmigratory existence due to *avidyā*, it longs for liberation. It would follow, therefore that the teaching of Scripture serves a useful purpose.

Ānandagiri explains *vastuvṛttānurodhataḥ prasiddhitaḥ* as *vastuno vṛttān svarūpabhūtān caitanyaṁ tadanusārāt prasiddhiḥ*.

[583]

कार्यकारणहानाच्च न विभागः परात्मनि ।
अभावात् कर्मकर्त्रादेर्बोध एवावशिष्यते ॥

And also, being devoid of both cause and effect, there is no division in the supreme Self. Since distinctions such as the agent and the object are absent (in the Self), consciousness alone remains.

It has already been stated in verse (580) that the Advaita view is free from the defect of one and the same thing being both the agent and the object of an action. It is reiterated again in this verse.

The Self by its very nature is free from activity. It has neither the body nor the senses. It is pure undifferentiated consciousness. Agency and other characteristics belong to the internal organ which carries the reflection of consciousness.

[584]

कारकाण्युपमृद्नाति विद्या बुद्धिमिवोषे ।
कारकत्वमविद्योत्थं स्वतश्चाकारकात्मता ॥

Knowledge removes (from the Self) the notions of agent, object, etc., in the same way as the knowledge (of desert) removes the thought (of water) in the desert. The sense of agency, etc., is caused by *avidyā*. The Self by its very nature is devoid of agency, etc.

There is yet another reason to show why the standpoint of non-duality is free from the defect of one and the same entity being both the agent and the object of an action. The Self by its very nature is immutable (*kūṭastha*) and so the notions of agency, etc., which arise with regard to the Self, are due to *avidyā*. When a person attains the saving knowledge, viz., "I am Brahman," his ignorance of Brahman-Ātman gets removed. When *avidyā* disappears, the wrong notions about the Self also disappear. An example is given to drive home this point. So long as a person does not know that the area he is getting into is a desert, he thinks that water will be available in that place. But when he gains the knowledge of the place, he does not think of water in that place. In the same way when a person attains the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman he no longer associates the sense of agency, etc., with that non-dual reality.

[585]

यद्धि यस्य स्वतो रूपं न तत्प्राप्तावपेक्षते ।

क्रियामन्यनिमित्तत्वादपेक्षा कर्त्रपह्वे ॥

There is no need of action for attaining that which is one's own nature, because action is the cause of modification (etc.). There is the need of *karma* for removing the sense of agency from the Self.

Action (*kriyā*) is required to originate or modify something. Since Brahman is immutable, there is no scope for action thereto. But this does not mean that Advaita does not recognize the importance of Scripture-enjoined actions. *Karma*, according to Advaita, is required for attaining the purification of mind. Only when the mind is purified, knowledge will arise, and agency and other erroneous notions set up by *avidyā* will disappear along with *avidyā*.

[586]

नैवेहान्नमयात्मानं जलूकावत् परोऽज्जसा ।

उपसङ्क्रामतीत्यस्मादौणी सङ्क्रान्तिरिष्यते ॥

Since here the *jīva* does not attain, in the literal sense, the self made of food as in the case of a leech, attainment in the figurative sense is desired.

When the *Upaniṣad* says that "he who knows thus attains, after desisting from this world, this self made of food," it does not speak about attainment in the literal sense of the term. For instance, when a leech or some other worm moves from one thing to another, we can say that it attains or reaches an object literally. But in the case of the knower of Brahman, attainment is only figurative. When *śruti* says that the knower of Brahman, becoming indifferent to the things of the world, attains the self made of food, what it means is that as a result of the knowledge he has gained he does not see the things of the world as different from the cosmic self in its gross aspect. He realizes, that is to say, his identity with the *Virāj*. Then he realizes his identity with the *Hiraṇyagarbha*. It is in this sense that we have to explain his attaining the *prāṇamaya*, the *manomaya*, etc.

[587]

बहिः प्रवृत्तेः सङ्क्रान्तिः प्रत्यावृत्त्येति चेन्मतम् ।

मनोमयादिवन्नैवं विरुद्धा स्वात्मनि क्रिया ॥

If it be said that like the mind, etc., the Self turns back after having gone out and attains itself, it is not so, because it is impossible for one to get into oneself.

The critic argues by suggesting an example that attainment here may be understood in the literal sense. Just as the mind which goes out towards external objects through its *vṛtti* turns back and reaches itself, so also the Self which goes out towards the physical body, etc., through the mind turns back and reaches itself. This argument will not do. It is impossible for one and the same entity to be both the

agent and the object of an action. That which attains must be different from that which is attained. It is absurd to say that the Self reaches itself by itself (*ātmaivātmānam praviśatīti praveśakriyā viruddhā*).

[588]

स्फुरन्ती न जलूकापि स्वात्मानं स्वात्मनाञ्जसां ।

उपसङ्क्रामतीत्यत्र निर्भागत्वात्तथापि न ॥

Even the well-known leech cannot literally attain itself by itself. (Even if we assume that a leech, being made of several parts, attains one of its parts by another part), here (in the case of the Self) it cannot be explained even in that way, because the Self is without parts.

[589]

तस्मात् प्राप्तिर्न सङ्क्रान्तिर्न च कोशात्मकर्तृका ।

पञ्चकोशातिरिक्तात्मकर्तृका परिशिष्यते ॥

Therefore, *saṅkrānti* (here) does not mean attainment. Nor does it mean that any of these sheaths is the agent (of *saṅkramaṇa*). The Self which is different from the five sheaths is what remains as the agent of (knowledge).

The word *saṅkramaṇa* here means only realization, mere knowledge. Who is it that attains this realization or knowledge? It cannot be any of the sheaths, because every one of them is insentient (*na kośānāmānyatamaḥ saṅkramaṇa-kartā, acetanasya jñānakartṛtvādyogāt*). Since the entity that is left over is the Self, we have to say that the Self is the knower, i.e., that which attains the knowledge which removes the erroneous identification with the sheaths (*pañcakośa-ūddāmyābhimāna-nivartaka-jñānakartṛ bhavati*). When we say that *saṅkramaṇa* means mere knowledge (*jñānamātrām*), we do not mean the pure consciousness, but the mental mode which remains unified and undifferentiated in the form of Brahman (*jñānam cātra brahmākārāntaḥkaraṇavṛttiḥ*).

How can the immutable Self which is pure consciousness be the knower (*jñātā*)? This will be answered in the next verse.

[590]

कोशातिरिक्तरूपस्य सर्वान्तरतमात्मनः ।

अक्रियस्यैव सङ्क्रान्तिर्नभोवत् स्यात् परात्मनः ॥

The supreme Self, the innermost Self of all, which is immutable, and which is different from all sheaths, is said to be the knower (through ignorance) in the same way as *ākāśa* is said to provide space.

The immutable Self is by itself *nirguṇa*. But it is looked upon as the knower only because of *avidyā*. When *avidyā* is removed through knowledge, *jñāna-karṭṛtva* which is falsely ascribed to the Self also gets removed.

[591]

गुहाश्रयाभिसम्बन्धो योऽविद्याविभ्रमाद्भवेत् ।

आत्मज्ञानाद्भ्रमध्वस्तौ सङ्क्रान्तिरिति गौरियम् ॥

The relation of the Self with the semblance of consciousness in the intellect and (through that with the five sheaths) is due to the illusion caused by *avidyā*. When the illusion is destroyed through Self-knowledge, it is (figuratively) said to be *saṅkrānti*.

The Self by itself is not related to anything. There is first of all the erroneous identification of the Self with the semblance of consciousness in the internal organ due to *avidyā*. On the basis of this initial identification, its further identification with the *pañcakōśa* takes place. The word *saṅkramaṇa* is used figuratively with regard to the removal of error, created by ignorance, on the onset of Brahman-realization.

[592]

तस्मात् सत्यमनन्तं यत् सवेदाविकलेक्षणम् ।

तदस्मीति प्रबोधार्थं बहुस्यामिति कल्प्यते ॥

Therefore, with a view to impart the knowledge, "I am that Brahman," which is real, infinite, and eternally perfect consciousness, (the creation of the world, etc., as taught in) the *śruti* text, "May I become many," are superimposed (on the Self).

Śruti teaches that Brahman created the world and then entered into it, etc., with a view to enable the spiritual aspirant to attain the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman. Since Brahman is immutable, it is free from action, instruments of action, etc. It is, therefore, wrong to think that Brahman-Ātman is the agent of the creation of the world, the entry into it, etc., being in the real sense of the term.

[593]

पञ्चकोशातिवर्त्यात्मा ज्ञानभानूदयात् क्रमात् ।
जग्ध्वा पञ्चापि कोशास्तान्निर्वात्यात्मनि दीपवत् ॥

On the rise of the sun of knowledge, the Self which lies beyond the five sheaths devours one by one all the five sheaths, and shines, like a lamp, remaining in its own form.

This verse explains how, on the onset of knowledge, ignorance and its effects get removed. There is no time lag between the rise of knowledge and the disappearance of ignorance. They take place simultaneously (*jñānāvirbhāva-samakālika evaividyā-vināśaḥ*).

[594]

तदेतस्मिन् यथोक्तेऽर्थे श्लोको मन्त्रोऽपि विद्यते ।
अशेषानन्दवल्लघर्थसारस्यास्य प्रकाशकः ॥

In respect of this idea which has been stated (in the *Brāhmaṇa* portion), there occurs this verse in the *Mantra* portion, which brings out the essence of the teaching of the entire *Anandavallī*.

The central teaching of the *Ānandavallī*, otherwise called the *Brahmavallī*, can be stated as follows: Brahman-Ātman which is one and non-dual is of the nature of unsurpassable bliss. It is free from all misery and sorrow. Not knowing this truth on account of ignorance, it gets involved in bondage, and attains release by realizing the truth. This idea is succinctly brought out in the verse that occurs at the beginning of the next *anuvāka*.

The eighth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad* commenced in verse (480) is concluded with this verse.

[595-596]

यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते तद्ब्रूहेति प्रतीयताम् ॥

शब्दप्रवृत्तिहेतूनां प्रत्यगात्मन्यसम्भवात् ।

शब्दार्थासम्भवम्प्राह ह्यप्राप्येत्यादराच्छ्रुतिः ॥

That should be known as Brahman from which (all) words return. Since the features necessary for the usage of words for the purpose of denoting objects are absent in the inward Self, *śruti* carefully declares through the expression *aprāpya* that words do not denote it.

The ninth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad* is covered by verses (595) to (750).

Verses (595) to (599) explain the meaning of *yato vāco nivartante aprāpya*.

Brahman-Ātman from which all words along with the mind turn back without reaching it can be known only through *śabda-pramāṇa*. And yet *śruti* says that words along with the mind return without reaching Brahman-Ātman. Words are used to refer to a relation, or a quality, or an action, or the class characteristic, or the name of an object (*śaṣṭhī-guṇa-kriyā-jāti-rūḍhayaḥ śabdapravṛtti-hetavaḥ*). But none of these factors which occasion the usage of words are present in the Self. It is

for this reason that *śruti* says that words do not reach the Self. It means that Brahman-Ātman cannot be denoted by words.

[597]

तस्माल्लक्षणवाचीनि सत्यादीनि पुराऽब्रवम् ।

विशेषणविशेष्याणां निषेधात् कोशशायिनाम् ॥

I have, therefore, said before that the words "real," etc., state the definition of Brahman by denying the applicability to it of substantives and attributes, which are applicable to the (five) sheaths.

Substance, quality, and other categories can be denoted by words. All of them are not-Self. Brahman which is *nirviśeṣa* cannot be designated by words. Even the words *satyam*, *jñānam*, and *anantam* indicate Brahman only by implication, and not directly.

[598]

निर्ममं निरहङ्कारं ब्रह्मैवात्मेत्युपास्महे ।

द्रव्यादिविषये यानि प्रयुक्तानि प्रयोक्तृभिः ॥

स्वार्थहेतोर्निवृत्त्यैव निवर्तन्ते वचांस्यतः ॥

We hold that the Self is Brahman itself which is devoid of the ideas of "I" and "mine". Words which are employed by the speakers to refer to substance, etc., (in the world) return from Brahman only because of the absence therein of the factors which occasion the application of words.

Though it is denied that Brahman can be expressed by words, it is nevertheless admitted that Brahman can be spoken of by implication (*brahmaṇo'ra śabda-viśayatvameva niṣidhyate, na tu lakṣaṇāviśayatvam*).

[599]

न मातृयायिनो यस्मात् प्रत्यया बुद्धिकर्तृकाः ।

तन्निवृत्तौ निवर्तन्ते तस्मात्ते मनसा सह ॥

Inasmuch as the cognitions which are caused by *buddhi* do not reach the Witness-self, words along with the mind return when the cognitions return.

This verse explains the meaning of *manasā saha*. Here the word *manas* means cognition (*pratyaya* or *viññāna*). When we utter words with a view to express something, they give rise to certain mental modes or modifications (*buddhivṛtti*) on the part of the person who listens to them. These modifications of the *buddhi* are known as cognitions. When any object is to be made known through *śabda*, the object must be such that it can be comprehended by the cognitions of the *buddhi*. In the case of Brahman-Ātman, the cognitions caused by *śabda* return without comprehending it because of the absence of features like *jāti*, *guṇa* etc., therein which are necessary for the usage of words. Where there is scope for cognition, there is also scope for speech (*yatra ca viññānam, tatra ca vācāḥ pravṛttiḥ*). Since Brahman cannot be comprehended by means of cognitions, *śruti* says that words return failing to reach Brahman along with the cognitions of the mind.

[600]

यतो वाचोऽभिधानानि प्रयुक्तान्युपलब्धये ।
सर्वाण्यनभिधायैव निवर्तन्तेऽवबोधे च ॥

All the words which are used to convey the knowledge (of Brahman) return without expressing their sense directly. (But they return) only after revealing it (indirectly).

If words do not reach Brahman, how is it said, it may be asked, that Brahman is made known by *śabda-pramāṇa*? The answer is that, though *śabda* does not directly express the nature of Brahman, it nevertheless reveals its nature indirectly (*lakṣaṇāvṛtityā brahmaṇi śāstrasya bodhakatvam*).

[601]

उदपादि च यच्छब्दैर्ज्ञानमाकारवद्वियः ।
स्वतो बुद्धं तदप्राप्य नाम्ना सह निवर्तते ॥

The cognition relating to Brahman generated by the words in the intellect returns along with the word without reaching Brahman, which is by its very nature consciousness.

It was stated earlier that words return along with cognition without comprehending Brahman. This verse now explains that cognition returns along with words without reaching Brahman which is itself consciousness. In short, Brahman is not an object which can be known through *śabda* or through the cognition generated by *śabda*.

[602]

माहात्म्यमेतच्छब्दस्य यदविद्यां निरस्यति ।
सुषुप्त इव निद्राया दुर्बलत्वाच्च बाध्यते ॥

The peculiar power of the word is such that it removes the ignorance (concerning the Self) as the man who is asleep is removed from his sleep (by the power of the word). Since *avidyā* also is not firmly established, it is removed.

If Brahman-Ātman cannot be made known by the words and by the cognition generated by them, how can the ignorance about Brahman be removed through *śabda*? In order to answer this question, let us first consider an example. A person is fast asleep. In order to wake him up we utter the words: "O! Devadatta, get up." These words do not reach him, because he is fast asleep. Nevertheless, they are capable of rousing him from his sleep. In the same way the scriptural utterance *tat tvam asi* is capable of removing the ignorance about Brahman-Ātman, though it does not directly reveal its nature.

Since *avidyā* is not *pramāṇa-siddha*, it is really weak, and so it disappears at the onset of knowledge.

[603]

दुर्बलत्वादविद्याया आत्मत्वाद्बोधरूपिणः ।
शब्दशक्तेरचिन्त्यत्वाद्विज्ञस्तं मोहहान्तः ॥

Since *avidyā* is not strong, since knowledge constitutes the essential nature of the Self, and since the power of the word is inconceivable, we know Brahman through the destruction of ignorance.

Since Brahman is of the nature of knowledge, *avidyā* can hardly exist in it. In other words, its hold on Brahman is not strong. Further, the power of *śabda* is, indeed, inconceivable, as seen in the case of spell-chants used for curing bites of poisonous animals. Though *śabda* cannot directly designate Brahman, it nevertheless gives rise to the knowledge of Brahman as soon as it is uttered and thereby removes *avidyā* (*viśāmantrādiṣu dṛṣṭatvādeva śabda-sāmarthyasyūcintyutvādātmano viśayīkaraṇamantareṇa tadākūra-jñānodaya-mātreṇa tatvavidyām śabdo nivartayati*).

[604]

अगृहीत्वैव सम्बन्धमभिधानाभिधेययोः ।
हित्वा निद्राम्प्रबुध्यन्ते सुषुप्ते बोधिताः परैः ॥

Even without grasping the relation between the word and its meaning, persons who are asleep, being awakened by others, wake up, giving up sleep.

This verse explains the example of rousing a person from sleep mentioned in verse (602).

[605]

जाग्रद्वन्न यतः शब्दं सुषुप्ते वेत्ति कश्चन ।
ध्वस्तेऽतो वचसाज्ञाने ब्रह्मास्मीति भवेन्मतिः ॥

For, in sleep no one grasps the word as one grasps it during the waking state. Hence, when ignorance is destroyed by (the cognition caused by) speech, there will arise the realization, "I am Brahman."

A person who is asleep is not conscious of the word uttered by others. So he does not remember the relation between the word and its meaning. Nevertheless, the word uttered by others has the desired effect in that it gives rise to knowledge in him and makes him get up from sleep. In the same way, though a person does not grasp the relation between the Upaniṣadic utterance and its meaning, the former reveals Brahman indirectly through *lakṣaṇā*. When *avidyā* is removed by the cognition generated by *śabda*, the person realizes that he is Brahman.

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न भेदः क्रिययोरत्र क्रियातत्फलभेदतः ।
किम्पूर्वमिति चोचस्य नात्रातः सम्भवो भवेत् ॥

Here there is no difference between the two actions (viz., the rise of knowledge and the removal of ignorance). Since the causal action and its effect are different, the question as to which of the two is earlier that is asked (in other cases) will not arise here.

Though the rise of knowledge is the cause and the disappearance of ignorance is the effect, there is no time interval between them. As knowledge arises, ignorance disappears. It is not as if that there is some interval between the two, which calls for some action to be done after the rise of knowledge for the purpose of removing ignorance. The two — the rise of knowledge (*jñānotpatti*) and the destruction of ignorance (*avidyānāśa*) — are simultaneous.

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अविद्याघातिनी शब्दादहं ब्रह्मेति धीर्भवेत् ।
नश्यत्यविद्यया सार्धं हत्वा रोगमिवौषधम् ॥

From the (scriptural) utterance there arises the cognition, "I am Brahman," which destroys ignorance. This cognition disappears along with ignorance after destroying

it, in the same way as the medicine disappears after destroying the disease.

The unitary, non-relational, cognition through the mental mode (*akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti-jñāna*) generated by the *śruti* text removes ignorance. The question that arises here is whether the unitary, non-relational, cognition continues to exist after removing ignorance. If it exists, what is it that removes it? If it cannot be removed, it will undermine non-dualism, because it has to be reckoned as an entity in addition to Brahman.

According to Advaita, none of these difficulties arise. Only if the *akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti-jñāna* persists after removing ignorance, the standpoint of non-dualism will be at stake, as in addition to Brahman there is this final *vṛtti-jñāna*. But it disappears after destroying ignorance, in the same way as a medicinal drug gets itself removed after destroying the disease.

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अवशिष्टं स्वतो बुद्धं शुद्धं मुक्तं ततो भवेत् ।
नातः स्याद्भावनापेक्षा नापि मानान्तरम्प्रति ॥

Then there remains that one reality which is by its very nature consciousness, pure, and free. Hence there is no need of meditation (and of injunction in respect of attaining Brahman-knowledge). Nor is there any need of another *pramāṇa* (in this regard).

When *avidyā* which veils the nature of Brahman is removed, the latter remains in its own form as the eternal, ever-free, self-luminous consciousness.

In order to attain the knowledge of Brahman, which is of the nature of self-luminous consciousness, through *śabda*, neither meditation (*bhāvanā*) nor injunction (*niyoga*) is required. Since Brahman is ever-existent, nothing is to be gained by means of both meditation and

injunction. Since it is of the nature of self-luminous consciousness, there is no need of another *pramāṇa* for the purpose of knowing it.

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अलौकिकत्वाद्बोध्यस्य स्वतश्चावगमात्मनः ।

बोध्ये हि लौकिकेऽपेक्षा परतोऽवगतौ तथा ॥

Since the Self that is known is not an empirical object and since it is consciousness by its very nature, (there is no need of other *pramāṇas*). They are, indeed, required in respect of objects of knowledge, which are empirical and which are known by other means.

There is yet another reason to show why other *pramāṇas* are not required for attaining the knowledge of Brahman. Stocks and stones which are empirical are known through perception and other *pramāṇas*. The latter have validity only with regard to empirical objects. But Brahman is not an empirical object. So it cannot be known through any of these *pramāṇas*. In short, only empirical objects which can be known by perception and other *pramāṇas* and which are insentient require these *pramāṇas*, but not the trans-empirical, self-luminous Brahman (*svapṛakāśavirahite laukike vastuni pramāṇāntarāpekṣā, na tu svapṛakāśe pare brahmaṇi*).

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नद्यास्तीरे फलानीव प्रत्यक्षाद्यनपेक्षतः ।

किमिवेहान्यमानेषु तवापेक्षाभिधाश्रुतेः ॥

Unlike the statement, "There are fruits on the bank of the river," (uttered by a trustworthy person), the *śruti* text which has the power to convey the knowledge does not depend on perception, etc. Where, then, is the need of other *pramāṇas* here?

That there is no need of other *pramāṇas* like perception for obtaining the knowledge of Brahman can be explained by means of

an example. Consider the following statement of a trustworthy person: "There are fruits on the bank of the river." A person who hears this statement has to depend upon perception with a view to confirm the truth of this statement. The information conveyed by him is such that it can be known through perception. But in the case of scriptural utterance like *tat tvam asi*, the knowledge conveyed by it cannot be confirmed by *pramāṇas* like perception, for Brahman which is trans-empirical does not fall within the scope of perception and other *pramāṇas*. It means that perception and other *pramāṇas*, whose validity is restricted to things empirical, are of no avail for obtaining the knowledge of Brahman.

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प्रमाता च प्रमाणञ्च प्रमेयो निश्चितिस्तथा ।
यत्सान्निध्यात् प्रसिद्ध्यन्ति तत्सिद्धौ किमपेक्षते ॥

What evidence is needed for establishing that (Brahman) by whose presence the knower, the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the resulting knowledge get established?

When we claim to know anything, three factors are involved — (1) *pramātā*, the subject of knowledge, (2) *prameya*, the object known, and (3) *pramāṇa*, the instrument of knowledge. When the necessary conditions of knowledge are fulfilled, knowledge takes place. The resulting knowledge is called *pramiti*. It is the Witness-consciousness that reveals all these. That Brahman-consciousness by which everything is known cannot be known by other *pramāṇas*. What is presupposed in all means of knowledge cannot be established through them.

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जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तेषु घटोऽयमिति संविदः ।
व्यवधानं न चेहास्ति तद्भावाभावसाक्षितः ॥

Unlike the cognition, "This is a pot," here (in respect of Brahman-consciousness) there is no interruption (by

space, etc.) in waking, dream, and deep sleep states, because it is the witness of the presence as well as the absence of the interruption.

We have the cognition of an object like a pot only when certain conditions are fulfilled. An object is cognized only when there is no interruption or obstacle (*vyavadhāna*) by space and time. We are able to perceive an object which is in front, but not that which is in some other place. It means that among the various requirements there must be the absence of interruption by space (*deśa-vyavadhāna*) if the object is to be perceived. Again, we perceive an object which is in front of us just now, but not one which was in the past. In other words, there must be the absence of interruption by time (*kāla-vyavadhāna*) if an object is to be perceived. Further, our cognition is dependent on the appropriate state of mind. In the absence of the appropriate mental mode (*buddhi-vṛtti*), an object cannot be cognized, though other conditions are fulfilled. Like space and time, *buddhi-vṛtti* also, when not appropriate, will be an obstacle or interruption to the rise of cognition. An object which is cognized in the waking state is not cognized in dream, and *vice versa*. An object which is cognized in waking and dream states is not cognized in the state of deep sleep. Therefore our cognition of an object suffers interruption for want of appropriate conditions like place, time, mental mode, etc. (*ghaṭo'yamitisamvido deśa-kāla-jīṇabuddhivṛtti-lakṣaṇam vyavdhānamasti*). But there is no such interruption or obstacle for Brahman-consciousness in any condition or in any state whatsoever — waking, dream, or deep sleep. Brahman is the ever-existent and ever-revealing consciousness. It is the Witness of the presence as well as the absence of any interruption. It is through the Witness-consciousness that we have to know whether there is any interruption or not for the rise of cognition. Such being the nature of Brahman-consciousness, it does not require any other *pramāṇa* for its revelation.

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इदमेवमिदं नैवमितिबुद्धिर्विभागभाक् ।

अनात्मिकात्मवत्यत्र येनासौ किमपेक्षते ॥

The mind, which makes distinctions like "This is thus," and "This is not thus", and which does not have any nature of its own, comes to be endowed with a certain nature by the Self. If so, what is it that the Self is in need of?

The internal organ undergoes modification from time to time in accordance with the nature of the object which is presented to it. It is as a result of the work of the internal organ that we are able to determine the nature of an object as such and such, and also to decide what should be done and what should not be done. It has no being or nature of its own. Being insentient, it cannot reveal anything by itself. It comes to have the power of illumination because of the reflection of consciousness therein. It obtains the status of a knower (*jñātā*) because of Brahman-consciousness. The latter, being self-luminous by nature, requires neither meditation, nor injunction, nor another *pramāṇa* for its revelation.

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कर्त्रादिव्यापृतेः पूर्वमसङ्कीर्णं उपाधिभिः ।

अविक्षितो ह्यसंसृतोऽनुभवः किमपेक्षते ॥

What is the evidence required by Brahman-consciousness, which is, indeed, wide awake (i.e., self-luminous) even before the instruments of action such as agent, etc., come into operation, which is unassociated with the limiting adjuncts, and which is free from illusion?

There is the experience of the Self in deep sleep where there is no scope for the work of meditation or injunction or the means of knowledge such as perception. If so, none of them is required for attaining the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman.

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अभिधेयं न यद्वस्तु प्रत्ययश्च न ढौकते ।

नियुक्तोऽपि नियोगेन कथं तदद्रष्टुमर्हति ॥

Though commanded by (a Vedic) injunction, how is it possible for one to see that Brahman, which cannot be denoted by words and which cognition, too, does not reach?

This verse brings out the futility of injunction with regard to the Self. What is the work of injunction with regard to the Self? Is an injunction required for the purpose of bringing the Self into existence? Or, is it required for the purpose of knowing the Self? Since the Self is ever-existent, it does not require to be brought into existence through human effort following the command of an injunction (*ātmano niyogāpekṣā na svasattāsiddhaye yuktā, tadīyasattāyā nityatvāt*). Since Brahman cannot be designated by words, and since cognition does not reach it, how can one see it even when one is commanded by means of a Vedic injunction? In short, Brahman-Ātman does not fall within the scope of an injunction.

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अपि मानान्तरप्राप्तं वस्तुवृत्तं निवर्तयेत् ।
नियोगार्थानुरोधेन यदि वस्त्वबोधयते ॥

If the Self is made known (by *śruti* texts like *tat tvam asi*) by being subservient to the meaning of an injunction, then what is known through another *pramāṇa* (like perception) will set aside the information about the Self (conveyed by *śruti* texts like *tat tvam asi*).

There are existential or assertive statements (*siddhārtha-bodhaka-vākya*) like *tat tvam asi* which reveal the nature of the existent Brahman-Ātman. The Mīmāṃsakas argue that assertive statements are valid only if they are construed as subsidiary to the injunctive texts (*vidhivākya*) like, "The Self, verily, should be seen" (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV, v, 6). According to them, assertive statements like *satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ brahma, tat tvam asi*, etc., provide information about the Self called for by the injunctive texts. So these have validity only when they are construed along with the injunctive texts.

This line of reasoning will not really help the Mīmāṃsakas to vindicate the need of injunction for obtaining the knowledge of Brahman. If we admit their view of the relation between assertive and injunctive texts, what the assertive texts convey regarding the nature of Brahman will have to be set aside when it comes into conflict with the evidence of perception and other *pramāṇas*, for the assertive texts are subsidiary to the injunctive texts, and the latter have their purport in what is to be accomplished (*sādhya*) and not in revealing the nature of the existent reality, viz., Brahman.

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भाव्यतेऽसन्नपीहार्थः प्रसिद्धेर्लोकवह्निवत् ।
ब्रह्मणस्त्वप्रसिद्धत्वात्ताप्यत्र सुदुर्लभम् ॥

Though what is to be meditated upon as something else is not really so, still it has to be meditated upon in that way, because they are already known like *dyuloka* and *agni*. But since Brahman is not already known, (meditation) is not possible here, as in the other case.

Just as Brahman does not fall within the scope of an injunction, so also it does not fall within the scope of meditation. In the case of meditation, an object which is to be meditated upon is always imagined to be something else, as directed by the *upāsana-vidhi*, though it is not really so. Consider, for example, the *Chāndogya* text (V, iv, 1) which says: "That world, verily, O Gautama, is a sacrificial fire." Here the heavenly region (*dyuloka*) must be meditated upon as the sacrificial fire (*agni*). *Dyuloka* is not really *agni*; still it is to be regarded as *agni* for the purpose of meditation. In the case of meditation, the two objects, viz., the object which is to be meditated upon and the subject of meditation, must already be known to us. But *dyuloka* and *agni* are already known to us through other *pramāṇas*; and so, as required by Scripture, it is quite possible to meditate upon *dyuloka* as *agni*. But this is not possible in the case of Brahman. The subject of meditation, viz., Brahman, is not already known to us. The *śruti* texts like *tat tvam*

asi, through which we can know Brahman, are, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, subsidiary to the injunctive texts, and so they cannot reveal the nature of the existent Brahman. Since Brahman is not in any way known to us, it will follow that it is not the subject of meditation (*dyulokāgnivad-brahmavasiuno'prasiddhatvāt tadanuṣṭāsyam*).

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क्रियतेऽलौकिकोऽप्यर्थः पदार्थान्वयरूपतः ।

अवाक्यार्थात्मकम्ब्रह्म तथाप्यत्र सुदुष्करम् ॥

Though the subject matter (of Vedic injunction or meditation) is trans-empirical, still it can be conveyed, because it is a related sense, arising from the combination of the word-senses. But Brahman is not what is conveyed by the sentence-sense. As in the other case, here (Brahman-knowledge) cannot be brought (within the scope of injunction).

Only a relational sense conveyed by a sentence can be brought within the scope of injunction or meditation. But Brahman, the pure undifferentiated Being, is non-relational. So it cannot be directly conveyed by a sentence which imparts a relational sense (*saṃsr̥ṣṭa-viśaya*) through the combination of the meanings of words (*padārthānvayadvārā*). It is for this reason that we say *śruti* texts like *tat tvam asi* convey the non-relational sense of identity through implication (*ata eva tattva-masyūdī-vākyaṇūh saṃsargānavagāhi-yathārthajñāna-janakatvarūpamakha-ṇḍārthatvamiṣyate*).

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प्रमाणमप्रमाणञ्च प्रमाभासस्तथैव च ।

कुर्वन्त्येव प्रमां यत्र तदसम्भावना कुतः ॥

How is the non-existence of Brahman tenable, since that (Brahman-consciousness) alone makes known *pramāṇa*

as well as *apramāṇa*, valid cognition as well as erroneous cognition?

It should not be thought that Brahman which is not conveyed by the sentence-sense does not really exist. If we say that something is a *pramāṇa* and that something else is not a *pramāṇa*, it is because of the Witness-consciousness. Similarly we are able to distinguish a valid cognition (*pramā*) from an erroneous one (*ābhāsa-jñāna*) only through the Witness-consciousness. All of these bear testimony to the existence of Brahman-consciousness, for we know them only as witnessed by the Self, which is eternal consciousness (*pramāṇādisādhakatvena nityadṛṣṭi-svabhāvasya brahmaṇaḥ siddhatvāt tadāsamabhīvanī nāsti*).

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प्रामाण्यमेतत्पृष्ठेन कस्मान्नैत्यभिधाश्रुतिः ।

नियोगस्यापि मानत्वं नानपेक्ष्य प्रमामिमाम् ॥

Why should the assertive statements (like *tat tvam asi*), which impart Brahman-knowledge, not be regarded as valid? Even an injunctive text by itself cannot have validity independently of this consciousness.

Independently of injunctive texts, the Upaniṣadic texts which are assertive have validity on their own, since they convey the knowledge of Brahman, which removes ignorance and its effects. It is the nature of a *pramāṇa* to make known what is otherwise unknown (*ajñāta-jñāpakam*). Judged by this criterion, the *Vedānta* texts which are assertive must be considered to be valid.

Further, even an injunctive text which enjoins something cannot have validity unless what it enjoins is made known by the Self which is consciousness, for an injunctive text by its very nature is insentient: i.e., an injunction cannot make itself known in the absence of consciousness (*na ca jādasya niyogasya yathoktamanubhavamantareṇa mānatvamanumanturī sakyaṭe*.)

[621]

पश्येदात्मानमित्यादि वाक्यं यत्स्याद्विधायकम् ।
ज्ञानकर्तृव्यतायां तन्नियोज्यपुरुषम्प्रति ॥

If it be said that the text, "He shall see the Self," is injunctive (that enjoins the knowledge of the Self, its work comes to an end) after commanding the person to acquire the knowledge of the Self.

The *Niyogavādin* insists on the need for an injunction in respect of Self-knowledge. He argues that texts like "He shall see the Self," which are injunctive, enjoin the knowledge of the Self. If so, we would like to know whether the nature of the Self is revealed by the injunctive text or by the assertive text. The nature of the Self cannot be made known by the injunctive text, because the latter has its purport only in enjoining the acquisition of the knowledge of the Self, and not in imparting the knowledge of the Self. The injunctive text here enjoins that one should inquire into Brahman (*brahma-jijñāsā kartavyā*). It does not, however, reveal the nature of Brahman. So the nature of Brahman cannot be had from the injunctive text.

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स्वव्यापारेऽनपेक्ष्यैव वस्तुवृत्तं वचो यतः ।
नियुङ्क्ते पुरुषं तस्माद्वस्तुवृत्तं सुदुर्लभम् ॥

Since an injunctive text commands a person to do what is directed by it without any reference to the nature of the object, it cannot reveal the nature of the object.

An injunctive text enjoins some action to be done. It does not purport to reveal the nature of the existent object. If so, an injunctive text like "He shall see the Self" does not have validity in respect of what is existent, viz., Brahman-Ātman.

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स्वशक्त्यननुरूपञ्चेत् कार्यं वाक्यशतैरपि ।
नियुक्तोऽपि न तत्सिद्धावलं शक्ये स हीश्वरः ॥

Though prompted even by one hundred injunctive texts a person cannot accomplish an act, if it is impossible for him to do. He is competent only in respect of that which is possible for him to do.

Knowledge does not fall within the scope of an injunction, because it is not something which can be done, or undone, or otherwise done by a person at will. An action which is to be accomplished is dependent on a person (*puṣatantra*), but knowledge of an object is dependent on the object as well as on the *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-vastu-tantra*). Since knowledge is not dependent on the will of a person, it is not something which can be accomplished by him, though prompted by hundreds of injunctive texts. But the position is different in the case of *yāga*, etc., which are dependent on the will of a person. With regard to these, he is free to do, not to do, or do it otherwise. Further, he can accomplish all these acts. So unlike these acts, knowledge does not fall within the scope of an injunction.

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अभिधाश्रुतितः सिद्धौ व्यापृच्छेत् प्रयत्नतः ।

विधिवाक्यानुगामित्वान्नार्थस्पृक्ष्यात् स्वतन्त्रतः ॥

One may try to hold the view that Brahman is known from the assertive text. But since the latter is made subsidiary to the injunctive text, it cannot independently reveal the nature of the object (viz. the Self).

In verse (621) it was stated that an injunctive text cannot impart the knowledge of the existent Brahman. Now the other alternative, viz. whether an assertive text, which is construed by the *Niyogavādin* as subsidiary to an injunctive text, can convey the knowledge of Brahman is taken up for consideration. So long as an assertive *śruti* text, without being given an independent status, is construed as subsidiary to an injunctive text, it cannot have any independent validity in respect of what it conveys. In short, it cannot, under the circumstances, reveal the nature of Brahman.

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स्वमांसान्यपि खादन्ति नियोगानतिलङ्घिनः ॥

जहत्यपि प्रियान् प्राणाञ्शक्यार्थत्वात्ततोऽपि हि ।

अशक्ये त्रिनिशुक्तोऽपि कृष्णलाञ्श्रपयेदिति ॥

सर्वात्मनाप्यसौ कुर्वन्कुर्यात्तस्करकन्दुवत् ॥

Those who would never transgress the scriptural injunctions may even eat their own flesh and give up their dear lives, since these acts can be accomplished by them. 'Though a person is commanded by the text, "One should boil iron pieces," to do an act which cannot be accomplished when compared with others, (he does not do it). (Though knowledge cannot be accomplished by an act) in any way whatsoever, a person who undertakes to do will do that like a thief who did the work of Kandu.

Since knowledge is not dependent on the will of a person, it is not something to be accomplished by an act being commanded by an injunction. What is possible alone can be done by a person, and not what is impossible. A person who is a devout follower of the *Veda* will readily eat his own flesh, and give up his life if he is commanded to do so, because these acts can be accomplished. But he can never do the act of boiling iron pieces, for it is impossible for him to do that, even though he may be commanded to do that by the *Veda*. In the same way since knowledge is not something to be accomplished by the will of a person, one will not undertake to do that, even though he may be commanded by a Vedic injunction. If a person chooses to do that, believing that he must do as directed by the injunction, he will subject himself to physical pain and hardship as he has undertaken to do what is impossible for any one to do.

The allusion in the verse is to a thief who took shelter in the house of Kandu. The thief started doing the work assigned to him by Kandu, though he was not really competent to do that work. The

police who came there saw him when he was doing the job very awkwardly. They decided that he must be the thief and arrested him. Just as the thief landed in difficulties by doing what was not possible for him to do, so also a person who aims at accomplishing knowledge as a piece of work to be done will court physical pain and hardship without, however, achieving his goal.

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न चोपासान्तराधीनो ब्रह्मज्ञानोदयो भवेत् ।

तं यथा तं तमेवेति न्यायदृग्धश्रुतेः स्मृतेः ॥

Brahman-knowledge will not arise even from meditation, as it has been stated by *śruti* and *smṛti* texts, "In whichever form one meditates upon Him," and "Him alone a person reaches" respectively, supported by reasoning.

This verse and the following one state that Brahman-knowledge cannot be obtained through meditation.

The practice of meditation as directed by Scripture may lead to the attainment of the conditioned Brahman, a fruit which is different from Brahman-knowledge (*jñānātiriktaphalam*). Two scriptural passages, one from *śruti* and another from *smṛti*, are cited in the second line of the verse in support of this view. The *Mudgala Upaniṣad* (III, 3) says, "In whichever form one meditates upon Him, one becomes that alone" (*taṁ yathā yathopāsate tadeva bhavati*). The *Bhagavadgītā* (VIII, 6) declares, "Him alone, O son of Kuntī, reaches he by whom the thought of that being has been constantly dwelt upon." Ānandagiri remarks that the reasoning referred to in this context in support of these scriptural passages is the well-known *tatkratu-nyāya* contained in the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka* (IV, iv, 5) which says: "As is his desire, so is his will; as is his will, so is the deed he does; whatever deed he does, that he attains."

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नार्थस्पृग्भावना चेत् स्याद्ब्रह्मधीजन्मने न सा ।

स्वभ्यस्ता राजती नो धीः शुक्तिकाज्ञानजन्मने ॥

If meditation does not comprehend the real nature of Brahman, then it cannot give rise to Brahman-knowledge. The cognition of silver, which is constantly repeated, cannot give rise to the knowledge of nacre.

It may be argued that, though meditation does not give rise to Brahman-knowledge, it may nevertheless be helpful to its attainment. This argument cannot be accepted. Since what accrues as a result of meditation is different from Brahman-knowledge, the practice of meditation for any length of time cannot be helpful in any way to the attainment of Brahman-knowledge. Just as the repeated contemplation on the idea of the illusory silver does not and cannot give rise to the idea of shell, so also the repeated contemplation on what is other than Brahman-knowledge cannot give rise to Brahman-knowledge.

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द्रष्टव्यश्चेद्भवेदात्मा स्यान्नियोगस्तदात्मनि ।
निषेधादर्शनस्येह न नियोगोऽस्त्यतः परे ॥

If the Self could be seen, then injunction would be possible in respect of (the knowledge of) the Self (or meditation on the Self). Since the seeing of the Self is denied (by the *śruti* text), injunction is not possible here in respect of the supreme Self.

The critic may argue that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (IV, v, 6), "Verily, the Self should be seen," enjoins the knowledge of the Self, or meditation on the Self. But this will not do. Only if the Self could be seen or known, injunction would be possible. The truth is that the Self can never be seen. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (III, iv, 2), for example, says: "You cannot see that which is the Witness of the vision." The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (I, iii, 15) says that Brahman is soundless, colourless, etc. These *śruti* texts indicate that Brahman cannot be seen or known.

Ānandagiri says that the word *ātmani* which occurs in the first line must be understood as *ātmaññāne tadupāsane vā*.

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नियोगानुप्रवेशेन वस्तुतत्त्वम्प्रबोध्यते ।

न हि विध्यनपेक्षस्य प्रामाण्यमनुवादिनः ॥

(The *Niyogavādin* argues:) "The nature of the object is made known (by the assertive *śruti* text) only in association with an injunctive text. An assertive text which is independent of an injunction and which is a restatement has, indeed, no validity."

This verse states the *pūrvapakṣa* of the *Niyogavādin*. According to this argument, if an assertive *śruti* text is not construed along with an injunctive text, it will be, in so far as it conveys information about an existent object; just a restatement; and this will be prejudicial to its validity. The only way to preserve its validity is to make it subsidiary to an injunctive text.

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नैवं यतः क्रियैवेह चोदनाभिर्विधीयते ।

स्वव्यापारे यतस्ताभिर्नियोक्तुं शक्यते पुमान् ॥

द्रव्यस्वरूपेऽसाध्यत्वात् कथं ताभिः प्रवर्त्यते ॥

It is not so, because action alone is enjoined by the injunctive texts, and a person can be directed by them only in what is to be accomplished. How can he be impelled by them in respect of the existent reality, since it is not what is to be accomplished.

This verse refutes the *pūrvapakṣa* stated in the previous verse.

The *Niyogavādin* argues that the *Vedānta* texts which are assertive are in need of injunction. Let us examine how he would try to justify his standpoint. Two possibilities are open to him. He may argue that the Self falls within the scope of an injunction. Or, he may argue that the knowledge of the Self falls within the scope of an injunction. The first alternative is not tenable. Action alone which is to be

done is enjoined by an injunctive text. Since its scope is restricted to what is to be accomplished (*sādhya*), the Self which is existent (*siddha-vastu*) can never be the subject of an injunction.

[633]

न चापोहात्मविज्ञानं चोदनाभिर्विधीयते ।
स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य इति ह्येतस्मात्तस्य सिद्धितः ॥

The knowledge of the Self, too, is not enjoined here by the injunctive texts, for from the general injunction, "Every one shall study his own section of the *Veda*," it will take place.

Let us now consider the other alternative, viz., the knowledge of the Self (*ātma-jñāna*) is the subject of an injunction. There are two possibilities here. Is the Self-knowledge, which is conveyed by *śabda*, the subject of an injunction? Or, is it some other knowledge? If the former, then does it require an injunction for its origination (*svotpatyartham*) or for bringing out its result (*svaphalārtham*)? A special injunction is not required in respect of the origination of Self-knowledge. There is the general injunction (*sāmānya-vidhi*), viz., "Every one shall study his own section of the *Veda*." Following this injunction, a person begins the study of the *Veda* and thereafter is interested either in the ritual-section (*karma-kāṇḍa*) of the *Veda* or in the knowledge-section (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*) depending upon the purity of mind and other qualifications he has attained. A person who resorts to the study of the *Vedānta* as a result of the general injunction attains the knowledge of the Self therefrom. No special injunction is, therefore, needed for the origination of Self-knowledge.

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कर्मावबोधो न यथा नियोगान्तरमीक्षते ।
तथैवात्मावबोधोऽपि न नियोगान्तराद्भवेत् ॥

Just as the knowledge of *karma* (which arises from the general injunction) does not require another injunction, even so the knowledge of the Self does not arise from another injunction.

Just as the knowledge of *karma*, which a person attains, can be accounted for in terms of the general *adhyayana-vidhi* without bringing in a separate injunction, so also the knowledge of the Self which a person attains can be explained in terms of the general *adhyayana-vidhi* without resorting to a separate injunction.

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स्यादेतदात्मबोधस्य नियोगविरहाद्यदि ।
 पुमर्थकारिता पुम्भिर्लभ्यते न तु लभ्यते ॥
 नियोगैकाधिगम्यत्वाज्ज्ञानकार्यस्य नान्यतः ।
 प्रमान्तरादिदं सिद्धयेन्नापि स्यादभिधानतः ॥

(The *Niyogavādin* argues:) "Let it be so if, in the absence of an injunction, it is understood by men that Self-knowledge is the means to the end desired by man; but it is not understood (by men without an injunction). That the knowledge of the Self is conducive to the good of man is known only from an injunction. This cannot be known from another *pramāṇa*. Nor can it be known from the assertive text that reveals the Self."

These two verses state the argument of the *Niyogavādin*.

In verse (634) we have shown that a separate injunction is not required for originating Self-knowledge. The *Niyogavādin* now takes his stand on the other alternative and argues that a separate injunction is needed for knowing that Self-knowing is conducive to the *puruṣārtha*. Assuming that heaven is the *puruṣārtha* to be obtained through Self-

knowledge, he argues that we can know this only through an injunction, and not through assertive texts like *tat tvam asi* or through some other source.

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नैतदेवं यतो नेह ज्ञेयार्थव्याप्तिमात्रतः ।
फलान्तरम्प्रबोधस्य किञ्चित् सम्भाव्यतेऽप्यपि ॥

It is not so, because here knowledge has no other result, however minute, than revealing the object to be known.

This verse refutes the argument of the *Niyogavādin*.

The work of knowledge consists in the manifestation of an object. Determination or ascertainment of the nature of the object known is the only result of knowledge. Without revealing the nature of the object, the knowledge of that object cannot arise. Since knowledge is conducive to its result, viz., the manifestation of an object, of its own accord, there is no need for injunction.

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अन्तरेण नियोगञ्च स्वात्मबोधस्य सिद्धितः ।
स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य इति ब्रूहि स्यात् किं नियोगतः ॥

Since the knowledge of the Self can arise even without a separate injunction other than the general one, viz., "Every one shall study his own section of the *Veda*," please tell, what is the purpose served by an injunction?

The *Niyogavādin* may argue in a different way. It may be conceded that knowledge of its own accord gives rise to its result, viz., the manifestation of an object, and that it does not seek the help of an injunction in this regard. But knowledge must first come into existence.

In the absence of an injunction, the *Niyogavādin* argues, knowledge cannot arise at all. It means that knowledge, according to this argument, is in need of an injunction in order that it may come into existence.

This argument is untenable. It has already been stated that the *adhyayana-vidhi*, viz., "Every one shall study his own section of the *Veda*," is enough to prompt a person to undertake a formal study of the *Veda*. In the course of his study, he obtains the knowledge of the Self from the *śruti* texts like *tat tvam asi*. No other injunction is required for this purpose.

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नैवं यतोऽन्यदेवेदं विज्ञानान्तरमात्मनि ।
 सोपायं कार्यमित्येवं चोद्यते केवलम्परम् ॥
 शब्दाज्जनितविज्ञानाद्व्यतिरिक्तम्परात्मगम् ॥

(The *Niyogavādin* argues:) "It is not the case (that the knowledge of the Self which arises from the *Vedānta* text is what is enjoined). But it is argued that another knowledge of the Self different from this, which is non-relational, and which is obtained through means (like *śama*, *dama*, etc.) is what is enjoined. This knowledge of the supreme Self is different from the knowledge which arises from the *śruti* text."

Verses (639) to (647) state the view of the *Niyogavādin*.

The *śabda-jñāna*, i.e., the knowledge which arises from the Upaniṣadic text is mediate (*parokṣa*) and involves relation (*saṃsṛṣṭa*). The *Niyogavādin* argues that it is not this knowledge that is enjoined, but a different knowledge which is non-relational (*asaṃsṛṣṭa*) and immediate (*aparokṣa*) that is enjoined. The latter is obtained through the repeated contemplation on the *śabda-jñāna* along with the practice of the control of the mind, control of the senses, etc.

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न हि शब्दसमुत्थेन ब्रह्म ज्ञानेन शक्यते ।

तस्यावाक्यार्थरूपत्वात् परिच्छेत्तुं घटादिवत् ॥

“By the knowledge arising from the *śruti* text Brahman cannot be comprehended in the same way as objects like jar are comprehended because Brahman cannot be denoted by a sentence.”

Śabda-jñāna is the knowledge which arises from the words which constitute a sentence. While objects like jar fall within the scope of *śabda-jñāna*, Brahman does not. A sentence, according to this argument, conveys a related sense (*saṁsr̥ṣṭa-viśaya*); but Brahman, which is pure, undifferentiated consciousness, which is one and non-dual, cannot be denoted by a sentence (*saṁsargarūpo viśiṣṭarūpo vā vākyārthaḥ, akhanḍai-karasasya brahmaṇastadātmakatvāśambhavāt*). Since Brahman cannot be comprehended by *śabda-jñāna*, there is the need for another knowledge which can comprehend Brahman.

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नानापदार्थसंसर्गलक्षणोऽयं यतः स्मृतः ।

वाक्यार्थो वाक्यविद्भिर्हि प्रमावाक्यञ्च नो मतम् ॥

तस्य चाविषयत्वात् ब्रह्मावाक्यार्थरूपभृत् ॥

“The sentence-sense, as understood by those who know the import of a sentence, consists, indeed, in the relation among the different word-senses. We do hold that a (scriptural) sentence is the source of knowledge (of Brahman). But since Brahman does not fall within the scope of a sentence, it cannot be denoted by a sentence.”

The *Niyogavādin* continues his argument in justification of the view that Brahman cannot be comprehended by *śabda-jñāna*. A sentence consists of a group of words. Each word in a sentence has its own sense;

and the words combining with each other constitute a sentence. From the combination of words in a sentence there arises the 'sentence-sense' (*vākyaārtha*). A sentence will, therefore, convey only a related sense. Such being the nature of a sentence, Brahman, the non-dual, pure, undifferentiated consciousness, cannot be made known by the Upaniṣadic text. This does not, according to the *Niyogavādin*, deprive the Upaniṣadic text of its validity as a *pramāṇa*.

The *Niyogavādin* readily admits that the Upaniṣadic text is the *pramāṇa* for Brahman. At the same time he maintains that, the nature of Brahman being what it is, it cannot be made known by the Upaniṣadic text.

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विज्ञानान्तरगम्यं तदभ्युपेयं बलादपि ।
न चेद्वाक्योत्थविज्ञानग्राह्यमब्रह्माभ्युपेयते ॥
नाम्नायार्थो भवेत्तर्हि नैवं वेदार्थ एव च ॥

"We are thus compelled to admit that Brahman is comprehended by another knowledge (different from that produced by a sentence)."

(Objection:) If it is not admitted that Brahman can be comprehended by the knowledge which arises from a sentence, then Brahman is not the subject-matter of the *Veda*. (The *Niyogavādin* replies:) "It is not so. (Brahman) is assuredly the subject of Vedic teaching."

It may be objected that the argument of the *Niyogavādin* will lead him to say that Brahman is not the subject-matter of the Vedic teaching. The substance of the objection comes to this: if Brahman cannot be revealed by the Vedic text, then it cannot be the subject-matter of the Vedic teaching; without being *vedavākyaārtha*, Brahman cannot be *vedārtha*. Since the *Niyogavādin* maintains that Brahman is not *vedavākyaārtha*, he must also maintain that Brahman is not *vedārtha*.

The *Niyogavādin* does not see any force in this argument. He maintains that while Brahman is *vedārtha*, the subject-matter of Vedic teaching, it is not *vedavāk्यārtha*, what is comprehended by the Vedic text. Brahman, according to him, is *vedārtha*, because it is directly known by the knowledge which arises as a result of the repeated contemplation on the knowledge conveyed by the Vedic text (*vedavāk्यōi-thajñānābhhyāsa-sādhyā-sākṣātkāra-lakṣaṇa-jñānagamyaivāt vedārthatvaṇi brahmaṇaḥ siddhyati*).

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कथं वेदार्थतैतस्य न चेद्वाक्यार्थ इष्यते ॥

पुंव्यापारानधीनत्वान्न नियोगादयम्भवेत् ।

पदार्थानन्वयान्नापि वाक्योक्त्यो बोध आत्मनि ॥

(Objection:) If Brahman is not denoted by a sentence, how can it be the subject of Vedic teaching? (The *Niyogavādin* replies:) "Because of your command, Brahman will not be the import of a sentence, for the latter is not dependent on the effort of man. The Self is not comprehended by the knowledge which arises from a sentence, because it is not conveyed by the sense of a word."

What sense a sentence conveys is not, says the *Niyogavādin*, dependent on the will of a person. One cannot decide according to one's liking that "This is the meaning of a sentence." Because of somebody's command, Brahman will not be the sense conveyed by a sentence (*vāk्यārtha*).

It is no argument to say that, just as *dharma* is both *vedārtha* and *vāk्यārtha*, so also Brahman could be both *vedārtha* and *vāk्यārtha*. There is, says the *Niyogavādin*, a basic difference between the two cases. What is possible in the case of *dharma* is not possible in the case of Brahman. *Dharma* can be the sense conveyed by a word (*padārtha*), and so it can also be the sense conveyed by a sentence (*vāk्यārtha*). But Brahman cannot be the sense conveyed by a word. It can be referred to by a word only if it has certain features like *jāti*, *guṇa*,

relation, etc., necessary for the usage of a word. Since Brahman has none of these, it cannot be referred to by a word: Brahman, that is to say, is *apadārtha*. Since it is *apadārtha*, it cannot be *vākyaārtha*. Summarising the position of the *Niyogavādin*, Ānandagiri writes: *padasya-arthatvena brahmānanvayād-brahmaṇo'padārthatvād-dharmavailakṣyaṁ yānna vākyaajanyañānagamyatvam*.

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तदन्वयेऽपि नैवायं वाक्यार्थत्वं समश्नुते ।

सामान्यमात्रवाचित्वे पदानां सङ्ख्यो यतः ॥

“Even if Brahman is conveyed by a word, it cannot be the import of a sentence, since the work of words (when taken severally) comes to an end after conveying their sense in a general way.”

The *Niyogavādin* continues his argument to show why Brahman cannot be the import of a sentence.

Let us concede for the sake of argument that Brahman can be conveyed by a word. Even then, the *Niyogavādin* argues, Brahman cannot be the sense conveyed by a sentence. Every word, when taken by itself, conveys its sense in a general way. For example, the word “cow” when uttered conveys its sense in a general way (*sāmānya-viśaya*). It does not say anything specific about it — whether it is the subject, or the object, or the instrument, etc. Only a sentence can convey a specific meaning (*viśeṣa-viśaya*). Even if it be granted that Brahman could be referred to by a word, it cannot be the import of a sentence, because it is *nirviśeṣa*. There is no specific characteristic in Brahman as a result of which it can come into relation with anything. In fact, Brahman, according to the Advaitin, is devoid of all characteristics, general as well as specific (*sāmānya-viśeṣabhāva-sūnyam*). And in the absence of any feature necessary for the application of word, it cannot, indeed, be referred to by a word. The *Niyogavādin* concludes that Brahman cannot be conveyed by a word. It would follow from this that it cannot also be conveyed by a sentence.

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पदार्थव्यतिरेकेण न चावाक्यार्थवाचकः ।

अतोऽवाक्यार्थरूपोऽयं योऽहम्ब्रह्मेति निश्चयः ॥

“Being not denoted by a word, (Brahman cannot be denoted by a sentence); and what cannot be denoted by a sentence cannot be conceived by speech. So the (non-relational, direct) knowledge, “I am Brahman”, is not the import of a sentence.”

The argument of the *Niyogavādin* which commenced in verse (639) is concluded in this verse.

Though Brahman cannot be directly referred to by a word, should it not be said that it can be indicated by implication (*lakṣaṇā*)? Even this, says the *Niyogavādin*, is not possible. If an object can be directly referred to by a word, it can be indirectly indicated by some other word. For example, the word *tīra* directly conveys the sense of a bank. It is possible to say that the word “Ganges” in a particular context conveys the sense of a bank through implication. If an object cannot be directly referred to by a word, then it cannot be indicated by implication through another word. The difficulty in the case of Brahman is that it cannot be stated by any word; if so, it cannot also be indicated by implication (*lakṣaṇā*) through another word. It only means that Brahman cannot be the import of a sentence directly or by implication.

How do we, then, obtain the direct, non-relational knowledge of Brahman? When the indirect, relational knowledge conveyed by the Upaniṣadic text is constantly meditated upon, there arises therefrom the immediate, non-relational knowledge: “I am Brahman.” The *Niyogavādin* argues that it is this immediate, non-relational knowledge which is enjoined.

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नियोगानुप्रवेशेन वस्तुतत्त्वमितीरितम् ।

यत्तस्य परिहाराय श्लोकोऽस्माभिर्यथोदितः ॥

In order to refute the view that Brahman is known (from the *Vedānta* text) only in association with an injunction, there is the verse (*yato vāco nivartante*, etc.) which has been explained by us.

The argument of the *Niyogavādin* is not acceptable. The *siddhāntin* says that the verse: "That from which words return along with the mind, without reaching it," provides the answer to the argument of the *Niyogavādin*.

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इदं ज्ञेयमिदं ज्ञानं ज्ञातास्मीति विभागतः ।
सर्वदा दर्शनात्तावन्नाविद्यास्यैष विद्यते ॥

"This is the object known," "This is knowledge," "I am the knower," — each of these being always perceived as distinguished from one another, there is no ignorance in respect of these to the Self.

With a view to show how the verse *yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha* contains the answer to the argument of the *Niyogavādin*, the *siddhāntin* first of all establishes that the not-Self is illusory. Ordinarily our claim to know anything involves three factors, viz., the knower (*jñātā*), the object known (*jñeya*), and the resulting cognition (*jñāna*), which are not-Self (*anātmā*). These three factors are always known to us. Every person knows that he is a knower, that there are objects known by him, and that he has knowledge of them. He also knows that the knower is different from the known, and that the resulting cognition is different from both the knower and the known. Since they are always known to the *Sākṣin*, the Witness-consciousness, there is no scope for *pramāṇa* in respect of them. A *pramāṇa* makes known what is otherwise not known. These three factors are given to us in our experience, but still they are not known through a *pramāṇa*. Their status is no better than that of an illusory snake which is experienced or cognized, even though it is not known through a *pramāṇa*. They are

experienced, because they are illumined by the Witness-self (*sākṣi-bhāṣya*). The Self alone is real, while the not-Self comprising *jñātā*, *jñeya*, and *jñānam* are illusory.

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चिन्मात्रव्यतिरेकेण सर्वप्रत्ययसाक्षिणः ।

रूपान्तरं न सम्भाव्यं प्रमाभासात्तथा ह्युतिः ॥

The Self which is the witness of all cognitions cannot have a nature other than that of pure consciousness. It is not known to be such because of illusion.

It may be argued that the Self which is ever existent is always known like the *jñātā*, *jñeyam* and *jñānam*, which are not-Self. So the Self is not what is to be known through a *pramāṇa*. In other words, the Self, according to this argument, must be treated as illusory like the not-Self.

This argument is not sound. The Self is of the nature of the self-luminous consciousness. It is the Witness of everything known and unknown (*jñātamajñātamapi vastu sākṣicaitanyasya viśayo hi*). It is the locus on which everything including *avidyā* is superimposed. That which is the locus of *avidyā* cannot itself be illusory. Being of the nature of eternal consciousness, it cannot have a different nature. It is on account of *avidyā* that we fail to grasp its nature.

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हानोपादानहीनोऽयं तत्साक्षित्वात् स्वतो ध्रुवः ।

द्रष्टृदिसाक्षिताप्यस्य तत्कारणसमाश्रयात् ॥

The Self has nothing in it to cast off and has nothing to acquire. Since it is the witness of these, it is by its very

nature immutable. And also, it is the witness of the knower, etc., because of its association with *avidyā* which is the cause of the knower, etc.

In the two preceding verses it has been shown that the Self is real, and that it is self-luminous consciousness. This verse seeks to show that the Self is immutable (*kūṭastha*). The Self has nothing in it which is to be abandoned. Nor does it require anything which is to be acquired. The notion of giving up or acquiring anything presupposes duality, which is due to *avidyā*. The Self is said to be the witness as it were to everything only from the standpoint of *avidyā* (*ajñānād-ātmanah sākṣitvam*). It can be the witness to something — the knower, a mental state, etc. — only if something else, a second entity exists. A witness implies something which it witnessed. But in reality there is nothing else than the Self. If we say that the Self is the witness, it is by presupposing *avidyā* which is responsible for the perception of duality.

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इदं वेद्मि न वेद्मीदमिति बुद्धिर्विवर्तते ।
प्रत्यभिज्ञाश्रया सा स्याद्द्रष्टैवोभयरूपभाक् ॥

The intellect assumes these forms: "I know this," and "I do not know this." It is the seat of recognition. The perceiver alone has the two forms (mentioned earlier).

According to Advaita, while the Self is pure consciousness, the internal organ, which carries the reflection of consciousness, is the knower (*jñātā*). In accordance with the modification it undergoes, it is spoken of as being in a state of knowledge or ignorance. So knowing something and not knowing something are the characteristics of the internal organ; they have nothing to do with the Self which is free from characteristics (*nirviśeṣa*). Even the work of self-identity or recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) belongs to the internal organ and not to the Self (*pratyabhijñāvṛtterantaḥkaraṇāśrayatvāt na tasyātmāśrayatvam*).

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निर्विभागात्मकत्वात्तु सर्वकोशातिवर्तिनः ।

रूपं नानात्मवन्न्याय्यमप्रत्यभिज्ञासमाश्रयम् ॥

Since the Self which transcends all the sheaths is by its very nature devoid of distinctions, it is not proper to say that it assumes (different) forms like the internal organ which is not-Self. (The internal organ) which is the seat of recognition (is also the seat of other distinctions).

[654]

प्रतिस्मृत्यान्यतः प्राप्तं रूपं यत्पारिणामिकम् ।

ज्ञाता प्रत्यभिजानाति प्रत्यक्षार्थोपसंस्कृतः ॥

Having the impression of the object seen in perception, the knower, (i.e., the internal organ which carries the semblance of consciousness), recognizes it, when at a different time and place it assumes the form of the same object presented to it, remembering the earlier experience.

The nature of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) to which reference was made earlier is now explained in this verse.

[655]

बुद्धेः स्यादपराधोऽयं यद्वाह्यार्थानुकारिता ।

प्रत्यक्त्वं चिन्निभत्वञ्च कौटस्थ्यान्नायमात्मनि ॥

All this is the fault of the intellect — that it assumes the forms of external objects, that it appears as the inward Self and as consciousness. This (change of forms) cannot take place in the Self, because it is immutable.

This verse refutes the view that the Self is the knower (*jñātā*). The internal organ, which undergoes modifications is the knower due to the semblance of consciousness in it.

[656 - 657]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ।
 बाह्यं निरस्य धीरूपं चिन्मात्रात्मावभासया ॥
 धियोऽलक्ष्यावाक्यार्थं सर्वदाव्यभिचारतः ॥
 व्यभिचारिणश्च बाधेन तत्त्वमस्यादिरूपिणी ।
 दहन्त्यखिलमज्ञानम्बोधयत्येव केवलम् ॥

By the method of agreement in presence and in absence, (the spiritual aspirant) sets aside all external objects which (when being perceived) are in the form of the mind, (as they are not invariably present) in waking, dream, and deep sleep states, and knows the pure consciousness, which is invariably present in all states and which cannot be conveyed by a sentence, through the intellect which shines in the form of consciousness. (To such a spiritual aspirant, the mental mode) produced by texts like *tat tvam asi*, after negating the not-Self which is inconstant, burns the entire ignorance and makes known, indeed, the unconditioned reality.

After hearing the *Vedānta* texts (*śravaṇa*), a spiritual aspirant must critically reflect (*manana*) on the content of the *Vedānta* texts. Applying the method of agreement in presence and in absence (*anvaya-vyatireka*), he understands that, while other factors such as the sense, and the mind are not uniformly present in the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep, the Self which is pure consciousness is uniformly present in all the three states. He then realizes the non-relational Brahman through the unitary mental cognition (*akhaṇḍākāśravṛtti-jñāna*) obtained from the *śruti* texts like *tat tvam asi*.

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सामानाधिकरण्यादेर्घटेतरखयोरिव ।
 व्यावृत्तेः स्यादवाक्यार्थः साक्षान्नस्तत्त्वमर्थयोः ॥

As in the case of the ether in a pot and the ether outside it, so also because of the co-ordinate relation of the words "That" and "Thou" (in the *śruti* text "That Thou art)," by the removal (of incompatible factors denoted by them), the direct non-relational sense takes place to us (from the text).

Though ether (*ākāśa*) is one, we speak of the ether enclosed in a pot (*ghaṭākāśa*) and the all-pervasive ether (*mahākāśa*) outside it. It appears, on account of the limiting adjunct that, while the ether enclosed in a pot is limited, the ether outside it is vast. Strictly speaking the ether, which is free from these distinctions, is one. When a person says, "The pot-ether is the vast-ether," (*ghaṭākāśo mahākāśaḥ*) from the co-ordinate relation between the two words in the sentence, we get the sense that the ether is one by removing the incompatible factors, viz., its limited state in the one case and its vastness in the other. In the same way, the co-ordinate relation between the two words *tat* and *tvam* in the text *tat tvam asi* helps us to realize the oneness of consciousness by removing the adjunct-based incompatible factors between the *jīva*-consciousness and *Īśvara*-consciousness. The knowledge that we get from the *śruti* text *tat tvam asi* in this way is *avākyaṛtha*, because it is not obtained by means of the construction (*anvaya*) of the meanings of the words in the text. It is *sābda-jñāna*, because it is conveyed by the *śruti* text.

[659]

वाक्यादेवमवाक्यार्थो यस्मात् साक्षात्प्रसिद्ध्यति ।

अन्यदेवेदमित्यादि सर्वं स्यात्तुषकण्डनम् ॥

Since the non-relational Brahman is thus directly known from the sentence, the entire argument (of the *Niyogavādin*) that this (knowledge of the Self) is different from the one (conveyed by the *śruti* text) carries no weight like the husk of a grain.

[660]

अज्ञानमन्यथाज्ञानं संशयज्ञानमेव च ।

घटादावेव तद्दृष्टं न ज्ञातृज्ञानसाक्षिषु ॥

Ignorance, error, and doubt are found to arise only in respect of objects like pot, but not in respect of the cognizer, the cognition, and the Witness-consciousness.

The opponent now argues in a different way. Though the knowledge of the non-relational Self is obtained directly from the *śruti* text itself, another knowledge different from the *śabda-jñāna* is required for the purpose of removing ignorance, etc. And for getting this "another knowledge", injunction is required.

With a view to show that even this argument is untenable the *siddhāntin* first of all explains that ignorance (*ajñānam*), erroneous cognition (*anyathā-jñānam*) and doubt (*saiṁśaya-jñānam*) are possible only with regard to objects like pot, etc. For example, a person may say that he is ignorant of a certain object (say, a lamp-post), or he may cognize it erroneously as a man, or he may doubt whether it is a lamp-post or a man. But none of these is possible with regard to the knower (*jñātā*) or the cognition through a mental mode (*vyākhyāna*) or the Witness-consciousness (*sākṣī-caitanya*). This will be explained in the sequel.

[661 - 662]

अज्ञानादि त्रयं तावत् प्रत्ययेऽपि न विद्यते ।

तस्य ह्यव्यवधानेन प्रत्यक्षान्नान्यमानता ॥

ज्ञातुरव्यवधानेन संशयो निश्चयोऽपि वा ।

प्रत्ययः प्रथते यस्मान्न मानान्तरकाङ्क्षितः ॥

The three, viz., ignorance, error, and doubt, are not possible even with regard to the (mental) cognition, for, being directly perceived without any interruption, it does

not require another *pramāṇa*. Since a cognition, whether it is dubitative or certain, manifests itself to the knower without any interruption, it does not require another *pramāṇa*.

These two verses explain how ignorance, error and doubt are not possible with regard to a cognition obtained through a mental made. As a cognition takes place, the knower knows it directly. He cannot be either ignorant or mistaken about it. Nor can he entertain any doubt about it. The cognition which he has obtained is the basis of all that he does (*vyavahāra*.) So it does not require "another knowledge" for its manifestation.

[663]

अज्ञानादि त्रयं तावज्ज्ञातर्यपि न विद्यते ।

किमङ्ग सर्वदालुप्तचक्षुष्यात्मनि केवले ॥

The three, viz., ignorance, error, and doubt are not certainly possible even in respect of the knower, (because he is directly present before the Witness-consciousness). Such being the case, what more need to be said in respect of the eternally luminous, pure Self?

The knower (*jñātā*) is directly illumined by the Witness-self; so neither ignorance, nor error, nor doubt is possible in respect of the knower. If ignorance, etc., are not possible with regard to both the cognition and the cognizer, it would follow that they are not equally possible even with regard to the Witness-consciousness, which reveals both the cognition and the cognizer. The Witness-consciousness is self-luminous in the sense that, while it reveals other things, it is not revealed by any other thing. In short, there is no need of "another knowledge" as stated by the opponent for the purpose of removing ignorance, etc., in respect of the cognizer, cognition, and the Witness-consciousness.

[664]

निर्धूताशेषभेदोऽयमवाक्यार्थात्मकस्तथा ।
सुषुप्ते गम्यतेऽस्माभिर्नानृतं श्रुतिगौरवात् ॥

Further, the Self, which is free from all difference and which does not form the direct import of a sentence, is experienced by us in deep sleep. (And this experience) is not an illusion, because it is supported by the authority of *śruti*.

Since everyone experiences the Witness-self in deep sleep, there is no need of "another knowledge" referred to by the opponent. The *Brhadāraṇyaka* text (IV, iii, 23) speaks about the Witness-self in the state of deep sleep as follows: "That it does not see in that state (of deep sleep) is because, although seeing then, it does not see, for the vision of the witness can never be lost, because it is immortal." One cannot, therefore, dismiss the experience of the Witness-self in the state of deep sleep as an illusion.

[665]

सर्वदा चात्मरूपत्वाद्ब्रह्मविचारादनन्मनः ।
ब्रह्मात्मनि स्वतः सिद्धं ज्ञानं मोहापनोदि यत् ॥

Since consciousness which constitutes the nature of the Self (is constant), and since the not-Self is inconstant, the knowledge which is ever-existent in Brahman-Ātman (manifested by the mental mode) removes ignorance.

As a result of the study of the *śruti* texts followed by reflection thereon, there arises the appropriate mental mode (*buddhi-vṛtti*) which manifests Brahman-consciousness. The idea here is that, since the internal organ is pure (*svaccha-dṛavyatvāt*), it is capable of reflecting Brahman-consciousness (*nedamahāṅkārasya cidabhiṣyañjakatvaṁ cidava-*

bhāṣakatvaṃ, kintu citpratīphaṇanagrāhakatvaṃ). It is not pure consciousness as such, but consciousness reflected in the appropriate mode of the internal organ alone that serves to remove ignorance. There is, therefore, no need for "another knowledge" which is the subject of an injunction as argued by the opponent.

[666]

ज्ञाताज्ञातविभागोऽस्मिञ्ज्ञानाज्ञानात्मता तथा ।
ज्ञात्रज्ञातृत्वमप्येवं स्वतः सिद्धेर्न साक्षिणः ॥

Distinctions such as what is known and what is not known, knowledge and ignorance, and one who knows and one who does not know, are not in the Self, for these (distinctions) exist to us on account of the Witness-self alone.

It cannot be said that injunction is required for removing the distinctions such as the cognizer, the thing cognized, the resulting cognition, etc., that exist in the Self. It is only the Witness-self that reveals to us these distinctions such as the cognizer, etc. But for the Witness-self, we will not be able to say, "I am the knower," "This object is known by me," "I am ignorant of that object," "I have this cognition," etc. The Self is, indeed, free from all these distinctions. In fact, the Self as such is not even the Witness of all these distinctions, because these distinctions do not exist in reality (*sākṣiṇaḥ sākṣitvamapi vastubhūtaṃ nāsti*). So long as there is *vyavahāra*, we speak of the Witness-self. So there is no need of injunction for removing the alleged distinctions.

[667]

स्वव्यापारे नियोगोऽपि नियुङ्क्ते पुरुषम्बलात् ।
यथाभूतार्थता बुद्धेर्वास्तवी न तु पौरुषी ॥

Moreover, an injunction can command a person to do his action by the force inherent in it. But the knowledge

of an existent thing is dependent on the object and not on the will of a person.

There is no scope for injunction in respect of the knowledge which arises from a *pramāṇa*. The work of an injunction is restricted to commanding a person to do a certain action. An injunction has nothing to do with the knowledge which arises from a *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-jñāna*). Two things are required for obtaining the knowledge of any object: (i) the appropriate *pramāṇa* and (ii) the object which is to be known. In short, *pramāṇa-jñāna* is *pramāṇa-tantra* as well as *vastu-tantra*. So it does not fall within the scope of an injunction.

[668]

इदमेवमुदो नेति यथैवार्थमृते विधिम् ।
वेत्ति तत्त्वमसीत्येवं किं न वेत्यभिधाश्रुतेः ॥

If a person knows the meaning, "This is thus," and "That is not thus," (from the ritual-section of the *Veda*) in the absence of a separate injunction, why can he not know the meaning of the text *tat tvam asi* from the text itself which has the power to convey the meaning?

There is no difference in respect of understanding the meaning of a *karma-vākya*, an injunctive text which enjoins a certain action, contained in the ritual-section of the *Veda* (*karma-kāṇḍa*) and an assertive *Vedānta* text contained in the knowledge-section of the *Veda* (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*). In order to understand the meaning of a text which enjoins an action, a separate injunction is not required. The knowledge of the action to be done takes place from that text itself without that knowledge being enjoined by another injunction. In the same way from the assertive *Vedānta* texts such as *tat tvam asi* we get the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman, without that knowledge being enjoined by an injunction.

[669]

क्रियायां विधिसम्पातः कर्त्रादिषु न सिद्धितः ।
न चानेकार्थतैकस्य वाक्यस्य भवतेष्यते ॥

An injunction has its purport in an action to be done but not in the agent, etc., because the latter are already existent. That one and the same sentence can convey many senses is also not admitted by you.

The futility of injunction in respect of the Self and its knowledge can be vindicated in yet another way. Only an action which can be accomplished can be enjoined. The agent, etc., are existent objects, and so they do not fall within the scope of an injunction. There is also another difficulty. If it be said that knowledge falls within the scope of an injunction, then the injunctive text has its purport (*tātparyam*) in what is enjoined (*vidheya*) and not in revealing the nature of the object; and in order to reveal the nature of the object, a text other than the injunctive text is required (*vidhivākyasya kāryaikaparatvād-vastubodhakam vākyāntaramavaśyamānveṣṭavyamiti tātparyam*). The *Niyogavādin* cannot argue that an injunctive text has its purport both in enjoining knowledge and in revealing the nature of the object, for a sentence has its purport only in one thing.

[670]

प्रत्यक्षादेव भेदोऽयमभिधाननियोगयोः ।

तस्य चेद्व्यभिचारित्वं व्यर्थं सर्वज्ञभाषितम् ॥

The difference between an assertive and an injunctive text is, indeed, immediately known (by the auditory sense even as they are uttered). If it be said that perception cannot always be relied upon, then what has been said by the omniscient sage (Jaimini) is futile.

The *Niyogavādin* cannot argue that all sentences are injunctive and that there are no assertive texts that reveal the nature of the existent object (*vastubodhakam*). The difference between an injunctive text and an assertive one is so obvious that one perceives it as soon as they are uttered. It is no argument to say that perceptual knowledge is erroneous and that it cannot be depended upon. This is to ignore the definition of perception given by the omniscient Jaimini in his *Pūrva-*

mīmāṃsā-sūtra (I, i, 4) and the learned commentary thereon by Śābara. According to Jaimini, perception is that cognition which arises in the mind from the contact of the senses with the object cognized. It is the cognition of an object that is actually present at that time. Śābara in his *bhāṣya* on this *sūtra* states that what is erroneous is not valid perception, and that what is valid perception is not erroneous (*yadyabhicarati na tatpratyakṣam, yanya vyābhicarati tatpratyakṣam*). So the difference between injunctive and assertive texts, which is perceived, cannot be ignored with a view to maintain that every sentence is injunctive.

[671]

कर्तुः क्रियायां स्वातन्त्र्यं वस्तुवृत्ते ह्यनीश्वरः ।

वस्तुवृत्तं च नो मुक्तिः क्रियातश्चेदनित्यता ॥

An agent can exercise his freedom in respect of an act to be done. He is, indeed, powerless in respect of an existent thing. To us release is of the nature of the existent Self. If it is to be accomplished by an act, it will not be eternal.

It has already been stated that neither the existent Self nor the knowledge of the Self falls within the scope of an injunction. A further reason is given in this verse to show that the existent Self cannot be brought within the scope of an injunction. An agent can exercise his freedom with regard to an act which is to be done. He is free to do it, or not to do it, or do it differently. Such being the case, injunction is quite in order with regard to an act to be done. Since a person has no such freedom with regard to an existent object, no injunction is possible thereto.

The *Niyogavādin* may argue that, even though injunction is not possible in respect of an existent thing, it is possible in the case of release (*mukti*) which is to be attained through Scripture-ordained rites. Even this argument is untenable. According to Advaita, release consists in realizing the nature of the ever-existent Brahman-Ātman. It is the essential state of the Self, which is eternal consciousness. It is

not something to be accomplished by *karma*. So it does not fall within the scope of an injunction. If it is what is accomplished through Scripture-ordained rites, it will cease to be eternal.

[672]

यथावस्तु हि या बुद्धिः सम्यग्ज्ञानं तदेव नः ।
पौरुषायासमात्रोत्थमज्ञानं रजतादिवत् ॥

To us that cognition alone is, indeed, valid which comprehends an object as it is. That cognition which arises solely on account of the effort of man is not valid like the cognition of silver, etc.

As in the case of an existent object, so also in respect of the knowledge of the existent, there is no work for injunction. Since knowledge is dependent both on the object known and the *pramāṇa* through which it is known, it cannot be enjoined (*pramāṇa-vastutantram jñānam na vidheyam*). Here there is absolutely no place for the effort of man. That cognition which is obtained only through the effort of man cannot be a valid one like the cognition of silver in a shell.

[673]

वस्तुमात्रानुरोधित्वात् सम्यग्ज्ञानस्य दुष्करम् ।
नियोगानुप्रवेशेन वस्तुतत्त्वावबोधनम् ॥

As valid cognition takes place depending on (a *pramāṇa* and) the object which is known, it is impossible (for the *Vedānta*) to reveal the nature of the object by being connected with an injunction.

[674]

नियोगानुप्रवेशे वा हेतोर्व्याप्तिः प्रदर्श्यताम् ।
गमकत्वमृते व्याप्ति नैव हेतोः प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥

If it be argued that the Upaniṣadic text is connected with an injunction, the invariable relation of the *hetu* with the major term must be shown. A *hetu* which does not have invariable relation with the major term cannot establish what is sought to be proved.

The *Niyogavādin* may resort to inference as stated below to vindicate his view that the Upaniṣadic text is connected with an injunction: the Upaniṣadic text is connected with an injunction, because it is a sentence, and all sentences are connected with injunction, e.g., a *karma-vākya*.

The invariable relation (*vyāpti*) between the middle term (*hetu*) and the major term (*sādhya*) given in the above argument is not acceptable. Citing the case of *karma-vākya*, i.e., a sentence which occurs in the ritual-section of the *Veda*, as an example, the *Niyogavādin* argues that all sentences are connected with injunction. This argument is wrong. There are corroborative statements (*arthavādas*) in the ritual section of the *Veda* which do convey their sense on their own independently of injunction. It means that the *vyāpti*, mentioned in the argument, does not hold good. And in the absence of *vyāpti*, the *Niyogavādin* cannot prove that the *Vedānta* text is connected with injunction.

The following inference is also not acceptable: the Upaniṣadic text is connected with an injunction, because it is a *pramāṇa*, and every *pramāṇa* is connected with an injunction, e.g., a *vidhi-vākya*.

In this argument also, the *vyāpti* that is mentioned is not valid, as it does not hold good in the case of *pratyakṣa*. Though *pratyakṣa* is a *pramāṇa*, it is not connected with an injunction; it does not, that is to say, discharge its work as a *pramāṇa* by being connected with an injunction. Hence the inference stated above is not valid.

[675]

विधिशून्यस्य वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यम्प्रत्यगात्मनि ।

येषाम्प्रकाशत इति न तेषां मतिरीदृशी ॥

Those who hold the view that the Upaniṣadic text which is not connected with an injunction is the source of knowledge of the inward Self do not think (of the work of injunction in respect of the Upaniṣadic text) in this way.

The *Niyogavādin* may argue that, since the Advaitin admits injunction in certain places, his denial of the need for injunction in respect of the assertive *Vedānta* texts is untenable. But this argument is based on a basic misunderstanding of the standpoint of the Advaitin. The way in which the Advaitin explains the need for injunction is different from that of the *Niyogavādin*. While the Advaitin denies the need for injunction in respect of the Self or the knowledge of the Self, he readily admits that there is injunction in respect of those *Vedānta* texts which refer to acts like hearing, etc. (*śravaṇādi-kriyā-viśaya*). See verse (714) in the sequel.

[676]

प्रकाश्यत्वाश्रयश्चायं व्यापारः सर्व एव च ।
तस्मिन्नसति तन्मिथ्या यदेतद्ववतेरितम् ॥

The work of injunction at all levels presupposes that Brahman is comprehended by knowledge. If this is not the case, what is said by you is wrong.

In the absence of Brahman, the self-luminous consciousness, it is impossible to think of the work of injunction in any way. An injunction can convey its meaning through the mental mode only if the latter is illumined by the Witness-consciousness.

[677]

अस्थूलाशब्दतावादिप्रकाश्यत्वादि कुप्यति ।
नियोगानुप्रवेशेन यदि वस्तु प्रकाश्यते ॥

If it be said that Brahman is made known (by the *Vedānta* text) through its association with an injunction, it will go against the texts which make known that "Brahman is not gross," and that "Brahman is beyond words."

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (III, viii, 8) says that Brahman is not gross. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (I, iii, 15) declares that Brahman is beyond words. These texts seek to convey the nature of Brahman by negating all attributes and specifications from Brahman. Since Brahman, as taught by these *Vedānta* texts, is devoid of all attributes and specifications, it cannot be brought within the scope of an injunction.

[678]

न चाप्रमाणता तस्य नियोगोत्सङ्गसंश्रयात् ।
एवमप्यप्रमाणञ्चेन्नियोगोऽविषयो भवेत् ॥

Further, the *Vedānta* text should not be made to lose its validity by making it subsidiary to an injunctive text. If it be said that it ceases to be a source of knowledge accordingly (in the absence of its connection with an injunction), then injunction would have no scope at all.

The negative *Vedānta* texts which describe Brahman as "not gross" (*asthūlam*), etc., reveal the nature of Brahman by denying all characteristics and specifications in Brahman, and are, therefore, valid. If, as the *Niyogavādin* contends, they have to be construed along with injunctive texts, then they lose their validity in respect of what they convey. It is not proper to deprive them of their validity by making them subsidiary to injunctive texts.

The *Niyogavādin* may argue that the *Vedānta* texts which are not connected with injunctive texts have no validity like the utterance of one who is not trustworthy (*anāpta*). But such an argument is detrimental to his own standpoint. Let it be admitted for the sake of argument that the *Vedānta* texts which are not connected with injunctive

texts have no validity, and so they do not reveal the nature of Brahman. Also, other pramāṇas like perception cannot reveal the nature of Brahman. It means that it is impossible to attain the knowledge of Brahman in the absence of which there will be no scope for injunction.

[679]

अदृश्यम्पश्य इत्येवं नियुक्तोऽपि न शक्नुयात् ।
शक्नुयात् स नियोगाच्चेत् कुर्यात्तस्करकन्दुवत् ॥

Though a person is thus commanded to see what cannot be seen, he cannot do it. If it be said that he will do it because of the injunction, then he will do it like the thief who did the work of Kandu.

See the explanatory notes to verse (627) for the allusion to the thief who took shelter in the house of Kandu.

[680]

विदितेतरातिरेकित्वाद्गृह्यरूपानुवादिभिः ।
नियोगगर्भवचनैः पश्येदिति विरुध्यते ॥

The view that Brahman must be known as directed by the injunctive texts is opposed to the Upaniṣadic texts which speak of the nature of Brahman as different from what is known and what is unknown.

It is no argument to say that the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined by the *Vedānta* texts like "The Self, verily, should be seen" (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II, iv, 5), which are in the injunctive form. Brahman, as stated in the *Kena Upaniṣad* (I, 4), is different from what is known and also different from what is unknown. So the argument that Brahman-knowledge falls within the scope of injunction is not sound.

[681]

विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयादिति श्रुतिः ।
न दृष्टेरिति दृश्यत्वं नियोगैरेव वार्यते ॥

The knowability (of Brahman) is denied by the *śruti* texts themselves such as "By what should one know the knower?" "Thou shalt not see the seer of seeing," which are in the injunctive form.

The passage quoted in the first line of the verse is from the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, II, iv, 14. The second line of the verse quotes another passage from the same *Upaniṣad* (III, iv, 2). The Upaniṣadic texts like these, which are in the injunctive form, deny that Brahman can be known, and so it is wrong to say that the knowledge of Brahman falls within the scope of injunction (*niyoga-sahitāvākya-ir-brahmano viśayatvāṇiṣedhācca tajjñānasya vidheyatvasiddhiḥ*).

[682]

सदावगतिरूपस्य ज्योतिश्चक्रावभासिनः ।
स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावस्य न्याय्यं तस्मान्न दर्शनम् ॥

Therefore, the knowing of Brahman which is by its very nature self-luminous, eternal consciousness and which illumines the heavenly constellations is inappropriate.

[683]

द्रष्टा चेद्दृश्यते दृश्यम्प्रत्यक्षाविषयः कथम् ।
कर्मकर्तृत्वमेकस्य दोषो ब्रह्मात्मदर्शने ॥

(Objection:) Since the world of objects is seen by the Self, how can it be said that the Self is not the object known by perception? (Reply:) In respect of Brahman

being known, there will arise the defect of one and the same thing being both the subject and the object of the same act of knowing.

It may be argued that in the very act of cognizing the world, the Self which is the cognizer is also known, for the person who cognizes claims to the effect: "I cognize the world." It follows, according to this argument, that Brahman-Ātman falls within the scope of perception. But this argument is wrong. One and the same entity cannot be both the cognizer and the cognized at the same time. If the Self is the cognizer, it cannot be the cognized, and if it is the cognized, it cannot be the cognizer.

[634]

अदृष्टं तदकर्मत्वात् कौटस्थ्यान्नापि दृष्टिकृत् ।
जन्यादिविक्रियाष्टकनिषेधोऽप्येवमर्थवान् ॥

The Self is not seen, because it is not an object. Nor is it a knower, since it is immutable. The denial of the six states such as birth, etc., (with regard to the Self) is thus meaningful.

One may suggest that, if the Self cannot be both the knower and the known at the same time, it can at least be one of the two. It amounts to saying that the Self is either the knower or the known. This possibility, too, has to be ruled out. Since the Self is not an object like stocks and stones, it is not what is known. Since it is immutable, it cannot be the agent involved in the act of knowing; that is to say, it cannot be the knower. There is yet another reason to show why the Self is neither the knower nor the known. The things of the world are subject to the sixfold change (*ṣaḍbhāvavikāra*), viz., birth, existence, growth, change, decline, and death. Since the Self is free from all these changes, it is neither the knower nor the known. The following *śruti* passages are relevant in this context. The *Śvetāsvatara* (VI, 19) says that the Self is "without parts, without activity" (*niṣkalaṁ niṣkriyam*).

The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (I, ii, 18) declares: "The intelligent Self is neither born nor does it die. It did not originate from anything, nor did anything originate from it. It is birthless, eternal, undecaying, and ancient."

[685]

प्रमातृत्वादिभेदेन यत्स्वरूपम्प्रतीयते ।

तत्प्रकाशयत इत्याहुरप्रकाशस्वरूपतः ॥

The wise declare that the distinguishable forms such as the knower, etc., which are known (to us) are cognized (being illumined by the Self), because they are insentient.

[686]

प्रमातैव प्रमेयञ्चेत् प्रमाणम्प्रमितिस्तथा ।

स्वरूपाच्चैकरूपत्वान्न तदेभिर्निरुच्यते ॥

If the knower (i.e., the Witness-consciousness) is also the object known, in that case the source of knowledge and the resulting knowledge (would also be the Witness-consciousness). Since all of them thus would be one having identical nature, (what is ordinarily denoted) by these terms (like *prameya*, etc.) would not be so denoted.

This verse brings out in yet another way that the Witness-consciousness which is the knower is different from the object known. If the object known (*prameya*) is also the knower, one may as well argue that the source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the resulting knowledge (*pramiti*) are identical with the Witness-consciousness, which is the knower. In that case all of them must be treated as one, because all of them are said to be identical with the Witness-consciousness. This is not acceptable. Each of these words — *prameya*, *pramāṇa*, *pramiti* — expresses its own meaning which is different from the meanings of the other words. These words are not synonyms. If *prameya*, *pramāṇa*, and *pramiti*

are treated as identical with the Witness-consciousness, then what is ordinarily denoted by these terms would not be so denoted.

[687]

प्रामाण्यमनुवादानां न चेत् स्वविषये मतम् ।
पयोगुणस्य सम्बन्धो न प्राप्नोति जुहोतिना ॥

If it is held that anuvādas have no validity (independently of injunction) in respect of what they convey, the connection of the substance "milk" with the act of offering cannot take place.

Verses (687) to (690) discuss the validity of words (*pada*) and corroborative statements (*arthavāda*) which praise what has been enjoined or condemn what has been prohibited. These are treated as anuvādas, because they restate what is already known. According to the *Niyogavādin*, injunctive texts alone which teach us what to do and what not to do are valid. Inasmuch as individual words and corroborative statements, when taken by themselves, do not fulfil this criterion of validity, they are not, says the *Niyogavādin*, authoritative independently of injunctive texts.

This argument is wrong. The *Niyogavādin* must admit that each word conveys its meaning independently of injunction. If this is not acceptable to him, he cannot establish the validity of the injunctive text itself. There is, for example, the injunctive text: "He shall offer milk," which clearly brings out the connection of the substance "milk" with the act of offering. If the word "milk" fails to convey its meaning on its own, its connection with the act of offering can never take place with the result that the text "He shall offer milk" will not be valid. An *arthavāda* text like "Vāyu is a swift deity" may form a unitary passage with an injunctive text, viz., "One who wants prosperity should touch a goat relating to Vāyu." As a corroborative statement of the injunction, it praises Vāyu and suggests that a rite in connection with that God is praiseworthy. But it cannot be denied that an *arthavāda*

conveys its meaning on its own. The sentence, "Vāyu is a swift god," does convey its meaning when taken by itself independently of the injunction: that is to say, it gives rise to the knowledge relating to Vāyu. It may be that this text is taken as subsidiary to the injunction by way of answer to the question: "What for is this knowledge relating to Vāyu given (*kaimartha*)?" By way of answering this question it may be said that this *arthavāda* text is meant for praising an action enjoined in the injunctive text and that it must, therefore, be construed along with it. Ānandagiri sums up the position as follows: *padānām-arthavādānām ca niyoganirapekṣameva svārtham pratipādya paśāt kaimarthyakyaśena niyoga-anupraveśābhyupagamādityarthah.*

[688]

स्वर्गेणैवाभिसम्बन्धः पयसश्चेदनुत्तरम् ।

स्वर्गस्य सिद्धये नालं द्रव्यमात्रम्पयो यतः ॥

It is no reply to say that the substance "milk" is connected with heaven alone (and not with the act), because the substance "milk", by itself (without being connected with the act) is not enough for attaining heaven.

It is no argument to say that the substance "milk" is connected with *svarga*, which is the result, to which it is conducive and not with the act of offering. So long as it is not admitted by the *Niyogavādin* that a word conveys its sense on its own without depending on an injunction, its connection with anything else, be it an act or a result that accrues as a consequence of an act, cannot be established. Strictly speaking the substance "milk" cannot be directly related to the result, viz., *svarga*, without being connected with the act of offering.

[689]

प्रणयः साधनत्वञ्च प्राप्तं तस्मादनद्यते ।

विशिष्टोपाश्रयं द्रव्यमतोऽलम्पशुसिद्धये ॥

Īnasmuch as the substance (viz., the milk-pail) through its relation with the act of pouring is competent to secure cattle, the act of pouring and its being a means (to heaven) which are already given (in the text "He shall pour water by a pan") are restated (in the text "He shall obtain cattle by a milk-pail").

It was stated earlier that a substance can be a means to the attainment of a fruit only through an act (*dravyasya kriyādvāreṇaiva ħumārtha-sāddhanatvam*). Citing the text, "He shall obtain cattle by a milk-pail," (*godohanena paśukāmasya*) which occurs in the section dealing with the *darśa-pūrṇamāsa* rites, one may argue that the principle enunciated does not hold good, because this text shows that the substance, viz., milk-pail (*godohana*) is directly connected with the fruit, viz., cattle. But a careful reading of the text in the context will show that this text is partly a restatement in so far as it repeats what is already conveyed by the text, "He shall pour water by a pan," (*camasenāpaḥ praṇayet*) which occurs in the section dealing with the *darśa-pūrṇamāsa* rites. Through the latter text we know that the substance "water" which is in the pan (*camasa*) is the means to heaven through the act of pouring (*praṇayana*). So the text *godohanena paśukāmasya* is a restatement, because it contains a repetition in respect of (1) the act of *appṛaṇayana* and (2) its being a means to a fruit. But since the fruit to be secured here is cattle and not heaven, it enjoins *godohana* in the place of *camasa*. So the text *godohanena paśukāmasya* must be understood as conveying that the substance, viz., the milk-pail, is the means to the fruit, viz., cattle, only through the act of *praṇayana*.

[690]

गोदोहनस्य भिन्नत्वाद्विन्नञ्चेत् साधनं मतम् ।
प्राप्ता प्रणयतीत्यस्य साध्यभेदाद्विभिन्नता ॥

If it be said that, since milk-pail is different (from pan), the means (viz., the act of pouring, in the two cases) is

different, it would follow that the two acts of pouring are different because of the difference in fruits (viz., heaven and cattle, secured by them).

One may argue that the act of pouring, which is the means, is different in the two cases, since the two substances, viz., milk-pail (*godohana*) and pan (*camasa*), are different. In that case, the sentence *godohanena paśukāmasya*, it may be urged, does not repeat what is conveyed by the other text. This argument will not do. One might as well argue that the two acts of *praṇayana* must be different inasmuch as the fruits, viz., heaven and cattle, obtained thereby are different. This line of argument will make the injunction which enjoins a particular substance for obtaining a particular fruit in connection with the act previously enjoined futile.

[691]

हानोपादानशून्यत्वादप्रामाण्यं मतं यदि ।

ब्रह्मास्मीति परिज्ञानमप्रमाणम्प्रसज्यते ॥

(Objection:) "If it is held (that the assertive Upaniṣadic texts) have no validity as they do not teach that something should be either given up or acquired, the knowledge 'I am Brahman' (conveyed by them) is also not valid."

This verse states the *pūrvapakṣa* of the *Niyogavādin*. The latter argues that only a sentence which makes a person do something or abstain from something has validity. Since the assertive *Vedānta* texts do neither, they have no validity. So the knowledge of non-difference of Brahman and Ātman conveyed by them is not valid.

[692]

आत्मत्वादनुपादेयमनन्यत्वादहेयता ।

अभिधाश्रुतेश्चेदेतत्किमन्यत् प्रार्थ्यते विधेः ॥

Since Brahman is our very Self, it is not something to be acquired. Since it is not different from the Self, it

is not something to be given up. Since this (knowledge of Brahman-Ātman) results from the *śruti* texts which have the power to convey it, what is an injunction required for?

The *siddhāntin* replies to the objection in this verse. The *Niyogavādin* claims validity for the injunctive texts on the ground that what they enjoin is conducive to the attainment of heaven, which is the *puruṣārtha* according to him. Since the highest *puruṣārtha*, viz., the realization of Brahman Ātman, is obtained through the *Vedānta* texts independently of injunction, they have validity on their own.

[693]

अनक्तेरपि मानत्वं नैव ध्वाङ्गैर्विलुप्यते ।
नियोगानुप्रविष्टत्वाद्यैवेहाभिधाश्रुतेः ॥

As in the case of (assertive) *śruti* texts which have the power to convey (the knowledge of Brahman), the validity of anuvādas (i.e., words and arthavādas), too, cannot be snatched away by the crows (of Mīmāṃsakas), by connecting them with injunction.

[694]

एवञ्च सति दृष्टान्तो भवतां नोपपद्यते ।
नियोगादेव विज्ञानमित्येवं नियमः कुतः ॥

This being the case, there is no example for you (to show that only a sentence which is connected with an injunction has (validity). Why, then, is there the ruling in this way that from an injunction alone valid knowledge results?

[695]

वादानुवादयोरर्थो यदि भिन्नः प्रतीयते ।
अगतार्थाधिगन्तृत्वादस्त्वनूक्तेः प्रमाणता ॥

If the meaning conveyed by the original statement and the restatement is known to be different, the restatement has validity, because it conveys what is not known.

A sentence which is said to be a restatement (*anuvāda*) must convey the same sense which has already been conveyed by the original statement (*nāda*) or a different sense. If the sense conveyed is identical, then a restatement has as much validity as the original statement. If it conveys a different sense, it is not a restatement, and inasmuch as it conveys what is otherwise not known, it is a *pramāṇa*.

[696]

अन्वक्षस्मिन्नरूपा धीरिह वादान्वादयोः ।
अपूर्वाधिगतिः पूर्वमिह बुद्धावबोधनम् ॥

Here the different meanings conveyed by the original statement and the restatement are directly seen. The former conveys what is new and the latter what is already known.

This verse emphasizes the obvious difference between the original statement and the restatement. While the one makes known what is not known, the other, what is otherwise known.

[697]

मृगतोयादिवन्मिथ्या यद्यनूक्तेर्भवेन्मतिः ।
विधेर्निर्विषयत्वं वः सर्वत्रैव प्रसज्यते ॥

If it is held that what is conveyed by a restatement is illusory like the mirage, then for you injunction will have no scope at all anywhere.

This verse stresses once again that what is conveyed by a word must be admitted to be valid. There is the text, "He shall offer curd" (*dadhnā juhuyāt*). Here the word *juhuyāt* repeats what is already stated

in another text *agnihotram juhuyāt*, though it enjoins a different substance, viz., curd, for attaining a different end. This will not be possible if it is not admitted that what is conveyed by a word, despite its being a repetition, is valid. If this is not accepted, the substance "curd" cannot be connected with the rite, and this would take away the scope of injunction.

[698]

स्वाभिधेयं निराकाङ्क्षो ह्यनुवादः प्रबोधयेत् ।
तत्र चेदप्रमाणं स्यात् स्यात्तदुच्चारणं वृथा ॥

A restatement can, indeed, make known what it states without depending on anything else. If it is not a *pramāṇa* in that respect, its utterance is futile.

[699]

साकाङ्क्षत्वानुवादत्वे कुतश्चावगते त्वया ।
अप्रामाण्यान्न चेत्ताभ्यां विधेयप्रक्षयाद्विधेः ॥

Whence have you come to know (that a word) is dependent on something else and that it repeats what is already known? If it be said that they are known (from the word itself), it cannot be accepted, because the word has no validity (for you). They are not known from injunction, because its work comes to an end (after making known what is enjoined).

The *Nīyogavādin* argues that a word by itself has no validity because (1) it is dependent on something else for conveying its meaning and (2) what it states is a repetition. What is the source through which he has come to know of these? He cannot answer this question by saying that he has come to know of them through the word itself which has these two characteristics, i.e., through the word which is both

dependent and repetitious. Since he does not admit the validity of a word on its own, the dependent and repetitious nature of the word cannot be known from the word itself. If they are known from the word itself, it only means that he accepts the validity of the word. The *Niyogavādin* cannot argue that they are known from an injunction. Since the work of an injunction is restricted to revealing what is enjoined, it cannot reveal the nature of a word.

[700]

स्वशब्दानभिधेयं यत्तदेवापेक्षते पदम् ।

स्तथै तदप्रमाणञ्चेद्वाक्यार्थस्यान्वयः कुतः ॥

A word seeks after that alone (i.e., the meaning of another word) which is not expressed by it. If it is not a *pramāṇa* in respect of what it signifies, how can there be sentence-sense by the combination of words?

A word seeks another word, not for expressing its sense, but for conveying the sentence-sense. If the validity of a word in respect of what it states is not accepted, it will not be possible to account for the sentence-sense which arises as a result of the construction (*anvaya*) of the meanings of the words.

[701]

अप्रमाणमिति ज्ञानं कस्मादज्ञायि कथ्यताम् ।

विद्यमानोपलम्भानि न ह्यभावम्प्रमिष्वते ॥

Whence you have got the knowledge that (a word) is not a *pramāṇa* (in respect of what it conveys) may be stated. (Perception and other *pramāṇas*) which make known what is existent cannot, indeed, reveal non-existence.

How does the *Niyogavādin* know that a word is not a *pramāṇa* in respect of what it conveys? The knowledge of the absence of validity in a word (*pade pramāṇyābhāva*) is *abhāvajñāna*. How is this knowledge

obtained by him ? Is it obtained through *pramāṇas* like perception? Or, is it obtained through the word itself? It cannot be through *pramāṇas* like perception, because they can reveal what is existent alone and not what is non-existent. The other alternative will not be helpful to the *Niyogavādin*. If the knowledge of the absence of validity in a word is known through the word itself, then the word *ex hypothesi* must be admitted to be a *pramāṇa*.

[702]

परस्वभावविध्वंसवर्त्मनैवात्मवस्तुनः ।

वक्ष्यत्यवगतिञ्चोर्ध्वं विधिनैवेति दुस्मितम् ॥

Through the process of negating the alien forms (like the *annamaya*, etc.) *śruti* will, in the sequel, convey the knowledge of the Self. So it cannot be said that through an injunction alone (this knowledge of the Self is obtained).

[703]

व्यावृत्तिः परतोऽभावो न च तस्येन्द्रियेण हि ।

सम्बन्धोऽस्ति ततो भेदः प्रमाणैर्नोपलभ्यते ॥

(If it be said that) difference from other things (like the *annamaya*, etc.) is *abhāva*, it has, indeed, no relation with the sense-organ. Consequently, difference cannot be known through *pramāṇas*.

The *Niyogavādin* may argue that the Self is not known through the method of negating the *annamaya*, the *prāṇamaya*, etc., which are not-Self, but it is known as different (*bhinna*) from them.

This argument will not do. It is necessary to inquire into the nature of difference (*bheda*) which is said to exist between the Self and other objects. Is it positive (*bhāva-rūpa*) or negative (*abhāva-rūpa*)? If the former, it must be considered to be a distinct entity. Such a view involves a number of fallacies like mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*).

Consider the statement, "This object is different from that object." One can speak of *this* object and *that* object only if the difference between them is already known; and the difference can be known only if we know the one as other than the other. Further, if difference is a separate entity other than the two objects which are said to be different, how is it known? It cannot be said that it is known through another difference, as such an argument will lead to infinite regress. In view of these difficulties, it is not possible to hold the view that difference (*bheda*) is positive (*bhāva-rūpa*).

With a view to avoid these difficulties, the *Niyogavādin* may argue that *bheda* is negative (*abhāva*). Difference, according to this view, is *anyonyābhāva*, i.e., the absence of one thing in the other. The difficulty here is that being an *abhāva* it cannot be known through perception which requires sense-object contact. Since difference is viewed as *abhāva*, it cannot have any contact or relation with the sense organ. If it cannot be known through perception, it cannot also be known through *anumāna* and other *pramāṇas* which are all dependent on perception.

[704]

प्रमाभावस्वरूपत्वान्नाप्यभावाद्भिदेष्यते ।

संविद्यभावो नैवेह प्रकाशयति किञ्चन ॥

Nor can it be said that difference is known from the absence of *pramāṇa*, which is negative. The absence of knowledge can never reveal anything.

It may be argued that difference (*bheda*), which is said to be negative, is known through non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*). Even this argument is not tenable. *Anupalabdhi* may mean either the absence of *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇābhāva*) or the absence of knowledge (*samvittyaabhāva*). The first line of the verse rejects the first alternative, while the second line the second one. It is absurd to say that the absence of *pramāṇa* is the *pramāṇa* by which *abhāva* is known. Nor is it possible to say that the absence of knowledge is the means for knowing *abhāva*. Knowledge

alone reveals an object. If so, how can anything be known through the absence of knowledge?

[705]

इति स्वाभिमतं सर्वं तेन चास्य विरुद्धता ।
वस्तुवृत्तानुरोधेन व्यापारः फलवानिह ॥

This view of yours comes into conflict with your own position (that there is no negative entity). The method of instruction about the Self as it is (by negating the not-Self therefrom) is fruitful here.

The Prābhākara who is a *Jñāyogavādin* does not accept negative entity. To him, *abhāva* or non-existence is nothing apart from the substratum where it is supposed to exist. It is, therefore, inconsistent on his part to explain *bheda* as an *abhāva*.

The second line of the verse reiterates what was stated in verse (702) about the method of conveying the knowledge of the Self through negating the alien forms such as the *annamaya* from it.

[706]

न कुलालवशाद् व्योम शरावायाप्यलं यतः ।
आत्मज्ञानमप्रसिद्धञ्चेद्विधेरिव विधिः कुतः ॥
अथाप्रसिद्धं नितरां विधिनैवोपपद्यते ॥

As ether cannot be converted into trays by the effort of a potter, (so also if the assertive *Vedānta* texts have no validity on their own, they cannot be made valid through injunction). As in the case of an injunctive text, if the knowledge of the Self is obtained (from the *Vedānta* text), where is the need of injunction? If, on the contrary, it has not been obtained, injunction has no scope at all thereto.

The futility of injunction in respect of the knowledge of the Self conveyed by the *Vedānta* text is once again stated in this verse. If the knowledge of the Self conveyed by the *Vedānta* text is not valid on its own, it cannot be made valid even by the injunction. Just as an injunctive text conveys its sense without requiring another injunctive text, so also the *Vedānta* text conveys its sense without requiring an injunctive text.

[707]

कैवल्यकारिता बुद्धेर्नियोगादेव चेद्भवेत् ।
नियोगार्थावगतये नियोगोऽन्योऽपि मृग्यताम् ॥

If it be said that only from an injunction it can be known that knowledge leads to liberation, then in order to know the meaning of an injunction, another injunction, too, must be sought after.

The need for an injunction may be argued on the ground that only from an injunction can it be known that knowledge leads to liberation. But this argument will lead to infinite regress. How do we know, it may be asked, that an injunction helps us to know that knowledge is conducive to liberation? In order to know that, we have to depend on another injunction, and the meaning of the second injunction can be known from a third injunction, and so on *ad infinitum*.

[708]

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थं विज्ञानं स्वफलं स्वतः ।
अतोऽवगम्यतेऽस्माभिस्तृप्त्याख्यफलवद्भुजेः ॥

So we understand that the knowledge which has sprung up from texts like *tat tvam asi*, etc., yields its fruit by itself in the same way as eating has satisfaction as its fruit.

[709]

स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य इति विध्यन्तरमृते यथा ।
विध्यर्थावगमस्तद्वदस्त्विहाप्यभिधाश्रुतेः ॥

Just as the meaning of the injunction, "Every one shall study his own section of the *Veda*," is known without another injunction, even so here, too, it is true of the (assertive) *śruti* text which has the power to convey its meaning.

See verse (638) for explanation.

[710]

नियोगविरहादस्य यद्यर्थावगमो मृदा ।
इहापि तदमानत्वमभिधानश्रुतेरिव ॥

If, because of the absence of injunction, the knowledge conveyed by this (*Vedānta*) text is false, here, too, the, meaning (conveyed by the injunction, viz., "Every one shall study his own section of the *Veda*") must be false, as in the case of the (assertive) *śruti* text, which has the power to convey its meaning.

[711]

भवेद्विध्यनुकूला वा अभिधा यदि वा विधिः ।
अभिधावर्त्मयायी स्यात्तत्र दोषगुणाविमौ ॥

Either the (assertive) *śruti* text which has the power to convey its meaning is subservient to the injunctive text, or the injunctive text is subservient to the (assertive) *śruti* text which has the power to convey its meaning. In that case (the following) defect and merit (will arise).

[712]

स्याद्युलोकामिवज्ज्ञानं यदि विध्यनुरोधिनी ।
अभिधाश्रुतिरदृष्टार्था सम्यग्ज्ञानं तु दुर्लभम् ॥

If the (assertive) *śruti* text which has the power to convey its meaning is subservient to injunction, (then the knowledge imparted by it will have only) an imperceptible result like the knowledge that the *dyuloka* is fire. Right knowledge will, indeed, be impossible.

If the *Vedānta* text is made subservient to an injunctive text, the knowledge conveyed by it will be conducive to an imperceptible result in the future in the same way as the meditation on the heavenly region (*dyuloka*) as a sacrificial fire (*agni*) is conducive to an imperceptible result. In that case, the *Vedānta* text cannot give us the knowledge of the existent Brahman as it is. Reference is made in the first line of the verse to the *Chāndogya* text, V, iv, 1.

[713]

अथाभिधानुरोधी स्यान्नियोगोऽयं तथापि च ।

अभिधानुविधायित्वाद्विध्यर्थोऽत्र सुदुर्लभः ॥

If, on the contrary, the injunctive text is subservient to the (assertive *Vedānta*) text which has the power to convey its meaning, in that case the meaning of injunction is not possible, because the injunction is subservient to the (assertive *Vedānta*) text which has the power to convey its meaning.

If an injunctive text is made subservient to the *Vedānta* text, knowledge of the Self will not fall within the scope of injunction.

[714]

प्राक्तु वाक्यार्थविज्ञानात्तन्निविष्टपदार्थयोः ।

अन्वयव्यतिरेकार्थविवेकाय विधिर्भवेत् ॥

Prior, however, to the attainment of the knowledge imparted by the sentence (such as *tat tvam asi*), there is the need for injunction for the purpose of reflecting, through the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, on the meanings of the words contained in the sentence.

This verse explains the scope of injunction in the *Vedānta*.

There is the need for injunction before the rise of the unitary, non-relational knowledge from the principal *śruti* text *tat tvam asi*. One must inquire into the meanings of the words *tat* and *tvam* contained in the text by the application of the method of agreement in presence and in absence (*anvaya-vyatireka*). It is for the purpose of directing such an inquiry into the meanings of words that we have the *śruti* texts like "The Self, verily, must be seen," which are in the injunctive form.

[715]

वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तौ हि पदार्थाज्ञानमेव च ।

प्रतिबन्धो यतस्तस्मादन्वयाद्यवलोकनम् ॥

Since ignorance of the meaning of the words (of the sentence) is, indeed, an obstacle in the way of understanding the sentence-sense, enquiry (into the meanings of the words) through the method of *anvaya*, etc., (is necessary).

This verse explains why the meanings of the words contained in the *śruti* texts such as *tat tvam asi* must be inquired into.

[716]

वाक्यार्थज्ञानकाले यः पदार्थो नैव विद्यते ।

कर्तव्यः कारकापेक्षो विधेयः स न संशयः ॥

That is the object which can be enjoined — that object which, at the time of getting the knowledge of the sentence-sense (from the injunctive text relating to a rite) is not at all present, but which is to be done and which seeks the causal factors. There is no doubt about this.

This verse explains the scope and work of injunction in the ritual-section of the *Veda*. It states that *yūga*, etc., can be enjoined.

[717]

विपरीतस्ततो यस्तु वाक्यादेवावगम्यते ।

नित्यः कर्मविमुक्तः सन्न विधेयः कथञ्चन ॥

On the contrary, when Brahman, which is different from that (which is to be done), which is ever-existent, and which is free from action, is known from the sentence itself, it can never be enjoined.

While *yāga*, etc., which are dealt with in the ritual-section of the *Veda*, can be enjoined, neither Brahman nor the knowledge of Brahman spoken of in the knowledge-section of the *Veda* can be enjoined. Since the *Vedānta* text imparts the knowledge of Brahman on its own, there is no scope for injunction in respect of Brahman-knowledge. Brahman is ever-existent and not what is to be accomplished. It is also not connected with action. Such being its nature, it can never be enjoined.

[718]

स्वसिद्धेः कारणं नान्यज्ज्ञानमज्ञानहानये ।

यस्मादपेक्षते तस्मान्न निदिध्यासनाय तत् ॥

Since knowledge, after its origination, does not seek the help of another cause for the destruction of ignorance, there is no injunction on meditation.

This verse rules out the possibility of meditation (*nididhyāsana*) being the subject of an injunction. The *Niyogavādin* argues that one must repeatedly contemplate on the knowledge which has arisen from the *śruti* text, and that only the knowledge which has been repeatedly contemplated upon can remove ignorance. But this argument is wrong as it is based on the wrong assumption that knowledge which has arisen from the *śruti* text requires to be supplemented by *nididhyāsana*. Knowledge has to seek the help of *nididhyāsana* only if it is not able to do its work on its own. But it does. When knowledge arises, igno-

rance is removed, and so there is no dependence of knowledge on *nididhyāsana*. It means that the latter, too, is not the subject of an injunction. The scope and work of injunction so far as the *Vedānta* is concerned must be explained as stated in verse (714).

[719]

सिद्धमप्यात्मकार्यस्य कारणं सिद्धये न चेत् ।
विध्यपेक्षं तदेव स्यान्न स्वसिद्धिप्रकाशकम् ॥

If a cause (viz., knowledge), even after it has taken place, cannot bring about its own result (viz., the removal of ignorance), then the very same cause by depending on injunction (also) cannot produce its result.

If knowledge by itself is not competent to remove ignorance, it can never do it even with the assistance of *nididhyāsana*. The principle that is involved here is: *na hi svato'sati śaktiḥ kartumanyena śakyate*.

The word *prakāśakam* in the second line of the verse means *sādhakam*.

[720]

तस्मात् कूटस्थविज्ञानम्प्रत्याख्याताखिलद्वयम् ।
आनन्दम्ब्रह्मणो विद्वान्न बिभेति कुतश्चन ॥

So, the enlightened man, who knows the bliss of Brahman, the immutable consciousness, from which all duality has been negated, is not afraid of anything whatsoever.

Deviating from Śaṅkara's commentary, Sureśvara began in verse (608) an independent discussion whether there is any scope for injunction or meditation in respect of the knowledge of Brahman imparted by the assertive Upaniṣadic texts. This discussion is now concluded with this verse.

Since the knowledge imparted by the *Upaniṣad* leads to the highest end, there is no need of injunction or meditation thereto.

[721]

ब्रह्मणो ब्राह्मणस्येति भेदश्चात्रौपचारिकः ।

राहोः शिरोवन्मुख्यस्तु नैव स्यान्निर्गुणत्वतः ॥

Here the duality signified by the expression “of Brahman” is figurative as in the case of “the head of Rāhu”. There is no duality in the real sense, since Brahman is without attributes.

The expression *brahmaṇaḥ ānandam* (Brahman’s bliss) must not be understood to mean that bliss is an attribute of Brahman. *Guṇa-guṇī* relation is not possible between bliss and Brahman, since the latter is free from attributes. Bliss is not an attribute of Brahman, but bliss is Brahman. They are not two different entities related in terms of *guṇa-guṇī* relation. Just as there is no Rāhu apart from his head, there is no Brahman apart from bliss. The duality signified by the expression *brahmaṇaḥ ānandam* is figurative as in *rāhoḥ śirah*.

[722]

महिमा ब्राह्मणस्यैष हानिवृद्धिविवर्जितः ।

स्वतः सिद्धेर्विज्ञानंस्तं न बिभेति कुतश्चन ॥

This excellence of the man who has known Brahman admits of no decrease or increase as it is his inherent nature. Knowing this, he has no fear from anything whatsoever.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* text *vidvān na bibhēti kutaścana*.

[723]

विद्वान्सन्न बिभेतीति विद्याकालम्भवेत् फलम् ।

न तु स्वर्गादिवत् प्राप्यम्मुञ्जानस्तृप्यतीतिवत् ॥

By saying that being a knower of Brahman he is not afraid of anything, (*śruti* teaches that) the fruit (of knowledge) takes place simultaneously with knowledge in the same way as the sentence "The person who eats is satisfied" (conveys that the satisfaction resulting from eating is simultaneous with eating). It is not like heaven, etc., which are to be attained (in the future).

[724]

यतोऽविद्यातिरेकेण प्रतिबन्धो न विद्यते ।

तन्नाशानन्तरं मुक्तिं विद्वानिति ततोऽवदत् ॥

Since there is no other obstacle (to liberation) except ignorance, *śruti* says that the knower of Brahman attains liberation, immediately after the destruction of ignorance.

The attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*) is coeval with the rise of knowledge. The only obstacle that stands in the way of attaining *mokṣa* is *avidyā*. Since the rise of knowledge does not take place without removing *avidyā*, the attainment of liberation is simultaneous with the rise of knowledge.

[725]

भयहेतुर्द्वयं यस्मात्तच्चाविद्यासमुद्भवम् ।

प्लुष्टायां विद्यया तस्यां न कुतश्चन भीर्भवेत् ॥

Duality is the cause of fear, and that (duality) comes into being through ignorance, so that when ignorance is burnt by knowledge, fear cannot arise from anything whatsoever.

This verse and the previous one explain why the attainment of liberation is coeval with the rise of knowledge.

[726]

परमात्मधियैतस्मिन् प्रत्यगात्मनि केवले ।
निरस्तायामविद्यायां भयं नास्ति कुतश्चन ॥

When ignorance has been removed by the knowledge that this pure inward Self is the supreme Self, there is no fear from anything whatsoever.

[727 - 728]

निर्धूतपदवाक्यार्थमित्येवमप्रतिपत्तये ।
यतो वाचो निवर्तन्त इत्येवं वचनं श्रुतेः ॥
तथा मनोविकल्पानां निषेधाय परात्मनि ।
धिया सहेत्यतो वक्ति श्रुतिर्याथात्म्यबोधिनी ॥

In order to make us understand that Brahman cannot be denoted by a word or a sentence (directly), there is the declaration of *śruti*, "That from which all words return." In the same way, *śruti* which teaches the truth says "along with the mind" with a view to deny differentiating cognition through the mental mode in respect of the supreme Self.

[729]

निषिध्य नायमात्मेति भिन्नमात्मोपलम्भनम् ।
अनन्यानुभवम्ब्रह्म यमेवेत्याह नः श्रुतिः ॥

By denying all other means of knowing (the Self) in the words, "The Self is not (to be known)," the *śruti* text teaches us through the words *yameva* that Brahman can be known through itself.

Reference is made in this verse to the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (I, ii, 23) which also says that Brahman cannot be designated by a word or a sentence, or comprehended by the differentiating cognition (*vikalpa-*

jñāna) through the mental mode. Stating that "This Self cannot be known through much study, nor through the intellect, nor through much learning," it says that "it can be known through the Self alone that the aspirant prays to."

[730]

प्रत्यग्रह्यावसायित्वाद्भेदानां रज्जुमर्षवत् ।

उदाहरि ततः श्रुत्या ह्ययं श्लोको मनोमये ॥

Since all duality terminates in Brahman-Ātman, like the serpent in the rope, this verse was uttered by *śruti* in the section dealing with the *manomaya-kośa*.

The *śruti* passage *yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha*, etc., which we have now discussed as occurring at the commencement of the ninth *anuvāka* also occurs in the fourth *anuvāka*, which deals with the *manomaya-kośa*. See verse (303). Since this passage is intended to teach Brahman which is different from the five *kośas*, how is it, it may be asked, that it has also been used in connection with the *manomaya-kośa*? Just as the illusory snake, which is superimposed on the rope, does not have a being of its own apart from the rope which is the substratum, even so the five *kośas* which are illusory have no being of their own apart from Brahman, the substratum, on which they are superimposed. The five *kośas* stand for duality. Brahman-realization, it has already been shown, has to be attained by resolving progressively the *annamaya-kośa* in the *prāṇamaya*, the *prāṇamaya-kośa* in the *manomaya*, etc. This *śruti* passage *yato vāco nivartante* has also been used in connection with the *manomaya-kośa* with a view to teach that the *pañca-kośa*, which is not-Self, has no being of its own, and that it does not exist apart from Brahman-Ātman.

[731]

विद्वानेव परं ब्रह्म आत्मनात्मानमद्वयम् ।

न विभेत्येकलोऽद्वन्द्वो भयहेतोरसम्भवात् ॥

Thus the wise man knows himself by himself as the non-dual supreme Brahman. Being one only without a second, he does not fear, because there is no cause of fear.

Duality is the cause of fear, and *avidyā* is the cause of duality. When *avidyā* is removed through the knowledge of Brahman, the knower of Brahman remains as Brahman, the fearless.

[732]

ननु साध्वक्रिया हेतुः पापानुष्ठानमेव च ।

इत्येतस्य निषेधार्थं एतं हेतुच्यतेऽधुना ॥

It may be objected that omission of good deeds as well commission of sinful ones is the cause (of fear even to a wise man). In order to refute this objection, it is now said *etam ha* (by *śruti*).

After explaining the verse *yato vāco nivartante*, the subsequent *śruti* passage *etam ha vāva na tapati* is now taken up for explanation.

[733 - 734]

नैतमेवंविदं यस्माद्वितीहावधारणे ।

न तपत्यन्तकाले तमकर्तृत्वात्मवेदिनम् ॥

क्रियाफलस्य सर्वस्य कर्तृगामित्वकारणात् ॥

At the time of death (the remorse in respect of his omission and commission) never burns him who knows the Self as the non-agent, because all fruit of action goes to the agent. Here the particle *vāva* is used for the sake of emphasis.

[735]

धिङ्मां योऽहं शुभं कर्म जीवन्नाकरवं क्वचित् ।

अकार्षञ्च सदा पापं ह्यतो भयमुपस्थितम् ॥

“An accursed being I am who, while alive, have not done a good deed at any time; and I have always done sin. So fear has overtaken me.”

This verse explains the way in which a person is afflicted by remorse at the time of his death, as stated in the *śruti* text, *kimaham sūdhū nākaravam, kimaham pāpamakaravamiti*.

[736]

अस्माद्धेतोर्महांस्तापोऽविद्यासंश्रितचेतसाम् ।
जायते मृतिकाले हि हिक्किकावशवर्तिनाम् ॥

It is from such cause as this that a great remorse arises, indeed, at the time of death in those whose mind is veiled by ignorance and who are overwhelmed by hiccoughs.

[737]

फलस्यायं स्वभावो हि यत्स्वकर्त्रनुगामिता ।
अतो न तपतोऽज्ञोत्थावकर्तारं शुभाशुभौ ॥

This is, indeed, the nature of the fruit (of an action) that it accrues to the agent of the act. Hence good and evil performed by him when he was ignorant (earlier) do not afflict him who knows himself as the non-agent.

The omission of the good and the commission of the bad do not torment the wise man, the knower of Brahman, who remains as Brahman, which is not an agent. That is to say, since the wise man has no sense of agency, he is free from remorse.

[738]

कस्मान्न तपतस्तौ चेद्धर्माधर्मौ विपश्चितम् ।
कौटस्थ्यादद्वयत्वाच्च प्लुष्यत्येव शुभाशुभे ॥

If it is asked why good and evil do not afflict the wise man, (the answer is that) since having become Brahman, he is immutable and also non-dual, he does burn good and evil.

This verse states another reason to show why the wise man is not tormented by remorse.

[739 - 741]

स य एवं यथोक्तार्थं विद्वानेते शुभाशुभे ॥
 साधुकर्माक्रिया या च पापानुष्ठानमेव च ।
 अकर्तास्मीतिविज्ञानदुताशेनाञ्जसा द्रुतम् ॥
 दग्ध्वा निरन्वये कृत्वा ह्यात्मानं स्पृणुते यतः ।
 स्पृणोतिर्बलकर्मायमात्मानम्बलयत्यतः ॥

He who knows (Brahman as his own inward Self) in this way as stated, having burnt at once good and evil, i.e., the omission of good deeds and the commission of sin, by the fire of the knowledge that he is not the agent, and having annihilated them without any remnant, strengthens, indeed, the Self. Since the verb *śpr* means to strengthen, (it means that) he strengthens the Self.

These verses bring out the meaning of the *śruti* text *ya evaṁ vidvānete śprṇute*.

[742]

अविद्यासंश्रयादात्मा बलीयानपि दुर्बलः ।
 अविद्या राजयक्ष्मास्य कार्यमेति तथा यतः ॥
 ध्वस्तायां विद्यया तस्यामात्मानम्बलयत्यतः ॥

Though strong in itself, the Self becomes weak because of the association of *avidyā*. Since the consumption of

avidyā makes it lean, the knowledge, having destroyed ignorance, strengthens the Self.

This verse explains why the Self needs to be strengthened by knowledge. The Self becomes weak *as it were* only because of *avidyā*. When the latter is destroyed by knowledge, the Self shines in its native strength.

[743]

बोधेनैव निरस्तायां निद्रायां स्वप्नदर्शनम् ।
बुद्धात्मशेषतामेति तथैकलशेषताम् ॥

When a person is awakened from sleep, the object seen by him in dream becomes part of the awakened person. In the same way, here (good and evil) remain part of the non-dual Self.

When a person wakes up from sleep, he realizes that the dream-objects seen by him are illusory and that they do not have any being apart from the Witness-self. In the same way when a person has attained the saving knowledge that he is no other than Brahman, he realizes that *avidyā* and its effects including *dharma* and *adharma* have no being of their own apart from the non-dual Self, and so they become powerless and harmless. He is no more tormented by them in the same way as the person who is awakened from sleep is not frightened by the dream-objects seen by him earlier.

[744]

अथवा एष एवोमे सत्यादृश्यादिलक्षणः ।
शुभाशुभे यतस्तस्मादात्मानम्बल्यत्यम् ॥

Or, since the wise man who has become the real, imperceptible Brahman treats these good and evil (as identical with the Self), he strengthens the Self.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* text *ubhe hyevaiṣa ete ātmānaḥ spr̥ṇute*. To the wise man, good and evil lose their individual forms, because he regards them as identical with the Self. So they cannot torment him any more.

[745 - 746]

लिङ्गदेहाश्रितं कार्यं तच्च कर्मनिबन्धनम् ।
कर्म कर्त्रादिसम्भूतं कर्त्राद्यज्ञानहेतुकम् ॥
अहं ब्रह्मेत्यतो ज्ञानाद्ध्वस्तायाम्प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
कार्यहेतावविद्यायामेकत्वाद्बल्यत्ययम् ॥

Weakness is dependent on the subtle body, and it is due to *karma*. *Karma* is caused by agent, etc., and agent, etc., are due to ignorance. When ignorance of the inward Self, which is the cause of weakness, is destroyed by the knowledge, "I am Brahman," he strengthens the Self, because it remains as one alone.

[747]

स्वतो बुद्धं स्वतः शुद्धं स्वतो मुक्तं यथोदितम् ।
वेदैवं यः स्वमात्मानम्फलं तस्येदृशं स्मृतम् ॥

It is said that such a fruit accrues to him who knows his own Self described in this way as consciousness, pure, and free, by its very nature.

The meaning of the *śruti* text *ya evaṁ veda* is explained in this verse.

[748]

इतीत्युक्तपरामर्शो ब्रह्मणोऽद्वयरूपिणः ।
साक्षात्तद्बोधहेतुत्वाद्ब्रह्मी ह्युपनिषद्भवेत् ॥

The word *iti* is for recalling the non-dual Brahman. This *Vallī* is, indeed, the *Upaniṣad*, because it directly imparts the knowledge of that Brahman.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* text *ityupaniṣat*, which occurs at the end of the concluding *anuvāka* of the *Brahmavallī*.

The word *iti* is used to recall what has been said about the non-dual Brahman in this chapter beginning from *brahmasvidāpnoti param* and ending with *ya evaṁ veda*. This chapter called the *Brahmavallī* is spoken of as the *Upaniṣad* by courtesy as it conveys the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman, which is the quintessence of the teachings of the *Upaniṣad*.

[749]

विद्यैवोपनिषज्ज्ञेया तयैवोपेत्य निर्द्वयम् ।
विन्दते निर्भयात्मानं तस्मादुपनिषत्सृता ॥

The word *upaniṣad* means knowledge alone. It is by knowledge alone that one, having approached the non-dual (Brahman), attains the Self which is free from fear. Hence (this *Vallī*) is spoken of as the *Upaniṣad*.

This verse explains the primary meaning of the word *upaniṣad*.

[750]

इमां वल्लीं तु तादर्थ्यात् परब्रह्मविदो गुणात् ।
सदोपनिषदित्यूच्युस्त्यक्तसर्वैषणाः शुभाम् ॥

Those who know the supreme Brahman and have abandoned all desires always call this sacred *Vallī* as *Upaniṣad* by courtesy, as it is intended for that (knowledge of Brahman).

Here ends the ninth and concluding *anuvāka* of the *Brahmavallī*.

CHAPTER III

BHĠGUVALLĪ

[1]

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं यद्ब्रूह्योक्तम्प्रत्यगात्मनि ।
तदभिन्नम्परं ज्ञानमुक्तं मोहापनोदि यत् ॥

It has been stated that Brahman, which is real, knowledge, and infinite, is the inward Self (located in the cavity of the intellect). It has also been said that the supreme knowledge which removes ignorance is non-different from Brahman.

With a view to bring out the connection between the previous chapter, viz., the *Brahmavallī* and the present one called *Bhṛguvallī*, what was taught in the former is stated in this verse very briefly. At the beginning of the *Brahmavallī* it was stated that Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite, and that it is identical with the Self located in the cavity of the intellect. It has also been stated that the knowledge of Brahman-Ātman conveyed by the Upaniṣads removes ignorance and that this highest knowledge constitutes the nature of Brahman. The person who knows Brahman — i.e., who remains as Brahman — is not afflicted by good and bad deeds and is free from transmigration.

There are ten anuvākas in the *Bhṛguvallī*. Verses (1) to (21) deal with the first *anuvāka*.

[2]

अभिधित्सुरथेदानीं यथोक्तज्ञानसिद्ध्ये ।
यत्साधकतमं तस्य प्राप्त्यै प्रववृते श्रुतिः ॥

Now, then, *śruti* proceeds to explain the best means for attaining the knowledge (of Brahman) as described.

The *Śikṣāvallī* has given an account of scriptural rites and meditations which are remote aids (*bahiraṅga-sādhana*) to the attainment of knowledge. A person whose mind has been purified by the practice of *karma* and *upāsana* in a spirit of dedication to the Lord is eligible for the study of the *Vedānta*. Guided study (*śravaṇa*), rational reflection (*manana*), and repeated contemplation (*nididhyāsana*) are the principal proximate aids (*mukhyāntaraṅga-sādhana*) to knowledge. The nature of Brahman-Ātman has been set forth through the study of the *śruti* texts in the previous chapter. The present one purports to teach the method of reflection (*manana*) on the teaching of the *śruti* texts for attaining the direct knowledge of Brahman-Ātman, which will destroy *avidyā* and its effects.

[3]

गुरुद्वारैव विद्येयमाचार्याच्चेति नः श्रुतिः ।

शिष्योपाध्यायरूपेयमत आख्यायिकोच्यते ॥

This knowledge, indeed, has to be obtained only through a teacher, as *śruti* tells us, "That knowledge alone which is learnt from a teacher leads to real good." So, the story in the form of (the dialogue between) the disciple and the teacher is told.

The *Bhṛguvallī* begins with a dialogue between the disciple and his teacher. Here Bhṛgu is the disciple, and his father Varuṇa plays the role of a teacher. Bhṛgu requests his father to teach him *Brahma-vidyā*. *Brahma-vidyā* is the highest knowledge; it must be learnt directly from a competent teacher. There is a text in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (IV, ix, 3) which says: "That knowledge alone which is learnt from a teacher leads to real good." It is with a view to convey this idea that the *Bhṛguvallī* begins with the story of the philosophical dialogue between Bhṛgu and Varuṇa.

[4]

अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेत्येतन्मन्त्राभिः शब्दितम् ।
अन्तर्गीतणिजर्थस्य ह्यधीहीति भवेद्यतः ॥

Adhihi bhagavo brahma is a *mantra* (to be uttered by a disciple at the time of approaching a teacher for instruction). The word *adhihi* is used to convey the causal meaning which is implied in it.

Adhihi bhagavo brahma means "Revered Sir, teach me Brahman." A disciple must utter this *mantra* when he approaches a teacher for instruction. With a view to know Brahman, Bhṛgu approached his father Varuṇa uttering this *mantra*. In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (VII, i, 1) there is a reference to Nārada approaching Sanatkumāra uttering the *mantra adhihi bhagavah*, as he wanted to acquire the knowledge of the Self.

The word *adhihi* is formed by combining the verb *ik* with *adhi*. Here it is used in the sense of *adhyāpaya*.

[5]

जिज्ञासुः परमम्ब्रह्म श्रद्धाभक्तिपुरःसरः ।
उपसीदेद्गुरीयांसं मन्त्रेणानेन शुद्धधीः ॥

Having faith and devotion as well as a pure mind, a person who is desirous of knowing the supreme Brahman should approach a competent teacher with this *mantra*.

Some of the qualifications which a spiritual aspirant must possess are mentioned here. Faith, devotion, and a pure mind are necessary for attaining Brahman-knowledge.

[6]

मोक्षादर्वाक्षु भोगेषु व्यावृत्तकरणो भृगुः ।
अध्यापय परम्ब्रह्मेत्यवृच्छद्वरुणं गुरुम् ॥

With a mind turned away from all pleasures lower than *mokṣa*, Bhṛgu asked his teacher, Varuṇa: "Teach me the supreme Brahman."

In addition to the qualifications mentioned above, a spiritual aspirant must have detachment (*vairāgya*). He should turn away from all kinds of pleasures other than *mokṣa*.

It was stated earlier that *adhihi* means *adhyāpaya*. The latter is used here in the sense of *śikṣaya* or *jñāpaya*. Bhṛgu requests his father to teach him Brahman. Varuṇa is not going to teach him something entirely new. His instruction will amount to making Bhṛgu remember his essential nature, for Bhṛgu in his essential nature is no other than Brahman, which he wants to know.

[7]

अन्नम्प्राणमितीत्यादि वरुणो भृगवेऽवदत् ।

देहकारणमन्नं स्यात्प्राणः प्राणादिकारणम् ॥

चक्षुः श्रोत्रं मनो वाक्च करणान्युपलब्धये ॥

Varuṇa spoke of "food, vital force," etc., to Bhṛgu. Food is the cause of body. Vital force is the cause of *prāṇa*, etc. Eye, ear, mind, and speech are the instruments of knowledge.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* texts *tasmā etat-provāca, annam-prāṇam*, etc.

Varuṇa begins his instruction by first speaking of food, vital force eye, ear, mind, and speech. Food (*annam*) is the cause of body. Vital force (*mukhya-prāṇaḥ*) is the cause of *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *samāna*, *vyāna*, and *udāna* in the sense that it functions differentiating itself as *prāṇa*, *apāna*, etc. Eye, ear, mind, speech, etc., are organs of knowledge. Only some of the organs of knowledge are mentioned here. All these — food, vital force, eye, etc., — which have been referred to by Varuṇa can be characterized as doors (*dvārāṇi*) to the realization of Brahman.

[8 - 9]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकोक्तिर्ब्रह्मणो वोपलब्धये ॥

अनिर्देश्यस्य वा भूम्नो लक्षणस्य प्रवृत्तये ।

अन्नम्प्राणमितीत्यादि प्रत्यग्धर्मोपदिश्यते ॥

Food, vital force, etc., which are inward qualities, are mentioned for getting the knowledge of Brahman through the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* or for the purpose of defining Brahman, the unutterable and the infinite.

Bhṛgu requested Varuṇa to teach him Brahman. Instead of teaching him Brahman, Varuṇa spoke of food, etc. So it may appear that the answer given by Varuṇa is not relevant to what was asked by Bhṛgu. But it is not really so. Two explanations can be given to show how reference to food, etc., is quite relevant in the context. (1) Food, life, etc., are mentioned with a view to bring in the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* (i.e., the method of agreement in presence and in absence) for the purpose of discriminating the Self from the not-Self. Food, vital force, etc., are not always cognized: sometimes they are cognized, and sometimes they are not. Further, when one is cognized, the other is not. But the Self, on the other hand, is always present. It is that which reveals all other things when they are present as well as when they are absent. Being uniformly present at all times, the Self is, therefore, different from food, the vital force, etc. (2) There is also another reason for mentioning them. The infinite Brahman is free from attributes. It cannot be designated by words. Nor can it be comprehended by the mind. Food, vital force, etc., are mentioned with a view to give a definition of Brahman *per accidens*.

[10]

प्राणस्य प्राणमित्येवं श्रुतिरप्याश्रिता भवेत् ।

कर्मश्रुतिश्च ब्रह्मत्वे वाचमित्यादि युज्यते ॥

The *śruti* text which describes Brahman as “the Vital Force of the vital force” is also taken into consideration. Also, the accusative case in which words like “speech” are used in the *śruti* text for the purpose of defining Brahman is appropriate.

The second explanation mentioned in the previous verse is in accordance with the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (IV, iv, 18) which refers to Brahman as “the Vital Force of the vital force, the Eye of the eye, the Ear of the ear, and the Mind of the mind.” Food, vital force, etc., are mentioned because it is easy to know Brahman through them. This explanation is further strengthened by the use of the words *annam*, *prāṇam*, *vācam*, etc., in the accusative case. The meaning of the *śruti* text is: “Know food as Brahman, know the vital force as Brahman,” etc.

[11]

अन्नादयः पदार्था वा अन्वयव्यतिरेकयोः ।

इहोच्यन्ते प्रवृत्त्यर्थं सौकर्यं स्यात् कथं न्विति ॥

Or, objects like food, etc., are mentioned here for introducing the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in such a way as to make an easy understanding (of Brahman).

The significance of the first explanation referred to in verse (8) is brought out here.

[12]

उत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशेषु ब्रह्मादिस्थावरावधि ।

नात्येति ब्रह्मरूपं यत्तादृह्येति प्रतीयताम् ॥

That must be known to be Brahman leaving which none, from *Brahmā* down to the unmoving objects, can exist at the time of creation, maintenance, and destruction.

Immediately after mentioning *annam*, *prāṇam*, etc., Varuṇa gives a definition of Brahman. Brahman is that from which all beings are born; having been born, it is that by which they live; and it is that into which they are finally dissolved. In short, Brahman is the cause of the creation, maintenance, and destruction of the world. Brahman is defined here not in terms of its essential nature, but in terms of its accidental attributes (*taṭastha-lakṣaṇam*). Origination, etc., belong to the universe. Brahman is said to be the cause of the universe due to its accidental connection with the origination, etc., of the universe.

[13]

विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म यदेवंलक्षणम्भवेत् ।
अनुत्पन्नमहीनञ्च जगदुत्पत्तिहानिभिः ॥

Seek to know that Brahman well which is thus defined and which is not born and destroyed by the origination and destruction of the universe.

Varuṇa asks Bhṛgu to find out for himself Brahman which has been defined.

[14]

तपश्चचार तच्छ्रुत्वा भृगुर्ब्रह्मोपलब्धये ।
प्रतिपेदे तपोऽनुक्तं सावशेषोक्तिकारणात् ॥

Having heard this (from his father). Bhṛgu practised *tapas* for knowing Brahman. He resorted to *tapas* (as a means) though it was not stated as such, since the instruction was incomplete.

This verse explains the *śruti* text *sa tapo'tapyata*.

[15]

शृङ्गग्राहिकयोक्त्वापि ह्यन्नम्ब्रह्मेति लक्षणम् ।
पितोवाच यतस्तस्मात्तपो भेजे स्वयम्भृगुः ॥

Since, even after teaching clearly that food, indeed, is Brahman, the father told (him) the definition of Brahman, Bhṛgu by himself resorted to *tapas*.

Bhṛgu felt that the instruction of his father in respect of Brahman was incomplete. He requested his father to teach him Brahman. Varuṇa first told him that *annam*, *prāṇam*, etc., are Brahman. He did not stop with this. After speaking of *annam*, *prāṇam*, etc. he gave a definition of Brahman without stating what Brahman is in itself. Bhṛgu felt that the instruction given by his father was incomplete inasmuch as he had to find out Brahman by applying the definition.

[16]

ब्रह्म साक्षात् निर्दिष्टं लक्षणोक्तेस्तो भृगुः ।
नूनमाकाङ्क्षते योग्यं साधनं ब्रह्मवित्तये ॥

Brahman has not been directly stated, since the definition (of Brahman) has been given. Bhṛgu, therefore, has to seek after undoubtedly some appropriate means for the knowledge of Brahman.

Varuṇa should have told his son what Brahman is in a direct way. He should have helped Bhṛgu to understand Brahman by saying that Brahman is such-and-such. But he did not describe Brahman in that way. If it was his intention to convey the nature of Brahman directly when he spoke about food, vital force, etc., he should not have given the definition of Brahman. In so far as he gave the definition of Brahman after speaking about *annam*, *prāṇam*, etc., Bhṛgu came to the conclusion that his father must have had in view some other appropriate means for attaining the knowledge of Brahman.

[17]

तपोविशेषादित्सा स्यात्तत्साधनतमत्त्वतः ।
यद्दुस्तरं यद्दुरापमिति स्मृत्यनुशासनात् ॥

Bhr̥gu desired to practise *tapas*, since it was the best means as declared in a *smṛti* text: "Whatever is hard to be traversed, whatever is hard to be attained (may be accomplished by *tapas*)."

Tapas is of different kinds. Studying one's own *Veda* is the *tapas* prescribed for a celibate-student. For a house-holder, the practice of charity is *tapas*. Fasting is the *tapas* for a forest-dweller. Concentration of mind and the senses which is the *tapas* for an ascetic, is the best means to the knowledge of Brahman.

A text in the *Manusmṛti* (XI, 239) quoted in the second line of the verse brings out the importance of *tapas* as follows: "Whatever is hard to be traversed, whatever is hard to be attained, whatever is hard to be reached, whatever is hard to be performed — all these may be accomplished by *tapas*; *tapas*, indeed, possesses a power which it is difficult to surpass."

[18]

मनसश्चेन्द्रियाणाञ्चेत्येवमाध्यात्मिकं तपः ।

इह न्याय्यम्प्रसिद्धं तु ह्यारादुपकरोति नः ॥

Here, subjective concentration, that is concentration of mind and the senses, is appropriate. But (the other kinds of *tapas*) which are well-known help us, indeed, indirectly.

Concentration of mind and the senses is *ādhyātmika-tapas*. Bhr̥gu, who wanted to know Brahman, resorted to *tapas* in the form of concentration of mind and the senses, since it was the direct means to the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. The other kinds of *tapas* like *kṛcchra*, *cāndrāyana*, etc., which are the well-known religious observances, are useful to the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman only indirectly.

[19]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकादिचिन्तनं वा तपो भवेत् ।
अहम्ब्रह्मेतिवाक्यार्थबोधायालमिदं यतः ॥

Or, *tapas* is reflection on the subject-matter through the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, etc., since this is competent to make us understand the knowledge conveyed by the sentence, "I am Brahman."

In the previous verse Sureśvara explained *tapas* in the sense of concentration as stated by Śaṅkara in his commentary. Now he gives his own explanation. Since the problem with which Bhṛgu is concerned is inquiry into Brahman, Sureśvara interprets *tapas* as reflection on the subject-matter through the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, i.e., agreement in presence as well as in absence, reflection on the import of the *Vedānta* text, inquiry into the means (*sādhana*) which will be conducive to the end, and examination of the nature of the end (*phala*) to be attained. He adopts this interpretation, as the inquiry into the subject-matter along these lines will lead to the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman from the *Vedānta* texts.

[20]

कोऽहं कस्य कुतो वेति कः कथं वा भवेदिति ।
प्रयोजनमतिर्नित्यमेवं मोक्षाश्रमी भवेत् ॥
व्यासः प्राहात एवेदं मुमुक्षोर्मुक्तये तपः ॥

Vyāsa has said: "Who am I? Whose or whence? What will one become and how? An ascetic who is desirous of *mokṣa* should always think thus." So for a seeker of liberation this (method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*) is the *tapas* for attaining liberation.

Sureśvara echoes Vyāsa's words (*Mahābhārata*, XII, 359, 9) in order to show that his interpretation of *tapas* as reflection on the subject-

matter through the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, etc., is quite acceptable to Vyāsa. An ascetic who is desirous of *mokṣa* should find out the answer to questions like "Who am I?" etc. An inquiry along these lines will enable him to discriminate the Self from the body, the senses, and the mind which are not-Self.

[21]

यतो वा इति चैवं स्यादुक्तमेव परं तपः ॥

Even the definition of Brahman as "That from which all these beings are born," etc., indicates the highest *tapas* which has been stated.

Sureśvara argues that his explanation of *tapas* as inquiry by the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* is implicit in the very definition of Brahman which has been given. Brahman has been defined as that from which all beings are born, that by which they live, and that into which they are finally dissolved. By this definition *śruti* distinguishes Brahman from other beings. Whereas Brahman is devoid of origination, etc., all other beings have origination, etc. While Brahman alone is constant, all other beings are not. *Śruti*, therefore, emphasizes the need for discriminating the Self from the not-Self by applying the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*.

[22]

उक्तलक्षणसम्पन्नं तपस्तप्त्वा प्रपन्नवान् ।

अन्नम्ब्रह्मेति भूतानामुत्पत्त्यादिसमन्वयात् ॥

Having practised *tapas*, he understood food, to which the given definition applies, as Brahman, since it is the cause of birth, etc., of all beings.

Verses (22) to (29) explain the second, third, fourth, and fifth anuvākas of the *Upaniṣad*. By applying the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, Bhṛgu came to the conclusion that food is Brahman, because

the definition which has been given by his father holds good in the case of food.

[23]

उक्तान्यन्नमयादीनि यानि तेषां तु कारणम् ।
अन्नादि प्रतिपत्ताव्यं न हि कार्येऽस्ति लक्षणम् ॥

Food, etc., must be understood as the material cause of the *annamaya*, etc., spoken of (in the *Brahmaṣallī*). The definition of Brahman does not hold good in the case of an effect (like the *annamaya*).

Brahman has been defined as the cause of origination, maintenance and destruction of the universe. This definition does not hold good in the case of the *annamaya*, the *prāṇamaya*, the *manomaya*, the *vijñānamaya*, and the *ānandamaya*, which are all effects or modifications of *anna*, *prāṇa*, etc., respectively. So the latter, viz., *anna*, *prāṇa*, etc., referred to by Varuṇa must be looked upon as causes. For example, food is the material cause of all gross bodies. All beings are born from food; they live by food; and they are finally dissolved into food. So the definition of Brahman holds good tentatively in the case of food.

[24]

शुद्धं ह्यन्नमयाद्येतदन्नादेरुपजायते ।
कार्यप्रविलयश्रुत्या कारणानन्दमेत्यतः ॥

Annamaya, etc., are effects because they come into being from food, etc. By the *śruti* text which speaks of the effect as merging in (and becoming one with) the cause, the spiritual aspirant is, therefore, led on to *Ānanda* which is the final cause.

In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (VI, i, 4) Āruṇi tells his son Śvetaketu that through a clod of clay all that is made of clay would become known, and that the clay alone is real, the products of clay existing

in name only. What he wants to convey is that the effect is non-different from its material cause. So when the cause (clay) is known, all its products are also known. The effect can be merged in, and be made one with, its cause. The *annamaya* is a modification of *anna*, and so it can be merged in the latter. *Anna* which is an effect of *prāṇa* can be merged in it, and by the same reasoning *prāṇa* in *manas*, *manas* in *viññāna*, and *viññāna* in *ānanda*.

[25]

कार्याणि कारणेष्वेवं तानि चैवोत्तरोत्तरम् ।
प्रवित्ताप्य परानन्दं यायाद्वाचामगोचरम् ॥

By thus dissolving the effects into their cause and, in the case of the latter, dissolving the lower into its next higher (cause), the supreme Bliss which cannot be comprehended by speech must be attained.

The process of dissolution is twofold. The *annamaya*, the *prāṇamaya*, etc., which are modifications, are first dissolved into their respective causes, viz., *anna*, *prāṇa*, etc. *Anna*, *prāṇa*, etc., are themselves related as cause and effect. So *anna* which is itself an effect is dissolved in its cause, viz., *prāṇa*, and so on till *ānanda* is attained. Even this *ānanda* which is the cause of the entire universe is finally resolved through knowledge in the pure Brahman-Ātman, which is free from cause-effect relation.

[26]

अन्नम्ब्रह्मेति विज्ञाय कार्यत्वं तस्य वीक्ष्य सः ।
संशयोच्छित्तये भूयो गत्वापृच्छद्गुरुम्भृगुः ॥

Having known food as Brahman and also having understood that (food) as effect, Bhṛgu once again with a view to remove his doubt went to his teacher and asked.

Though at the beginning Bhṛgu thought that food must be Brahman as it had all the features enumerated in the definition, he soon found out that it could not be Brahman as it was also an effect of something else. So once again Bhṛgu went to his teacher, Varuṇa, in order to clear his doubt.

[27]

अन्नादेर्ब्रह्मणश्चैवं दोषं दृष्ट्वा स कार्यताम् ।

भूयो भूयः परम्ब्रह्म पप्रच्छातृष्णिवर्तनात् ॥

In the same way, finding that *prāṇa*, etc., when regarded as Brahman have the same defect of being effects, he again and again asked about the supreme Brahman till his doubt was completely removed.

When Bhṛgu approached his father once again for instruction, he was asked to practise *tapas* for knowing Brahman. After reflection, Bhṛgu thought that *prāṇa* was Brahman. But he could not stick on to this idea as he found that *prāṇa*, too, was an effect. He came to the same conclusion with regard to *manas*, *viśvāna*, and *ānanda*, though he thought each of them initially as Brahman.

[28]

यावत्साक्षात्परम्ब्रह्म करविन्यस्तबिल्ववत् ।

न वेत्ति निर्बुभुत्सुः सन्न तावद्विनिवर्तते ॥

A spiritual aspirant who desires to know does not give up his inquiry as long as the supreme Brahman is not directly known like a *bilva* fruit held in the hand.

It should not be thought that the inquiry which a spiritual aspirant undertakes will be an endless affair. The inquiry comes to an end as soon as Brahman is realized. So long as Brahman is not directly realized, the spiritual aspirant has to persist in his inquiry.

[29]

विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म तपसेति पुनः पुनः ।
ब्रुवञ्ज्ञापयतीहास्मांस्तपसैवात्मवीक्षणम् ॥

By repeatedly saying, "Seek to know Brahman well through *tapas*," (Varuṇa) makes us remember here that Self-realization can be attained only through *tapas*.

Whenever Bhr̥gu sought the help of Varuṇa for knowing Brahman, the latter told him: "Seek to know Brahman well through *tapas*." The repetition "*tapasā brahma vijijñāśasva*" is intended to convey that the Self can be known only through *tapas*.

[30]

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेवं स शनकैर्भृगुः ।
तपसैव परम्ब्रह्म विजज्ञौ प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥

Thus by *tapas* alone, i.e., by the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, Bhr̥gu gradually knew Brahman as the inward Self.

The method of investigation which Bhr̥gu adopted led him step by step from *anna*, i.e., the *Virāj*, to *prāṇa*, i.e., the *Hiraṇyagarbha* in His aspect of activity (*kriyā-śakti*), from *prāṇa* to *manas*, i.e., the *Hiraṇyagarbha* in His aspect of will (*icchā-śakti*), from *manas* to *vijñāna*, i.e., the *Hiraṇyagarbha* in His aspect of intelligence (*jñāna-śakti*), and from *vijñāna*, to *ānanda*, i.e., Brahman associated with *māyā*. Though he first thought of *anna*, *prāṇa*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* as Brahman, he had to revise his views as they did not satisfy the definition of Brahman. Finally, he thought of *ānanda*, i.e., Brahman associated with *māyā* as Brahman.

Verses (30) to (39) explain the sixth *anuvāka* of the *Upaniṣad*.

[31]

यस्मादेवमतः कार्यं संसारम्प्रजिहासुभिः ।
प्रत्यग्रह्मावबोधाय सदा निष्कल्मषं तपः ॥

Accordingly, those who desire to give up *samsāra* should always resort to the faultless *tapas* with a view to know Brahman as the inward Self.

What was possible for Bhṛgu is equally possible for others who are desirous of knowing Brahman.

[32]

व्युत्थायाख्यायिकारूपात्तन्निवृत्तमथाधुना ।
श्रुतिः स्वेनैव रूपेण व्याचष्टेऽर्थम्प्रयत्नतः ॥

Departing from the story, *śruti* now states carefully the accomplished result (of the inquiry) directly in its own words.

From *bhṛgurvai vāruṇīḥ* till *ānandena jātāni jīvanti, ānandam-prayant-yabhisamviśanti*, *śruti* narrated the story relating to Bhṛgu and Varuṇa. Giving up the story form, it now proceeds to state the purport of the story, the final result of the inquiry into Brahman.

[33]

भृगुणा विदिता यस्माद्भार्गवीयम्भवेदतः ।
वारुणी वरुणोक्तत्वाद्विद्या स्याद्ब्रह्मवेदनात् ॥

This (knowledge) is called *bhārgavi* since it was learnt by Bhṛgu, and *vāruṇī* since it was taught by Varuṇa. It is *vidyā*, because it makes known Brahman.

The meanings of the three words *bhūrgavī*, *vāruṇī*, and *vidyā*, which occur in the *śruti* text *saiṣā bhūrgavī vāruṇī vidyā*, are explained here.

[34]

युष्मदस्मद्विभागोऽयं यत्र व्यावर्ततेऽञ्जता ।
स आत्मा तत्परं व्योम तत्र विद्या प्रतिष्ठिता ॥

The supreme Space is the Self wherein all distinctions of “you” and “I” straight away disappear; therein this knowledge is firmly established.

It may appear that Bhṛgu’s inquiry has not taken him as far as the supreme Brahman which is neither cause nor effect, but only upto *ānanda*, i.e., Brahman associated with *māyā*, which is the cause of the universe. But strictly speaking his inquiry has culminated in the non-dual Brahman which is neither cause nor effect (*kārya-kāraṇa-vilakṣaṇa*). The word *vyoma* which occurs in the *śruti* text refers to the supreme Brahman which is non-dual. That is why it is said that the knowledge learnt by Bhṛgu and taught by Varuṇa is firmly established in the supreme Space, the non-dual Brahman.

[35]

आत्मता ब्रह्मणो यत्र आत्मनो ब्रह्मता तथा ।
अहम्ब्रह्मेत्यवाक्यार्थमेवं वाक्यात्प्रपद्यते ॥

Thus, the non-verbal knowledge wherein one sees Brahman as the Self and the Self as Brahman is obtained from the sentence, “I am Brahman.”

The knowledge of non-difference between Brahman and Ātman cannot be obtained through perception and other *pramāṇas*, but only through *śabda*. It is from inquiry into the *Vedānta* texts like *tat tvam asi*, etc., that we obtain the non-relational, unitary knowledge (*akhaṇḍārtha jñāna*) of Brahman.

[36]

अन्योऽपि भृगुवत्तप्त्वा तप ऐकाग्र-चलक्षणम् ।
कोशान्निरस्य पञ्चापि प्रतिष्ठां लभते पराम् ॥

Any one else, after having practised the one-pointed concentration like Bhṛgu and after having abandoned the five sheaths, can attain the supreme Support (Brahman).

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* text *ya evaṁ veda pratītiṣṭhati*.

[37]

ब्रह्म पुच्छम्प्रतिष्ठेति बल्लयोक्तम्पूर्वया तु यत् ।
तस्यामेव प्रतिष्ठायां विद्वान् सम्प्रतितिष्ठति ॥

The knower of Brahman is firmly established in that abode alone which has been spoken of by the earlier *Vallī* as "Brahman, the tail, which is the support."

In the *Bṛamavallī* there is the text *brahma puccham-pratiṣṭhā*, where-in Brahman is referred to as the tail which is the support. The idea is that the non-dual Brahman is the support of all duality which is superimposed on it due to ignorance. The same idea is brought out once again in the text *ya evaṁ veda pratītiṣṭhati*. The practice of *tapas* enables one to get established in Brahman.

[38]

अन्नाद्युपासकानां वा फलमेतदिहोच्यते ।
न्याय्यं नावाप्तकामानामन्नादिफलकीर्तनम् ॥

The fruit which accrues to those who meditate on food etc., (as Brahman) is spoken of here (to praise *Brahma-vidyā*).

It is not proper to speak of fruits such as food, etc., as accruing to those who have fulfilled their desires.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* texts *annavānannādo bhavati*, etc., which occur at the end of the sixth *anuvāka*.

According to Śaṅkara, *śruti* texts beginning with *annavānannādo bhavati* refer to the visible result (*dṛṣṭa-phala*) which accrues to one who has realized Brahman. Āṇaudagiri observes that it is quite reasonable to speak of the visible result accruing to one who has realized Brahman; for, though he is a *jīvanmukta*, he perceives the semblance of duality due to *avidyāleśa* which still persists (*etacca dṛṣṭa-phalam-brahma-vido jīvanmuktasyāpi avidyāleśa-vaśād-dvaitābhāsam-paśyato nānupapannam*). Even a person who has not realized Brahman possesses plenty of food through the grace of *Īśvara*. If so, what more need to be said in the case of a *jīvanmukta* who has become one with *Īśvara*.

But Sureśvara explains these texts in a different way. He maintains that *śruti* here speaks about the fruit which results from meditation on the conditioned Brahman (*saguṇa-vidyā-phalam*). This is referred to with a view to praise *Brahma-vidyā*. It is usual to mention the fruit which results from *saguṇa-vidyā* with a view to praise *nirguṇa-vidyā*. Sureśvara thinks that it is not proper to say that such fruits accrue to one who has realized Brahman, for the latter has all his desires fulfilled and has nothing else to attain.

[39]

भूयोऽन्नवान् दीप्तवह्निर्महांश्च स्यात्प्रजादिभिः ।
शान्तिदान्त्यादिहेतुस्त्विद्वद्ब्रह्मवर्चसमुच्यते ॥

He becomes one who possesses plenty of food and good digestion. He also becomes great through progeny, etc. By *brahmavarca*s is meant the spiritual lustre obtained through the control of the mind and the senses.

[40]

अन्नमेव गुरुर्न्याय्यमुत्तरज्ञानहेतुतः ।

अन्नं न निन्द्यःत्तोनादौ व्रतं स्यात्तदुपासितुः ॥

It is proper to say that food alone is the teacher, since it is the cause of subsequent knowledge. Accordingly, one shall not condemn food. This is the first vow of a contemplator.

Verses (40) and (41) deal with the seventh *anuvāka* of the *Bhṛguvallī*.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* texts *annaṁ na nindyāt, tadvratam*.

Food is the gateway to the knowledge of Brahman. It should, therefore, be regarded as *guru*, a teacher. A person who meditates on food as Brahman shall not deprecate it. The contemplator must take a vow not to deprecate food.

Sureśvara's interpretation of this *śruti* passage is different from that of Śaṅkara. According to the latter, the vow that is spoken of here is enjoined on him who knows Brahman. But according to Sureśvara, it is enjoined on one who meditates on food (*annopāsaka*).

[41]

अन्योन्यस्थितिहेतुत्वादन्नादत्वमुच्यते ।

शरीरप्राणयोरेवमुत्तरेष्वपि निर्णयः ॥

The body and the vital force are said to be food and the eater of food, since they mutually support each other. In this way, explanation must be given in respect of the subsequent entities also.

This verse explains the *śruti* texts *prāṇo vā annaṁ, śarīramannādam*.

Śruti speaks of the body and the vital force as both food and the eater of food. What dwells within something is food, and whatever holds something within is the eater. Since the vital force dwells in the body, it is food, and the body is the eater. In the same way, the body, too, is food, and the vital force is the eater, because the body is dependent on the vital force for its continuation. Just as a pillar within the house supports the house, even so the vital force, dwelling within the body, supports the body; and so the body is fixed on the vital force (*prāṇe śarīram-pratiṣṭhitam*). In the aspect of their being lodged in each other, they are food; and in the aspect of being the support of each other, they are eaters. In the same way, the relation between water and fire as well as earth and ether mentioned in the subsequent anuvākas has to be explained in terms of food and the eater of food.

[42]

प्राप्तं न परिचक्षीत त्वन्नं व्रतमिदम्भवेत् ।
अन्नं सुबहु कुर्वीत तथैवैहोत्तरं व्रतम् ॥

One shall not discard the food which is obtained. This is his vow. In the same way, in the sequel there is a vow that he shall make food plentiful.

This verse explains the eighth and the ninth anuvākas of the *Bhṛguvallī*.

It was stated earlier in verse (60) that the *śruti* texts *annam na nindyāt, tadvratam* refer to the vow enjoined on one who meditates on food as Brahman (*annopāsake*).

The first line of the verse refers to the vow mentioned in the *śruti* passage *annam na paricakṣīta, tadvratam*, which occurs at the beginning of the eighth anuvāka. It relates to one who meditates on the body and the vital force as the food and the eater of food.

The second line of the verse refers to the vow spoken of in the *śruti* texts *annam-bahu kurvīta, tadvratam*, which occur at the commence-

ment of the ninth *anuvāka*. This vow to make food plentiful is enjoined on one who meditates on water and fire as food and the eater of food.

[43]

वसत्यर्थं तथायातम्प्रत्याचक्षीत नैव तम् ।
वसते चान्नदानार्थं कुर्यादन्नं गृही बहु ॥

Likewise, he shall never turn away any one who has come for shelter. A householder shall make plenty of food for the sake of offering food to one who is given shelter.

The tenth and concluding *anuvāka* of the *Bhṛguvalli* is explained from this verse onwards

The *śruti* texts *na kañcana vasatau pratyācakṣīta, tadvratam* which occur at the commencement of the tenth *anuvāka* refer to the vow enjoined on one who meditates on earth and ether as food and the eater of food. His vow is that he shall not refuse shelter whomsoever approaches him seeking shelter.

If a person is given shelter, he must also be given food. For this purpose, the *upāsaka* who meditates on earth and ether as food and the eater of food shall collect plenty of food by every means — either by officiating as a priest in a sacrifice performed by others, or by teaching Scripture to others, or by receiving gifts. This is the idea of the *śruti* text: *tasmādyayā kayā ca vidhayā bahvannam-prāpnuyāt*.

[44]

एतद्वै मुखत इति सत्कारोक्तिस्त्रिधा भवेत् ।
वयोवस्था त्रिधा वा स्यादन्नदानविवक्षया ॥

The *śruti* texts *etadvai mukhataḥ*, etc. speak of kind treatment, with reference to offering food, as of three

kinds. Or, with reference to offering food, they speak of the period of life as of three kinds.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* texts beginning from *etadvai mukhato'nnam rāddham till antato'smā annam rādhyate*. These texts speak of the greatness of the gift of food. Hospitable treatment (*satkāra*) is of three kinds — best (*uttama*), moderate (*madhyama*), and low or inferior (*adhama*). A person may offer food to the guest with the greatest respect or with middling courtesy or with least respect. Considering the age factor of the person who offers food, we may refer to three periods of time — prime of life, middle age, and old age. In whatever manner and at whatever period of time a person offers food to a guest, in like manner and at the self-same period of time food accrues to him.

[45]

राद्धं सिद्धम्भवेदन्नम्पात्रेभ्यो यस्य तस्य तु ।
यथासत्कारवयसी अन्नदानफलम्भवेत् ॥

In whatever manner and at whatever period of time food is prepared for the guests, the fruit of the gift will accrue (to the donor likewise).

[46]

गृहिणो ह्यन्नवन्तोऽपि यत आचक्षते सदा ।
अराधि सिद्धमेवान्नमतिथ्यर्थं न संशयः ॥
यत एवमतः कार्यं बहुन्नं यत्नतः सदा ॥

Inasmuch as the householders, possessing food, declare, indeed, that food is always ready for the guest, one should, accordingly, always collect plenty of food with effort. There is no doubt about this.

[47 - 48]

अपि चान्नस्य माहात्म्यमिदमन्यद्यथावयः ॥

यथाश्रद्धं यथाकालं यथासत्कारमेव च ।

अन्नं ददद्वाप्नोति तत्तथैव न संशयः ॥

This, again, is the greatness of food — at whatever period of life, with whatever faith, at whatever time, and with whatever kind treatment it is offered, it, no doubt, reaches the person who offers it likewise.

A person shall acquire plenty of food for offering it to others. It is said that the food that is earned is best given when given at the best of places (e.g., a sacred place), at the best of times (e.g., a new moon day), to the best person (e.g., one who has studied the Vedas and follows their teachings), in the best way (with the greatest veneration and faith), etc. All these are important in respect of offering food to others. As and when he gives, so he gets back. The *Gītā* description (XVII, 20) of sāt̥tvic gift is relevant in this context. It says: "That gift which is given — knowing it to be a duty to give — to one who does no service, in place, and in time, and to a worthy person, — that gift is held to be sāt̥tvic."

[49]

उपात्तरक्षणं क्षेमो ब्रह्मैतद्वाचि संश्रितम् ।

क्षेमहेतुर्यतो वाक्यं तदुपासीत वाच्यतः ॥

Kṣema is preservation of what has been acquired. Brahman exists in speech (in the form of preservation). Since speech is the cause of preservation, one should meditate upon Brahman as existing in speech (in the form of preservation).

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* text *kṣema iti vāci*. *Śruti* here teaches the process of meditation on Brahman.

[50]

अत्राप्तप्रापणं योगः क्षेमश्चोभयरूपभृत् ।
प्राणापानाश्रयम्ब्रह्म तदुपासीत तौ ह्यतः ॥

Yoga is acquisition of what has not been already acquired. And, *kṣema* (is preservation). Brahman exists in *prāṇa* and *apāna* in the two forms (of acquisition and preservation). So one should meditate on the two (*prāṇa* and *apāna*) as Brahman.

The *śruti* text *yogakṣema iti prāṇāpānayoḥ* is explained in this verse.

[51]

योगक्षेमात्मकम्ब्रह्म प्राणापानसनाश्रयम् ।
कर्मेति हस्तयोस्तद्वदुपासीताप्रमादवान् ॥

Brahman in the form of acquisition and preservation exists in *prāṇa* and *apāna*. Similarly, one who is free from carelessness should meditate on Brahman as existing in the hands in the form of action.

Why is it that Brahman is spoken of as existing in *prāṇa* and *apāna*? The first line of the verse gives the answer. A person can preserve what he has acquired and acquire what has not been already acquired only so long as *prāṇa* and *apāna* function vigorously. The same explanation holds good in other cases mentioned in the sequel.

[52]

तथा गतिरिति ध्येयम्पादयोर्ब्रह्म सर्वदा ।
विमुक्तिरिति पायौ च समाज्ञा मानुषीः स्मृताः ॥

In the same way, Brahman should always be meditated upon as existing in the feet in the form of motion and in the anus in the form of excretion. These are said

to be meditations pertaining to men (i.e., with reference to the human body).

This verse explains the other meditations on Brahman with reference to the human body as stated in the *śruti* texts *gatiriti pūdayoh*, *vimuktiriti pāyau*.

[53]

मनुष्यविषया यस्मादाज्ञा विष्णोरियं ततः ।
समाज्ञा मानुषीस्त्वेवं सदैवाचक्षते बुधाः ॥

Since these are the meditations on *Viṣṇu* (Brahman) relating to man, the wise always call them *mānuṣīḥ samājñāh*.

[54]

अथ दैवीः समाज्ञास्तु उपासीत यथाक्रमम् ।
वृष्टौ तृप्तिरिति ध्येयं तृप्तेर्वृष्टिसमन्वयात् ॥

Then, there are meditations (on Brahman) relating to gods. One should meditate (on Brahman) in the same order. Brahman should be meditated upon as satisfaction in the rain, since satisfaction is dependent on the rain.

After explaining meditations on Brahman as identified with the parts of the human body, *śruti* proceeds to give an account of meditations on Brahman as identified with the body of the cosmic being. This verse explains the *śruti* texts *atha daivīḥ, tṛptiriti vṛṣṭau*. Since rain brings about contentment by producing food, etc., Brahman should be meditated upon as existing in the rain in the form of satisfaction.

[55]

तेन तेनात्मना तद्वदुत्तरेष्वपि चिन्तयेत् ।
ब्रह्मोपस्थ उपासीत प्रजात्यादिगुणात्मकम् ॥

Similarly, in the case of other things mentioned in the sequel, Brahman should be meditated upon as existing in those forms. One should meditate on Brahman as existing in the generative organ in the form of procreation, etc.

After stating that Brahman should be meditated upon as energy in lightning, as fame in cattle, as light in the stars, *śruti* says that one should meditate on Brahman as existing in the generative organ in the form of procreation, immortality, and happiness, because one attains happiness, etc., through the generative organ.

[56]

प्रजातिः पुत्रपौत्रादिस्मृतत्वं ततः पितुः ।
आनन्दः पुरुषार्थोऽत्र सोऽप्युपस्थाश्रयो भवेत् ॥

Procreation, etc., i.e., son, grandson, etc., immortality which a father attains through them, and the pleasure, too, which is desired by man — all these are dependent on the generative organ.

This verse explains the meanings of the words contained in the *śruti* text *prajātiramṛtamānanda ityupasthe*.

The race is perpetuated through procreation. A person pays off his debt to his ancestors through his progeny, and this enables him through purification to attain the saving knowledge which leads to liberation, which is immortality (*putramukhena ṛṇāpākaraṇapūrvakam jñānena sampādīto mokṣo'trāmṛtatvamityucyate*). *Ānanda* here refers to sexual enjoyment.

When *śruti* speaks about the various parts of the body including the generative organ and the different functions such as speech, respiration, movement, alimentation, and procreation, it is with a view to stress on the spiritual aspirant the significance of the human body as a symbol for sublime thought on Brahman.

[57]

आकाशे सर्वमित्येवम्ब्रह्मोपास्यं समाहितैः ।
सर्वाश्रयं तदाकाश उपासीनस्य शिष्यते ॥

Brahman should be meditated upon as everything in ether by those who have controlled the mind. To him who meditates on the ether, which is the substratum for all things, as Brahman, (the fruit, viz., becoming the Self of all) takes place.

This verse explains the *śruti* text *sarvamityākāśe*. The whole universe comprising material things exists in ether. If one meditates that everything in ether is Brahman and that ether, too, is Brahman, one becomes all-pervasive.

[58]

तत्प्रतिष्ठेत्युपासीत प्रतिष्ठावानसौ भवेत् ।
उपासनानुरूपं स्यात् फलं यादृगिदं तथा ॥

One should meditate on that (Brahman) as the support; one becomes (thereby) well-supported. In the manner the meditation is practised, so the fruit will accrue.

The *śruti* texts *tatpratiṣṭhetyupāsīta*, *pratiṣṭhāvan bhavati* are explained in this verse. In this meditation and also in the subsequent ones, the fruit will accrue in accordance with the nature of the *upāsant* one practises. As a person meditates on Brahman, so he becomes.

[59]

तद्ब्रह्म मह इत्येवमुपासीत ततः फलम् ।
प्रजादिभिर्महान् स स्यात्तं यथेति श्रुतिस्तथा ॥

One should meditate on Brahman as great, thereby one becomes great through progeny, etc., as stated in the *śruti* text *tanm yathā*.

This verse explains the *śruti* text *tanmaha ityupāsīta*. The *śruti* text cited in the second line of the verse is from of the *Mudgala Upaniṣad*, III, 3. It says: "in whatever form one meditates on Him, one becomes that very thing" (*tanm yathā yathopāsate tadeva bhavati*).

[60]

तन्मन इत्युपासीत मनस्वी भानवान् भवेत् ।
प्रह्वीभावो नमोर्थः स्यात् फलं तस्येदमुच्यते ॥
नम्यन्तेऽस्य यथाकामं विषया भोगकारिणः ॥

One should meditate on Brahman as thinking; (thereby) one becomes *mānavān*, i.e., one capable of thinking. *Namaḥ* means bowing down. The fruit which accrues to him (who meditates on Brahman as possessed of suppleness) is stated (here). All objects which cause enjoyment bow down to him according to his desires.

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* text *tanmana ityupāsīta mānavān bhavati, tannama ityupāsīta, namyante'smai kāmāḥ*.

The word *manaḥ* means *mananam*. *Mānavān bhavati* means *manana-samartho bhavati*.

[61 - 62]

यस्तु ब्रह्मेति तद्ब्रह्म ह्युपासीत यथोदितम् ॥
फलं तस्य तदेव स्यादिति पूर्वमत्रादिषम् ।
ब्रह्मणो ब्राह्मणस्यैव परिमरम्ब्रह्म तत्तादा ॥

It has been stated earlier that to him who meditates on Brahman as the supreme, as described, the same fruit

(viz., supremacy) will accrue. That (ether which is non-different from Brahman) is Brahman's destructive agent.

These two verses explain *śruti* texts *tadbrahmetyupāsita, brah-mavān bhavati, tadbrahmaṇaḥ parimara ityupāsita*.

It was stated earlier that, if one meditates on Brahman as great, one becomes great through progeny. Now another meditation on Brahman is stated. If one meditates on Brahman, which is identified with ether, as the supreme, one attains supremacy through knowledge.

The last line of verse (62) says that ether is the destructive agent of Brahman. This will be explained in the next verse.

[63]

विद्युद्वृष्टिः शशी भानुरग्निश्चेति यतः श्रुतिः ।
वायौ म्रियन्त इत्याह परिमरस्तेन कीर्त्यते ॥

Since *śruti* says that (the five gods, viz.,) Lightning, Rain, Moon, Sun, and Fire die in Air, thereby Air is said to be their destructive medium.

Reference is made in this verse to the *saṁvargaśruti* of the *Chāndogya* (IV, iii, 1-2). With a view to explain how ether (*ākāśa*) is the medium of destruction, it is first of all shown that the five gods, viz., lightning, etc., meet their end, i.e., get absorbed, in *vāyu* at the time of dissolution. This is brought out in the *Chāndogya* (IV, iii, 1-2) as follows: "Air, verily, is the end of all; for when fire goes out, it goes into the air. When the sun sets, it goes into the air, and when the moon sets, it goes into the air. When water dries up, it goes into the air. For air, indeed absorbs them all. This, with regard to the divinities."

[64]

अनन्यश्चायमाकाशो वायुना ब्रह्मणा च खम् ।
द्विषन्तश्चाद्विषन्तश्च म्रियन्ते तस्य शत्रवः ॥

Ether is not different from air. And also, ether is non-different from Brahman. His enemies who hate him and also those (whom he hates, but) who do not hate him die.

After stating how *vāyu* is the end of all divinities, it is now explained how *ākāśa* is the end of all. Ether and air are related as cause and effect. As cause, ether constitutes the nature of air, and so is not different from it. Since ether is the effect of Brahman, it is non-different from it. So *ākāśa* is viewed as the destructive medium of Brahman, as that in which everything gets dissolved.

The second line of the verse states the fruit that accrues to one who meditates on Brahman which has ether as its destructive agent.

[65]

प्राणो वा अन्नमित्यादिवियदन्तस्य पूर्वया ।
अन्नान्नादत्वं श्रुत्योक्तं कार्यत्वात् संहतस्य हि ॥
अन्नान्नादत्वमस्यैव कथं नाम प्रतीयते ॥

Beginning with the text *prāṇo vā annam* and ending with *ākāśo'nnādaḥ*, food and the eater of food have been spoken of earlier by *śruti* with a view to show that the relation of food and the eater of food belongs to the aggregate alone, since the body which is, indeed, an aggregate is an effect.

The text *prāṇo vā annam* occurs in the seventh *anuvāka*, and the text *ākāśo'nnādaḥ* in the ninth *anuvāka*. These texts intend to show that the created things such as ether, etc., can be explained in terms of food and the eater of food.

[66 - 67]

मा भूद्ब्रह्मणि तत्सक्तिर्मनोवाचामगोचरे ॥

अविद्याविषयस्तस्माद्भोक्तृभोज्यादिलक्षणः ।

व्यवहारोऽवसेयः स्यान्न तु सत्यादिलक्षणे ॥

This relation (of food and the eater of food) cannot be applied to Brahman which cannot be comprehended by mind and speech. Therefore, the relation of the enjoyer and the enjoyed, etc., which we speak of must be accepted as belonging to the realm of *avidyā*. It is not in Brahman which is real, etc., by nature.

The relation of enjoyer and the enjoyed holds good only among the created things which belong to the sphere of *avidyā*. It cannot take place in Brahman-Ātman.

[68]

अविद्योत्थं द्रव्याभासम्भोज्यभोक्तृत्वलक्षणम् ।

यत्र हि द्वैतमित्याद्या श्रुतिर्नः प्रत्यपीपदत् ॥

Śruti texts like "Where there is duality (*as it were*)" etc., have conveyed to us that the semblance of duality in the form of enjoyment and enjoyership is caused by *avidyā*.

The *śruti* text quoted in the second line of the verse is from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II, iv, 14.

[69]

यत्र त्वस्येति विध्वस्तसर्वाविद्यादिलक्षणे ।
निषेधति सदाविद्याध्यस्तं द्वैतमिहात्मनि ॥

The *śruti* text "Where, verily, everything has become the Self" always denies duality, set up by *avidyā*, in the Self which is free from the entire *avidyā*, etc.

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (II, iv, 14) quoted in the first line of the verse clearly shows that one cannot think of any duality in the Self in the absence of *avidyā*. It says: "Where, verily, everything has become the Self, then by what and whom should one smell, then by what and whom should one see, then by what and whom should one hear...?"

[70]

एकत्वाच्च न संसारः क्रियाकारकलक्षणः ।
कुतस्तदिति चेत्तत्र स यश्चायमितीर्यते ॥

Also, since the Self is one with Brahman, bondage in the form of action and instruments of action does not exist in the Self. If it be asked "How?" it is said (by way of answer) to that *sa yaścāyam*.

The Self by its very nature is identical with Brahman. Brahman-Ātman is one and non-dual. It is free from difference of all kinds — *sajātīya-*, *vijātīya-*, and *svagata-bheda*. If the Self appears to be involved in action, it is due to *avidyā*.

The *śruti* texts "And this one who is in the man, and that one who is in the sun, He is one" (*sa yaścāyam-puruṣe*, *yaścāsāvāḍitye*, *sa ekaḥ*) stress the non-difference of Brahman and Ātman. These *śruti* texts

which are cited in this verse as occurring in the tenth *anuvāka* of the *Bhṛguvalli* also occur with only a slight difference in the eighth *anuvāka* of the *Brahmavalli*. See verses (528) to (537) of the *Brahmavalli* for the explanation of these texts.

[71]

सह ब्रह्मणेति यच्चोक्तं निर्णयस्तस्य साम्प्रतम् ।
 कथं नु सकलान् कामानश्नुते युगपद्बुधः ।
 प्रतिपत्तयेऽस्यार्थस्य श्रुतिः प्रवृत्ते परा ॥

Now, the ascertainment of the meaning of what was said in the *śruti* text *saha brahmaṇā*. With a view to explain how the wise man enjoys all his desires at the same time, the subsequent *śruti* begins.

In the first *anuvāka* of the *Brahmavalli* there occurs the passage: *so'śnute sarvān kāmān saha brahmāṇā vipaściteti*. It says that the knower of Brahman, having become Brahman, enjoys as Brahman all the desirable things simultaneously. This passage has already been explained briefly in verses (116) to (126) of the *Brahmavalli*. The remaining part of the tenth *anuvāka* of the *Bhṛguvalli* beginning from *sa ya evamvit* till the end is a further explanation of this passage, for it provides answer to such questions as: "What are those desires of the knower of Brahman?" "What are the objects which they refer to?" "How does he attain them all together as Brahman?" etc.

[72]

न सहार्थे तृतीयेयं न्यायोऽत्र प्राक्समीरितः ।
 यतोऽतोऽत्र तृतीयेयं ग्राह्येत्थम्भूतलक्षणा ॥

The instrumental case termination (added to the word *brahman*) is not used to convey the sense of "with." Inas-

much as the reason for this has been explained earlier, here the instrumental case must be understood in the sense of "remaining as."

[73]

हेत्वर्था वा भवेदेषा तृतीयः ब्रह्मणेति या ।
सर्वकामाशनं यस्माद्ब्रह्मणैवोपपद्यते ॥

Or, the instrumental case termination contained in the word *brahmaṇā* is used in the sense of cause, because his enjoyment of all desires is tenable only by his having become Brahman.

This verse states that the instrumental case may also be used to convey *hetvartha*. Everything is Brahman. The knower of Brahman, by virtue of his having become Brahman, which is the cause of everything, enjoys all desires (*sarvasya brahmamātratvād-brahmāṇā hetunā brahmavidah sarvakāmāśanamupapannam*),

[74]

निरात्मकस्य सर्वस्य ब्रह्मात्मा येन तत्परम् ।
सत्यज्ञानादिरूपत्वात्तदेतदधुनोच्यते ॥

Brahman is the Self or the essence of the entire universe which has no being of its own. Since Brahman is of the nature of existence, knowledge, etc., the entire universe has Brahman as its essence. It is this which is now explained.

This verse establishes how everything is Brahman. An illusory object has no being or nature of its own apart from the substratum on which it is superimposed (*kalpītasya adhiṣṭhānameva svarūpam*). Brahman is real, knowledge, and infinite, and everything other than Brahman is

illusory. The entire universe, being illusory, has no being of its own apart from Brahman, the substratum. The latter is, therefore, said to be the Self or essence of the entire universe.

[75]

स यश्चायमिति ह्युक्तिरन्नान्नादादिकस्य हि ।

ग्रन्थस्य ग्रसनार्थाय ब्रह्मविद्यापरस्य तु ॥

It is with a view to show that the things of the universe, which are related as food and the eater of food, are, indeed, sublated (by knowledge) that this part of the *Upa-niṣad* beginning from *sa yaścāyam*, etc., whose import is in Brahman-knowledge, has been stated.

This verse explains the purport of the concluding part of the tenth *anuvāka* beginning from *sa yaścāyam-puruṣe*, etc. The central idea conveyed here is that the world of diversity set up by *avidyā* is sublated by knowledge and that non-duality is real (*jñānabādhyaṁ dvaitaṁ, advaitaṁ-pāramārthikam*).

The word *grasanam* which occurs in the second line of the verse means eating or swallowing. Here it is used in the sense of *jñānabalena bādhanam*.

[76]

सङ्क्रम्य विद्यया सर्वानविद्योत्थाननात्मनः ।

आत्मनात्मानमापन्नः सत्यादृश्यादिलक्षणम् ॥

By realizing, through knowledge, the (unreality of the) entire not-Self set up by *avidyā*, the knower of Brahman attains the Self, which is real, invisible, etc., by himself.

The substance of the *śruti* passage beginning from *sa ya evamvit, asmāṁlokaṭ pretya, etamannamayamātmānam-upśaṅkramya till etamānanda-*

mayamātmānam-upasāṅkramya is stated in this verse. See verses (589) to (592) of the *Brahmavallī* for meaning of *sāṅkramaṇa*.

[77]

उत्कृष्टीतरहीनः सन्निर्माँल्लोकान्क्रियोद्भवान् ।

कामाक्षी कामरूपी सन्नुपाधीननुसञ्चरन् ॥

Being devoid of superior and inferior forms, getting the food according to his wish and assuming the forms according to his wish, the knower of Brahman remains (one with Brahman) traversing these worlds which are upādhis created by acts.

The *śruti* text *imān lokān kāmānnī kāmārūpyanusañcaran* is explained in this verse.

A person who has realized Brahman experiences everything in the world as his own Self. Such a person is truly liberated. We speak of him as a *jīvanmukta*, since we see him tenanting the body as before. Having become Brahman, and being free from the threefold *guṇa* (*nīstraiguṇya*), the knower of Brahman who has "attained" liberation sees the world-show without in any way being deceived by it or getting himself involved in it. At the onset of Brahman-knowledge, *avidyā* ceases to exist, and so the pluralistic universe, too, which is a product of *avidyā*, full of snares and sorrows, ceases to exist. Though the world along with its cause has been negated, to the *jīvanmukta* there is the semblance of the world-show persisting for sometime due to *saṁskāra* (*bādhitānuvṛtyā pratibhāsamānān-upādhīn anusañcarannāsta iti*).

[78]

न हि सञ्चरणं साक्षाद्ब्रह्मणोऽस्त्यविकारिणः ।

अस्ति हि ध्यायतीवेति तथा च श्रुतिशासनम् ॥

No traversing in the literal sense is, indeed, possible in the case of Brahman which is immutable. Accordingly, there is, indeed, the *śruti* declaration, "It thinks *as it were*."

Since the knower of Brahman remains as Brahman, which is all-pervasive and immutable, traversing in the literal sense will not hold good in his case. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text (IV, iii, 7) which says, "It thinks *as it were*, it moves *as it were*," is quoted in the second line of the verse in support of this view.

[79]

सर्वात्मत्वादिमाल्लोकान् पश्यन्नात्मतया बुधः ।
एतद्ब्रह्म समं साम गायन्नास्ते कृतार्थतः ॥

The wise man, seeing all these worlds as the Self since he is himself the all, and having the satisfaction that he has achieved everything, remains singing about Brahman which is *sāma*, i.e., equal (non-different from everything).

This verse explains the *śruti* text *etat sāma gāyannāste*. Brahman is called *sāma*, i.e., equal, because it is all, because everything is non-different from it (*samatoūd-brahmaiva sāma, sarvānanyarūṣam*). The "traversing" of the liberated man through the worlds must be understood in the sense of "seeing" or experiencing all the things of the universe in accordance with the principle *gatyarthā buddhyarthā*. Here *anusañcaram* means *anubhavamātram*.

[80]

द्वेधा भिन्नमिदं सर्वमन्नमन्नाद एव च ।
सत्यादृश्यादिरूपात्मा अहमेवैतदीक्ष्यताम् ॥

This entire (world) is divided twofold as food and the eater of food. (The wise man says:) "Let it be understood

that I, who am the Self, which is real, imperceptible, etc. am myself this world (in the twofold form)."

This verse explains the *śruti* texts *ahamannam ahamannādaḥ*

[81]

तयोः श्लोकश्च सन्ध्वो भोज्यभोक्तृत्वलक्षणः ।
अहमेव यथोक्तात्मा न मत्तोऽन्यस्ततोऽस्ति हि ॥

"I myself, of the nature described above, am the connection between the enjoyed and the enjoyer. There exists, indeed, nothing else except myself."

The *śruti* text *aham ślokaḥ* is explained in this verse.

[82]

क्रियाकारकनिर्मुक्तस्पर्शयन्नात्मानमात्मनि ।
त्रिरहो इति भवेत् स्तोभो विस्मयार्थश्च स स्मृतः ॥

(The knower of Brahman remains) seeing in himself the Self which is free from action and the instruments of action. The injerjectional sound *hā-vu* is uttered three times in the sense of *aho*. It is well-known that the latter conveys the sense of wonder.

Who is the person that experiences everything as his own Self? The answer is *vidvān*, the knower of Brahman, who has realized Brahman as identical with his own Self, which is free from action and the instruments of action. The person who has realized Brahman-Ātman proclaims to the spiritual aspirants the greatest wonder that has taken place as a result of the attainment of Brahman-knowledge. Earlier, on account of ignorance, he identified himself with his body, the senses, and the mind, which are not-Self. Now as a result of the saving knowledge which he has attained through the grace of his

teacher and Scripture, he has become Brahman, which is all; and with a view to give expression to the greatest wonder that has taken place, he sings the song (*sāma*) of oneness (*satatva*), with a threefold repetition of *hū-vu*.

[83]

त्रिरुक्तिश्चादरार्थेयमहमन्नमितीष्यते ।
अश्रद्धानलोकस्य प्रतिपत्त्यर्थमुच्यते ॥

The repetition of "I am food," etc., three times is intended for the sake of conveying regard (for knowledge). It is uttered (thrice) with a view to create confidence in the minds of those people who lack it.

This verse states the purport of the threefold repetition of "I am food" (*ahamannam*) by the knower of Brahman.

The same explanation holds good in the case of *ahamannādaḥ* and *aham ślokaḥ*, which are also repeated thrice as *ahamannam*. As in the case of swearing, the threefold repetition is meant to inspire confidence among the spiritual aspirants.

[84]

मूर्तामूर्तात्मकस्यास्य ह्यन्नान्नादत्वरूपिणः ।
अतद्वानग्रजोऽहं वै न तदश्नाति हि श्रुतिः ॥

"I am the First-born (*Hiranyagarbha*) of this universe which consists of objects with form and without form and which are related as food and the eater of food, even though I am different from it." *Śruti*, indeed, says, "It eats nothing whatever."

This verse explains the meaning of the *śruti* text *ahamasmi prathamajā ṛtāsyā*. This is also the utterance of the knower of Brahman.

The *śruti* text quoted in the second line of the verse is from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (III, viii, 8).

[85]

देवेभ्यः पूर्वमेवाहं नाभिरमृतस्य च ।
कारणत्वाद्देवेन्नाभिर्मन्त्रिष्ठा वामृतात्मता ॥

“I am even earlier than gods. Also, I am the navel (middle part) of immortality. I am the navel, because I am the cause (of immortality), or because liberation is dependent on me.”

This verse explains the *śruti* text *pūrvam devebhyo amṛtasya nābhāyī*, which, like the earlier texts, expresses what the knower of Brahman conveys in great amazement.

It was stated in the previous verse that the knower of Brahman as Brahman, existed even prior to the world constituted by the five elements (*ṛtasya bhūtapañcakasya prathamajah*). It is now mentioned that the knower of Brahman, as Brahman, existed even prior to Indra and other gods (*devebhyoḥ pūrvam*). The two words *ṛtam* (*bhūtapañcakam*) and *deva* (*jīva*) contained in the *Upaniṣad* are significant. The former refers to the *upādhi* which serves to limit *as it were* the pure Brahman-consciousness, while the latter refers to the *jīvas*. The idea intended to be conveyed here is that Brahman-Ātman is prior to the manifestation of *jīvas* and the world.

The second line of the verse explains how Brahman-Ātman is the navel of immortality. The word *amṛta* may be understood in two senses — in the sense of immortal and also in the sense of liberation. Taking the word in the first sense, it is said that Brahman-Ātman is the cause, the support, of immortality. In the latter sense, liberation constitutes the essential nature of Brahman; and the *jīva* attains liberation by realizing its inward Self to be none other than Brahman.

[86]

अदत्त्वान्नं तु पात्रेभ्यो यो मामश्नाति घस्सरः ।
अहमन्नमदन्तं तम्प्रत्यग्मीहान्नवन्नरम् ॥

“I, who am food, eat up here like food that man who being a glutton eats me without giving food to those who seek it.”

This verse explains the *śruti* text *ahamannam-annamadantamādmī*.

[87]

यो मां ददाति पात्रेभ्यो देशकालसमन्वितम् ।
दददित्थमसावन्नं मामवत्येव सर्वदा ॥

“He who offers me at the proper place and time to those who seek it always protects me, indeed, in this form (as food).”

The *śruti* text *yo mā dadāti sa ideva mā āvāh* is explained in this verse.

[88]

सत्यज्ञानादिरूपोऽहमविद्योत्थमशेषतः ।
अहं ह्यभिभवाम्येको दिनकृच्छारं यथा ॥

“I am (the inward Self identical with Brahman) which is real, knowledge, etc. I myself remove, without remainder, everything caused by *avidyā* in the same way as the sun removes the darkness (of the night).”

Since the *śruti* texts *yo mā dadāti*, etc., speak of Brahman in the form of food, it may be thought that Brahman is *saviteṣa* and *sapra-*

pañca. The subsequent *śruti* text *aham viśvam bhuvanamabhyabhavām*, which is now taken up for explanation, is intended to show that Brahman is free from attribute (*nirviśeṣa*) and is trans-phenomenal (*niṣprapañca*). The knower of Brahman remains as Brahman by transcending, through knowledge, the things of the world which are related as food and the eater of food. The phenomenal world, in which alone the relation of the enjoyer and the enjoyed holds good, is not real. The *Upaniṣad* speaks of the relation of food and the eater of food with a view to teach that the phenomenal world involving such a relation is supported by, and has no being of its own apart from, Brahman, the non-dual reality. When the knower of Brahman realizes, through the saving knowledge obtained from the Upaniṣadic texts, that his inward Self is no other than Brahman, *avidyā* along with its effects disappears in the same way as darkness of the night disappears at sun rise. The knowledge imparted by the Upaniṣadic texts is competent by itself to remove ignorance and its effects without requiring assistance from any other source.

[89]

ध्यानैकताननिबिडाहितचेतसोऽज-

म्प्रध्वस्तकृत्स्ननिजमोहसमस्तदोषम् ।

प्रत्यक्तया शुभधियो यतयोऽभ्युपेत्य

यं देवमेकमलम्प्रविशन्ति सोऽव्यात् ॥

May the supreme Brahman, which is beginningless, which is free from *avidyā* and all its evil consequences superimposed on it, which is self-luminous, one, and pure, which the sannyāsins, with minds which are pure and are engrossed in the continuous, uninterrupted contemplation (of Brahman), attain knowing it as the inward Self — may that supreme Brahman protect all.

By way of concluding his verse commentary on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya*, Sureśvara sums up the central teaching of the *Brahmavallī* and the *Bhr̥guvallī*, and invokes the blessing of the supreme Brahman for all.

Brahman is one and non-dual, self-luminous and ever-free. It is non-different from Ātman. This Brahman-Ātman can be attained only by knowledge. Brahman-knowledge can be attained only by the sannyāsins whose minds are pure, who are detached and have renounced all actions, who have controlled the mind and the senses, and who resort to the *Vedānta* with an intense desire for liberation.

[90 - 91]

तैत्तिरीयकसारस्य वार्तिकामृतमुत्तमम् ।

मस्करीन्द्रप्रणीतस्य भाष्यस्यैतद्विवेचनम् ॥

सुमुक्षुसार्थवाहस्य भवनामभृतो यतेः ।

शिष्यश्चकार तद्भक्त्या सुरेशाख्यो महार्थवित् ॥

This nectar of the *Vārtika*, the best discriminative study of the *Bhāṣya* on the *Upaniṣad*, which is the essence of the *Taittirīyaka-śākhā*, composed by the foremost among the sannyāsins, was written by Sureśvara, the knower of the great truth, disciple of the sannyāsin who bears the name of Śiva, and who is the leader of the group of the spiritual aspirants, as a mark of devotion to him.

Here ends Sureśvara's *Vārtika* on Śrī Saṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*. Sureśvara has written this verse commentary as a mark of devotion to his teacher, Śrī Saṅkara.